... it is fair to say that if there were no opium in Turkey, there would be no heroin in New York. But it is also fair to say that if there were no addicts in New York, there would be no smugglers in Istanbul.
Jean Nepote, "The International Police Fight Against Drugs"

If there is one aspect of the problems associated with drugs to which the international community pays more attention than others, it is the illicit traffic. We will not attempt in this chapter to analyze the enormously complex international drug trafficking business, but will confine ourselves to tracing the way in which the policies of the drug control organs towards trafficking have evolved, the forces in the world's marketing structure to which these policies have responded, and the conceptions or misconceptions on which they are based.

The Prewar Period

The context within which international policies developed has undergone several changes, some of which were effected by the control system itself. Drug trafficking has always existed, but restructuring has taken place, depending on what has been defined as legal or illegal. Opium was prohibited in China before the war of 1856-58, but under the Tientsin treaties which ended the war Britain and France (the victors) secured not only the legalization of opium but also of Christianity (Lowes, 1966:50). With legali-zation, "smuggling" naturally ceased, and opium entered China through authorized channels.

Although the illicit traffic is sometimes described as though it were a business separate from other activities, it is, in fact, intimately bound up with other types of commerce, both legal and illegal. In the 1920's, drug trafficking was a business which was mostly carried on by supposedly law-abiding European pharma-ceutical firms. The Opium Advisory Committee saw it as a question of overproduction and the diversion of "surplus" drugs into illegal channels. As was pointed out by the Chinese member of the Committee, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States were all turning out "morphia by the ton, which was purchased by smugglers by the ton." It was as if, he observed, the manufacturing countries were "competing with each other owing to the fact that the business was a very profitable one, although the profits went only to smugglers and a few manufacturers .. . . He could not understand why civilized countries should allow such a scandalous state of affairs to continue unchecked" (OAC: 5th, 1923:73). The large influx of European morphine and heroin into China during the 1920s had been in response to the elimination of the Indian opium trade and the suppression campaign within the country. Small quantities of both drugs were imported for medical use from Europe—for a time they were believed to be a cure for opium addiction—but the distinction between "medical" and "nonmedical," as that between legal and illegal, became progressively blurred, and a great deal of smuggling occurred (Adams, 1972).

The illicit traffic in manufactured products from Western pharmaceutical houses became a major problem in the Far East in the 1920s, "constituting a more serious menace to Orientals than the use of prepared opium" (Taylor, 1969: 231). Attempts to control diversion from drug manufacturers often came up against the problem that those manufacturers knowingly supplied drugs to smugglers (OAC: 10th, 1927) and that the authorities of some countries were negligent about checking such diversion. Switzer-land, for instance, was a particularly safe place from this point of view, not only for irresponsible drug firms but also for money transactions associated with drug deals. What came to be known as the "Canton Road Smuggling Case," handled by the Mixed Court of Shanghai in 1925, offers an illustration of this. The case involved 180 chests of opium shipped from Constantinople and sold in China, and 26 boxes containing mostly heroin imported from Basle, Switzerland, by a Chinese dealer, Gwanho. Docu-ments produced at the trial revealed that a considerable trade had been plying between Gwanho and the Swiss drug firms Hoffmann-La Roche and MacDonald and Co. The latter had been "notoriously engaged in the illicit traffic" and had operated for a time from Germany, where it transacted a considerable trade in drugs and arms to the Far East.* German inquiries into the dealings of this company had driven it to seek a "more convenient centre," which it subsequently found in Switzerland. A Stuttgart firm was involved too, and a telegram was found showing that Gwanho had remitted X2,000 sterling to it through the Schwei-zerische Kreditanstalt of Zurich (OAC: 7th, 1925, Annex). But pressure applied to Switzerland by other members of the Advisory Committee was steadily resisted. When another case of illicit traffic involving Hoffmann-La Roche was discussed and protests were voiced by the British delegate that this threw "a lurid light on the character of the firm," protests supported by the chair-man, Sir John Campbell, who personally "had no doubt whatever that Hoffmann-La Roche and Company was not a firm to which a licence to deal with drugs should be given," the Swiss representa-tive persisted in his attitude that the Swiss government was neither responsible nor could it justifiably intervene (OAC: 10th, 1927: 67-69).

