THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY was highly uncertain of the effects of the drug at the time national marihuana prohibition was achieved. This ambiguity was never perceived as an impediment to criminalisation; yet it was never readily acknowledged either to the public or to the lawmakers. No group which opposed the law and might have insisted on facts rather than speculation had access to public opinion.

The narcotics bureaucracy was well aware that the state of knowledge about marihuana in 1937 contrasted sharply with scien-tific understanding about opiates in 1914 and alcohol in 1919 when similar national action had been taken. The FBN was eager to dispel this uncertainty, both to facilitate enforcement and to pre-clude subsequent criticism. Six months after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, the consulting chemist of the Treasury Department detailed gaps in scientific knowledge and encouraged Anslinger to commission research. Emphasizing "that virtually nothing is known concerning the nature of the narcotic principle, its physiological behavior, and the ultimate effect upon the social group,"1 Dr. Herbert Wollner contrasted the present situation with that prevailing at the time the Harrison Act was passed. In 1914, he pointed out, the scientific community understood how the opi-ates worked and what their effects were on humans. The behavior of addicts, the physical addiction produced by continued use, and the psychochemical character of the drugs were all sufficiently well understood to permit regulation and administrative control "with clarity and understanding." With marihuana, he observed, lack of understanding as to the nature of the active principle of the drug and consequently the impact of the drug on the physiology and psychology of its users made sensible regulation impossible.2

Several months later Wollner convinced Anslinger that it would be desirable for experts "to collate their results (in scientific in-vestigations) and observe the direction of parallel investigations conducted by other investigators in related fields."3 A Marihuana Conference was convened on 5 December 1938 in Washington to analyze the need for research on "questions relating to the agri-cultural, chemical, pharmacological, sociological, economic and industrial phases of the problem."4 The minutes of the conference record the presence of several acknowledged American experts on cannabis. Yet, the discussion continuously reflected the fact that uncertainty about the active principle and the inability to standard-ize doses for research precluded understanding and permitted only conjecture. For example, Wollner stated:

The situation is as bad in the chemical literature as it is in all of the other phases.

I should certainly be within the reasonable bounds of correct-ness when I guess that ninety per cent of the stuff that has been written on the chemical end of Cannabis is absolutely wrong, and, of the other ten per cent, at least two-thirds of it is of no consequence. . .

I think if all the research work done so far were dumped together by a group of chemists, or if they started out today on this investigation, that they would be exactly the same as they are now inside of six months; that is, all of the information which we have which is very little, could be accumulated in six months.3

Each professional group at the conference summed up what little was suspected by investigators in their fields about the effects of marihuana. There was only one significant substantive interchange among the participants, a strong disagreement between Anslinger and Dr. Walter Bromberg, senior psychiatrist at Bellevue Hospital in New York, on the relation between marihuana and crime. Draw-ing on his study of marihuana users in the New York courts (which would be published the following year), Bromberg concluded that "the extravagant claims of defense attorneys and the press, that crime is caused by Marihuana addiction, demand careful scrutiny."6 This assertion was challenged immediately by the commissioner. He repeated many of the incidents allegedly relating marihuana to crime that he had culled from the files of the bureau. In response Bromberg called for "a Commission (to) be appointed to examine the matter scientifically...."7 Anslinger quickly changed the subject.

So far as we can tell, the interest in research generated by this conference soon dissipated. The chemists and pharmacologists quietly continued to search for the active principle, but the bureau's interest was limited to agricultural questions which touched en-forcement of the law: eradication, and the development of an inactive strain of hemp. Anslinger viewed all new studies of the effects of the drug on man as potential threats. He preferred to rest on the prevailing ignorance. Neither the Public Health Service nor the bureau sponsored any concentrated research. During the ensuing decade private investigators engaged in ad hoc research with the bureau serving as an informal storehouse. As a result the law enforcement agency became the public's arbiter of scientific arguments and debates, functioning as a filter through which scientific research had to pass on its way to the public. Inevitably, the bureau promoted public attention for those scientific studies which sup-ported the law enforcement stance and either ignored or, as in the case of the La Guardia Report of 1944, openly attacked those with which it did not agree.

A variety of technical articles, studies, and books on marihuana were published from 1938 to 1950.8 Most had significant method-olIDgical defects, which recent commentators have identified, but their existence, not their validity, is of interest here. Although a complete review is beyond the scope of this book, let us now examine the general thrust of the most widely circulated literature, as well as the official response, pertaining to the three theses upon which policy makers had relied during the criminalisation period: addiction, insanity, and crime.

Addiction

Despite the general consensus within the American scientific community in the 1930s that marihuana users did not evidence the tolerance and withdrawal symptoms characteristic of physical addiction, Commissioner Anslinger harbored his own doubts at least into the forties. At the 1937 hearings the following was characteristic:

Senator BROWN. I want to bring out one fact that you have not touched upon yet. As I understand it, marihuana is not a habit-producing drug, at least to the same extent that opium is, for instance. It is somewhat easier to break the habit in the case of marihuana than it is in the case of opium smoking?

