CHAPTER 8 SWEDEN

In the next bill on drug policy the Social Democratic government
reported on the drug situation and proposed further actions (Prop. 1972:
67). The Minister of Justice summed up the results of the drug policy so
far and depicted the situation as quite positive.
At the end of 1968, drug abuse had spread to almost all parts of the
country. The overall effect of the offensive against drugs was that abuse
of amphetamines had been circumscribed to the Stockholm,
Gothenburg, and Malmö regions. Furthermore, due to the information
campaign in 1969 together with police and custom actions, young
people had started to avoid central stimulants (Ibid. 19). The situation
was still worrying, however. Despite efforts from police and customs
the dissemination of cannabis throughout the country had continued.
Research showed that cannabis was the predominant drug. Some
increase in the availability of LSD, raw opium and morphine base had
been notified. According the standing committee of justice a
development of spreading heroin like in the US, Canada and England
had to be avoided at all costs (JuU 1972: 14: 6). In big city regions,
demands for drugs were still substantial and abuse deeply rooted (Ibid.
18). Abuse of cannabis had descended to occur in younger ages.
Therefore, the struggle had to continue and be fought on different fronts
along the lines set out in 1968. The drug problem was difficult and
complicated, which created tricky problems in weighing the benefits of
a certain action against its harmful consequences. Patience and
perseverance were required in the struggle. The minister warned against
painting the situation black and against exaggerations, for example, the
exponential growth theory predicting that the number of addicts would
be doubled every thirteen months (Ibid. 19). The minister seemed quite
satisfied with developments so far and concluded that efforts in Sweden
were substantial compared to other countries which experienced similar
problems.
The description of the situation by the National Police Board was not
at all that positive. Recent research had shown that drug use was
increasing again after the national police action in 1969. Supply of
central stimulants to Sweden had diminished substantially during 1969
and 1970. After that period police had to prioritise other duties and in
1971 plenty of drugs were on the illegal market again. Another
important factor was that demand for drugs was still high in Sweden.
This caused high prices, which attracted drug traffickers and
counteracted the positive results of police actions. According to the
NPB, police actions were not sufficient to combat demand for drugs.
Decreasing demand was a task for assistance, and more resources to
strengthen assistance were needed (Prop. 1972: 67:15).
The description by the minister reveals a recurrent pattern. The
situation is described in ambivalent terms. On the one hand, positive
results of the action programme are stressed but on the other hand, the
severity of the situation must be underlined to justify the existence of
the programme. In order to amplify the positive results politicians
compared the Swedish situation to developments in other countries.
Another phenomenon is the reports from the police, customs, and
correctional treatment, always able to present facts that refute surveys
indicating a positive trend.


Drug Act

In the bill, a sharpening of the Drug Act was proposed. The maximum
penalty for serious drug crime was to be raised from six to ten years'
imprisonment. This raise was meant to combat big dealers and would
not imply a general sharpening of the law. It was an adaptation to the
level of penalties in other European countries. Sweden would end up in
a vulnerable position if the maximum penalty were considerably lower
than in the surrounding countries (Ibid. 27). Another argument was that
serious drug crime was analogous to other serious crimes such as
spreading poison or contamination, and arson.
The revised Drug Act (SFS 1972:194) passed the parliament with
only a few MPs being critical. The only reservation was tabled by a MP
of the communist party, referring to the US that had proved the failure
of the "hard line" (JuU 1972: 14). Takman of the Communist Party,
vpk, supported by the social democrat Eriksson, stated that drug abusers
selling drugs to finance their abuse also would be sentenced to harsher
penalties. Another consequence of increasing the risks for drug dealing
would be higher prices for drug abusers and an increase of petty crime
(Rd 1972: 87: 85). Minister Lidbom could go along in this reasoning
but:
A logical consequence of this argument would be to accept drugs in the same way
as we have been forced to accept alcohol for generations and ages. I don't think that
anyone in this Riksdag is prepared to take the risk of drugs becoming a part of the
Swedish way of life and our cultural pattern similar to alcohol (Ibid. 68).