The records of the Opium Advisory Committee abound with cases of illicit transactions implicating European pharmaceutical firms. One of the most widely publicized cases involved Naarden, a Dutch firm, which, between 1927 and 1928, had amassed about 850 kilograms of morphine, 3,000 kilograms of heroin and 90 kilograms of cocaine, most of which was smuggled into China. In general terms, the supplies came mainly from three firms in Germany, Switzerland, and France (A.86.1929.XI).

Gradually, however, international pressure succeeded in per-suading drug manufacturing countries to apply adequate controls over their drug industries, and overproduction was by and large brought under control. But the implementation of the 1925 and 1931 conventions had a double-edged effect: while authorized manufacture was regulated, underground factories started to appear, often close to areas of uncontrolled production of raw materials. Turkey was a case in point. Drug trafficking persisted, but the sources of supply had shifted. It has remained that way to this day.

International Response: The prewar period

International legislation enacted from 1925 on, established a system of control over the distribution of opium, cocaine, and cannabis so as to confine the movement of these drugs within regular, legal trade channels. Under the Hague Convention of 1912, obligations were placed on the "treaty powers" to take measures to prevent the smuggling of opium, morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts into Chinese territory and into the Far Eastern colonies of these powers and the leased territories which they occupied in China. The focus in those days had been on China, which was then the chief consumer.

Paralleling the controls instituted over supplies was the intro-duction of penalty provisions in the international legislation. The Hague Convention enjoined its signatories to "examine the possibility of enacting laws or regulations making it a penal offence to be in illegal possession of raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts," whereas under the 1925 Convention, the parties agreed to punish "by adequate penalties" breaches of the laws giving effect to the provisions of the convention (Art. 28).

The development within the international framework of a purely penal approach towards trafficking came to a head in 1936 with the conclusion of the Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. The last treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, the Convention was drawn up by the International Police Commission (IPC)—the predecessor of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)--established in Vienna in 1923. It was based on the 1929 Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeit Currency, in whose formulation the IPC also had a hand. The Convention called for the severe punishment of offenders "particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty"; the application of the principle of universality of jurisdiction in national criminal law, that is, punishing violators irrespective of their nationality or the place where they had committed their offence; and for the extradition of offenders. In effect, therefore, illicit drug trafficking became under this Convention a crime of international character. It is perhaps a sign of the times that in 1972, when states came to reconsider the extradition provisions of the Single Convention, it was not a treaty on counterfeit currency but one on aircraft hijacking which was used as a model for drug legislation (E/CON F.63/C2/SR 11, 1972).

Thus, the mode of action against the illicit traffic established by the prewar treaties was based on controlling availability (through administrative regulation) on the one hand, and on the pursuit of a criminal policy on the other. In terms of practical measures, a number of schemes had been proposed. It was suggested, for instance, that a blacklist of drug firms and traffickers be established on the basis of information sent to the Committee by governments. This would establish a moral boycott of drug firms which had allowed their products to go into the illicit market. The German, Swiss, Japanese, and Portuguese representatives voiced strong oppposition to this proposal, and the idea of a blacklist of firms was dropped, although that of individual dealers was retained (OAC: 3d, 1923). Nationalization of the drug industry was another proposal (OAC: 10th, 1927), a unified system of police action yet another (OAC: 13th, 1930). The IPC came into the picture with its draft convention on the suppression of the illicit traffic which, among other provisions, called for the centralized organization of police offices.

Under a system of reporting established by the conventions, seizure information was submitted by governments on an annual basis to the Permanent Central Opium Board. Cases of illicit traffic were reported to the Advisory Opium Committee, and summaries of these were distributed to individual countries and enforcement agencies.

