Chapter Three: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM UP TO 1970

In the previous chapter an account was given of the early developments of the legal machinery and how certain drugs came to be selected for control. In this chapter I want to continue this theme, concentrating now on the international control system. The importance of this system cannot be underestimated as far as British legislation is concerned as all the Dangerous Drugs Acts from 1923-1964 were implemented as a result of Inter-national Conventions. Inevitably studies in the sociology of law must face the basic questions of examining why a legal system developed in a given way, and why it changed or was amended. The point here is that the international control system had so much effect on the legislative pattern that to ignore it would be to omit a large area of explanation. However, for the purpose of this essay international control must be relegated to a more secondary position as when all is said and done the domestic legislation is, for our purposes, more important.

From 1920 to 1970 international control continued to develop, first under the aegis of the League of Nations, and later under the United Nations. The reluctance of members to ratify The Hague Convention continued after the 1914-1918 War. B. A. Renborg states that "the experience was in fact so disappointing that at the war's conclusion, the victorious powers decided vigorously to underwrite the international campaign against narcotic abuse." Two steps were taken; firstly a provision was inserted into the peace treaties which automatically brought the convention into force between the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles; Article 295 of the Treaty states, "ratification of the peace treaty should be deemed in all respects equivalent to rati-fication of the (Hague) Convention." Secondly, a special provision was also included in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and Article 23 states that "the members of the League will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to . . . the traffic of opium and other dangerous drugs." Even so, some powers who were not involved in the war and did not sign the Treaty were still outside the ambit. As late as 1925, after a conference held in Geneva on drug control, the British Medical Journal somewhat tartly remarked, "It is satisfactory to learn from Geneva that Switzerland is at least about to ratify the [Hague] Convention." 2

On 15th December 1920, at the First Assembly of the League of Nations, a resolution by the British Government was passed creating an Advisory Committee with powers to exercise a general supervision over the traffic of opium and other dangerous drugs and to secure the full co-operation of the various countries in the field. This Committee was required to present a report on all matters concerning opium and other dangerous drugs at a period not later than 3 months before the beginning of every session. The Committee was composed of Government represen-tatives, and not individuals, from those countries which were considered most deeply concerned with the problem. Special provisions were made for the representation on this Committee of the U.S.A. and other countries not members of the League whose co-operation was seen to be important. At the first meeting of the Committee in May 1921, again on the motion of the British Government, a recommendation was accepted that an enquiry should be made into the world's requirement of drugs. As a result it was quickly revealed that the production of raw materials and manufactured drugs greatly exceeded the world's requirements for medical and scientific purposes. This prepared the ground for the first and second opium conferences held in Geneva in 1925 and ultimately led to the 1925 Dangerous Drugs Act in Britain.

The first opium conference, more properly called The Geneva Agreement on Opium in the Far East, had no specific effect on British legislation, but Britain was involved because of her control over certain Far Eastern territories. Much more important as far as British domestic policy was concerned was the Second Opium Conference which negotiated the Geneva Convention in 1925.

This Convention was originally convened "with the view to the conclusion of an agreement on the question of the limitation of the amuunts of morphine, heroin and cocaine and their respective salts to be manufactured, of the limitation of the amounts of raw opium and coca leaves to be imported and of the limitation of the production of raw opium for export. . . ."

In the 1920s, in spite of The Hague Convention, the inter-national trade in drugs was the main source of supply for the illicit traffic; smuggling was comparatively less important. The export and import of manufactured drugs were in general unres-tricted and were said to circulate across frontiers and oceans unhindered and in practically unlimited quantities. This vast trade—which was brought to The League's attention by the Advisory Committee, began to cause great anxiety and it was clear that a form of control was needed.3 At the conference, which was attended by 36 states, the U.S. delegate quickly pro-posed that plans should be made for the direct limitation of quantities of manufactured drugs on the basis of world require-ments, and to limit production of raw opium and coca leaves on the basis of medical and scientific needs. This proposal was not accepted so the U.S. delegate withdrew. The Chinese delegate wanted governments to agree to the suppression of opium where they held territories in which it was still legal. This was not accepted and the Chinese delegate also withdrew. The American and Chinese delegates argued that it was impossible to destroy the demand for opium or coca leaves as long as the other produc-ing countries were unable to restrict supply. The other producing countries argued that it would be impossible to justify such a policy to their nationals, as it would deprive many of them of their livelihood, so long as the other authorities, including China, were so ineffective as to be unable to stop illegal smuggling and pro-duction. With the departure of the U.S. and Chinese delegates, the conference concentrated on aspects of trade of the drugs. The major changes brought about by this conference were to extend the controls introduced by The Hague Convention by transform-ing them from a voluntary into a legal obligation. In view of the vast trade in manufactured drugs an obligation was also imposed on all parties to control the manufacture, sales and distribution, with the establishment of the Permanent Central Opium Board to "continuously watch the course of the international trade."
The 1925 Convention also extended the range of controlled drugs to include coca leaves, crude cocaine and cannabis. The first two of these drugs were an obvious choice in the general control of manufactured drugs, but cannabis was introduced for other reasons. The way in which it became included in British legislation is an example of how a 'drug' was first defined as a problem in other countries and then classified, and how, as a party to international conventions, Britain too agreed to define and classify its use as illegal.

