Any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem should know that the President of the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime, and I shall not hesitate to comply with that law where there are any violations.
Richard Nixon, in an address to a State Department-Sponsored Narcotics Coordinators Conference (1972)

As has been indicated in the historical review and in the previous chapter, the United States has occupied a leading role in the international drug control field. Interestingly enough, this role was assumed before the U.S. gained "superpower" status after World War II. In this chapter, the international drug policy of the U.S. will be further elaborated and related to the concept of power discussed earlier. Our task has been made considerably lighter by the fact that there are recent historical accounts of the earlier phases of U.S. drug policy (Musto, 1973; Taylor, 1969). The period since 1946 is less well-covered, however, although books and papers of a polemical character exist. The recent appearance of these materials is an indication of the topicality of the drug issue and of the fact that the objectives and means of both domestic and international drug control are being questioned. Disagreements have sometimes been so intense that the defense of a particular policy has entailed the use of censorship. In 1961, for example, a representative of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics visited a publisher in order to discourage the publication of a book by a committee appointed by the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association containing views contrary to the official one (Lindesmith, 1965: 246). Similarly, during the 1970s leaders of the National Institute of Health "found themselves unemployed" because of the views they expressed on the cannabis issue at Senate committee hearings (Lanouette, 1972: 170).

That views in the U.S. are divided probably makes it more difficult for its representatives to put across an official view in the international arena. Although U.S. policy has shown considerable consistency over the years, it is nonetheless probable that the changing domestic situation has influenced the motives behind the policy and the strength with which it is sustained. And when domestic problems prove intractable, to show that something has been achieved on the international level may become a political necessity, especially if the problem is seen to have originated from outside the country. The following statement by Richard Nixon in a message to Congress on 14 July 1969 illustrates the tendency to see the U.S. drug problem in this light:

Most of the illicit narcotics and high-potency marihuana consumed in the United States is produced abroad and clandestinely imported. I have directed the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to explore avenues of cooperation with foreign governments to stop the projection of this contraband at its source.

The frequent use of the term "victim country" to describe the U.S. In Senate hearings as well as in the international organizations is a further illustration.

It would be naive to suppose that the drug issue was something outside the world of politics. If the U.S. defines the drug issue as an important one, then the resources of the U.S. will guarantee that its importance is recognized beyond the domestic setting. The channels of power described by Galtung will be employed to this effect. Thus part of our analysis will be concerned with the variations in the importance attached to the drug issue by the U.S. government over the years.

The link between moves made by the U.S. in the area of international narcotics control and its overall foreign policy is well documented by Taylor's thorough study. He suggests that from the American point of view the period until World War II may be divided into three phases. During the first phase, the U.S. took the initiative to foster international cooperation in the drug field; it was the moving force behind both the Shanghai Commission and the Hague Conference. The U.S. interest in the opium question may be understood against the background of its China policy. Taylor writes (1969: 329):

As is well known, the object of American policy with reference to China was the establishment and preservation of a strong, stable and prosperous nation which woad be able to resist the encroachments of foreign powers and at the same time provide opportunities for mutually profitable commercial relations with the West. As the opium habit was believed to be largely responsible for the political, social and economic degeneration of China, its suppression was considered indispensable to China's revivification and to the development of her commercial
potential.

The fight against opium in China was not independent of economic interests; in assisting China in its effort to ban opium, the U.S. was siding with China against Western European commercial interests, particularly those maintained by the Anglo-Indian trade. However, it will be remembered that before the Shanghai Commission the U.S. had already developed "a comparatively large addict population, probably 250,000" (Musto, 1973:5), and that the problem in the Philippines was of considerable concern, particularly to Bishop Brent, who was to become the chairman of the Shanghai Commission. All these factors contributed to the fact that during this first phase the U.S. became the leading country in international drug control. Yet, not all of its proposals were accepted in Shanghai and The Hague, although some of the fundamental principles it espoused were established, such as the requirement to prevent the export of opium products to countries prohibiting their entry.