The Postwar Period

We have seen in earlier chapters that action by international organizations has to be based on information officially supplied by governments. The characteristics of this information-base thus determine to a large extent the picture which the international community has of drug trafficking and its perception of the nature of the problem. The documents forming the basis of the discussion in the Commission of the illicit traffic consisted of:

—review of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs (during the preceding year), prepared by the secretariat, based on in mation submitted to the UN by governments;
--chapter 11 of annual reports (for the preceding year);
—summaries of reports on illicit transactions and seizures.

In 1949 ECOSOC granted consultative status to INTERPOL, which was thereby entitled to receive the Commission's agenda and to be represented by an observer at its meetings. Soon INTERPOL was contributing a memorandum on the illicit traffic, and this became a regular addition to the documents listed above. In 1960 the Division of Narcotic Drugs and the secretariat of INTERPOL decided to simplify the system of reporting seizures to international bodies, and the review of the illicit traffic became a joint document amalgamating the informa-tion supplied by governments to the UN and to INTERPOL separately. Another addition to the set of documents regularly presented to the Commission was the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Seizures.

A significant input into the Commission's meetings on the illicit traffic were the written statements, notes, or memoranda by the U.S. delegation. These were often added to the list of documents given above: in a few instances the U.S. submission was published as an annex to the Commission's report (for example, in 1950 and 1966). The earlier reports of the Commis-sion reveal a significant reliance upon U.S. sources of data: the review of the traffic throughout the world during the war years, for example, was based on three documents, two of which were presented by the U.S. delegation.*

The data contained in official government reports on seizures were not always complete, nor were they consistently communi-cated, but they were considered an important source of inform-ation. The criteria for the selection of cases to be communicated to international and national bodies were laid down in article 23 of the 1931 Convention: cases should be reported which might be of importance "either because of the quantities involved or because of the light thrown on the source from which drugs are obtained for the illicit traffic or the methods employed by illicit traffickers." Annual world totals of drugs seized, as reported by national governments and INTERPOL between the years 1931 and 1969, are given for roughly five-year intervals in table 15.1. It will be seen that opium seizures have declined, while those of morphine and heroin have been climbing since 1946, although they still have not reached the levels attained in the 1930s. Clearly, seizures are connected with legislation, as is indicated by the appearance of stimulants, depressants, and LSD in the contraband traffic. The fluctuations in the size of cannabis seizures are suggestive of the turns which international interest and enforcement efforts took for this drug over the years; it may be possible for instance to relate the steep increase between 1950 and 1955 to the fact that 1954 and 1955 were crucial years in the process leading to the international decision to control cannabis.

The distribution of seizures among countries for one year, 1971, may be seen from table 15.2, in which we have listed the three leading countries in decreasing rank-order for each -of the following measures: total weight seized, number of seizures, number of arrests, and number of nationals implicated. Iran led on all four counts for opium, and the U.S. for cannabis. Sweden reported the largest seizures of stimulants and made the largest number of arrests of dealers in stimulants. While the largest number of heroin seizures and arrests were made in France, the largest amounts were seized in the U.S. (45 percent of the total). Seizures of cocaine in the U.S. accounted for over half of the world's total in terms of quantity, number of cases, and arrests.

Despite the merger of its report with that of the UN, INTER-POL has contimued to make its own studies. One such study was referred to during the 1969 session of the Commission: statistics collected during the first ten months of 1968 on illicit traffic involving tourists and migrant workers in Europe showed that, of the 675 seizures examined, 40 percent related to "tourists" and 5 percent to migrant workers. The largest number of seizures were of cannabis (255, constituting 51 percent of the total), followed by opium (24, representing 28 percent of the total), then ampheta-mines (16), LSD (9), morphine (4) and heroin (1). The drugs had been bought in 21 countries, and of the 986 offenders arrested, 442 were "tourists" of 42 nationalities and 60 were foreign workers.

The information collected, stored, and disseminated by INTERPOL relates chiefly to criminals: in 1966, its representa-tive to the Commission claimed that they had information on three hundred thousand criminals, and that many of these were drug traffickers.* Its sources are generally police forces in member countries, of which it had only nineteen in 1946 and ninety-eight in 1966 (CND: 21st, 1966). The number of communi-cations received from countries by its secretariat in 1971 totalled 12,259, the number sent out 1,208.

