Broadly speaking, the system established by the[Single] Convention is extremely simple. Narcotic drugs can be consumed only on medical prescription or at least in the legal performance of a therapeutic function.
Paul Reuter, "The Obligations of States under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs."
Bulletin on Narcotics (1968)

The international system of drug control rests on a legal framework provided by the wriffen international agreements of governments and brought into being by diplomatic conferences. The implementation of these agreements is super-vised and monitored by decision-making and administrative bodies. The different forces which influence the system—and in a sense are part of it—are traceable not only to the international institutions but also to the participating nations and, ultimately, to the different interests within each nation. We will discuss how these forces interact. Because of the central role occupied by the international bodies, as both the agents and the arenas of these interactions, we have made them the focus of our analysis.
We will begin with an analysis of the stated objectives of the system and proceed to an overview of the types of control subsumed under that system, seeing these as an end-product of international efforts. We will then go on to examine the formal mechanisms and procedures that are used in the international setting to achieve certain ends.

Goals
The avowed aim of the control system is to combat drug abuse. In examining this goal we are compelled to raise a series of questions. Is the goal the total suppression of abuse or is it the achievement of a tolerable level of undesirable drug use? Does the system recognize other goals? Is it possible to discern more specific, operational goals?

The International Opium Commission at Shanghai, in 1909, formulated its resolutions against the background of the Chinese problem but stated in general terms that:

the use of opium in any form otherwise than for medical purpose is held by almost every participating country to be a matter for prohibition or for careful regulation and that each country in the administration of its system of regulation purports to be aiming, as opportunity offers, at progressively increasing stringency.

Contained in this statement are some of the questions which have since bedevilled efforts to evolve a workable international
drug control policy. One of these questions concerns availability of drugs for medical use. Another is the choice between prohibi-tion and "careful regulation."

The aims of the international drug treaties may be inferred from the preambles. The following excerpts illustrate the differing formulations of goals in the various conventions:

The Hague Convention, 1912. Determined to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived . . . .

The Geneva Convention, 1925. Convinced that the contraband trade in and abuse of these substances cannot be effectually suppressed except by bringing about a more effective limitation of the production or manufacture of the substances, and by exercising a closer control and supervision of the international trade . . . .

The 1931 Limitation Convention. Desiring to supplement the provisions of the International Opium Convention by rendering effective by international agreement the limitation of the manufacture of narcotic drugs to the world's legitimate requirements for medical and scientific purposes and by regulating their distribution . . . .

The 1936 Convention on Illicit Traffic. Having resolved, on the one hand, to penalize offences contrary to the provisions [of earlier treaties] . . . and, on the other hand, to combat by the methods most effective in the present circumstances the illicit traffic in the drugs and substances . . . .

The 1948 Protocol. Desiring to supplement the provisions of that [1931 Limitation] Convention and to place these [synthetic] drugs, including their preparations and compounds containing these drugs, under control in order to limit by international agreement their manufacture to the world's legitimate requirements for medical and scientific purposes and to regulate their distribution . . . .

The 1953 Protocol. Determined to continue their efforts to combat drug addiction and illicit traffic . . . considering, however, that it is essential to limit to medical and scientific needs and regulate the production of the raw materials . . . .

Single Convention 1961. The Parties, concerned with the health and welfare of mankind, recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes, recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind . . . considering that effective measures against abuse of narcotic drugs require co-ordination and universal action, understanding that such universal action calls for international co-operation guided by the same principles and aimed at common objectives . . . desiring to conclude a generally acceptable international convention replacing existing treaties on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use, and providing for continuous international co-operation and control for the achievement of such aims and objectives . . . .

Vienna Convention 1971. The parties, being concerned with the health and welfare of mankind, noting with concern the public health and social problems resulting from the abuse of certain psychotropic substances, determined to prevent and combat abuse of such substances and the illicit traffic to which it gives rise, considering that rigorous measures are necessary to restrict the use of such substances to legitimate purposes, recognizing that the use of psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes is indispensable and that their availability for such purposes should not be unduly restricted . . . .

Conceptions of the problem have evolved from the threat that was represented by Chinese opium smoking in 1909 to the danger that was envisaged to the health and welfare of mankind in 1961. This change may be partly one in the manner of expressing the problem, but not entirely so. The problem which engaged the attention of the international committee in 1909 was opium smoking, facilitated by the unrestricted import of this drug into China. By 1912 the perception of the problem had extended to the "abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine," whereas the concept of "addiction"—a narrower one than "abuse"—was introduced in 1953. The Single Convention refers to both addiction and use, but the concept of addiction is given much emphasis and is expressed in emotionally charged terms ("addiction constitutes a serious evil"). Of all the defmitions of the problem, that expressed in the Vienna Convention is the broadest: "the public health and social problems resulting from the abuse of certain psychotropic substances." Most of the treaties, including the Vienna Conven-tion, also refer specifically to the problem of illicit trade.