The second phase delimited by Taylor is that covered by the 1920s. The U.S. stand in the international scene was affected by its domestic legislation and by the outcome of internal conflicts on how to interpret the new legislation. Of considerable importance, for instance, was the declaration of the U.S. Supreme Court that maintenance of addiction, with some exceptions, was illegal. Doctors who prescribed doses of narcotics for addicts were threatened with prosecution (Musto, 1973). The American principles of drug control could not, however, be effectively sold to the international control agency—the Advisory Committee of the League—of which the U.S. was not a member. Because the State Department refused to recognize the transfer of the administration of the Hague Covention from the Netherlands government to the League, cooperation in the drug field between the Advisory Committee and the U.S. was difficult to establish. When the U.S. attended the meeting of the Committee for the first time, its chief delegate, Stephen Porter, showed little understanding of the League system: not only did he try to secure the secretary-general's acceptance of the U.S. proposals, believing that they would thereby be binding on member states, he also proposed that a new committee be set up composed of five U.S. delegates and five League ones (Taylor, 1969: 162-63). The arrival of the American delegation was "unexpected and almost unannounced." It surprised Geneva and "galvanized the Advisory Committee immediately" (Fleming, 1938: 224). The League's policy had been based on the hypothesis that the drug traffic would have to be stamped out by degrees, but Porter came fortified with a resolution of Congress which he himself had sponsored and which stated that "the effective control of these drugs can be obtained only by limiting the production thereof to the quantity required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes, thus eradicating the source or root of the present conditions." To meet this objective, the president should ask Great Britain, Persia, and Turkey to limit opium production and make a similar request to Peru, Bolivia, and the Netherlands in regard to coca leaves (Buell, 1925: 75-76).

Although American influence was at its lowest ebb during this period, many of the proposals for reform came from the U.S. Taylor (1969: 330) describes the tenets of the U.S. position as follows:

(1) The United States regarded the use of opium and other narcotic substances for other than strictly medical and scientific purposes as a moral and social evil.

(2) As a corollary, the United States concluded that the only legitimate transactions in these drugs, from production to consumption, were those designed to meet medical and scientific needs.

(3) The United States maintained that the basic solution to the drug problem lay in limiting the production of raw materials to the quantities necessary to fill the world's legitimate requirements.

These principles were presented by the U.S. delegation to the Geneva conferences of 1924-25. The failure of the delegation to secure the agreement of other countries to these principles led it to withdraw from the conference. The delegation was actually bound by instructions prescribed by a resolution of Congress of 15 May 1924 which appropriated $40,000 for the delegation's expenses, "Provided that the representatives of the United States shall sign no agreement which does not fulfill the conditions necessary for the suppression of the habit-forming narcotic drug traffic." Commenting on the U.S. withdrawal later, the Dutch delegate said: "such a conference is doomed to failure if any one of the parties has imperative orders to impose its will upon the others under pain of leaving the conference" (Buell, 1925: 100, 112).

During the second Geneva conference, the U.S. proposed that the manufacture and distribution of heroin be prohibited. Although this item was not on the agenda, no one queried its presentation. Simultaneously, the U.S. delegation moved that the conference consider the limitation of raw opium and coca leAves. The Indian representative objected on the grounds that the adoption of the American proposal would entail the prohibition of internal consumption of opium and moved to rule the motion out of order, since the conference agenda was restricted to considerations of controls over production for export. The U.S. delegate's reply was: "there is nothing peculiarly sacred about an agenda." When, later, further protests were made, Porter said: "There is no reason why this conference cannot reach agreement and allow those three or four nations that do not feel that they can agree . . . to make reservations. Then we can all be good and neighborly and try to help them solve their problems" (Buell, 1925: 102-5).

Dissatisfaction with the League was a reason for American support of the Permanent Central Opium Board, which the U.S. regarded as "completely independent from the League, and as fulfilling a function which the United States [regarded] as necessary" (Hubbard, 1937). The development of a new supervisory organ had been an old American proposal (Taylor, 1969: 86). Although the Board's members were supposed to be experts serving in their personal capacity and independent of their governments, its American chairman, Herbert May, maintained informal contact with the U.S. State Department and the appropriate federal agencies during his term in office (Musto, 1973: 203-4; Taylor, 1969: 261-63). The third international drug organ, the Drug Supervisory Body, was set up by the convention of 1931, largely because of American insistence on its inclusion in the convention (Hubbard, 1937: 368).