At The Hague Convention there had been considerations as to whether cannabis should be included in international control. In 1923, the South African delegate proposed to the League's Advisory Committee that cannabis should be classified as one of the habit forming drugs. The British delegate suggested that more information was needed for the Advisory Committee to consider at its next meeting in 1925. However, at the 1925 Geneva Con-vention the Egyptian delegate at an early meeting 4 submitted a proposal that cannabis should be brought within the Convention, because it was a narcotic and could produce acute or chronic hashism. Acute hashism was said to produce a serious delusion and strong physical agitations; it predisposed to acts of violence and produced a characteristic strident laugh. Chronic hashism was a more serious condition; it was said to produce "physical ailments, heart troubles, digestive troubles, etc., the user's intel-lectual powers gradually weakened and the whole organism decayed. The addict frequently became neurasthenic and even-tually insane." 5 Although the matter was not on the agenda, in view of the Egyptian delegate's evidence it was later referred to a sub-committee from 16 countries, including Britain, comprising doctors, professors and persons with ministerial and administra-tive experience in public health, hospital or pharmaceutical service. Thirteen countries on the sub-committee reported in favour of complete prohibition; the others, Britain, India and The Netherlands, abstained. The British delegate was "uncertain whether there was potential medical value in the resin", but the Indian delegate made a more substantial point. He thought there were "serious difficulties in confining the use of hemp to medical and scientific purposes, for example there are social and religious customs which naturally have to be considered, and there is the doubt whether the total prohibition of drugs easily prepared from a wild growing plant could in practice be made effective." How-ever, the sub-committee's report was adopted and another sub-committee was appointed to prepare a draft provision. This was accepted virtually without discussion and contracting parties were required to exercise control over exports and imports in similar ways to those which applied to other drugs. At this stage though, only limited control existed "because of the ingrained habits which existed in many countries." ° There were no provisions requiring governments to control production, to prevent domestic traffic, or even to prevent its non-medical use. Nor were parties required to send to the Opium Board statistics on production, manufacture, etc., as for other drugs. It was not until the Single Convention in 1961 that control was further extended.

The Geneva Convention came into operation in September 1928. Its major influence was in the extensive machinery it created for international control. Also for the first time there was a central board in operation which was in a position to calculate world needs for restricted drugs. This has been termed by one authority as the first internationtal attempt to develop the essential principles of a planned economy on a world scale for a particular industry. The annual reports of the Board over the next 4 or 5 years were largely responsible for a later Convention in 1931.

Britain, as a party to the Geneva Convention amended the 1920 and 1923 Dangerous Drugs Acts "so f ar as it is necessary to enable effect to be given to a Convention signed at Geneva" and introduced the 1925 Dangerous Drugs Act. This Act was timed to coincide with the ratification of the Convention and came into operation in 1928. The Act itself contained only 7 sections and under Sections 1 and 3 it simply amended the previous Acts to include coca leaves, crude cocaine and cannabis. The Act passed quickly through Parliament and in spite of the introduction of new drugs was seen to be hardly worthy of comment. The Parliamentary correspondent of the British Medical Journal reported that "a Bill to make minor amend-ments and some extensions to the Dangerous Drugs Act was passed with amazing rapidity during the last days of the late session . . The Act brings coca leaves, Indian Hemp and resins under the same restrictions as raw opium . . . It will be seen that the amendments made in the Principal Act are comparatively unimportant."' In fact it was read a second time in the House of Lords on July 28th 1925, introduced in the Commons on July 30th, read a second time on August 4th and received the Royal Assent on August 7th. Regulations were made in December 1928 in respect of these drugs.