The Committee on Illicit Traffic used to meet in closed sessions that were attended by a large number of observers, including the Permanent Anti-Narcotics Bureau of the League of Arab States. Here, accusing fingers could be pointed at drug-supplying coun-tries and imputations made with less restraint than in the open sessions.

Although the Commission admits that assessing the dimensions of the illicit traffic hinges on a number of factors, such as the adequacy of national data and the effectiveness of law en-forcement services, and that therefore the apparent trends re-vealed by seizure figures might be merely illusory (CND: 24th, 1971), the seizure information nevertheless forms the basis of its discussions. Assessments are, in fact, also made, albeit on different criteria, by another body, the INCB. This latter organ has repeatedly pronounced on the volume of raw materials supplying the illicit drug traffic; in its 1965 report, for instance, it stated that while opium produced licitly for the world's medical and scientific use amounted to 800 tons a year, the amount available annually from illicit sources was around 1,200 tons; the corresponding quantities for coca leaf and cannabis were vast. Again, it reported in 1971 that the quantity of illicitly produced opium was substantially larger than the quantity absorbed in manufacture for legitimate use and that illicit traffickers were increasingly drawing upon this large source of supply. How the INCB arrives at these estimates is not known.

According to the INCB, "ebbs and flows in the illicit traffic, occasioned by variations in demand, on the one hand, and by problems of procurement, on the other, have not materially altered the central position which opium has occupied since international control was first imposed" (INCB, 1971). The Commission's reports often note that opium and the opiates, cocaine and cannabis continue to be the main drugs in the illicit traffic (which is hardly surprising since they are by definition the focus of international concern and control). The procurement aspect, however, has changed in the postwar period, and looking back over the years the INCB noted that (INCB, 1969):

during the formative stages of the control measures introduced by the treaties the illicit traffic supplied itself more or less freely by recourse to unprotected sectors of the licit trade. As the controls began gradually to take effect this became progressively more difficult and traffickers have been obliged to look more and more to sources which are still beyond control . . . . Unfortunately these sources are both extensive and prolific and they constitute an enormous reserve. Some of these sources are remote and even now are difficult of access.

Many of these sources are located in Southeast Asia. The share of the illicit opium market by the various regions is difficult to assess, as is the level of illicit production in the different uncontrolled producing areas. Estfinates of the latter made by the U.S. BNDD in 1970 and by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in 1971 are given in table 15.3. The highest concentration of illicit production is in the Golden Triangle region—northern Burma, northern Thailand, andm northern Laos (Holahan, 1972; McCoy, 1972), accounting for about 70 percent of the world's illicit supply. Turkey, although the major source for the American market in the last decade, accounts for only 7 percent of the total illicit supply (McCoy, 1972).

The traffic in cocaine subsided in the 1950s but a resurgence is apparent in current statistics (see table 15.1). The decrease in cocaine traffic in the earlier period is thought to be due less to the effect of international legislation than to fluctuations in demand; the renewed interest has been attributed to users switching from amphetamines.

The illicit-traffic chapter of the 1959 report of the Commission stated that "geographically, cannabis is the most widespread drug of addiction," but that a large proportion of the traffic is based on indigenous production and consumption in the Far East, Africa, Central and South Africa. Annually, reference was ma.de to the "traditional traffic" in hashish in the Near and Middle East, and to Lebanon and the Syrian areas of the UAR as principal sources. More recently, the discussions in international circles of the traffic in cannabis have taken an alarmist turn. The INCB spoke in 1970 of the "widespread, almost epidemic, resort to indulgence in cannabis in recent years" and INTERPOL of the "tremendous upsurge" in cannabis trafficking. Sources were said to be, expanding, Nepal and Afghanistan being the most frequently identified.