The third phase covered the 1930s. By modifying its attitude towards the League, the U.S. was able to regain its leadership. Limitation of manufacture was achieved, and here the U.S. was more fortunate than other drug-producing countries in having no serious opposition within the country. The American drug producers were, in fact, in favor of the control of manufacture because this would bring their European competitors under the same system of regulations as themselves (Taylor, 1969: 243). Taylor observed that many features of the 1931 convention were similar to American legislation (Taylor, 1969: 253). The estimates system, the creation of the DSB, and the inclusion of codeine under control all bore marks of U.S. initiative.

During this phase, Harry Anslinger enters the picture. In the 1920s domestic controls in the U.S. were exercised by the Bureau of Prohibition, which enforced alcohol prohibition as well as narcotics laws Anslinger contributed to bilateral agreements aimed at curbing illicit alcohol traffic. In 1928, when much of the earlier support for prohibition began to wane, Anslinger proposed a way whereby the prohibition campaign might be saved: he suggeted criminalization of liquor purchase and a harsh criminal policy (Musto, 1973: 211). Anslinger's proposal elicited no response, but he transferred many of his views to narcotics control when he became Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, established in 1930. In fact, Anslinger had always felt that "the most effective way of gaining public compliance with a law regulating a dangerous drug was a policy of high fines and severe mandatory prison sentences for first convictions" (Musto, 1973: 212).

However, Anslinger was careful to avoid conflict with federal judges, who were angered on behalf of the indicted citizens, and with the medical profession, which had been harassed by the agents of the Bureau (Musto, 1973: 213, 319). Organizational expansion and public support of the Bureau were later ensured through the assumption of new responsibilities under the famous Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 (Dickson, 1968). Cannabis control had, in fact, already been envisaged in an earlier draft of the Harrison Act, but had been resisted by the producers and by the American Medical Association.

On the international scene, U.S. initiative brought about another conference—the one which concluded the 1936 Convention for the suppression of illicit traffic. This was a subject "particularly favored" by Anslinger—the strengthening of criminal penalties for drug trafficking (King, 1972: 214). In an action reminiscent of the 1925 conference, the U.S. delegation walked out of the conference, dissatisfied with the treaty's limited coverage. In a note to the secretary-general of the League, explanations were given in detail as to why the U.S. withheld its signature from the 1936 Convention. Among them were the following (Hubbard, 1937: 370):

. . . the stipulations of the Convention do not tend in any increasing measure effectively to prevent or adequately to punish the illicit traffic.

. . . we regard the Convention inadequate in so far as cannabis is concerned.

Taylor's study ends at 1939. No equally thorough study of the sequel exists. Nonetheless, we will attempt to sketch the main developments which have occurred since then. We will deal with the Anslinger era, which lasted almost three decades, and with the period of hectic U.S. foreign policy starting in the late 1960s. During World War II, six members from the League drug section moved to Washington on the invitation of the U.S. government. In conferences with representatives of allied countries the U.S. secured their agreement to abolish opium monopolies in territories liberated from Japan; in Japan itself the MacArthur regime introduced a Japanese Harrison Act after the war (King, 1972: 215-16). The U.S. probably thought it to be in its own interest to have the control organs based in America, for it attempted to have the UN Narcotics Division, which had moved to Geneva, returned to New York "where the full force of wide public opinion can be brought to bear on the fight against illicit narcotics traffic" (King, 1972: 144). The Board was able to carry on after war broke out because, in the words of Herbert May, then president of the Supervisory Body, "I persuaded the State Department to allow me to operate from Washington . . . . There being no League of Nations funds available to set up the office, two American foundations donated the necessary money" (Bulletin on Narcotics 15 2 [19631:5).