The usual delays in ratification occurred and it was over 3 years from the signing of the Convention in February 1925 before the necessary 10 signatories were available for the Convention to come into force. As late as 1930 neither Turkey nor Persia, both large opium producing countries, had ratified either The Hague or Geneva Conventions. Meanwhile, smuggling and over-production continued. A factory in The Netherlands in 1927 and in the first 3 months of 1928 exported to the Far East 860 kilos of morphine, 2711 kilos of heroin and 40 kilos of cocaine. The legitimate needs of China for heroin were less than 100 kilos a year. The Advisory Committee in April 1928 reported that hundreds of kilos of morphine were being exported from France ostensibly to Germany. The German delegate maintained that they had never arrived, and it was thought they went to Russia via Copenhagen! The Health Committee of The League of Nations believed that 250 tons of raw opium and 6 tons of cocaine were enough for world requirements, but in the first 6 months of 1930 Turkey exported 2282 kilos of morphine and 4383 kilos of heroin which was about 40 times as much as required in Britain for 1 year, and 1 factory in Alsace manufactured in 1 year 21 times the world's requirements of heroin. The British delegate to the Advisory Committee in 1927 said the position was "most unsatisfactory . . and little short of absurd" and the Committee itself "deplored the fact that its efforts and those of the League had not bien so successful as had originally been hoped." Britain, however, or at least as far as the British Medical Journal was concerned, was "one of the model countries of the world" and they wanted others to do "the same as Britain, and administer their Acts with as much energy . . ."8 Their evidence for this was presumably based on the annual reports to The League of Nations which up to 1932 had noted that the illicit traffic in Britain was either "negligible", "inconsiderable" or "on a very small scale".

As a result of this international traffic, licit and otherwise, a further Convention was called to make another attempt to strengthen control, but the difficulty was to arrive at an agreed agenda. In 1923 the Advisory Committee had been asked to boycott all exports of the scheduled dangerous drugs from countries not adhering to The Hague Convention, e.g., Turkey, Persia, Switzerland and the Argentine. This was rejected because it was feared that such a boycott would give India a virtual monopoly of the export trade! In 1929 the Venezuelan delegate asked for an enquiry into the reasons why states had not succeeded in limiting the manufacture of drugs. Eventually, in 1930, the Advisory Committee produced a plan for estimating the world's legitimate requirements, and what was called 'a workman-like scheme' for approximating the amounts to be manufactured and supplied by the various producing countries. The plan was to limit manufacture of each drug to the preceding year's estimates; each country was to decide its own needs and the share to be made on a quota system. No agreement was ever reached on the quotas. For example, Turkey was only prepared to join if its quota was one-third of all opium production. Also it was feared that if the manufacture was restricted to a small number of producers, world prices would collapse and too much power would go to European cartels "whose behaviour in the past did not warrant unlimited confidence". There might also be over-production as manufacturers would tend to produce up to the limits of the estimates rather than for actual needs.

The system finally adopted was embodied in the Limitation Convention of 1931. This, the largest of all the conferences, was attended by 54 states whilst others sent observers. China and the U.S.A. also attended this time. The main resolution was that under Article 2 each contracting party was to provide estimates of the amounts of manufactured drugs needed for any one year,9 based on the quantities necessary for medical and scientific purposes, for conversion to other drugs, for reserve stocks and establishment and maintenance of government stocks. To examine and endorse these figures a Drug Supervisory Body was created which would publish the parties' annual estimates. It was also given power to establish estimates for any countries which failed to furnish them to the Body whether or not they were parties to the Convention. The Body also had the right to point out to governments where estimates were excessive. Also under Articles 14 and 16 it could initiate an embargo against countries where imports and exports exceeded those estimates, and where limitations had been placed on manufacture, so that stocks would not exceed the amount required for the next 6 months. Under Article 21 parties were to give full details of every case of illicit trafficking and they were to communicate with one another over their own laws and promulgations.

The 1931 Convention differed from the 1925 Convention in that all estimates were to be binding, as its main aim was to close the channels through which drugs escaped into the illicit traffic. The Drug Supervisory Body was to work with the Permanent Central Opium Board, in that the latter performed a semi-judicial function whilst the former had the duty of establishing the totals and estimates for each country and territory. The 1931 Conven-tion also added new drugs to the list, but these were confined to the phenanthene alkaloids of opium and ecgomine alkaloids of the coca leaf.

It is difficult to judge the effects of this Convention on the international field, because it is so closely linked with the 1925 Convention. The Permanent Central Opium Board, however, said that although the period between 1931-1936 in the case of manu-factured drugs is relatively short, "nevertheless . . . some of the aims of the 2 Conventions . . . namely a complete account of supplies available (Geneva Convention 1925) and the limitation of the manufacture to medical and scientific purposes (Limitation Convention 1931) has been to a large extent and, subject to one exception, attained." The exception was Japan which was said to be manufacturing large quantities of heroin for illicit use in China. The Board believed that it had been able to account for 99% of all the heroin manufactured and 94% of the cocaine during this period. Whereas from 1925-1930 90 tons of morphine was thought to have escaped into the illicit traffic, from 1931— 1935 the manufacture of morphine had dropped to 25% of the 1929 amount without any resulting damage to medical require-ments.