The Commission's sessions are occasions for some countries to identify others as sources of supply for the drugs found in the illicit traffic. Countries from which seized drugs were alleged to have originated had defended themselves either on the grounds that they lacked the means of control or that the charges were unfounded. There were, in any event, frequent charges and countercharges. The importance attached by the Commission to the need to settle the question of origin led to the collection of "authenticated samples" and to the establishment of the UN Laboratory, whose sole raison d'être seemed to be the scientific determination of the geographical origin of opium seized in the illicit traffic. What is referred to in UN documents as "scientific research on opium" (a regular item in the agenda for the Commission's sessions) is often not much more than that. As earlier stated, testing for opium origin is an obsolete exercise, but, previously, considerable belief was invested in the method.

Although these tests purported to afford countries protection against ill-founded charges (CND:10th, 1955), they have, in fact, been used for quite opposite purposes. Anslinger's determination to misrepresent the People's Republic of China as the source of most of the heroin entering the western United States and as a sponsor of an illicit trade aimed at earning foreign exchange and at "undermining the morale and health of the population of other countries" is well known. Despite the protests of the members of the socialist countries on behalf of the Chinese government, which was not even present in the Commission, Anslinger persuaded a number of countries that "the continuation and expansion of a twenty-year-old plan to finance political activities and spread addiction among other peoples through the sale of opium and heroin, and the extension of these operations to areas which had come under the jurisdiction of the Chinese mainland had muti-lated and destroyed whole sections of population which, during the past 40 years, had been freed of the danger of addiction through the efforts of the enforcement authorities of the free countries" (CND:9th, 1954). At one session the representative of Poland raised a query regarding the identification of samples of opium, and the reply of the representative of the Laboratory was as follows:

in the determination of the origin of a sample of seized opium, the analytical data for the seizure were compared with the data obtained for all the authenticated samples in the UN laboratory. The basis for the determination of origin was, therefore, the range and number of authenticated samples available . . . . The firmness of a conclusion as to the origin of a seizure was thus dependent upon the number of authenticated samples available from the particular region in question. In the case of the mainland of China, there were only four authenticated samples, which were received in 1951 from the National Government of China (CND: 18th, 1963).

It is obvious that the charges against the Chinese People's Republic were based on opium samples sent to the UN by the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Both Anslinger and the UN apparently thought this to be in order, since they considered the N ationalist government to be the only recognized government of China, but the situation was anomalous, to say the least, for the UN Laboratory was accepting as authenticated samples those sent to it by a government which neither ruled nor had any access to the country in question (CND: 18th, 1963). Lately, the USSR has been making allegations in the press (Pravda) that China earned "at least $12,000 to $15,000 million a year" through opium trafficking, while the U.S. government has admitted that there has been "no evidence of any trafficking from China into any other area" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1973, 79, 2: 5). It seems that there never has been any concrete evidence of such trafficking, but, while this fact has remained constant, the foreign policies of countries towards China have been reversed. In spite of allegations by the Taiwan government that the People's Republic was smuggling opium out of China, a UN mission accompanied by U.S observers in northeast Thailand could find no evidence of Chinese involvement in drug trafficking (Report on World Affairs, 1972, 53, 3: 167).

While INTERPOL publishes monthly lists of traffickers, and the Commission's reports sometimes record the names of those arrested, a long-held belief among the international control bodies is that drug trafficking is operated by criminal underworld syndicates and that it is "to some extent the prerogative of a hierarchically organized criminal elite headed by 'sleeping part-ners' who often displayed a respectable facade and were difficult to unmask" (CND: 20th, 1965). The Mafia was mentioned in connection with heroin smuggling in the United States (CND: 14thr1959); and the image of the traffickers was one of those who, "prompted by predatory greed, were amassing fortunes by exploiting the morbid craving of drug-dependent persons" (Steinig, 1971). In the 1940s, merchant seamen were identified as the chief trafficking group, and there were proposals to persuade governments to revoke their licenses or certificates and to bar them from unions. Of late, the international bodies must have felt their beliefs challenged, for, in its 1971 report, the Commission noted that:

A new category of traffickers appeared to be emerging between the highly organized gangs working on a large scale and the individuals smuggling one or two kilogrammes for the use of themselves and their friends. Among the latter there was a growing awareness of commercial possibilities, and small groups were now dealing in quantities of 10-25 kg. of cannabis or opium.

