Evidence is growing that international agencies are fully capable of developing vested interests and "empire-building" tendencies .... The pacts concluded between the central organization and the Specialized Agencies are, in large measure, agreements to agree.
Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares

Many organizations within the total UN system are concerned in one way or another with matters closely related to drugs. It is not our intention to examine the activities of all these organizations. Instead, attention will be confined to a few key organs which have formal and de facto responsibility for drug control under the UN system. How the drug control structure relates to the overall organizational structure of the UN is shown in figure 4:1; the organs in boxes are those we will be dealing with. A word on their selection is necessary.

The highest body of the UN, the General Assembly, can make important decisions concerning drugs. However, these are usually based on recommendations by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which in turn draws from resolutions drafted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. In fact, only 2 percent of the sessional time of ECOSOC is devoted to drugs (Woodcock, 1974:306). The Commission, which succeeded the League of Nations' Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, is the chief policy-making organ in the drug area. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), estab-lished by the Single Convention and taking over from the Permanent Central Board and the Drug Supervisory Body in 1968, is charged with the supervision of drug treaties, particularly of those provisions pertaining to quantitative control of drug production and distribution. It is said to enjoy a special status (one of technical independence) vis A vis the UN—this is a point of contention to which we will return—but its secretariat is an integral part of the UN secretariat. Both the Commission and the INCB report to ECOSOC but, unlike ECOSOC, their entire concern is with drugs.

The other principal components of the drug control apparatus come under the World Health Organization (WHO), a UN specialized agency. The central organs of WHO are: the World Health Assembly, the executive board, and the secretariat headed by the director-general. WHO is decentralized to a very large extent but its regional offices do not administer drug matters. Work on drugs is primarily carried out by the headquarters in Geneva, specifically by the Divison of Pharmacology and Toxico-logy, one of twelve divisions of WHO. This division breaks-down into six sections, one of which—the Drug Dependence Unit—is, as its name implies, concerned with that aspect of drug use to which international controls are directed. WHO acts in an advisory capacity under the treaties, providing information and expertise of a pharmacological, pharmaceutical, and medical nature to the other drug control bodies. In doing this, it draws upon the opinions and knowledge of an Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, periodically appointed by the director-general. The terms of reference of the Drug Dependence Unit do not provide for action in the field of alcohol, so that alcohol has, in the recent past, been a concern of the Mental Health Unit in WHO's Division of Health Protection and Promotion. This unit is in a different category from that into which the Commission, INCB, and the Drug Dependence Unit fall; its field of attention embraces subjects other than alcohol, whereas the other units are exclusively concerned with drugs. We should add here that changes in the organizational structure of WHO occurred in August 1972 at headquarters and that in consequence "alcohol-ism" and "drug dependence" have been united at the adminis-trative level.

The secretariats of the key UN drug control organs have a dual source of authority: on the one hand, they serve the Commission and the INCB; on the other, they have to respond to decisions and directives from the secretary-general and other higher officials of the bureaucracy. The impression gained from interviews with various staff members suggests that in the area of drug control administration the role of these higher officials is sufficiently minor to justify their exclusion from our analysis. Also excluded from our analysis of the drug control machinery are organizations like INTERPOL, the Customs Cooperation Council, the Univer-sal Postal Union, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). While these are all involved in varying degrees in drug control matters, they are peripheral to the central apparatus, and we will thus consider them only when their activities or attitudes bear on the policy and actions of the central organs. The following discussion is confined to the contemporary drug organs, but it will be remembered that these organs have predecessors in the League of Nations. Figure 4.2 illustrates their descent.

Objectives of Control Bodies

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs was established in 1946 "in order to provide machinery whereby full effect may be given to the international conventions relating to narcotic drugs, and to provide for continuous review of and progress in international control of such drugs" (ECOSOC: lst, 1946). More specifically, The Commission would:

(a) assist the Economic and Social Council in exercising general supervision over the application of international conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs;

(b) carry out such fiinctions entrusted to the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs by the international conventions on narcotic drugs as the Council has found necessary to assume and continue;

(c) advise the Council on all matters pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs and prepare such draft international conventions as may be necessary;

(d) consider what changes may be required in the existing machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs and submit proposals to the Council;

(e) perform such other functions relating to narcotic drugs as the Council may direct.

The Commission's terms of reference imply that it should function as a policy-maker, but they are sufficiently vague to allow the Commission considerable flexibility in adjusting to changes in the world drug situation and climate of opinion, and in modifying its strategies accordingly. Shifts of position have occurred: in 1951, for example, a discussion took place in the Commission over the question of coca-leaf chewing and it was pointed out by a representative that before continuing the discussion "the Commission should decide whether the chewing of coca leaf was to be considered an addiction, in which case the Commission would be competent to deal with it, or as an economic and social problem outside its competence" (CND: 6th; 1951). Today, the Commission would be the first to insist on its competence to handle the social and economic aspects of drug-related problems.