As a result of the 1931 Convention, Britain introduced the 1932 Dangerous Drugs Act. The Act itself is again very short, containing only 5 sections, and it brought under control those substances which were included in the Convention. It also passed quickly through Parliament; it had its second reading in the House of Lords on 17th February 1932, and had been through the Commons and received the Royal Assent before the Easter recess. There were no drafting amendments at any of the Committee stages. The Act came into operation on the 9th July 1933 after the Limitation Convention had been ratified by the agreed number of signatories. In December 1933 appropriate Regulations were made, which gave detailed arrangements for the control of these drugs.

The last major international convention before the 1939 war was in 1936. It was convened in another attempt to suppress the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs. Its object was "to strengthen the measures intended to penalise offences . . . [and] . . . to combat by the methods most effective in the present circumstances the illicit traffic in the drugs and substances covered by the Conventions." Its aim was to encourage a similar approach to all drug offences in all countries. Whereas in Britain the maximum penalties were 10 years for drug offences, in Switzerland 6 defendants were given prison sentences ranging from 9 months to 6 weeks for unlawfully possessing 12 hundredweight of heroin valued at £14,500. It was presumably this sort of anomaly that the Convention tried to remove. It therefore defined the offences and the penalties and stipulated that they should be included as extradition crimes in any extradition treaty. Where no extradition treaty existed, parties undertook to prosecute a national who returned to his country after committing an offence abroad. It was therefore aimed at preventing offenders, especially traffickers, from avoiding prosecution because the law of the country in which they resided did not cover smuggling offences committed abroad.

This convention came into operation in October 1939, one month after the outbreak of the second world war. Britain did not ratify it on the grounds that it interfered with her right to decide her own penalties. A number of other countries had by this time also increased penalties and so the Convention itself could be regarded as relatively unimportant compared with others of that period.

After 1935, the production of manufactured drugs increased as political events moved governments to take in emergency supplies of morphine and its derivatives. By 1939 international control was firmly established, but the war temporarily put an end to any further development. However, the Opium Board and the Super-visory Body moved to Washington and still operated so that there would be no break in international control. The Opium Board reported that during 1939-1945 "in general governments furnished estimates required, and the Limitation Convention operated to a satisfactory degree"; the difficulties were apparently from the Axis countries. In 1940, for example, 65 countries and 98 territories returned estimates leaving only 7 countries and 8 territories where the Opium Board had to decide for them. Germany and Russia, when they returned the estimates, headed the list for morphine.

Britain continued to complete the annual reports although some concessions were made to the fact that a war was on. For example, no details are available in the reports during the war years about exports or imports of drugs; this information was apparently given direct to the Secretariat of the Permanent Central Opium Board. Other than this, it would be difficult to know that a national emergency existed. In 1941 in a masterly piece of British under-statement, the report contained the para-graph that "No difficulties were encountered in the application of the Conventions, though as in the previous year, drugs con-signed to destinations overseas were, in a few instances, lost through enemy action".

By the time the war ended in 1945, only 21 drugs were controlled; by 1970 this number had increased to well over 100. The control system which had begun so quietly at the Shanghai Conference, had developed under The League of Nations to become a sophisticated system which had already been responsible for 3 out of the 4 Dangerous Drugs Acts in Britain. After 1945 this control system continued to develop, but this time under the United Nations. Even by 1970 it had still accounted for most of the Dangerous Drugs Acts, and all of them up to 1964. After that year events in Britain developed their own momentum and led to the 1967 and 1971 Acts. In 1964 the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act was also introduced which, strictly speaking, could not be called a Dangerous Drugs Act, but it nevertheless had similar effects in that it controlled the use of certain 'drugs' for similar reasons as the other Acts.

After the war, Britain introduced the 1950 Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, which tidied up certain anomalies in respect of Northern Ireland as well as transferring international control from the League to the United Nations." The next Act, the 1951 Dangerous Drugs Act, was a consolidating Act, as were the Regulations attached to it, and the final Act, the 1964 Dangerous Drugs Act, was passed to implement the Single Convention.
The control system under the United Nations began on the 12th February 1946. Just before the League of Nations finally ceased to exist, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution "to take the necessary measures to ensure the continued exercise of those functions and powers of a technical and non-political character conferred by certain international instruments on the League of Nations." The United Nations Charter makes no specific mention of narcotic drugs; the General Assembly Resolution of 12th February 1946 includes narcotic drugs by implication. The matter was then referred to the Economic and Social Council who, at their first session on 18th February 1946, established a Commission on Narcotic Drugs with duties similar to that of the old Advisory Committee.11 By October 1946 the Economic and Social Council approved a draft Protocol amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on narcotic drugs concluded between 1912 and 1936. This was then approved by the General Assembly in November 1946. The whole matter of transfer was concluded within a period of 9 months.