The following quotation from the INCB's report for 1969 likewise illustrates this:

The flow of illicit traffic has been aided and expanded by the swelling stream of young people travelling from one country to another, frequently as students, sometimes in the guise of stu-dents or as wandering musicians who, both by their number and by their often innocent appearance, aggravate the problems of the preventive staffs. On the not infrequent occasions when young people from several countries assemble in mass gatherings the scope for trafficking is greatly facilitated as well as enlarged and the problems of narcotic enforcement staffs are intensified.

The two stereotypes—"the victims" of the traffic, that is, the drug addicts, and "its organizers, the professional criminals"—also exist (CND: 20th, 1965). How simplistic these beliefs are compared to reality is shown in recent studies of drug traffickers and users (Blum, 1972). Many dealers engage in drug trafficking in order to finance their own consumption.

A category of traffickers which has not been discussed i,n the international forum is, on the other hand, the diplomat who travels under special immunities (McCoy, 1972); between 1%0 and 1969 the BNDD arrested and convicted two ambassadors and one ambassador-designate with a total of 168 kg of heroin in their luggage (Gaffney, 1969). Also missing from international discus-sions today (cf. Advisory Opium Committee discussions) is the illicit side of legitimate drug supplying. It is estimated in the U.S. that 20 percent of all amphetamines are diverted from licit channels; this suggests some collusion on the part of those in charge of the channels involved. Such collusion also exists in the alcohol trade. It has further been shown that, in the U.S., pharmacists not only violate regulations but also sell drugs illegally (Blum et al., 1974).

While the question of illicit traffic comprises the bulk of the work of the Commission, it is illicit traffic in a rather narrow sense which actually occupies it. Perception is typically focused on the opioids, cocaine, and cannabis. The Single Convention itself defines illicit traffic as cultivation or trafficking in drugs contrary to its provisions and, in spelling out measures to combat it, does not venture beyond the usual reliance on prohibition of cultiva-tion (article 22), coordination of repressive action (article 35), and the punishment of drug production, acquisition, possession, and distribution (article 36).* In the 1972 amended version of the Convention, the harshness of the last provision has been toned down by the introduction of the possibility for parties to provide, "either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to conviction or punishment" for the "treatment, educa-tion, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration" of offenders.

Nevertheless, the tendency is increasingly towards perceiving the problem of drugs as one of illegal trafficking, and towards a narrowing of intervention options to that which is directly geared to controlling that particular aspect. One of the aims of amending the Single Convention was to enhance the involvement of the INCB in the control of the illegal production of opium as well as the legal production. As originally proposed, the new terms would allow the Board to obtain information on the production of raw materials from which the illicit traffic draws its supply, to use information from all sources, official or private, to make on-the-spot checks of suspect drug activities within a country, to modify estimates to limit a country's production to the amount of illicit diversion or illicit production or both that has occurred in that country, and finally, to impose an embargo when it decides that a country is becoming a center of illicit traffic: in short, to increase the INCB's enforcement powers. In the actual protocol adopted, the Board's functions have been defined in such terms as to include an explicit reference to the prevention of "illicit cultiva-tion, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs" (article 2). Moreover, countries are encouraged to supply the INCB, as well as the Commission, with data on illicit drug activity within their borders; the Board, on the other hand, is empowered to offer its advice on the party's endeavors to reduce the illicit activity.

A further illustration of the increased emphasis on the illicit traffic aspect is afforded by the drastic emasculation of an amendment introduced by Costa Rica, providing for education, for control of "advertising which explicitly, subtly or by omission incites to the consumption of drugs," for the promotion of national centers to deal with rehabilitation and prevention in relation to drug consumption, and for regional centers for investigation, education, coordination, and control (E/CONF. 63/C.1/L.20, 1972). This was redrafted by the conference to read as follows:

If a Party considers it desirable as part of its action against the illicit traffic in drugs . . . it shall promote the establishment, in consultation with other interested parties in the region, of agreements which contemplate the development of education centres for scientific research and education to combat the problems resulting from the illicit use and traffic in drugs (article 38 bis) (emphasis added).