As some treaties were enacted to supplement earlier ones, they omitted, as may be expected, a definition of the problem. They do attest, however, to the failure of the earlier treaties to resolve the problem and to the need for additional arrangements. -

The definition of concrete objectives also has undergone changes. In 1909 the "gradual suppression" of opium smoking was recommended and the nonmedical use of opium was to be subjected to "prohibition or careful regulation." Only the "gradual suppression" of abuse was mentioned in 1912. The 1925 convention sought to suppress "effectually" contraband trade and abuse. By 1931 the goal is stated as a "limitation of manufacture to legitimate [i.e., medical and scientific] require-ments."

There are two sides to controlling drug availability: on the one hand medical and scientific supplies have to be ensured; on the other supplies for other kinds of use have to be withheld or restricted. In view of the need to protect the interests of medicine and science and simultaneously to "prevent and combat" drug addiction, the control system is said to have dual goals.

A clear-cut separation of goals and means is not possible. Ultimate goals—such as "the health and welfare of mankind"— are sought through processes which often come to acquire the values of ends; thus prevention of "drug abuse" as a step towards universal health and welfare has come to be an end itself. Farther down on the scale between immediate and ultimate objectives, such means for achieving drug control as regulation of interna-tional trade, law enforcement, international cooperation, and the like acquire more than instrumental value and come to assume the importance of goals in themselves. Excluded from the treaties is a statement of their levels of aspiration in what they seek to do.

A treaty should ideally be an instrument of some duration, and this militates against the setting forth of a very specific set of goals in the treaty itself. Moreover, its international character behooves it to avoid goals that have relevance for only a single nation. That the dual goals of ensuring medical/scientific availability and preventing other kinds of use are not always commensurable makes it all the more difficult to set specific objectives.

We might well note in this context that these tvvo goals do not only coexist but also overlap. Scientific and public debate is by no means agreed on what constitutes medical need as opposed to nonmedical, or on alternative ways of minimizing the risks involved in drug use; nor is speculation ended as to how factors such as fringe medical needs or alternative drugs and treatrnent modes may affect the balance between availability and control. Where are the lines to be drawn, if indeed any lines can be drawn?

The formulation of the two goals has undergone a slight but significant change in the last drug treaty. While the preamble of the Single Convention notes "that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes," the Vienna Convention formulates the idea in this way: "the use of psycho-tropic substances for medical and scientific purposes is indispen-sable-and . . their availability for such purposes should not be unduly restricted." The latter, in not tying the definition of medical needs down to pain and suffering, would seem to broaden the category of medical use to the practice, for example, of enhancing or suppressing emotional behavior or performance.

To reach ultimate, necessarily long-term, goals, there is first a need for short-term goal-setting. This also applies, of course, when no specific goal is set but only a direction of action. What may be termed operational goals which general or specific programs are designed to attain are not formulated in the international agreements, nor are they often made explicit publicly. One reason for this may be that specific objectives and plans by which the overall goal can be reached are not readily definable; another may be that, in a situation of limited resources and options, to be precise is often to court criticism for subse-quent failure to attain the objectives set. Perhaps, too, a treaty might be harder to agree on if it were to attend to more concrete affairs. Nevertheless, a clear definition of operational goals is a necessary part of planning. The natural forums for reaching such definitions should be the sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and ECOSOC.

When it comes to executing these programs, the various international agencies will derive their operational goals from those set for the tasks assigned to them. However, it is charac-teristic of most organizations that, regardless of these assigned goals, one of their prime concerns will be to increase their existing allocation of resources and power and to maintain the interest of individual functionaries even if these ends prove inconsistent with those formal mandates set forth as their tasks.

Both at the international and the national level drug policy is usually only part of a more comprehensive public policy, ancf the objectives of one must conform to, or fit within, the goals of the other. A country may wish, for example, to allocate its resources to education or to development of an industrial infrastructure, rather than to finding substitutes for drug-bearing crops or to enforcement of drug laws. In this case little headway will be gained by proponents of drug programs, at least not as long as the priorities remain that way. If, on the other hand, the drug policy agreed upon by the international community is in line with the government's own general policy, the government will pursue it and will brandish it at international gatherings with a suitable underlining of its contribution to international solidarity.