One of the first acts of the Commission was to take official cognisance of the Protocol and express the hope that it would be accepted by the States and Parties concerned. This Protocol was the first, and a model for a series of legal instruments transferring to the United Nations powers and functions formerly held by the League of Nations in various technical non-political fields. On 3rd June 1948, this Protocol, called the Protocol on Narcotic Drugs Done at Lake Success, New York, become operative, and in 1950 Britain passed the Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, which transferred duties and powers to the United Nations.

This Protocol made few changes to either personnel or policies. The new Commission contained many members of the League's Advisory Committee, the representatives of Canada, the Nether-lands, France and the U.S.A. having previously worked for the League. The duties of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body were under Article II(i) of the Protocol to "continue to perform their previous functions". The only difference was that, where vacancies existed, new members were to be appointed by the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Secretary-General was authorised under Article II(ii) "to perform at once the duties hitherto discharged by the League's Secretary-General."

Similarly much of the thinking of the new body was a direct inheritance from the League. Almost all the subsequent changes in international control had already been considered by the Advisory Committee, and the Commission itself, although faced with a formidable number of new problems, attempted to solve them in an empirical way, following the same tradition as the Shanghai Conference in 1909. One authority who approved of this approach wrote, "It has not tried to think out academic solutions, but has adapted to the complexity of international relations . . . and to the fact that any construction in order to last must grow naturally. Narcotics control has not, and could not, be prefabricated."12

There were 3 main changes in international control which impinge upon British legislation; the 1948 Protocol, the 1961 Single Convention, and to a lesser extent the 1953 Protocol. The 1948 Protocol deals with synthetic narcotics. The first of these, pethidine, was produced in Germany in 1939; others followed in other countries during the war years and were developed because of the threat to supplies of the 'natural' narcotics such as the opiates. Although control of synthetic narcotics had already been discussed by the League, at the first session of the United Nations Commission each country was urged to initiate without delay its own measures of control. Meanwhile, a new instrument at the international level was obviously needed to cope with these changes. Whereas the 1925 Convention had made it possible for all addiction-producing drugs to be placed under international control, these measures only applied to those defined by the Convention and were only binding on the parties who signed it. The 1931 Convention under Article 11 only established a system which would control manufactured drugs produced from the phenanthene alkaloids of opium or ecgomine alkaloids of the coca leaf. The difference in chemical structure between the 'synthetic' and 'natural' narcotics posed additional problems. Manufactured natural narcotics belong to specific chemical groups; synthetic narcotics belong to an increasing variety of chemical groups which are theoretically unlimited in number, and which may not all need to be controlled.

The 1948 Protocol signed in Paris on 19th November, attempted to close this gap in the control system. Under Article I each party should inform the Secretary-General of any drug used for medical and scientific purposes which did not come within the scope of the 1931 Convention and which that party considered capable of abuse. The Secretary-General would then inform all other parties and notify the Commission and the W.H.O. Expert Committee on Drug Dependence who would then decide if it were capable either of producing addiction or of being converted into an addiction-producing product. If it was, then parties to the Protocol were required to take steps to control it. Article 2 allows the Commission to take interim measures pending the conclusion of the W.H.O. report.13

Before the Protocol was signed, letters to the appropriate medical journals in Britain had already warned of the dangers of pethidine. One such letter in 1946 stated that "Pethidine may cause addiction in as serious a degree as the more common drugs associated with these conditions . . . Physicians who relieve an addiction to some of the common drugs by substituting pethidine run the risk of a mere alteration of the addiction."14 By that time a small number of pethidine addicts had come to the notice of the Home office, and there were also a number of convictions for forging pethidine prescriptions. On 1st January 1947 the Govern-ment, by Order in Council, brought pethidine under the control of the Dangerous Drugs Acts and their Regulations, even before the 1948 Protocol was signed. Other synthetic narcotics such as physeptone (methadone) were brought under control by later Regulations or by subsequent Dangerous Drugs Acts.

The League's Advisory Committee in the late 1930s had already noted that international control should be codified and brought under one single convention. This idea was taken up by the Commission which at its 7th session adopted a Resolution requesting the Secretary-General to begin work on the draft of a new Single Convention. It was hoped that this convention would also include provisions for the limitation of the production of the "raw materials", i.e., the plants or vegetal products of the opium, cannabis and coca leaves. However, the drafting of the Single Convention was expected to take many years, and it was thought that control of the raw materials should be dealt with immedi-ately.

The 1925 Convention had already placed a general duty on the parties to ensure control of production, distribution and export of raw opium but did not control the raw materials such as poppy straw, which was also known to be capable of producing the opiates. The opium poppy was still grown in some regions because they were remote from administrative centres, and it seeds were used for culinary purposes, and in some areas it was thought the farmers were not even aware of its narcotic potentialities. Yet all such production was in a sense a threat to international control. At first it was hoped to extend control over the raw materials of cannabis and coca leaves too, but eventually the Commission decided to concentrate on the opium poppy as it was thought that addiction to opiates was more widespread, and the opium poppy, unlike the cannabis plant and coca leaf, needs to be cultivated and thus needs an abundant supply of cheap labour.