The accepted text bears little resemblance to the original, and the problem itself has been redefined as one resulting from the illicit use and traffic.

A constant theme in the Commission's discussions of illicit drug activity has been the imposition of penalties of greater severity than are found in a number of countries. The 1%8 report records that "the Commission recalled its long-held conviction that severe penalties for drug trafficking were an effective deter-rent, and its appeals to governments to ensure that long periods of imprisonment should be imposed on drug traffickers, since fines alone were insufficient punishment." A resolution adopted in 1%1 called for the imposition of "adequate sentences"—the word "adequate" to be interpreted, according to the representa-tives of Canada, France, Turkey, and the UAR, as meaning "severe."

The diversity of penal sanctions applied in different countries for what appear to be similar offenses is considered undesirable, and the harmonization of legislation is often urged. Domestic laws do differ widely; a study of selected countries by a staff member of the Division of Narcotics noted that there was an "obvious lack of a common international point of view on the subject" (Memorandum on Penal Sanctions for Narcotics Offen-ces, 1972: MNAR/3/72). To take a few examples: the Afghani criminal code of 1924 expressly forbade the local use of alcohol, cannabis and cannabis resin, and opium, and punished such offenses with imprisonment or fine; however, the exportation of "Afghani production" of narcotics was expressly authorized.

Under new legislation (1956) an across-the-board penalty com-prising confiscation of the drug and imprisonment and/or fine was introduced for all drug offences. In contrast, Iranian legisla-tion bases penalties upon the quantity of drug involved; in cases involving more than 2 kg of opium or 10 kg of morphine, heroin, cocaine, and cannabis, capital punishment by firing squad can be ordered. The study noted that since 1%9 over 110 executions have taken place, and eight life sentences were imposed in 1970. While Japan places as heavy an emphasis on penalizing possession as trafficking, most European countries punish import/sale/manu-facture more severely than possession. Some countries do not distinguish between classes of drugs: the United Arab Republic of Egypt is an example. It is noteworthy that a feature shared by many of the legal systems surveyed is the severe penalization of the user; this is seen by the study as a sign of society's frustration at not being able to strike more effectively at the suppliers.

The study points to the vastly different concepts that different countries have of what constitutes fit punishment for a particular offense but sees these as being linked to local conditions which may possibly justify them. Yet in the Commission, countries are urged to harmonize their drug legislation. If the Commission is in favor of stiffer penalties, then what is being urged is uniformity towards greater severity. In withholding any criticisms it may have pf the death penalty, is the Commission tacitly advocating that other legal systems, too, should adopt the Iranian firing squad?

As an adjunct to heavier sentencing policies, effective law enforcement and better intelligence services are thought necessary. More than once, the Commission had recorded its recognition of the "bravery of officials killed or wounded" in reported battles between enforcement officers and traffickers (for example, CND: 22d, 1968). What has not been admitted is the high incidence of corruption in some narcotics police forces (see Blum et al., 1974). Training programs for law enforcement officers designed to impart or improve investigative and other techniques have been instituted by the UN on a regular basis. INTERPOL also organizes international training seminars for police officers, and the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics Training School has likewise trained officers from other countries. Along with INTERPOL, BNDD—now DEA—is a frequent participant in UN technical assistance missions and seminars on narcotics control (in the study tour of Latin America in 1965; seminar for narcotics law-enforcement officers in East Africa, 1967; inter-regional seminar on narcotics control, Beirut, in 1968, and so on). The UN itself awards fellowships to enforcement officers both under its technical assistance program and under the aegis of the UN Fund (UNFDAC). The importance attached to enforcement is reflected in the infusion of funds into the Central Training Unit, which conducts courses designed for law enforcement officials specializing in countering illicit traffic (UN Information Letters, 1972: 9; 1973: 3). Financial support for this unit represented the second largest allocation (the first being the Thai project) from the resources available to the Fund in 1972.