Other goals, such as a desire to safeguard national sovereignty and commercial interests, will influence the position of a country vis-a-vis the development of treaties and its subsequent willing-ness to adhere to them. Once a state becomes a party to a convention, fulfilling its obligations under the convention may become an end in itself. However, even within these obligations there is often room enough for the contracting state to aim for the furtherance of a variety of interests. Such interests are not a priori less legitimate, nor do they invariably reflect commercial interests. The Vatican state, has, for example, suggested that the safeguarding of human rights be considered an important goal in the area of drug control.

These diverse goals interact on different levels, sometimes in conflict and other times in concordance. Their realization depends on what possibilities exist in the means for attaining them and what forces and interests will prevail in the final decision and action. The choice of goals and actions is based upon concepts of what the problems are, how they have come about, what various measures can do to counter them, and how drug policy relates to other interests.

Attitudes towards drug control range from opposition to all controls to belief in the need for total prohibition. The former attitude may be based on a number of notions—that the problem does not exist, or that controls will not bring about any improve-ment in the situation, or that society should not interfere with what is perceived as the private conduct of the individual, or that possible improvements would be outweighed by the costs of producing them, or that it is more important to protect commer-cial interests connected with production and sale. The revenue-oriented policy of the British in the Indian-Chinese opium trade at the close of the nineteenth century might be an example of the last position. Variations of the same position were taken by the drug manufacturing countries of Western Europe towards inter-national control in the early days of the League of Nations. Illustrations of the prohibitionist attitude might be drawn from the alcohol field. Here there are some examples of implemented prohibition policies, although the use of alcohol for industrial purposes has seldom been questioned. As has been mentioned earlier, the two prongs of international control are, first, ensuring medical supplies and, second, minimizing nonmedical use. Inso-far as it is only over nonmedical and nonscientific use that control is to be exerted, the international approach may be seen as one of partial prohibition. That even this is not wholly accepted is suggested by the fact that under the Single Convention, for instance, reservations can be made to certain provisions so as to allow the continued nonmedical use of some of the substances it covers.

A number of intermediate positions between laissez-faire and total prohibition can be identified. The position taken by a group or nation is not necessarily determined by a particular philosophy but may have to do with actual possibilities, given local legal tradition, resources, and expectations of outcome.

From the texts of treaties two crucial concepts emerge--coordi-nation and evaluation. Both the Single Convention and the Vienna Convention point to the necessity for coordinated action. However, the conflict of interests, such as that between civil rights and law enforcement, between scientific interests and regulatory purposes, pose serious challenges to drug policy formation; it is usually not possible to give every interest its due. Nevertheless, it is important for conflicts between goals to be brought out into the open. The other point is the importance of evaluation. The preamble to the 1925 Geneva Convention attributes "results of great value" to the Hague Convention, although this could hardly have been determined. A fact which is still being overlooked by the international drug control system is that the assessment of the outcome of efforts made in pursuit of goals is a necessary element in policy-making.

Means

The word "means" is understood to refer to any institution, rule, or action employed in pursuit of an end. Some means are international: treaties, the international agencies created to admi-nister them, and international cooperation fall into this category. However, the application of international control is based on national legislation and exercised through national executing devices. National action is, of course, determined to a very large extent by treaty obligations, but nations are also, within the limits prescribed by international law, relatively free to organize their drug control strategies to fit within their own institutions.

There are two points of general significance which must be stated. First, "drug abuse" is not an isolated phenomenon but is a part of a whole set of personal and social conditions. Although our discussion will be limited to policies and actions designed specifically to control "drug abuse," their relationship to the general pursuit of social policy must be borne in mind. Second, not all measures of drug control are designed to prevent "drug abuse." There has been a growing interest in establishing consu-mer safety procedures and setting standards and requirements for drug purity, nomenclature, labeling, marketing, pricing, and statistics. We do not deal with these forms of drug control, but we do not deny their relevance.

Which type of control measure is to be used in a problem situation is determined by the context. At the international level the scope of action has been limited to legal-administrative measures aimed at controlling the supply of drugs and the intervening activities between supply and demand, both licit and illicit. At the national level the range of options is wider and may encompass treatment, social welfare, law enforcement, education, and so on. Furthermore, controls will vary depending on the type of drug, drug-related behavior, and the drug-taking group to which they are directed.