The League in 1940 had already produced a draft convention for the limitation of opium production, but the Commission unfortunately chose to disregard the League's draft. Instead it looked at a new scheme, the central feature of which was an P international opium organisation with a monopoly to purchase, stock and sell opium. The scheme was endorsed by the United Nations Secretariat after years of work, but then was suddenly abandoned in 1952 for wholly political reasons, the main one being that opium is an important strategic substance, and the majority of the Commission were unwilling to place the responsi-bility for the world's supply in the hands of an international monopoly. A much less ambitious scheme, with fewer political implications, proposed by France, was therefore adopted, which eventually became the 1953 Protocol. The Protocol does not limit opium production, but rather the use of opium to the world's medical and scientific needs.15 Each producing country must confine its production and trade to government agencies, and regulate exports and imports so that stocks do not exceed the amounts likely to be exported over a 2i year period. Other limitations were placed on the manufacturing countries. The Permanent Central Opium Board was given extensive powers to supervise the Protocol which were far greater than those under the 1925 and 1931 Conventions. Under Article 6(ii), opium was only to be produced in 7 countries: Bulgaria, Greece, India, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., Iran and Yugoslavia.

The Protocol does not of course limit the production of opium. In 1953 it was seen only as an interim measure and it was hoped that opportunities would be available during the discussions on the Single Convention to introduce more effective control. However, the Commission later abandoned this idea, and the Single Convention under Article 24 included that Protocol with amendments which lessened its effect. Furthermore, the Protocol could not come into force until 3 of the 7 producing countries had ratified it. It took 10 years before the third country signed, and the Protocol came into operation on 8th March 1963, just a few months before the Single Convention.

The final important agreement, the 1961 Single Convention, came into operation on 13th December 1964.'6 It was a collective work which involved the Commission and its Secretariat, the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs, the Opium Board and the Supervisory Body, together with the World Health Organiza-tion and Interpol. The Convention was finally adopted by a Plenipotentiary Conference in 1961 in which 71 governments took part together with a host of other organisations such as the International Federation of Women Lawyers, and the Inter-national Conference of Catholic Charities. It is not possible to note in detail all the features of the Convention which contains 51 articles, each with 3 or 4 subsections. Nor is it possible to record the various confrontations and vicissitudes which occurred before it was finally signed. These problems were partly political, but others were due to the more practical problems of attempting to codify into a single enactment the 8 Conventions which governed international control. These Conventions had some provisions which had become obsolete, others which had never worked satisfactorily, and others which needed updating to fit into the complexities of the post World War II era. It was not therefore a question simply of joining up all the old Conventions, but of updating and evaluating without losing any qualities, and at the same time making changes which were acceptable to all parties. This had led to numerous drafts extending over many years, and the final version, like the 1953 Protocol, was changed at the last minute and was not as the Commission had prepared it.

The central feature of the Single Convention is still the system of estimates which were introduced by earlier treaties. However, the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drugs Supervisory Body were amalgamated and are now called the International Narcotics Control Board. The duties of this Board were to continue with the administration of the estimates system and to act as a focal point in international control." As in the past, its authority is a moral one and its power lies in the right to recommend to parties not to import or export drugs from any offending country. It has an additional right to publish any reports concerning these recommendations, but no power to usurp the authority of any government. In practice the methods used will mainly be those of gentle diplomatic persuasion rather than formal lecturing or administering public reproofs.

The drugs subject to the Convention are listed in 4 schedules. Schedule I contains those which have the most rigid control, and use is limited to medical and scientific purposes. They include heroin, morphine, opium, pethidine and cannabis. Estimates are to be sent to the Control Board and manufacture is to be under licence with strict measures to enforce the requirements on domestic and international trade. Schedule II drugs are subject to similar control except that parties need not require medical prescriptions for domestic supply. Those in Schedule III, such as preparations of codeine, are subject to even less control as the special provisions relating to international trade do not apply and annual estimates are not required. The final group in Schedule IV consists of a special class of drugs selected from those in Schedule I. They are still subject to the same measures of international control as those in Schedule I, but each party has the right to adopt "special measures of control which are thought to be necessary, having regard to the particularly dangerous property of the drug" and the right to take "the most appropriate means of protecting public health and welfare, prohibit the production, manufacture, export and import or trade in, possession or use of such drugs except for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific research only . . ." Only 4 drugs have been included in Schedule IV, 2 of which are heroin and cannabis."