Mr. ANSLINGER. Yes, you have stated that correctly, Senator. It is a very difficult matter to break the opium habit. However, this habit can be broken. There is some evidence that it [mari-huana] is habit-forming. The experts have not gone very far on that.9

In 1938 an internal Treasury Department research summary refused to distinguish at all between cannabis and the opiates. 10

For the most part, however, the debate during the forties centered on the notion of psychological dependence, which had surfaced in the thirties.11 For some this notion was axiomatic. The Public Health Service's Kolb, who had now succeeded Treadway as assist-ant surgeon general in charge of the Division of Mental Hygiene, noted in 1938 that the "marihuana addict deprived of his drug merely has a hankering for it."12 But the assistant dean of the Rutgers College of Pharmacy explained the same year that "if four or five cigarettes are smoked daily, a small average for a cigarette smoker, the user would soon become an addict and a danger, to society. It is the smoker's desire to keep in 'high,' which eventually makes him a slave to the Mexican Reefer."I3 Another observer noted in 1939 that marihuana gives rise to a craving which may very easily lead to the habitual use of drugs.14 Probably the con-sensus, then, is best captured by Bromberg's comment in 1939, which reiterated his conclusion five years earlier:

In the main, American authorities support the view that mari-huana is not a [physically] habit-forming drug. Asiatic and European writers are not in accord with this opinion. . . . The most one can say on the basis of ascertainable facts is that pro-longed use of marihuana constitutes a "sensual" addiction, in that the user wishes to experience again and again the ecstatic sensations and feelings which the drug produces. Unlike addiction to morphine, which is biochemically as well as psychologically determined, prolonged use of marihuana is essentially in the service of the hedonistic elements of the personality.I5

During the forties few attempts were made to examine critically the presumed existence of psychic dependence. In 1942 Allentuck and Bowman concluded that habituation to cannabis was not as strong as that to tobacco and alcohol.16 The La Guardia Committee concluded in 1944 after a clinical study that there was no com-pelling urge to use the drug. They found that users encountered little or no difficulty when they were forced to discontinue it.17 One researcher observed in 1946 that subjects who had smoked seventeen cigarettes a day for thirty-nine days reported some diffi-culty after abrupt withdrawal, but they exhibited no behavioral changes.18

The failure of scientific investigation to demonstrate any significant behavioral indication of addiction was reflected in the bureau's de-emphasis of this issue in its public statements. The observation of arrestees also motivated agents to report that "mari-huana is not habit-forming and no discomfort is manifested when a user is cut off from his supply."19 During the forties the bureau made only occasional reference to marihuana "addicts," and it did not single out the addictive property of the drug as one of its major dangers.2° It should be noted, however, that the FBN did not make a public concession on this point until forced to do so by the testimony of Dr. Isbell during the Boggs Act Hearings in the 1950s.

Insanity

Despite the skepticism of the scientific community, Commissioner Anslinger left no doubt at the hearings about the relation between marihuana and mental deterioration and insanity. Nor did Dr. Munch, who never once during the course of the hearings acknowledged the obstacles that he discussed at the Marihuana Conference: ignorance of the active principle and lack of standardisation.

Two studies in the forties examined long-term users with respect to mental deterioration and they found no such result. A study for the La Guardia Committee utilized quantitative measures, including verbal and abstract tests, on a sample of seventeen chronic users. The researchers concluded that the subjects "had suffered no mental or physical deterioration as a result of their use of the drug. ,/ 21 Freedman and Rockmore reached the same conclusion in 1946 on the basis of their examination of 310 army personnel whose average period of use was seven years.22

A few efforts were made during the early forties to determine whether the alleged marihuana psychosis, so often described in Eastern literature, existed in American users. Drawing from a total of thirty-one cases of "psychosis" following marihuana use, Bromberg differentiated in 1939 between temporary reactions during acute intoxication and toxic psychosis. In fourteen subjects, the condition lasted from a few hours to several days. In eight of these cases, the reaction occurred during the first experience with the drug. Bromberg concluded that "no permanent effect is ob-servable by psychiatric examination after the effects wear off. . . ." In the seventeen cases of toxic psychosis, lasting from weeks to months, Bromberg found that the toxic picture was generally "superimposed on a basic functional mental disturbance, such as schisophrenia." He also raised the possibility that "the drug ex-perience might occasionally represent the incipient stage of a functional psychosis" in predisposed individuals, although "count-less persons use marihuana without the development of an observable mental condition."23

From their 1942 study Allentuck and Bowman concluded that "marihuana will not produce a psychosis de novo in a well-inte-grated, stable person," although it might precipitate a functional psychosis in predisposed individuals.24 In the La Guardia Com-mittee's study of seventy-seven subjects, only nine "psychotic" episodes occurred. Six were clearly of the acute variety, lasting only a few hours. The other three were considered inextricably related to conditions other than the marihuana experience.23

After this small flurry of activity, general disinterest set in everywhere, except in the FBN. Even in the countries of the East, the number of insanity-hemp reports decreased precipitously after 1930.26 Yet Anslinger continued to believe in the relationship between marihuana and insanity, and he continued to seek docu-mentation. In 1943 he directed all agents to be on the lookout for relevant information. Pursuant to this directive, one supervisor re-quested his agents to canvas state and local hospitals for information regarding "mental derangement of patients caused by continued use of marihuana." They found none."

