... the Commission has done truly constructive work.

By now the problems have been clearly defmed and some of them have been solved, or the instrtunents of their solution have been created: non-medical consumption of opium, coca leaf, cannabis, and of the drugs manufac-tured from them is outlawed in principle and is bound to disappear after transitional periods of adaptation ....

"Twenty Years of Narcotic Control Under the United Nations--Review of the Work of the Commision on Narcotic Drugs," Bulletin on Narcotics (1966)

We turn now from the historical development of international drug control to a consideration of the present situation, without, however, altogether abandoning the historical dimension. In this chapter we will discuss the legal framework which has evolved, and the related international institutions, in terms of structure, resources, policies, and functions. We shall try to see the forces which shape the overall legal framework as well as the patterns of power found within the institutions and the way in which these forces shape the decisions which emerge.

There has been no systematic evaluation to date of the workings of the international drug control machinery. The above quotations, taken from a UN publication, are examples of the kind of unrealistic and self-commending appraisal that does exist. In this and other reviews of its work, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, like many other organizations, affirms its own value as if this was an assessment of objective reality. In fact, it was agreed by the commission before the review was written by the UN Secretariat that "it should focus attention on the achieve-ments of the Commission" (E/CN.7 / SR.559, 1966).

Yet the survival and growth of an organization may also require periodic review of its performance; the acknowledgment of difficulties or inadequacies is, after all, a ground for further investment and change. But the public debate of issues and the continuous scrutiny of systems and institutions within a society that take place at the national level have no parallel in the international sphere. Here such criticism is either absent or tacit, or else it is always "unofficial."

The absence of proper evaluation and a constructively critical attitude towards the activities of international bodies is what makes it so difficult to study them. Despite the fact that we encountered, during the course of our own study, many coopera-tive individuals within the international organizations, there was in general a resistance to requests for data, the lack of which has no doubt affected not only the analysis attempted of the work of the international drug control bodies but also the conclusions at which the study will later arrive.

That this resistance is not due to any particular antagonism towards the authors themselves is borne out by the fact that access to the information sought has been denied other investi-gators. In fact the role played by members of the secretariats of international organizations may be seen as an occupationat'role close to that of the diplomat and of the civil servant (Galtung, 1966), two roles that carry with them a resistance to open discussions of their work and a corresponding belief in the virtue of secrecy. No doubt there are reasons for, and utility in, a good deal of work-related secrecy, but these reasons are too readily used to protect the prevailing policy against criticism (Lowry, 1972). Yet the importance of an evaluation of the work of international organizations has frequently been pointed out, not least by the organizations themselves. Within the UN system the existence of a Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) and an Administrative Management Service (AMS) attests to this need. Indeed, according to the reports of these units, there are real inadequacies in the administration of programs by the UN and its related agencies (Bertrand, 1971). Robert Jackson's "Study of the Capa-city of the UN Development System" (DP/5, 1969), a critical evaluation of the UN agencies' management of development programs, similarly found it to be a system "without a brain." In WHO steps are said to have been taken to evaluate its activities. Such work, however, is usually carried out by "insiders" (Sacks, interview), who are likely to be bound by loyalty and self-interest and to be partisan. The AMS, for instance, is staffed by a segment of the UN Secretariat, and, when a unit is under review, the AMS is assisted by the staff of that unit; although outside recruits and consultants are used, the AMS team is essentially an internal one. Furthermore, AMS reports are restricted to high-ranking UN officials, and outside investigators have no access to them.

Much of the literature on international organizations, some of it containing valuable material, consists of work by people who have either been employed by, or have been closely associated with, the organizations. A history of the League of Nations written by F. P. Walters, who worked closely with the first secretary-general, is one such work (Walters, 1952). Perhaps the best example of what can be achieved by combining critical evaluation on the one hand with intimate inside knowledge on the other is Landy's study of the International Labor Office (ILO) (Landy, 1966).

All this is not to say that international organizations are impervious to research. On the contrary, much of the research on these organizations has been done with the assistance of the officials working in them. While such research often yields insight into the nature of international organizations, much of what is done is seen as irrelevant as far as practical appplications of findiiiis is concerned (Dittert, interview). Good and relevant studies—such as that on the decentralization of WHO (Berkov, 1957)--certainly exist, but more of these might be done if it were not for the likelihood of official cooperation being withdrawn as soon as sensitive topics are broached (Anderson and Nijkerk, 1958).

These comments are not to be construed as implying criticism of those international civil servants who have aided our informa-tion-gathering. We are articulating a typical attitude of scientific investigators. We believe that outsiders have a contribution to make. In saying this, we are of course taking a stand on the issue of the relative merits of the "outsider" and "insider" positions. Whereas the "insiders" will argue that you must be Caesar in order to understand him, the "outsider" will argue that you must not be Caesar to do that. Both arguments may be vaild to a degree: insiders having "acquaintance with" and outsiders reach-ing "knowledge about" a phenomenon may arrive at the same point in understanding. Be that as it may, the broader perspective still comes more easily to the outsider, as is generally acknow-ledged in the social-behavioral tradition. Although we consider ourselves outsiders, we have tried, through observation of the system at close quarters and by interviewing the insiders, to benefit from the advantages of both positions.

Our approach to international organizations may be said to fall within a school of thought which holds that:

Every status quo—societal, organizational, or factional—thrives on myth and mystification. Every group in power ... tells its story as it would like to have it believed, in the way it thinks will promote its interests . . .. Every group in power profits from ambiguity and mystification, which hide the facts of power from those over whom power is exerted and thus make it easier to maintain hegemony and legitimacy. A sociology that is true to the world inevitably clarifies what has been confused, reveals the character of organizational secrets, upsets the interests of powerful people and groups (Becker & Horowitz, 1972: 54-55).