Some countries at the time of ratification reserved the right to permit "the quasi-medical use of opium", or "opium smoking, coca leaf chewing or even the use of cannabis for non-medical purposes." These countries undertook to abolish these within 15 years for opium and 25 years for coca and cannabis, but whether this will be achieved or not is difficult to say as similar statements have often been made in the past without many resulting changes. By 1970 about half the members of the United Nations had ratified the Single Convention. For the remainder, the provisions of the old Conventions are still in force, although in practice the Single Convention is observed by all countries whether they have signed it or not.

Britain signed on 30th March 1961, and by 1964 had introduced the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Act created certain offences in respect of cannabis, making it illegal to cultivate it in Britain. The Act also included control of poppy straw to bring Britain into line with the 1953 Protocol and the Single Conven-tion. Later, in December 1964, Regulations were made under the Act. However, the 1964 Act was later superceded by the 1965 Dangerous Drugs Act which consolidated previous legislation and up to 1970 was the principal Act.

This then is the most important Convention to date in the field of international control. The system has gone a long way since the days of the Shanghai Conference, and its effect on British legislation has been enormous. In the 50 years between 1920 and 1970, out of 8 major Dangerous Drugs Acts, 4 were directly implemented because of international agreements, and 1 other in 1923 merely extended the powers under the 1920 Act. Those not due to international control have all appeared in the 6 years since 1964. The success of the League and the United Nations has always largely depended on the willingness of governments to ratify conventions, and compared with some other European powers, Britain has always responded quickly and implemented international recommendations, with the exception of the 1936 Convention.

Sir Harry Greenfield, the first President of the International Narcotics Control Board argues that international control has been almost totally effective.'9 He thinks that although the illicit traffic may still flourish, it is entirely due to inevitable leakages at centres of primary production. India, which has the most efficient method of control, would not claim its security measures were 100% effective. Other producing countries are either less efficient or much more vulnerable. For example, in Iran and Turkey, despite controls, raw opium has been produced in greater quantities than those officially sanctioned, although in recent years Turkey has been trying to reduce the surplus by with-drawing her opium producing areas away from her land and sea frontiers. Heroin is thought to be manufactured in areas near where opium is grown, but its manufacture often takes place just over the border in a neighbouring country. Also, in spite of the Single Convention, there are still no controls over the raw materials and it is most unlikely that there ever will be as far as cannabis or the coca leaf are concerned. The fact that illicit traffic continues may be no reason to condemn the international control system; without it, if the experience of the 1930s is anything to go by, the illicit traffic would almost certainly be greater.

Some critics, in particular Renborg, have criticised the control system, especially that period under the United Nations. He thinks progress has been far too slow, and that political considerations have been allowed to weaken control." He gives examples of the Commission spending years on a draft Protocol only to abandon it in 1952 and then substitute another draft which was known to be less effective and which later became the 1953 Protocol. The Commission spent over 10 years on the draft of the Single Convention only to abandon this too. Renborg believes that the United Nations period has not been motivated by the same genuine humanitarian interest as existed under the League; national and political interests have played a more prominent part.

There is some force in these arguments. Codification was certainly an enormous task, but surely not so difficult as to require fifteen years' work when some of the preliminary stages had already been done by the Advisory Committee. The League in 1931 showed what could be done by vigorous effort over the Limitation Convention, which has been described as a bold conception without precedent in the history of international relations and international law. As far as the political issues are concerned, the Commission has sometimes tended to avoid con-frontations and taken an easier path; for example, prior to 1956 there had been long serious discussions over the fact that China was reputed still to be the world's largest producer of illegal opium, and the heroin and morphine manufactured from this opium was thought to be entering the illicit market. At the 1956 session the U.S. representative did not furnish the usual detailed information and the Commission's report only dealt with the matter very briefly. None of the usual accusations was made against China. Perhaps there were important political reasons for such a move, but the League had not appeared to believe they were so important as to affect free discussion. This approach even seems to be reflected in the Bulletin on Narcotics which is the official U.N. journal, as articles and discussion on international control remain at a factual and uncritical level.

Another criticism is that an opportunity was offered by the Single Convention to redefine what is meant by drugs and drug control, but this was never taken, although it is long overdue. The result has been an element of public confusion, especially as similar restrictions are placed on both cannabis and the opiates, implying that they produce similar effects and are equally 'dangerous'. Although the United Nations's concept of control is to permit each country to determine its own policies, especially for those drugs in Schedule IV, it also has a responsibility to clarify issues and give a lead. This it has sometimes failed to do and the Single Convention largely reflects the empiricism of the pre-war period.