The Commission has quasi-legislative and administrative func-tions and obligations under the Single Convention as well as policy-making authority. Article of the Convention provides that:

The Commission is authorized to consider all matters pertaining to the aims of this Convention, and in particular:

(a) To amend the Schedule in accordance with article 3;
(b) To call the attention of the Board to any matters which may be relevant to the functions of the Board;
(c) To make recommendations for the implementation of the aims and provisions of this Convention, including programmes of scientific research and the exchange of information of a scientific or technical nature;
(d) To draw the attention of non-parties to decisions and recommendations which it adopts under this Convention , with a view to their considering taking action in accordance therewith.

The functions of the INCB have been defined by the Single Convention, and its goals are basically those of that convention. The 1972 protocol amending the Single Convention has added a new dimension to the INCB's responsibilities by providing that it would "endeavour to limit the cultivation, production, manufac-ture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs." Hitherto, the Board's task had been very largely that of keeping a watch over the working of the treaties in relation to licit trade, but this new provision allows a much more explicit involvement in control over illicit drug production, distribution, and use. Earlier, the Board has been regarded as an administrative and semi-judicial body in some contrast to the policy-making Commission, but new functions assigned to the Board by the protocol have a tendency of making the INCB's scope of action broader, so that this distinction is perhaps less sharp. To offer another illustration: the Board has been authorized by the protocol to recom-mend technical or financial assistance to countries to help them carry out their treaty obligations. There would seem to be an overlap between this mandate--which in fact makes explicit what has already occurred informally—and the sphere of action of the Commission, to which the recommendation of technical assis-tance programs to supplement the treaty system has hitherto been attributed. The INCB, however, does not see an overlap and considers that its action will be limited to identifying countries in need of assistance (as distinct from the amount required and the source from which it should come) and to reviewing the situation after the assistance has been given to see if further action is warranted. In any case, the authorization merely confirms a practice which the Board has followed for many years (INCB, 1972: 32).

Although the WHO constitution contains no specific reference to drug addiction prevention, the general goal of the organization ("the attainment by all people of the highest possible level of health") would imply a responsibility to consider this problem, insofar as drug dependence is judged to be a health problem, as indeed it is by WHO definition. The second article of the constitution enumerates a number of subgoals but these are not assigned by reference to particular organizational units; instead, all the units have to keep all of these goals in sight, at least as far as is applicable. Under the treaty system WHO is required to evaluate and to identify the drugs that may warrant international control (a task once performed by the Health Committee of the League of Nations). But, for WHO, international control implies not only control of availability but also the reduction of demand through treatment and rehabilitation. Where alcohol is con-cerned, the objectives are again not explicitly stated but are to be inferred from the general WHO purpose of fostering an improved state of health, defined as a "state of complete physical, social, and mental well-being and not merely the absence of disease.'

The common purpose guiding the work of the key drug bodies does not preclude or completely override the existence of personal or group interests within the total system. The tendency of groups in formal organizations to favor actions that will maintain or augment their own power, prestige, and share of resources has been remarked upon by a great number of scholars (for example, Downs, 1967). And international bureaucrats, like national bureaucrats, are not free from the "instinctive interest" in the expansion of the activities of their organization by embarking upon new programs (Symonds and Cader, 1973: xvi). To some officials, the stability and cohesion of the agency to which they belong may be the prime consideration. In the early days of WHO, when the question of birth control programs was becoming a subject of debate in the international forum, the attitude of WHO's first director-general, Brock Chisholm, was that the first priority was to ensure that the future of the organization was not jeopardized by raising what was likely to be a highly controversial issue (Symonds and Carder, 1973: 59-60)

But these separate intersts relate more to means than to ends, and no doubt there are many officials who do not assert the primacy of the interests of their own organizations. In this they are supported by the consensus which is to be found among the international organizations that the "rules of the game" are to be preserved. While the organizations are not all agreed on all matters, they tend nevertheless to agree that the unspoken rules of the game upon which the entire international system rests should not be broken. This is often done by an avoidance of what may be considered radical measures or proposals. Another way of main-taining overall harmony despite factional interests is for members of one. body to nominate or appoint the members of another (Skolnick, 1%7), and for the same individual to be alternately a representative on the Commission and a member of the INCB, to take one of several examples (see chapter 9).

Resources

Table 4.1 gives a picture of the development of manpower in the four secretariat units of the key drug organs. For purposes of comparison we have provided similar data for the UN , WHO, and ILO. We have also compiled budgetary data on all these organizations for the period under review, and the comments which follow can as easily have been derived from these. But because identical conclusions can be drawn from both sets of data we have limited ourselves to the less cumbersome set. Both may, however, be used as indicators of the development of the resources of the bodies concerned.