As we saw earlier, U.S. nationals have been among the key persons in all the international drug control organs. During the period under review, the domestic problems of the U.S. were beginning to determine its stance on international control, and thus the morally based internationalism of the early days was transformed into a policy of ordinary self-interest. There has, in fact, always been an interweaving of domestic and international motives. Hamilton Wright and Stephen Porter had tried, for example, to enforce domestic legislation in time to underline the seriousness of U.S. intentions at international meetings and thereby increase their capacity to influence international decisions; at the same time, they used international obligations as an argument for domestic legislation. This strategy was further elaborated by Anslinger. The following episode provides an illustration of the domestic-international link In a Bureau of Narcotics publication, vigorous arguments were leveled against ambulatory treatment. By way of support, reference was made to the prestigious domestic organ, the National Academy of ScienceNational Research Council, which had asserted that "ambulatory treatment of addiction is impossible." There was also a reference to a resolution of ECOSOC which expressed appreciation of WHO's assistance and recommended "that, in the treatment of drug addiction, methods of ambulatory treatment and open clinics are not advisable" (Bureau of Narcotics, n.d. [1958?]: vii.-ix.). The reference seems to be to a WHO Expert Committee statement in October 1955, that "ambulatory treatment was not advisable." It will be remembered that the drug dependence committee of the Academy did the Bureau's drug classification work and that both Anslinger and Nathan Eddy had been on the committee. It will also be remembered that Eddy was probably the most influential WHO expert committee member. Considering these interconnections and the likelihood that Anslinger was the initiator of the resolution referred to, it would appear that some of the recommendations of international bodies were a reflection of domestic preoccupations in the U.S. It may not be immediately obvious to an outsider that pharmacological expertise does not necessarily imply knowledge of the efficacy of various types of treatment. It certainly does not imply knowledge of the efficacy of ambulatory treatment in societies other than the U.S. The ready generalization from the U.S. situation to the rest of the world also appears to have occurred in the case of cannabis control; there was also a close parallel between the earlier views expressed by WHO on cannabis and the official U.S. position on this drug (see chapter 13).

The conclusions of the WHO expert committee were largely based on the work of the Lexington Hospital in Kentucky, on which the Academy's recommendations were often based. This is clearly acknowledged in the following statement in a Drug Supervisory Body report:

as long ago as its first meeting in January 1949, the WHO Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs had noted the addiction-producing properties of several synthetic drugs. . . .,For its conclusions, the Committee relied then, as it has done ever since, on the observations of the research workers at the Lexington Hospital, the scientific value of which is indisputable (DSB, 1961: xi).

In the Commission, in contrast to the recriminatory criticisms of the American position by the League Advisory Committee, an increased acceptance of U.S. views on opium production is evident. Extreme as the following expression of these views may seem, a number of representatives, "in particular those of Canada and France," had "warmly supported" them when they were articulated by Anslinger at the 1965 session of the Commission:

(Anslinger stated that) . . . in the next decade it might well be possible to achieve international agreement on the complete abolition of all legal opium production. Even now, many opium derivatives could be replaced by synthetics, and most, if not all, medical requirements could be met without producing and stockpiling opium. . . . When it had been demonstrated, as was to be expected within the next few years, that opium was not essential for medical purposes, the United States would give very favourable consideration to discussions leading to an international agreement which would abolish legal opium production entirely (CND: 20th, 1965: 14).

It is the acceptance of these premises which the search for synthetic alternatives to opiates of natural origin—a task in which WHO has continued to be involved—implies. Although these views were expressed in 1965, the Nixon administration was still espousing them in 1973, as is shown by its response to the shortage of morphine for the manufacture of codeine in the U.S., brought about by the Indian opium crop failure in that year. Contending that codeine and morphine are replaceable by synthetics, the Nixon administration is said to have threatened not to release morphine and its derivatives from the U.S. strategic reserve stockpile, seeing this as an opportunity to curtail all world opium production. That many other Western countries share these assumptions to some degree may be inferred from their support of the U.S. proposals to amend the Single Convention, the effect of which would have been to place further constraints on licit opium production. The position of the British on these amendments was, for instance, a very long way away from that held in 1925, when their representative, Viscount Cecil, criticized the American proposals to the Geneva conference for the sole reason that they could not be accomplished (Records, Second Geneva Conference, 1925, 21st meeting).

It is an openly acknowledged fact that the U.S. has applied pressure on countries not at all, or not particularly, preoccupied by drug problems to adhere to treaties or to enforce drug laws. "Problem countries" in U.S. terms are also problem countries in the eyes of the INCB, in whose reports they are frequently enumgrated. Instead of coming under international discussion for its apparent mismanagement of its drug problems, the U.S. is often applauded for all its efforts. Such applause is most marked in the Board's reports (for example, INCB, 1972: 27). In contrast, it is invariably the developing countries, rather than the rich consuming countries, which are taken to task, albeit gently, for their inability to enforce controls.