It is likely that the area of international control will continue to expand. In 1968 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for effective action to prevent what it called "the epidemic spread" of drugs such as the stimulants, the repressants and the hallucinogens. In 1966 the Commission began studying the need for further international control of these drugs and on the 19th February 1971 agreement was reached at a United Nations Conference for the adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances. This Convention grouped these drugs into 4 schedules; the first contains hallucinogens, such as L.S.D. and mescaline; the second the amphetamines, and the third and fourth the depressant groups. Those drugs in the first and second schedules are thought to require a more stringent control, and parties to this Convention are required, under Article 16, to furnish detailed statistics to the International Narcotics Control Board. The Convention is due to come into force after 40 states have either ratified it or deposited their instruments of ratification or accession.

Although the Convention dealt with `psychotropic' substances, their definition of this term was tautological, i.e., psychotrepic drugs were defined as drugs which were psychotropic! However, under Article 2 there are provisions for increasing controls of other substances and parties can inform the Secretary-General who will inform the World Health Organisation of any drug which they think ought to be controlled. The W.H.O. will then examine the matter, and if they find that the drug "has the capacity to produce a state of dependence and central nervous system stimulation or depression resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor funcion c-- thinking oi behaviour or mood; . . . and that there is sufficient evidence that the drug is being abused so as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing of the substance under international control, the W.H.O. will make recommendations on control measures if any, that would be appropriate in the light of this assessment." This obviously permits the inclusion of a large number of substances, but dues, of course, still leave out those other drugs of addiction such as alcohol and tobacco which also constitute a public health and social problem. Where the process will end is as yet not altogether clear, but certain problems will have to be faced soon, as some serious inconsistencies are beginning to appear which result from this pragmatic approach and the refusal to examine wider sociological issues.

The solution to these difficulties would seem to lie in returning to a system of control which attempts to rethink the basic requirements and define the area which the United Nations sees to be its province. The next problem to be faced is to begin to clear up inconsistencies about what constitutes a 'drug' and further to decide which of these should or should not be con-trolled. If the U.N. is to be seen as having some moral authority, it cannot simply select substances for control whilst ignoring others which also constitute a public health and social problem, and expect to retain that authority. The danger is that it will be seen as representing sectional interests, aimed at attacking a group who are less powerful, and criminalising their activities, whilst permitting other groups to use drugs such as alcohol and tobacco with impunity. Individual governments faced with the enactment and enforcement of control would then be faced with the additional problems of justifying such legislation.

Britain, as a member of the U.N., is still a party to these treaties and a unilateral decision to remove drugs from control in Britain would attack the very foundations of a system which has been laboriously developed since 1909. At this stage there is no sign that Britain would make such a decision, and it would certainly not be given world wide approval. For better or for worse it appears that Britain must accept this system, irrespective of its defects and the attacks being made upon it by those who want to legalise such drugs as cannabis. It may not be perfect, but it is all there is, and whether one accepts it or not, it exerts a powerful influence which is worth examining for that reason alone.

REFERENCES
1. Renborg, B. A. 'International Control of Narcotics', in Law and Con-temporary Problems, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 86.
2. Brit. med. J., 1922, ii, 570.
3. Switzerland alone manufactured 732 kg. of cocaine in 1921 and received considerable imports from Germany and France. Brit. med. J., 1922, ii, 570.
4. Seventh Session and Sixteenth Session.
5. See Cannabis, H.M.S.O., op. cit, p. 72.
6. Bulletin on Narcotics, op. cit, vol. 18, p. 54.
7. Brit. med. J., 1925, ii, 354.
8. Brit. med. J., 1931, i, 496.
9. International Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 3979, Article 2, p. 4, 1931.
10. These anomalies arose in Northern Ireland because the first Dangerous Drugs Act in Britain was passed before the Parliament for Northern Ireland was set up. The Northern Ireland Parliament was empowered to deal with all questions of Dangerous Drugs and these were to correspond with the Acts in Westminster. In practice this did not happen and anomalies arose with the net result that the Act was described as "a jigsaw where the pieces do not fit clearly". Hansard, 14.11.50, vol. 480.
11. For a fuller description of the Commission's duties see Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. 18, No. 1, p. 3.
12. Bulletin on Narcotics, 1966, vol. 18, No. 1, p. 3, ibid.
13. For full details see Protocol, Treaty Series No. 4, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 7874, 1948.
14. Brit. med. 1., 1946, ii, 448.
15. H.M.S.O., 1953, Cmd., 8972, Article 2, p. 3.
16. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, H.M.S.O., 1961, Cmd. 1580.
17. Ibid, Article 9(ii)--See also Articles 10 and 11 for duties and Wes of Procedure.
18. Ibid, p. 34. 'The other two are Desomorphine and Ketobemidone.
19. Greenfield, Sir H. I.S.T.D., op. cit., p. 11.
20. Renborg, B. A. op. cit, p. 98.