In his own mind, Anslinger continued to rely on the early Asian and African literature, and he became very defensive about the importance of noncorroborative Western studies. For example, Dr.

Loewe had experimented with cannabis and dogs in 1940. He found only an impairment of muscular coordination: "The dogs show no apparent excitement, anxiety or other emotion. . . ."28 Dr. Wollner, well aware of the official position, specifically warned the Cornell professor of "the importance of not making statements to news-papermen from which erroneous inferences could be drawn."29 Similarly, Anslinger vociferously denounced a study by Dr. Salasar-Viniegra, one of the leading authorities in Mexico, whose specialty was social medicine.3° Dr. Salasar-Viniegra was convinced that marihuana was a fairly benign pharmacological entity and that individual reactions were governed in major part by social factors, particularly the power of suggestion. Moreover, "the suggestive load and the ideas which surround marihuana are formidable and have accumulated during the course of time. Marihuana addicts, journalists and even doctors have been the ones charged with trans-mitting the legend from generation to generation."31 A major factor in' the popular imagination, he observed, is the assumption

[t] hat marihuana 'renders insane' and that the mental disturb-ances which it produces are permanent, being responsible for a large percentage of the inmates of [mental institutions] . The common people are not the only ones who divulge these false-hoods; even the psychiatrists do it, spreading their statements, considerably enlarged and changed, to the newspapers, which are the most powerful means of propaganda.32

On the basis of his clinical observation of patients whose mental disturbances had been attributed to marihuana, Dr. Salasar-Viniegra refuted the separate existence of a "marihuana psychosis." There was no evidence in many cases that mentally ill patients had used the plant, and in others use was incidental, infrequent, and of small amount. The doctor also concluded that the symptoms bore little relationship to marihuana. Generally they composed a mental picture common to most inmates of mental asylums.33

With support from Dr. Bouquet, Commissioner Anslinger dis-missed Dr. Salasar-Viniegra's contentions out of hand. He called him "a man obviously without any experience in the narcotic problem."34 Bouquet remarked that if the Mexican was right, then all scientists who have worked on the cannabis problem since 100 A.D. "should have their heads examined."35 It should be noted, parenthetically, that Anslinger's conflict with Dr. Salasar-Viniegra extended well beyond marihuana. At the latter's suggestion, the Mexican government was then, in 1939, considering establishing clinics for dispensing a month's supply of opiates to addicts. As we noted in chapter 1, the Prohibition Bureau's enforcement of the Harrison Act successfully halted medical attempts—through private practitioners and clinics—to dispense opiates to drug-dependent persons for purposes of maintaining their addiction. According to the official view, this activity was not a legitimate medical practice since addicts were criminals, not sick persons. The debate about the proper public policy in this connection was raging once again, and Anslinger had no patience with anyone who seriously con-sidered the maintenance approach.36

The FBN continued to link marihuana and insanity through the forties despite mounting evidence to the contrary. As late as March 1950 the bureau circulated Anslinger's own "Criminal and Psychia-tric Aspects Associated with Marihuana" as the leading work in the field."37

Crime

Despite the skepticism of most scientific researchers throughout the thirties, the alleged link between marihuana and crime was the mainstay of the bureau's propaganda effort to secure passage of the Uniform Act in 1934-35, of its testimony before Congress to secure the Marihuana Tax Act in 1937, and of its public stance in die forties. Dr. Bromberg forcefully brought his doubts to Commis-sioner Anslinger's personal attention at the Marihuana Conference in late 1938, but Anslinger ignored the doctor's warnings. Anslinger personally had adopted the crime thesis in 1931, and he became increasingly convinced of its validity over the next five years. He became fully committed to it in 1936 and he nurtured and propa-gated it from 1936 to 1939. The press was saturated with the fruits of FBN endeavors,38 a phenomenon which overshadowed the recurrent criticism of Drs. Kolb and Bromberg.

For example, Professor George C. Schicks, assistant dean of Rutgers College of Pharmacy, contributed "Marihuana: Depraver of Youth" to the March 1938 issues of the Druggist Circular. On the crime thesis Schicks wrote:

The person may be very susceptible to suggestion. There may be a strong urge toward the commission of criminal acts. The addict at this stage is dangerous. He may commit the most violent or shocking of crimes and not know what he is doing. Finally, he falls into a stupor or deep sleep, wakens the next morning with-out a hangover, and perhaps realizes for the first time some unfortunate act he has committed. Fortunately, all excessive users of Cannabis do not commit crime, but more cases of crime as a result of the drug action are being reported.39

Anslinger was very pleased. He felt that this article was "the best thing we have recently seen."49 Similarly, in a letter to the bureau's district supervisor in San Francisco, Anslinger acknowl-edged receipt of a newspaper report that one woman had stabbed another while under the influence of marihuana, noting that "this is just another example of what a person will do while under the influence of that drug."41

Since the crime thesis rested entirely on the bureau case reports, Anslinger knew very well that continued corroboration depended on his efforts. Even after passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, he continued to use his agents as propaganda resources. In Circular Letter no. 458, labeled "Marihuana and Criminal Conduct," the commissioner requested all supervisors to send him any data from newspapers or other local sources which suggested a causal con-nection between marihuana use and the commission of any criminal act.42

Despite his continued search for examples of such a connection, Anslinger did not seek to publicise the results, having chosen to reduce public anxieties which he had formerly incited. He also continued his attempts to suppress the insanity defense. Of par-ticular importance was his effort to silence Temple University's Dr. James C. Munch.