The Division of Narcotic Drugs and its predecessor have always been the strongest unit as far as resources are concerned. Until 1929 the Opium Traffic Section was effectively the only secretariat service for drug matters. The increase in its resources as measured by manpower during the League days was negligible, but when the division began its work in 1947 there was a marked expansion of the unit. A lthough descriptions of work organization indicate that the two WHO units concerned have at their disposal the services of other departments not specifically concerned with drugs, their resources seem limited indeed when seen in relation to the other units in the table. There was an increase in manpower in INCB secretariat staffing in the late 1960s; INCB officials attribute this to increased workload brought about by the conclu-sion of new treaties (Greenfield and Dittert, interviews). As far as the Mental Health Unit of WHO is concerned, it should be remembered that alcoholism represents only a small part of the unit's work program, whereas drug matters are the only concern of the other organs. Thus the actual resources available for work in the field of alcoholism are even more limited than the table indicates. In fact, at no time has there been a single person in the unit whose entire time is devoted to alcohol work.

The table shows that manpower resources for work related to drug control have not increased at the same rate as manpower for the activities of UN, WHO, and ILO as a whole; the pace has been slower. This could mean that in proportion to overall increase that of drug control's claim on the total resources of the UN and VVHO, as determined by the priorities of these organi-zations, has been relatively slight.

As has already been mentioned, the development of budgetary resources over time closely follows that of manpower, as indeed it must when the bulk of the budget goes into salaries (see Woodcock, 1974: 312, 313). However, to provide some idea of the size of expenditures involved, table 4.2 gives the 1972 budget estimates of the institutions under review.

Quite clearly, drug programs do not have a very important role in the activities of the international agencies. Drug dependence and mental health activities together represent about 0.2 percent of the total WHO budget, while the proportion of the UN's budget allocated to drug control is just under 0.6 percent. WHO, the Division, and the INCB Secretariat do, however, have access to other sources of income. Voluntary funds, for instance, are used to finance some of WHO's projects, while the creation of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) has meant an increase in headquarters' resources all round.

Before we proceed to consider how these resources are used, and what specific tasks are performed by these bodies in pursuit of their goals and by virtue of their terms of reference, we must point, albeit arbitrarily, to the distinction between the policy-making, supervisory, and advisory bodies and what is generally referred to as the international civil service, although it must be stressed that in practice any dichotomy between them is false. Between the extreme of obvious policy and obvious implemen-tation (or administration, or the "carrying out of orders") is a wide no-man's-land in which the departmental orientation, the advice of the expert, the personal views of the top officials all have a part to play. The essence of a secretariat is its continuity and durability: it is always there. True, its action derives from rules laid down by others, in treaties, resolutions, and the like, but the decisions or policy statements which trickle through the ma-chinery often have to be interpreted, and it is usually the international civil servant who interprets them and puts them into effect according to his judgment about the intent of the decision, or the objectives to be pursued, or the right tactics to follow. Moreover, the officials are often involved in the earlier stages of the decision process when alternative plans and actions are being formulated (for example, when alternative drafts of a treaty are being worded), so that here, as well as later, the secretariat has a role. In 1938, for example, the Opium Advisory Committee asked its secretariat to prepare a draft of the main articles of a future convention for limiting opium cultivation. This was done by the Opium Section with the help of the Legal Section of the League, and very few changes were made by the Committee in the document (Pastuhov, 1945: 27). It is also well known that all the UN drug treaties enacted between 1946 and 1971 were drafted primarily by Adolf Lande, a former secretariat staff member. During the days of the League of Nations, the secretariat often determined what actions were to be taken by the governing bodies (Pastuhov, 1943: 1). As time passed, the relative importance of the civil servant increased; this was said to have been the case with the League of Nations (Ranshofen-Wertheimer, 1945: 393). Yet the work of the secretariat is to a high degree centered around the meetings of the policy-making, supervisory, or advisory bodies. Usually, only the professional staff members in the higher ranks of each department attend these meetings, and their participation affords an opportunity for individual maneuvering and influence. Compared to earlier years, the duration of the meetings of the INCB and the Commission has decreased. Although this might have been paralleled by an increase in efficiency, it is possible that the tendency towards shorter meetings will add to the relative importance of the civil servant.

The international civil servant maintains contact with those higher up in the UN hierarchy, and consultation occurs between the drug secretariats and such other UN offices as that of the Legal Adviser. But these are not frequent occurrences and we will not dwell on them; instead, we turn now to the more or less routine work which is being done by the agencies under review.