Finally, the scheme of control adopted will be affected by the rules governing the process whereby controls are decided, codi-fied, and implemented. Such rules pertain to the criteria for control, the responsibilities for initiating controls, and the rela-tions between individual states and international organizations.

The Treaties

The Single Convention, since it unified the treaties preceding it, will form the basis of the following discussion. The two treaties not yet in force--the Vienna Convention and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention—will be touched upon, the former especially, since, on the basis of an ECOSOC resolution, it is to some extent being provisionally applied. First, however, we will summarize the salient features of the earlier treaties. The 1925 convention established a system for regulating international trade; a country had to have the approval of the importing country before it was allowed to export narcotics. The 1931 convention introduced the estimates system, under which drug needs had to be anticipated and manufacture tailored to these needs. Under the 1948 treaty a range of synthetic narcotics came under control. The 1953 treaty provided for controls over the production of raw materials.

The parties to the Single Convention are obliged to cooperate with the international organs and with each other in the execution of the treaty provisions. Although this obligation seems a less than meaningful abstraction, it is not in fact so. The efficacy of control relies to a large extent on the goodwill of the parties and on the mutual observances of the rules governing international trade.

The national obligations under the Single Convention include the following (see E/CN. 7/484/Rev.1, 1966):

(a) establishing or adjusting national legislation to conform to the convention;
(b) maintaining a system of licenses (for manufacturers, wholesalers, and others), permits and prescriptions (for dispensing of drugs), record-keeping, reports, controls and inspections;
(c) establishing estimates of national requirements of drugs, transmitting them to INCB, and enforcing the established estimates;
(d) maintaining a system of export and import authoriza-tions and import certificates;
(e) maintaining statistics and other documentation, and transmitting them, respectively, to the INCB and the secre-tary-general;
(f) coordinating preventive and repressive actions against illicit traffic and arranging for treatment of addicts;
(g) cooperating with other nations and the international agencies in counteracting the illicit traffic and in extradi-tion and other questions relating to the punishment of offences.

Some of these obligations are subsumed under the Vienna Convention. A notable exception is the absence of the estimate system.

International intervention involves the following procedures:

(a) placing new drugs under control or altering the regimes of control;
(b) documentation and evaluation of the operations of the control system;
(c) establishing (by INCB) of drug-need estimates for dif-ferent countries and supervising the working of the control system;
(d) employing sanctions, ranging from criticism to the impo-sition of an embargo, against countries in breach of the treaty provisions;
(e) technical assistance;
(0 inducing changes in the system of control, ranging from
recommendations to the elaboration of new treaties.

With regard to the placing of drugs under control (which determines their level of control) it is as important to ask which drugs are controlled as how it is done. What critieria apply? Who takes the initiative? What is the procedure?

The Hague Convention of 1912 included opium, heroin, mor-phine, cocaine, and certain of their salts and preparations. The Geneva Convention added cannabis. Under the 1931 Limitation Convention more compounds of the drugs listed in the earlier treaties were included. There is a basic technical difference between the way drugs are controlled under these treaties, and the way they are controlled under the Single Convention and the Vienna Convention. In the earlier treaties the drugs are named in the text, which means that, as a rule, to change the type of control to which a drug is subjected, the treaty must be amended. The more recent treaties arrange drugs in separate schedules, corres-ponding to different regimes of control. A change in the degree of control of any drug can be brought about by moving it into another schedule, without amending the treaty.

Drugs have been brought under all treaties individually, not in groups. An exception to this practice may be found in the 1931 Limitation Convention. No trade or manufacture for trade was allowed in a country for any of the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or for the ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf, subject to a decision by a government and to an international review process.

As to the procedure for extending control to additional drugs, both Individual governments and WHO are entitled, under the Single Convention, to take the initiative. However, almost all initiatives have so far originated from countries. Other countries are then notified. If WHO finds that the drug is liable to similar abuse and is productive of similar ill effects as the drugs already controlled, then WHO will have to notify the Commission,* which will decide for or against the inclusion of the drug in a specific schedule. If WHO does not provide an assessment, then the controlling process will not be able to run its course. The decision of the Commission may be reviewed by appeal to ECOSOC, which in fact has the power not only to accept or reject the original WHO proposal but also to alter the proposal (by placing the drug in a schedule other than the one proposed).

Under the Vienna Convention, WHO is required to spell out in greater detail the criteria it applies in evaluating a drug for control. The Commission has the right to seek advice other than that of WHO (except on medical and scientific matters) and may alter the proposal. Another departure from the Single Convention is the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Commission when voting on such a question.