Dr. Munch had testified for the bureau at the hearings on the Marihuana Tax Act for good reason; he unhesitatingly linked marihuana with violent crime. The FBN solicited the testimony and Commissioner Anslinger had personally arranged for Munch's appearance before the committee.43

Munch's willingness to testify was not limited to legislative proceedings. Immediately after passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, he appeared on behalf of the defense in two of the most famous trials of the period. In the first, Ethel "Bunny" Sohl was tried in January 1938 in Newark, New Jersey. She and another woman were alleged to have murdered a bus driver during a robbery of his bus. Throughout Ethel Sohl's trial, it was claimed that she had smoked marihuana minutes before the robbery. Her attorneys,
associated with one of New Jersey's most prestigious law firms, decided that since five eyewitnesses had seen the defendant shoot the bus driver, the only way to save her from the electric chair was to maintain a defense of temporary insanity based on her marihuana use.

Sohl testified during the course of the trial that marihuana made "wrong seem right" and that she was forced under the influence of the drug to do "fantastic things." Following her testimony, Dr. Munch was called by the defense as an expert on marihuana. Dr. Munch testified that the use of marihuana was directly connected with criminal impulses and could make a person unaware of the difference between right and wrong. Ethel Sohl was ultimately convicted of first-degree murder, but the jury did recommend life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. Commissioner Anslinger was convinced that the reason for the jury's leniency was the credence which it had given Dr. Munch's testimony. At the commissioner's instance, an agent interviewed Ethel Sohl in prison. He reported that in his opinion "the commission of this crime by Ethel Sohl was not due to the use of marihuana but that such defense was conceived by her attorney in an effort to free her or lessen her punishment.""

Then on 7 April 1938 Dr. Munch testified in the even more notorious case of Arthur Friedman, age twenty-one, who was on trial in New York with five other defendants for murdering a police detective. The New York Post, in a story headlined "Prof Flies High and Crashes, All on Wings of Marihuana," reported:

"After the first one I puffed," said a wisened, scholarly little man on a General Sessions witness stand today, "I thought I had wings. Great big blue wings—and I was flying all around the world."

The court and the jury trying five youths for the murder of a police detective cocked curious eyes on Professor James Clyde Munch of Temple University.

"After the second one," he went on, "I was depressed. I thought I had been spending 200 years at the bottom of an ink bottle."45

Anslinger immediately wrote to his New York district supervisor, Garland Williams, asking him to convey to Dr. Munch the bureau's displeasure at his testimony.46 Anslinger was very angry:

I warned Dr. Munch not to testify in this case unless he was absolutely certain that the drug had been used by the defendant prior to the commission of the crime. In the past, we have afforded Dr. Munch considerable cooperation and he has likewise reciprocated.

What I would like to know is whether it was definitely es-tablished that the boys smoked the drug before the crime. Possibly the District Attorney can give you some information on this point. I am very anxious to know whether Dr. Munch in spite of my admonition proceeded with his testimony before he was absolutely certain that the drug had been used. I want this information so we may be able to determine our future relations with Dr. Munch.47

Agent Williams immediately contacted Dr. Munch to relay Anslinger's message. At the same time, Williams assigned a New York City Narcotics inspector to discuss the case with the two prosecutors to determine whether or not Arthur Friedman had definitely smoked marihuana before the commission of the crime. The district attorneys stated that they had no knowledge that Friedman had been a marihuana user until the defense showed up with two of the defendant's friends claiming that he had used two marihuana cigarettes on the night of the crime. Then, the inspector reported,

Dr. Munch got on the stand and put up a perfect defense for this man who murdered the cop and the two District Attorneys are very sore about it. They think Munch is a representative of the Bureau of Narcotics and wonder why the Commissioner sent him up there. According to the statements of the District At-torneys, Dr. Munch got up on the stand and stated he was an advisor to the Commissioner of Narcotics, Treasury Department, and advisor to the Congressional Committee to prepare the Marihuana Bill and that he furnished most of the information for it."