Anslinger retired from his office in 1962 but continued to represent the U.S. at the Commission until 1970. The recent period of hectic activity in international drug control is intimately linked to the Nixon administration's overall diplomatic activity abroad. Indicative of the importance attached to the drug issue is the appointment of a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in June 1971 and the inclusion of the item of drug traffic control in negotiations at a high political level, such as those between Nixon and Pompidou (U.S. Senate, 1972: 5), and between U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Chairman Ne Win of Burma (Gross, 1972). In fact, President Nixon elevated international drug control to a "foreign-policy level of high priority" (Gross, 1972). When a "superpower" exhibits this degree of involvement, there is unlikely to be much resistance or unresponsiveness on the part of countries appealed to for support unless such support is contrary to national interests. Generally speaking, cooperation with the U.S. in drug control matters does not conflict in any significant way with the interests of other Western countries, and it is therefore readily provided.

Without going into details, one might note that in the domestic setting an increasingly critical attitude towards the traditional U.S. policy has developed, at least insofar as criminal sanctions and marihuana are concerned (see, for instance, the report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, 1972), and this internal dissension may weaken the U.S. position in the international forum. Yet, heavy resources have continued to be committed to the Bureau of Narcotics, which was transferred in 1969 to the Department of Justice and was renamed the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD).* The manpower resources of the Bureau have increased from less than 400 employees in the 1930s and less than 450 during Anslinger's period to 1,200 employees in 1971, representing a markedly higher rate of expansion than the pace characteristic of the earlier period (data from BNDD). Of course, BNDD had responsibility only for some sectors of narcotics control. A precise estimate of the total U.S. expenditures on "drug abuse control" is difficult to establish, but government spending in fiscal year 1972 has been calculated to be between $417 and $601 million. Of the former figure, treatment and education account for nearly $200, enforcement for $126, research for $50, and education for $42 million (Goldberg and De Long, 1972: 302-4). Compared to these figures, the budgets of the international narcotics control agencies look small indeed; in fact, even the budget of a world organization like WHO appears meager when measured against the U.S. drug control expenditures. The expansion of U.S. establishments for law enforcement is accompanied by a reformulation of the objectives of U.S. international efforts. The primary objective has been identified as the reduction of the illicit flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United States (see Kinney et al., 1972). This is in some contrast to its earlier crusade against drugs on behalf of other countries, particularly China.

To reach this goal there was a marked increase in the despatch of BNDD (DEA) agents abroad. During the Anslinger era, BNDD agents worked abroad on a limited scale for reasons explained by Anslinger in a letter to Senator Dirksen on 10 April 1959:

Our work is confined to the international, national, and wholesale illicit traffic. We have only five men in Europe because that is all we can use at the present time. We can work only in countries where we are invited and in some areas the matter of placing a man has delicate overtones.

In 1962, however, the assistant secretary of the treasury, James Reed, assigned enforcement responsibilities to the Bureau for all foreign areas. And by 1965 the Bureau had ten offices abroad and fourteen agents in Europe.
The, above is only one indication of the hectic drug control activity abroad. In addition, the U.S. has developed a Narcotic Control Action Plan (the contents of which we have not been able to discover) for each of fifty-nine countries (see table 10.1). The plans are intended to cover most areas of the world except large parts of Africa, Australia, China, the USSR, and some other socialist countries.

U.S. diplomacy has resulted in thirty bilateral drug treaties. In addition, every U.S. mission has had to designate a drug control coordinator (U.S. Senate, 1972: 66). The table shows a progressive increase in the number of foreign offices, which now total forty-seven spread over thity-five countries. Uppermost among the countries hosting U.S. agents are Mexico, which has fifteen; France, eleven and Thailand, ten. It is also noteworthy that for Europe the number of bilateral treaties exceeds the number of offices, whereas for all other areas the opposite is true. In some instances (such as the Turkish opium ban), it is clear that the U.S. has paid for the action it has asked to be taken; there are probably other instances where one suspects that the threat of withdrawing foreign aid has been used to secure cooperation in U.S. efforts to interdict the drug traffic (U.S. Senate, 1972: 19).