Changing the System

With the exception of the Hague Convention all the drug treaties have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Considering the recognized authority which the UN has come to have for drug control, it is unlikely that future drug treaties with any claim to universality will be concluded outside the UN framework. However, bilateral and regional agreements may well be concluded, and do in fact exist. In another category is an agreement between a state and an international organization, such as the one between the INCB and the minister of public health of Bolivia (PCB, 1%4: xiii-xiv).

We will now see what possibilities there are in the process of enacting UN drug treaties, for states and international organiza-tions to pursue their own goals and to initiate or resist proposals for action.

The 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties (CA/CONF.39/27) provides a framework for viewing UN treaties. The convention does not lay down rules for the treaty-making process, and decisions leading up to the convocation of a conference to consider a draft convention are dictated by UN procedure in general. A pattern has been established for the creation of drug treaties. National initiatives are first raised in the Commission. When a necessary majority has been obtained, the initiative goes before ECOSOC, which adopts a resolution asking the secretary-general to convene a plenipotentiary conference according to article 62 of the UN charter. The ensuing preparatory work for the conference is usually performed by the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the UN Secretariat. Invitations to the plenipotentiary conference are issued to member states of the UN and to certain nonmembers. However, in spite of the universal application of the drug treaties, invitations have not been issued to all states, and this has been a matter of some contention at the plenipotentiary conferences.

It follows, given the central role of the Commission in the process of taking initiatives and making preparations, that a state which has a place on the Commission will have an advantage over those which do not when it comes to raising issues or deflecting them. These "outsider" states may attend the Commission meet-ings as observers, as do certain nongovernmental organizations and other UN agencies not exclusively concerned with drugs, so the opportunity does exist for them to wield some influence. But they cannot vote, nor can they take part in the management of the Commission (through such activity as deciding on agendas, and the like); thus their contribution to the making of important decisions will be only marginal. As the Commission initiatives have a decisive effect on subsequent ECOSOC standpoints, participation in the latter forum will barely compensate for the lack of representation at the Commission level. The actual preparation of draft proposals and the analysis of preliminary government responses are carried out by the Division of Narcotic Drugs, and such interests as the secretariat officials may have will probably manifest themselves at this stage.

The deliberations in the Commission and the plenipotentiary conference will be affected by what alternatives to the proposals are offered for discussion, but the way those responsible for the initial drafting of proposals have phrased them will also affect the outcome (see chapters 13 and 16, on the cannabis issue and the construction of the Vienna Convention).

The secretary-general provides a UN plenipotentiary confer-ence with such material as provisional rules of procedure, memo-randa on the topics to be discussed, and a provisional time-table.* These rules, which are generally adopted by the confer-ence, do not confer advantages or disadvantages unevenly upon the participating states. However, as the time allotted for any conference is limited—it was roughly two months for the conference which adopted the Single Convention and three weeks for the conference which considered its amendments—there is bound to be some bias in favor of draft proposals circulated in advance and of better-staffed delegations. Time pressure will require several committees to work simultaneously, and only if the delegation is a large one will a state be able to provide personnel for all these committees. The area of deliberation is provisionally defined by those participants who have submitted proposals; thus they will have a lead in steering the discussion along the lines which particularly interest them. In the negotiations which ensue, they will seek the general acceptance of their proposals. The strategy in the past for those participants who were bent on strengthening controls has been to work for mandatory regula-tions, administered by international organs and automatically binding on the contracting parties. Those participants who have wanted to minimize such controls have had recourse to other types of action. If the intention is not to be bound, then a state can either refrain from taking part altogether or it can take part in the bargaining process, vote against the proposals, and then refrain from signing the concluded document. Clearly, those aiming at increased control are usually willing to settle for less than all they aspire to, out of consideration for the need to have a treaty which contains only such undertakings as a sufficiently large number of states are prepared to accept. This has not always been the case, however. Recall that when the American delegation failed to secure acceptance for its plan to control opium at the source during the Geneva Conference of 1924-25, it withdrew from the conference. The Protocol of 1953 was a move to reinstate this plan, while the proposed amendments to the Single Conven-tion were yet another effort along the lines of the original attempts in the 1920s. Another way of reconciling different interests is to narrow definitions down to a point where there is common agreement: the definition of cannabis in the Single Convention, which excludes those parts of the plant other than the flowering or fruiting tops, is a case in point.