Anslinger was now irate. He requested Dr. Munch to give a specific and detailed statement of the qualifications he had pre-sented at the trial and, in particular, what connection, if any, he claimed to have with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

Munch repented. In a letter of 19 April 1938 he stated that he never assisted defense attorneys in making a claim of temporary insanity unless he was convinced that the defendant indeed used marihuana and would not escape his punishment on account of the defense. Moreover, the doctor continued, he had made every effort to keep his connections with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from being disclosed at the trial. Finally, he assured Commissioner Anslinger that he would appear in no further murder trials and that he would not lend his assistance to insanity defenses based on marihuana.° A few days after receiving Dr. Munch's letter, Com-missioner Anslinger spent some time studying the transcript of Munch's testimony in the Friedman case. He identified eight instances in which the testimony was in his view either in error or purposefully misleading, and he circulated his observations to his supervisors, not only to guide the bureau in its future relations with Dr. Munch but also to facilitate rebuttal in the event that Dr. Munch testified in any future cases.

The Munch experience illustrates the dilemma posed by -the bureau's previous position on the relationship between marihuana intoxication and crime. It no longer served the government's pur-poses to allege, as had been done in the Marihuana Tax Act Hearings, that a few marihuana cigarettes incited a violent frensy. Probably with some pressure from Dr. Kolb,5° the bureau reex-amined the scientific issue and now propagated a refined view that "no general rule could be evolved" since the "physiological effects of marihuana are variable." However, the bureau did maintain that in a substantial number of cases the user did lose control during the intoxication and might then impulsively commit violent acts.51

Even this view was difficult to sustain during the forties because study after study refuted it. In 1939, on the basis of review of the records of 16,854 criminal offenders in the psychiatric clinic of the New York County Court of General Sessions, Bromberg con-firmed his 1934 conclusions: He found only sixty-seven marihuana users, of whom but six were charged with violent crimes and the remainder with property crimes. He commented: " [I] t was found in general that early use of the drug apparently did not predispose to crime. No positive relation could be found between violent crime and the use of marihuana in the cases observed in the Psychia-tric Clinic. No cases of murder or sexual crimes due to marihuana were established."52

A 1938 survey of "colored prisoners" in Eastern State Peni-tentiary in Philadelphia revealed that "in none of these prisoners had there been any evidence that marihuana was a factor in their crimes."53 In an effort to reconcile this conclusion with cases in the Stanley and FBN reports, the author added that most of those cases "have been very incompletely reported, since we do not know what other factors may have entered into their acts of violence."54 Allentuck and Bowman (1942),55 Freedman and Rockmore (1946),56 and Bromberg again (1946)57 all disputed the crime thesis, while two studies of marihuana use in the military in 1944 and 1945 found a high incidence of minor criminal be-havior among the marihuana users in an overwhelmingly antisocial study population.58

The antagonism now developing between the FBN and the scientific community is reflected in the controversy generated by the Allentuck and Bowman paper, which had been published in the American Journal of Psychiatry in 1942. In the fall of that year; Assistant Surgeon General Kolb participated in a discussion of this paper during which he characterized the lay literature of the thirties as "fantastic" and "alarmist," noting that "the uninformed [were thereby] led to believe that modern civilisation [was] about to disappear because of the drug." He praised the return to scien-tific moderation reflected by Allentuck and Bowman's 1942 work. He stated, with respect to the crime thesis in particular, that:

It is reassuring to find from the careful study that Dr. Allen-tuck has made that the alarm about the relation of marihuana to crime is unfounded. The drug, like most other intoxicants, is taken mostly because it produces a sense of ease and finally sleep, but on its way to this final result there is a peculiar, bizarre type of intoxication with release of inhibitions. One of my cases said, "I can see to the bottom of things and solve prob-lems much better." Other cases have a vivid sense of happiness for short periods. Some become alarmed during one stage of their intoxication, others become hilarious and noisy. It can readily be seen that a drug which produces all these effects, if used as widely as alcohol is used in this country, might be like alcohol and a very important contributing cause to crimes of various kinds.59

Dr. Kolb did disagree with Allentuck and Bowman's suggestion that marihuana might prove beneficial in the treatment of opiate addiction. Yet, the editorial writers of the Journal of the American Medical Association echoed Dr. Kolb's sentiments and ratified this aspect of the "careful study" as wel1.6°

Commissioner Anslinger was more than a little disturbed by the implications of the Allentuck and Bowman paper, and by the AMA's approval. Since Allentuck was director of a pending clinical study under the auspices of the La Guardia Committee in New York City, he knew there was more to come. He wasted no time in de-nouncing the Allentuck and Bowman study and the AMA itself.61 He also solicited a rebuttal by his long-time ally, Dr. Bouquet.62

When the La Guardia Committee's report was published in late 1944, the crime thesis was dealt its most devastating blow. In September 1938 the Mayor of New York, Fiorello La Guardia, was prompted by the widespread marihuana propaganda to request advice from the New York Academy of Medicine. Having deter-mined that existing knowledge was inadequate, the academy recommended a two-part study, one to determine the scope and impact of marihuana use within the city of New York, and another to ascertain the drug's effects on humans on the basis of a con-trolled laboratory study. The mayor agreed and authorised the academy to appoint a blue ribbon committee of thirty-one scientists to make the sociological and clinical studies. Many authorities wel-comed the appointment of the committee, which launched its research in 1939. Dr. Kolb, for example, observed: "In view of the misinformation and alarm that has gotten abroad about marihuana, it is important to have a competent group like the Mayor's Com-mittee to study this drug and present the real facts."63 The sociological study was conducted by a team of New York policemen who reported directly to the committee. The clinical study was performed by Drs. Allentuck and Bowman, using as subjects seven-ty-seven volunteer prisoners who were observed in a city hospital ward.