Takman also pointed to the fact that the proposed increase of the
maximum penalty was in opposition to the liberalisation of criminal
policy at that time. Lidbom agreed but according to him there was no
other choice (Ibid.).
Another sharpening concerned the execution of sentences within
correctional treatment. The possibility of conditional release, of leaves
for convicts serving long sentences, and of moving convicts for serious
drug crimes to local prisons, should be reconsidered. This would
particularly be the case in conditional releases of foreign inmates.
Depriving serious drug offenders of their liberty would primarily have
the character of protecting society (Prop. 1972: 67: 31­32). The
Narkomanvård Committee had proposed establishing special sections in
prisons for criminal drug abusers (SOU 1969: 52). However, the
minister wanted to wait for the report from a state committee on
correctional treatment later that year (Prop. 1972: 67: 26).


Guidelines

In 1969, the Prosecutor-General had proclaimed new guidelines for
prosecution (RÅC 56). Prosecution of possession of 2­3 grams of
cannabis and a maximum of 100 tablets of central stimulants for
personal use could be dismissed if no special circumstances were at
hand. This could also be applied in cases of handing over negligible
quantities for use. In 1971, the guidelines for prosecution were
discussed once more. According to the Prosecutor-General, a balance
had to be kept between maintaining respect for the law and the
allocation of resources. Other reasons were that first-time offenders
might adopt the identity of a drug addict and the process of prosecution
could be harmful to the individual. However, as stated by the Minister
of Justice, drug abusers who systematically finance their abuse by
selling drugs in small quantities would normally not be eligible for
dismissal (RÅC C 67: 2).
In the next guidelines in 1972, developments of court practice were
accounted for since 1969 that showed that cannabis had been
dominating in drug cases in court. Practice had shown that courts did
take the type and quantity of drug into account. Prosecutors and courts
had obviously judged cases with cannabis in particular relatively
leniently (C 74: 5). In the guidelines, the limit of the maximum quantity
of drugs to be considered possession for personal use was raised.
Dismissal of prosecution could be decreed with a quantity that was
equivalent to one week's use, especially in the case of cannabis (C 74:
8). The reason for this change was the practice developed in some
districts that considered the addict's state of abuse. A person who has
been addicted for some years uses larger quantities than occasional
users. The limit of, for example, 100 tablets was far too little for an
addict.
Obviously, the Prosecutor-General was in support of a separate
judgement of cannabis compared to other substances:

Consideration of what kind of intervention from society is most suitable to meet a
certain kind of danger, for example, cannabis, can lead to a proportionately stronger
emphasis [than on penal action] on measures such as information and youth care
(RÅC C74: 6).

According to the Prosecutor-General, such judgements, especially in
relation to documentation provided by the WHO, the Shafer
Committee, and the LeDain Committee, were in accordance with the
spirit of the law.71 This is a peculiar statement if we look at the
conclusion on marijuana from the Shafer Committee. It stated that the
unauthorised possession of any controlled substance except marijuana
for personal use should remain a prohibited act (Musto 1987: 262).


Information

Informing the public and especially youth about the dangers of drug
abuse was regarded as an important preventive measure. Information
should be aimed at placing abuse in its social context and at extending
people's awareness that social difficulties should be met by openness
and a will for solidarity (Prop. 1972: 67: 22).
The state and municipalities, partly in co-operation with popular
movements and youth, had pursued information activities. The
experiences of information were positive; knowledge among the public
about the character, causes, and magnitude of the drug problem had
increased considerably (Ibid. 22).
The National Board of Health and Welfare had become responsible
for the provision of facts on drugs and other addictive substances. State
subsidies to information activities by non-governmental organisations
were to be continued under the responsibility of the State Youth
Council and be especially aimed at youth. Concerning the content of
information, the minister stated: "Drug abuse is but one of other
problems with a social background. Similar problems are abuse of beer
and solvents. Information should take this into consideration" (Ibid.
23).


Assistance

Outreach work did exist in big cities or was planned for in a number of
municipalities and counties. Ambulatory care was available in around
200 general psychiatric clinics and 15 clinics for drug abusers.
Intramural care of drug abusers was located at psychiatric clinics.
About 470 beds for drug abusers were available at specialist wards and
general wards for substance dependency at psychiatric hospitals. Young
drug abusers were taken care of in state correctional homes, child and
youth homes, and psychiatric youth clinics. Concerning the
establishment of treatment homes and boarding houses for drug
abusers, the results were disappointing.72 The total number of beds was
estimated at 100. State subsidies were available for a much larger
number but had not been applied for by counties and cities.
In all, facilities for care had been extended but were still insufficient
and especially new kinds of care and treatment were needed as an
alternative to the existing care institutions. Due to the complexity and
diversity of the drug problem, care and treatment had to be multifaceted
and initiatives to establish alternatives to traditional intramural care
were to receive financial support from the state (Ibid. 24).
The standing committee on Social Affairs mentioned two
explanations for the slow pace of establishing new facilities. Firstly, it
could not be excluded that exaggerated pessimism concerning the
treatment of drug abusers had influenced responsible authorities in
budget discussions (SoU 1972: 21: 11). The backdrop to this statement
can be found in the public debate on the drug problem. Proponents of
the "epidemic" theory claimed that drug abusers were very hard or
almost impossible to cure once they had become addicted. Secondly,
the National Board of Health and Welfare had been instructed in 1969
to work out guidelines for treatment of drug abusers but was delayed
(Ibid. 11).