States opposed to controls will strive to render the proposed rules more permissive; what is originally intended to be a mandatory provision can, in the course of negotiations, be toned down into a recommendation. For example, at the New York Conference of 1961, it had been intended to subject cannabis to mandatory suppression, but after a Burmese intervention general assent could only be had for a recommendation that strict control be applied (art. 2, pars. 2 and 4).* Similarly, rules concerning cultivation leave it to a state's discretion to determine whether it will opt for prohibition: if "prevailing conditions" render the prohibition of cultivation of the opium popy, the coca bush, or the cannabis plant "the most suitable measure," in the opinion of the party, for protecting health and welfare and preventing illicit traffic, then prohibition shall be carried out. Other such qualifi-cations are: "so far as possible," in relation to the uprooting of wild coca bushes (art. 26); "if . . . economic resources permit," where establishing treatment facilities is concerned (art. 38); holding a practice "desirable" rather than obligatory, such as the indication of the WHO nonproprietary names of drugs (art. 30).

Rights and duties are conferred sparingly. This is exemplified by article 14, by which the INCB "may" call the attention of the parties, ECOSOC, and the Commission to the failure of a government to give a satisfactory explanation for untoward occurrences. States are generally wary of investing international organs with too much authority. However, this is not to say that they are invariably more concerned about securing maximum relief from international jurisdiction than with giving sufficient leeway to the international organs and to themselves.

But escape clauses do exist, such as the one relating to the right of parties to export drugs to a country in spite of an embargo having been declared, if exceptional circumstances—such as the need of such drugs for the treatment of the sick—can be invoked. And, certainly, one of the most important devices for reconciling the interests of those pressing for controls and those hesitant about them is the possibility of making reservations. States can avail themselves of the provision which allows reservations to several highly important parts of the convention to be made at the time of signature and at the time of ratification or accession:

(a) the right of the INCB to request and establish estimates in respect of countries and territories not bound by the convention;
(b) the right of the INCB to question statistics and take action against govermnents;
(c) certain limitations on the export of drugs in excess of the estimated requirements of an importing country;
(d) the prescribed manner of settling disputes, including recourse to the International Court of Justice.

The transitional reservations embodied in article 49 allow a party to permit, throughout a specified period of time, the "quasi-medical use" of opium smoking, coca-leaf chewing, and the nonmedical use of cannabis, cannabis resin, and so on. Allowing for the continued use of cannabis is ironic considering that it is included in article 2 among the drugs purported to have "particularly dangerous properties."

The manner of a treaty's entry into force is often another compromise struck between the proponents and opposers of control. As its entry into force is subject to ratification or accession, the number of ratifications required to bring it into force will have a profound effect on how quickly it will be implemented. Recall the German insistence on universal adherence to the Hague Convention as a precondition of the convention's entry into force in 1912. The Single Convention follows the standard model in requiring forty ratifications, a number representing about a third of the number of UN member-states at the time of signature. The Vienna Convention requires the same number of ratifications, although between 1961 and 1971 the UN membership had increased.

The Single Convention can be altered through amendments (art. 47) and can be terminated as a result of denunciations or by a new treaty. Amendments to the treaty can be secured without convoking a conference (proposals can be circulated to the contracting parties), but this has not happened. Nor is it likely to, considering that eighteen months must elapse after the circulation of the proposals before a decision can be taken and considering that it takes only one party to dissent for the proposals to be rejected.

Finally, to illustrate the constellation of forces which have to be reconciled before a treaty is brought into being, we have tabulated the declarations and reservations which qualify the acceptance by the states concerned of the text of the Single Convention (see Appendix A). These throw light upon the positions which individual countries maintain towards the controls embodied in the treaty. In many cases they have little or no bearing on drug control, as such, but have to do with political relations in the world at large. The refusal of the socialist states to submit to international arbitration, and the declaration made by the UAR that ratification of the treaty did not imply recognition of Israel or that any treaty relation would be forged between the UAR and Israel, serve as examples.

* "The Commission" will be used hereafter as an abbreviation for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

* Work performed in the name of the secretary-general in the field of narcotics and other drugs is done by the Division of Narcotic Drugs, except for legal matters, which are usually handled by the legal adviser. Although documents prepared by the Division bear the name of the secretary-general, the term "the Division" will be used hereafter in reference to such documents.

* During a discussion on changes in the scope of control, U Ba Sein, the delegate from Burma, said that in his country cannabis was still used medically. "It was, for example, administred to elephants used for the transport of timber. The prohibition of cannabis in Burma would be a severe blow to the timber industry." Later, his fellow delegate made a similar intervention (E/CONF.34/24: 20, 61).