The La Guardia Report was finally released late in 1944, six years after the appointment of the committee. There has been some speculation, which we have been unable to confirm or deny, that the FBN tried to suppress the report after the Allentuck publication. Together with its findings disputing the prevalent assumptions link-ing marihuana with insanity and addiction, the report undercut the crime thesis, finding that the drug was "not the determining factor in the commission of major crimes" and that "juvenile delinquency [was] not associated with the practice of smoking marihuana.""

Having been berated by the bureau two years earlier for its endorsement of the Allentuck and Bowman paper which previewed the committee's report, the AMA Journal now cast its lot with Anslinger. A stinging indictment of the Mayor's Committee ap-peared in an April 1945 editorial, which vehemently defended the crime thesis. After questioning the methodological validity of experiments with confined criminals, the editorial writer errone-ously looked to Dr. Kolb for support: "Kolb, nationally known addiction expert, after reading the report stated, 'one may say of such a drug that, if it were abused as alcohol is abused, it might be animportant cause of crimes and other misdemeanors.' " Of course, the 1942 remark by Dr. Kolb to which the Journal referred had actually endorsed the committee's ultimate finding, and the quoted portion reflected only a caveat applying to any widely used intoxi-cant.

In tone and content the AMA's editorial espoused the FBN's position on the La Guardia Report. Judging from subsequent col-laboration between Anslinger and this Journal, we have little doubt that the words themselves are Anslinger's:

For many years scientists have considered cannabis a dangerous drug. Nevertheless, a book called "Marihuana Problems" by the New York City Mayor's Committee on Marihuana submits an analysis by 17 doctors of tests on 77 prisoners and, on this narrow and thoroughly unscientific foundation, draws sweeping and inadequate conclusions which minimise the harmfulness of marihuana. Already the book has done harm. . . .

The book states unqualifiedly to the public that the use of this narcotic does not lead to physical, mental or moral degener-ation and that permanent deleterious effects from its continued use were not observed on 77 prisoners. This statement has already done great damage to the cause of law enforcement. Public officials will do well to disregard this unscientific, un-critical study, and continue to regard marihuana as a menace wherever it is purveyed.65

Drs. Walton66 and Bowman° immediately endorsed the report and objected to the Journal's editorial, while another physician, whose own work had been cited in support of the AMA's attack, entered a qualified dissent.68 Apprehensive about the growing con-sensus within the scientific community against the crime thesis, Anslinger had successfully forged a wedge between the AMA and the acknowledged experts. As a direct result, the La Guardia Report sank quietly into oblivion.

In short, despite the accumulation of adverse data, the bureau held tenaciously to the crime thesis. Whenever any corroboration came to his attention, Anslinger seised it eagerly, magnifying its import along the way. For example, in a series of studies in India between 1939 and 194269 Dr. Chopra determined that the incidence of detected crime was higher among cannabis users than among the general population. At most, of course, this statistical correlation confirms the fact that Indian cannabis users were found predomi-nantly among the same lower class population that exhibited the highest incidence of criminal conduct. Moreover, the major con-clusion in Chopra's study was that violence was less common with marihuana users than with alcohol users. Nevertheless, Anslinger suggested in a letter to the AMA Journal that these data disproved the La Guardia Committee's findings."

All Quiet on the Western Front

The public interest in marihuana use had subsided substantially during the early and mid-forties, and there was only limited interest in marihuana research within the scientific community. The spo-radic exchanges were of little interest to anyone other than the participants. Even the La Guardia Report, which provoked such intense debate within the "marihuana community," received little attention outside it. Marihuana was no longer a "menace" in the United States.

With legislation already on the books and the eye of the press no longer trained on the issue, the Western scientific community generally coalesced around several propositions: dependence on marihuana, if it existed at all, related more to the motivation of the user than to the action of the drug; severe adverse psychological reactions seemed to be associated with the personality of the user rather than the precise action of the drug; and there was very little reliable evidence for any link between marihuana use and aggressive behavior or violent crime. On occasion scientific observers even questioned the public policy toward marihuana as well. The Military Surgeon editorialised in 1943: "It is the writer's considered opinion that the smoking of . . . cannabis is no more harmful than the smoking of tobacco. It is further considered that the legislation in relation to marihuana was ill-advised, that it branded as a menace and a crime a matter of trivial importance."71

The Federal Bureau of Narcotics combated this skepticism within the domestic scientific community by attempting to polarise that community and by relying heavily on Eastern investigations. There were muffled dissents within the ranks by government public hea' lth officials and even among its own agents,72 but the bureau held the line, quietly and firmly, during the forties.

Notes

1.    Memorandum from Wollner to Anslinger, 14 Feb. 1938, p. 1.
2.    Ibid., p. 2.
3.    Anslinger to Fuller, assistant secretary of state, 9 Nov. 1938.
4. Memorandum from Anslinger to Assistant Secretary Gibbons, 29 Nov. 1938. Participating in the conference were: H. J. Anslinger, commissioner of narcotics; Dr. H. H. Wright, professor of agronomy, University of Wisconsin; Mr. Frank Smith, chief of Drug Control, state of New York; Dr. B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, Department of Agriculture; Dr. John R. Matchett, chief chemist, Bureau of Narcotics; Mr. Henry Fuller, consulting chemist; Dr. James C. Munch, professor of pharmacology, Temple University; Dr. S. Loewe, pharmacologist, Cornell University Medical College; Dr. Walter Bromberg, senior psychiatrist, Department of Hospitals, New York City; H. J. Wollner, consulting chemist, Treasury Department; Dr. A. H. Blatt, Howard University; Mr. Joseph Levine, chemist, Bureau of Narcotics; Mr. Louis Benjamin, chemist, Treasury Depart-ment; Dr. H. M. Lancaster, chief dominion analyst, Canadian government; Dr. James Couch, Pathological Division, Bureau of Animal Industry, Department of Agriculture.
5. Report of Marihuana Conference held in the U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue Building, room 3003, Washington, D.C., 5 Dec. 1938, pp. 133-34, 141-42.
6.    Ibid., p. 106.
7.    Ibid.
8.* For a complete review of these articles see Lester Grinspoon, Marijuana Reconsidered (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971).
9.    Senate, Hearings on H.R. 6906, p. 14.
10.    "Marihuana," Federal Bureau of Narcotics In-House Paper (1938), p. 23. Authorship: "IAON/jel."
11.    J. D. Fraser, "Withdrawal Symptoms in Cannabis Indica Addicts," Lancet, 2 (1949), /47-48, and Marcovitz and Meyers, "The Marihuana Addict in the Army," War Medicine, 6 (1944), 382-91, did report withdrawal symptoms in heavy users. And Bouquet, "Marihuana Intoxication," a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association, 124 (1944), 1010-11, reported mild withdrawal in heavy users.
12.    Kolb's "An Authoritative Treatise on Marihuana" appeared both in The Recorder, 12 Sept. 1938, and in Federal Probation, July 1938.
13.    George C. Schicks, "Marihuana: Depraver of Youth," Druggists Circular (1938), 6. Mr. Schicks was assistant dean, Rutgers University College of Pharmacy.
14. Merrill, "Marihuana: Hashish in Modern Dress," American Foreign Service Journal, May 1939, p. 265.
15.    Walter Bromberg, "Marihuana: A Psychiatric Study," reprint from the Journal of the American Medical Association (1 July 1939), p. 1. This article had been read before the New York Academy of Medicine, 11 Oct. 1938, and also at the Marihuana Conference two months later..
16. S. Allentuck and K. M. Bowman, "The Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana Intoxication," American journal of Psychiatry, 99 (1942), 249.
17.    La Guardia Report, p. 146.
18.    E. G. Williams et al, "Studies on Marihuana and Pyrahedge Compound," Public Health Reports, 61 (1946), 1059-83.
19.    E. A. Murphy, federal narcotics agent, to Garland Williams, assistant narcotics supervisor, 20 May 1938, p. 2.
20.    See, e.g., H. J. Anslinger's 1940 compilation "Marihuana Research," reprinted from the 1938 Convention Book of the Association of Medical Students.
21.    La Guardia Report, p. 141.
22. H. L. Freedman and M. J. Rockmore, "Marihuana: A Factor in Personality Evaluation and Army Maladjustment," Journal of Clinical Psychopathology, 7 (1946), 365-82 (Part 1), and 8 (1946), 221-36 (Part 2).
23.    Bromberg, "Marihuana: A Psychiatric Study."
24.    Allentuck and Bowman, "Psychiatric Aspects."
25.    La Guardia Report, p. 51.
26.    H. S. Becker, "History, Culture and Subjective Experience: An Elaboration of the Social Bases of Drug-Induced Experiences," Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 8 (1967), 172.
27.    T. F. Middlebrooks, district supervisor in Houston to all agents and reply of 16 Apr. 1943. See also Anslinger to Dr. Ball, 18 Oct. 1937, and "Marihuana and Insanity," Federal Bureau of Narcotics file, specifically, Anslinger to Fuller, Kolb, etc., 23 Jan. 1940.
28.    M. C. Harney to Anslinger, 12 Mar. 1940.
29.    Ibid. See also Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City), 16 Mar. 1940, reporting the lack of effect of marihuana in the alertness of the dogs in Dr. Lowe's study.
30.    Dr. Jorge Segura Milian, a student of Dr. Salazar-Viniegra, authored a pamphlet in 1939 La Marihuana, studio Medico y Social [Marihuana: medical and social study] extolling his teacher's work. A translation of this pamphlet appears in the bureau's files attached to a memorandum to Anslinger from J. Bulkley, 28 Aug. 1943.
31.    Ibid., p. 4.
32.    Ibid., p. 5.
33.    Ibid.