The unmotivated

The debates on compulsory treatment of drug abusers continued in the
Riksdag, as well as in public discussions. Demands for compulsory
care, similar to that of alcoholics under the Temperance Act, had been
put forward by the RNS and FMN and their allies in the Riksdag. The
minister understood these demands, especially from parents of drug
abusers. However, in his opinion, the problem of addiction could not be
solved by radically changing the guiding principle of voluntariness. Use
of coercion on a large scale was not an effective method for solving
problems with a psychosocial background. The social backgrounds and
deficiencies in the social environment of drug abusers were similar to
groups that manifest other symptoms of social disturbances. Therefore,
it would not be meaningful to treat symptoms separately (Ibid. 25).
However, some drug abusers did not apply for or did not accept care.
For those, compulsory psychiatric care was possible but had to be
applied restrictively. The standing committee on social affairs agreed
with the minister, and motions from MPs for increased possibilities to
apply coercion were rejected. Instead, the standing committee stated
that provisions on drug abuse in the LSPV Act had not been applied in
accordance with the possibilities (SoU 1972: 21). A working group,
appointed by the National Board of Health and Welfare, was
investigating the reasons for this low utilisation of the Act. However,
the committee stated:

One has to keep in mind that the decision to apply the Act will always be in the
hands of physicians. Their decision will coincide with their opinion of the different
ideologies on care in the field of drug abuse but is also dependent on access to
evaluations of the appropriateness and effects of different treatment methods. The
law only regulates conditions for care, not its content (SoU1972: 21:10).

Demands to apply the Temperance Act for alcoholics to drug abusers as
well were also rejected. The standing committee referred to a Social
Committee that was investigating a total revision of the Welfare Act
including the Temperance Act (S 1969:29).
To strengthen their argument for compulsory care, several MPs
referred to a newspaper article written by Westerberg from the Hassela
community. Since 1969, they had taken care of young drug abusers
according the Care of Young Persons Act (LVU). According to
Westerberg their model of re-fostering youngsters had proved to be
effective (Rd 1972: 87: 74­75). The Hassela model acquired many
followers in the field of youth care and was used as an argument in
debates on compulsory care of adult abusers.


Co-ordination

The Minister of Justice, Lidbom, broached the issue of co-ordination.73
While the task for the SBN was to co-ordinate actions against drug
abuse, the final execution of actions rested on authorities. After its first
year, when the SBN indeed co-ordinated actions, the body's activities
during the following years can best be described as primarily
exchanging information between its members.74 This development was
criticised by some MPs who called it the "director-general club" and
instead advocated a parliamentary commission. On 19 March 1973, the
SBN held its last meeting and was succeeded by a new body within the
Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), the "BRÅ Narcotics Group".
This new body was to perform roughly the same activities as the SBN.
A major difference between the BRÅ Narcotics Group and the SBN
was that lower-ranking officials had replaced the directors-general and
the participation of departmental officials. The BRÅ Narcotics Group
would stay in office until 1984.


71 The documents referred to were: WHO (The Use of Cannabis. WHO Technical
Report series no. 478, 1971), Shafer Committee (The National Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Abuse: "Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding"),
Washington 1972, LeDain Committee (The Royal Canadian Commission on
Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs: Interim Report, "Treatment,
Cannabis", Ottawa 1970, 1972, and 1972).
72 The difference between treatment homes and boarding houses is that in the latter
no treatment is provided. It is a place to stay during a period when a person is
searching for a flat. Employment or study was a condition for admission to a
boarding house. Such houses existed already for alcoholics in the big cities.
73 Lidbom was also chairman of the SBN.
74 However, in April 1971 a supplement to the first fact leaflet was published.