Moreover, not only does the American government train narcotics officers in Afghanistan, but BNDD sent its staff to supplement UN personnel on missions to developing countries to provide law enforcement training courses (see chapter 15).

It is against the background of U.S. domination that two recent developments, the establishment of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and the amendment of the Single Convention, must be seen.

An idea which has gained much currency in the international forum is that some countries have not met their treaty obligations and have allowed illicit opium production to occur less through lack of goodwill than through lack of resources to control such production. The idea has come to be accepted that the treaty system has to be supplemented by technical assistance. The drawback to this strategy is that the majority of the potential recipients of technical assistance accord drug control a low priority. Thus, initially, the machinery established for UN aid in drug control was underused (E/3077). For the UN's assistance-financing body to be paying for drug control activities, When its primary concern is with national economic development, with which a drug program may even be at odds, is clearly incongruous. The need for other financial arrangements has led to the creation of UNFDAC. More than the theoretically mandatory contributions to the UN budget, the voluntary contributions to the Fund ensure a financial basis for UN activity in a field with which electoral concern, notably in the U.S., is clearly great.

The U.S. proposal to amend the Single Convention represents a renewed attempt to control opium production at the source. One of the objectives of the original U.S. proposals was to strengthen the Single Convention and give more power to the INCB. To secure support for its proposals, the U.S. government held consultations with a large number of countries and invited would-be cosponsors of its proposals to a private meeting in Geneva prior to the conference which was to consider the amendments. When the amendments were put before the conference, they consisted of a package of consensus proposals jointly made by Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the U.K., and Uruguay.

The conflict of interest was so intense at the conference that the instrument eventually adopted was a much watered-down affair. The U.S. delegation nevertheless held the conference to be a great success. As was explicit in the reactions sampled in the delegates' lounge in the UN building in Geneva (always a better place for this purpose than the conference hall), most delegates believed that the initiative of the U.S. was prompted in any event by an impending presidential election, that it was a vehicle for immediate political gains, and that, therefore, the weakness of the protocol was of less importance than the number of accessions it was likely to acquire.

This last phase of U.S. activity may be viewed in terms of the power concepts elaborated by Galtung. Support for U.S. policy on the part of other nations is won by the deployment of resources; its extensive network of bilateral agreements may lead to "fragmentation," and the accommodation of other countries to U.S. views is secured through the use of "remunerative" or "punitive" measures—for example, by giving or withdrawing aid. The ability to persuade depends on the availability of expertise and technical knowledge. The U.S. clearly leads the world in the extent of investment in drug research. We saw earlier that American writers contribute preponderantly to the UN Bulletin on Narcotics. And it is apparent from the sources used in our own study
that international drug control has been more widely and more, thoroughly studied in the U.S. than in any other country. Access to knowledge by administrators can mean increased possibilities of advancing the U.S. point of view.

To demonstrate the extent of American influence on the international drug control system, we have summarized in table 10.2 those features of the control system which have come about or have been sustained through U.S. efforts, or which are concomitants or logical outcomes of U.S. drug policy. Some of these features will be dealt with in more detail later.

U.S. ascendancy in the international drug control sphere is probably indicative of its position in all areas of concern in the UN. This has to do with the fact that it is the largest contributor by far to the UN budget. The system of a single vote for all UN members in the Assembly is, in fact, untenable in practice when one nation contributes about 30 percent of the budget. The U.S. government has been accused of skepticism towards the UN—the last place it is said to which U.S. decision-makers would turn where anything touching U.S. interests is concerned (Alger, 1973). It is our feeling that this attitude towards the UN has had a bearing on the increasing resort to bilateral arrangements outside the UN system. The American position of power is buttressed by a number of other factors. For the other nations, not a great deal is at stake in the drug control arena, and accommodation to U.S. wishes is more readily made than is the case elsewhere. The infusion of American funds into drug programs and the general elevation of the status of drug affairs in the UN are welcomed by the Secretariat, for they provide the means for organizational expansion and activity.

• Since then the BNDD has been dissolved, and in July 1973 a new organization—the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—was established under the attorney general to "carry out the following anti-drug functions": all BNDD's functions, the functions of the Bureau of Customs pertaining to drug investigations and intelligence, all the functions of the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and of the office of National Narcotics Intelligence.