34.    "Report of the 5th Session of the Cannabis Subcommittee of the League of Nations." Memorandum from Anslinger to secretary of treasury, 16 June 1939„
35.    Ibid.
36.    Ibid.
37.    B. Martin, district supervisor, to Mr. H. G. McAllister, secretary of the Pharmacy Board of North Carolina, 31 Mar. 1950.
38.    See, e.g., F. T. Merrill, Marihuana: The New Dangerous Drug (Washington, D.C.: Opium Research Committee, Foreign Policy Association, Inc., March 1938). See generally H. S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (London:‘Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 141-42.
39.    Schicks, "Marihuana: Depraver of Youth."
40.    Anslinger to Dr. James C. Munch, 14 Apr. 1938. File. no. 0480-36 Gen.
41.    Anslinger to Joseph Manning, 12 Apr. 1938.
42.    Circular Letter no. 458.
43.    "Hearing Federal Legislation Marihuana will be held before House Ways and Means Committee Ten AM Tuesday Twenty-Seventh stop please Endeavor to attend HJA." Telegram from Anslinger to Munch, 26 Apr. 1937. File no. 0480-36 Gen.
44.    T. W. McGeever, district supervisor, to Anslinger, 6 Apr. 1938 (in file on Sohl case). This letter followed the agent's interviews with Ethel Sohl and her convicted codefendant, her parents, and the defendants' husbands. In further investigation, Agent McGeever interviewed Mr. McLaughlin, Ethel Sohl's attorney, with reference to a news-paper report that he had introduced marihuana cigarettes into evidence at the trial. The attorney denied he had done so and expressed great anger at McGeever's having interviewed his client in jail without his permission. Moreover, McLaughlin said he thought the publicity the defense had given the marihuana issue would be of great help to all those trying to enforce the marihuana laws.
45. New York Post, 7 Apr. 1938.
46.    Anslinger to Williams, 9 Apr. 1938. File no. 0480-36 Gen.
47.    Ibid.
48.    File record of telephone call to Williams, 12 Apr. 1938. File no. 0480-36 Gen.
49. Munch to Anslinger, 19 Apr. 1938. File no. 0480-36 Gen.
50. Kolb stated that "the prevalent opinion that anyone who smokes a marihuana cigarette and becomes intoxicated by it will have criminal impulses is in error." Kolb, "Authoritative Treatise."
51. Memorandum to file by Will S. Wood, acting commissioner, 6 May 1938.
52. Bromberg, "Marihuana: A Psychiatric Study."
53. N. S. Kwager, "Marihuana: Our New Addiction," American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 195 (1938), 354.
54.    Ibid., pp. 355-56.
55. Allentuck and Bowman, p. 249.
56. Freedman and Rockmore, "Marihuana: A Factor in Personality Evaluation."
57. W. Bromberg and T. C. Rogers, "Marihuana and Aggressive Crime," American Journal of Psychiatry, 102 (1946), 825-27.
58. S. Charen and L. Perelman, "Personality Studies of Marihuana Addicts," American Journal of Psychiatry, 102 (1946), 674-82; Marcovitz and Meyers, "The Mari-huana Addict in the Army."
59. Kolb, transcript of comments on Allentuck and Bowman study, 1942. FBN File no. 0480-36-9.
60.    Editorial, "Recent Investigation of Marihuana," Journal of the American Medical Association, 120 (1942), 1128-29.
61.    Anslinger, "The Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana Intoxication," letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association, 121 (1943), 212-13.
62.    Bouquet, "Marihuana Intoxication," letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association, 124 (1944), 1010-11.
63.    Kolb, transcript of comments, 1942.
64'.    La Guardia Report, p. 25.
65.    Editorial, "Marihuana Problems," Journal of the American Medical Association, 127 (1945), 1129.
66. Walton, "Marihuana Problems," letter to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, 128 (1945), 283.
67. Bowman, "Marihuana Problems," letter to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, 128 (1945), 889-90.
68. Marcovitz, "Marihuana Problems," letter to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, 129 (1945), 378.
69. R. N. Chopra and G. S. Chopra, "The Present Position of Hemp-Drug Addiction in India," Indian Medical Research Memoirs, 31 (1939), 1-119; "Use of Hemp Drugs in India," Indian Medical Gazette, 75 (1940), 356-67; "Cannabis Sativa in Relation to Mental Diseases and Crime in India," Indian Journal of Medical Research, 30 (1942), 155-71.
70. Anslinger, "More on Marihuana and Mayor La Guardia's Committee Report," letter to editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, 178 (1945), 1187.
71. J. M. Pholen, "The Marihuana Bugaboo," Military Surgeon, 93 (1943), 94-95.
72.    See, e.g., the quotation attributed to Dr. J. D. Reichard of Lexington Hospital in the 4 Mar. 1947 editorial of the New York Times where he allegedly debunked seven myths about marihuana; see also, Report of Agent Murphy transmitted to Anslinger by Supervisor Williams, 20 May 1938.