A great deal of the discussion of penalties for tra,fficking is, in fact, vitiated by the failure to take account of the political context within which the drug trade is embedded. McCoy's study (McCoy, 1972) alleges, for instance, that the drug business in Southeast Asia is intimately linked to the cold war crusade of the United States. He reports that in Laos, for example, the U.S. working through the CIA to build up the Meo guerillas to counter Communist wars of national liberation, indirectly provides support by way of money, guns, aircraft, and the like to the very individuals who are engaged in the opium trade; while in Burma, the opium shipment business is for the most part in the hands of the remnants of the Kuomintang (KMT) army of the deposed Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, again CIA-financed. The involvement of the KMT troops had been pointed out to the Commission as early as 1960 (CND: 15th, 1960). A Southeast Asia Consultative Group on Narcotics Control organized by the UN had reported that "the presence of military irregulars (KMT) in Upper Burma . . . added to the difficulties of control. These irregulars had facilitated the opium traffic and were notorious as the 'opium army' " (TAO/ AFE/11). The intricacies of the situation are further illustrated by an incident reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review (1973, 79, 7: 13). A Thai police helicopter carrying Thai police and three Americans, one of whom was an official in the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, was shot down in eastern Burma. The explanation of the Thai officials was that they had come to persuade Thai farmers to stop growing opium poppy, but had strayed into Burmese territory by mistake. The area over which this occurred was where the Burmese troops had been engaged in skirmishes with the opium-growing Lahu hill-tribe insurgents. When the government began to set up administrative bodies in the villages, the Lahus had felt threatened and had sent an emissary to Thailand to acquire arms in exchange for opium.

UN discussions, however, eschew the total set of conditions of which the drug trade is only a part. A realistic appraisal of the situation is avoided. Perhaps attention is concentrated on the well-organized professional criminal for the reason that the other elements involved are both complicated and raise awkward questions. UN officials justify their inaction by saying that they are unable to originate anything which does not stem from official information supplied to the UN by the government concerned.

SUMMARY

1. Illicit drug traffic is bound up with other types of commerce, both legal and illegal. Its contents and sources have been affected by legislation and law enforcement.

2. International action against the illicit traffic has been based on controlling availability on the one hand, and the use of the crimi-nal sanction on the other.

3. International control over drug availability has had a double-edged effect: it regulated authorized production but gave rise to unauthorized production, especially in areas beyond local government control, for example in the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia.

4. Under international legislation, drug trafficking became a crime of international character.

5. A system of governmental reporting of drug seizures and trans-actions to international bodies has been established. The infor-mation reviewed by international bodies is sometimes uncertain. International organs also entertain some misconceptions of drug dealers and drug trafficking.

6. In its discussions of the illicit traffic, the Commission has con-stantly emphasized the need to impose stiffer penalties on traf-fickers. These discussions are also characterized by imputations of illicit consignments to various countries.

7. A wide diversity of penal sanctions exists in national laws despite injunctions to harmonization; a common feature, however, is the penalization of the user.

8. There is a tendency among international bodies to perceive the "drug problem" as a problem of illegal trafficking.

9. A large proportion of the resources and efforts of UN drug organs have been committed to increasing the effectiveness of police officers.

10. The political context in which the drug trade is embedded tends to be overlooked.

* Drugs and arms have continued their close association. See a League of Nations memorandum, "Analogies between the Problem of the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and that of the Trade in and Manufacture of Arms," which was presented to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in Geneva, 1933. See also page 241.

* "Review of the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs Throughout the World During the Years 1940 to 1945 and the first half of 1946," presented by Mr. J. W. Bulkely of the US Treasury Department (E/CN. 7/10); "Review of Illicit Traffic in the US in 1945," presented by the representative of the U.S. (E/CN. 7/10).

* Doubt has been cast on this claim by a member of the UN Narcotics Division (interview).

* The wording of this provision is as follows: "Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall adopt such measures as will ensure that the cultiva-tion production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention, and any other action which in the opinion of such Party may be contrary to the provisions of this Convention, shall be punishable offences when committed intentionally, and that serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty."