Drug Abuse

When the call came from the League of Nations for a new conference, the issue of the resumption of American collaboration with that body on the narcotics problem could no longer be evaded. If the United States refused to participate in an obviously sincere endeavor to solve one major aspect of the problem, it would open itself to severe and justifiable criticism and possibly end for a long time any chances it had of exerting any significant influence on the movement as a whole. Therefore, the initial reaction among those in the State Department concerned with the subject was in favor of American participation in the pending conference on manufacture. They regarded the con-ference and the preliminary meetings of the Advisory Committee lead-ing up to it as affording a propitious opportunity for the United States to resume its active and leading role in the international antidrug cam-paign. Other phases of the problem might be dealt with in later con-ferences.' But again Congressman Porter stood as the major obstacle to the resumption of active American cooperation with the League. Porter warned against the possible political repercussions from what might appear to be abandonment of the American position of 924— 1925. He therefore initially expressed opposition to American partic-ipation in a conference so long as China's interests were not taken care of and the Far East situation with respect to prepared opium was not dealt with.2 Thus the main task of the State Department was to over-come Porter's objections.

The arguments in favor of American participation in the conference on manufacture were compelling. Manufactured drugs from Europe constituted a far greater menace to the United States than raw or prepared opium from the Orient. As a result of strict enforcement of the American control system, the price of morphine in the illicit traffic had risen from $12 or $13 per ounce in T927 to $90 per ounce in New York and $13o per ounce in San Francisco in 1929.5 The quantity of American-made drugs, compounds, and preparations containing narcotics which found their way into the contraband traffic was negligi-ble. For the fiscal year ending June 3o, 1929, the value of such products exported from the United States amounted to only $2o,93i, constitut-ing only one-half of percent of the total value of narcotic drugs manufactured in the United States in 1928.4 As for China and the Far East, the control of the manufacture of drugs in Europe and Japan would have as much or more value than the abolition of opium smoking, for China was a major victim of illicit traffic in opium and coca leaf derivatives, as the Naarden case indicated. Furthermore, the Chinese delegate in the Fifth Committee of the Assembly had stated that China would support efforts to limit manufacture.5 In addition, restriction of manufacture was embodied in the American program at the Geneva Conference, and the achievement of this objectiveTwould be giving effect to Article of the Hague Convention relating to the restriction to medicinal and scientific purposes of the manufacture, sale, and use of certain narcotic drugs. Finally, while participating in a conference on manufacture, the United States could still make it clear that its attention to this phase of the narcotics problem did not mean the abandonment of its often stated position relative to prepared opium and the limitation of the production of raw products. These arguments were sufficient to cause Porter to modify his opposition to the extent of approving the attendance of Caldwell at the session of the Advisory Committee which would consider a plan of limitation, provided he took no active part in the work of preparation.6

Caldwell attended the thirteenth session of the Advisory Committee in January and February 193o and served on the subcommittee con-sisting of representatives of the manufacturing states which was appointed to prepare a plan of limitation. He confined his activities to help on technical questions, however, and refrained from taking a prominent role in controversial matters.' The plan which the sub-committee drew up was adopted by the Advisory Committee after only cursory discussion. It provided for the determination of the world requirements of manufactured drugs on the basis of the esti-mated needs of each country, the division of the manufacture of these total requirements either by agreement among the manufacturers them-selves or by the governments concerned, and the establishment of a central organization to make necessary readjustments in the quotas allocated and to ensure that the consuming countries received the amounts they required.8 In essence the plan proposed an international cartel of European narcotic drug manufacturers. As the attitude of the United States was opposed in general to cartels, and as the plan of the Advisory Committee would not provide a system of limitation more strict than that in force in the United States, the State Department con-cluded initially that American participation in the pending conference would be of no special benefit and should therefore be confined merely to sending an observer to watch the proceedings.8

At its- session in May 193o the League Council approved the plan of the Advisory Committee and authorized the sending of invitations to twenty-five major producing, manufacturing, and consuming coun-tries to participate in the limitation conference to be convened on December 1. The Council also accepted the British suggestion that a preliminary conference among the governments of the manufacturing countries be summoned by Great Britain for the purpose of agreeing upon the establishment of an international cartel and the allocation of quotas among the component nations or firms. It was expected that the preliminary conference would be held in July, to be followed by a special session of the Advisory Committee in August to draw up a draft convention. Because of the delay in the conclusion of private negotiations among European drug manufacturers on the rationing of quotas among them, the preliminary conference did not meet until October. In September the Council endorsed the decision of the Fifth Committee of the Assembly to invite all countries to the main conference and the date of its convening was changed to May 27, 1931, and that of the next session of the Advisory Committee to January 9, 1931. In the meantime, the United States had accepted the August 2 2 invitation of the British government to attend the preliminary discussions.10

The Preliminary Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs met in London from October 27 to November II, 193o. Representatives of eleven countries attended," including Cald-well for the United States. Caldwell was instructed to make clear the narcotics situation in the United States and to emphasize the American desire to see other countries establish effective controls. He was ad-monished to avoid committing the United States to any particular scheme or to participation in any further conference.12 For additional guidance Caldwell had before him the views of American manufac-turers on the subject of limitation. They had not participated in the discussions held by the European manufacturers on the question, but they vigorously disapproved of the formation of a cartel on the g- rounds that participation by American firms in such a cartel would be illegal under the antimonopoly laws of the United States. Such a system would also place them at a disadvantage in competing for a share of the world market. Although their drug exports were small, and there was no anticipation of any immediate increase in these, the American manufacturers were opposed to any scheme which would preclude such an increase if it were made possible by economic conditions and factors relative to the control of distribution. They claimed that the paucity of American drug exports was due less to the strict control over distribution provided in the Import and Export Act than to the American import duty on raw opium of $3 per pound. The latter was responsible for the price of American drugs being higher than that of their European competitors, who had the advantage of a lower import duty on the raw materials plus the ability to take advantage of certain other features of the drug traffic. They also doubted the prac-ticality of the Scheme of Stipulated Supply. The only system of control satisfactory to them was that in effect in the United States. They therefore urged the American government to recommend the adoption of similar control measures by European countries as being most ef-fective for worldwide control of the manufacture and distribution of drugs.13 This was the position which American drug manufacturers had maintained ever since the passage of the Import and Export Act in 1922. By placing their European counterparts under restraints similar to those imposed on them, the Americans hoped to gain a better com-petitive position in the world market. They emphasized, however, that they still would not be able to compete until the tariff on raw opium was reduced.14

The London Preliminary Conference had two principal items on its agenda: the apportionment of quotas among the manufacturing countries and the formulation of a system which would ensure a proper distribution of the drugs manufactured among the consuming coun-tries. As president, Sir Malcolm Delevingne initially dominated the confereuce, and it was on his insistence that the work of the conference was delayed for over two weeks until the European manufacturers could come to some agreement on quotas. Then, when the manufac-turers submitted their agreement, all the governments present whose nationals were to be included in the proposed cartels of the manu-facturers were willing to accept the manufacturers' allocations except the British. The principal objections voiced were that the quotas did not conform to the plan of the Advisory Committee; that they were quotas of company rather than national production, and some com-panies were established in more than one country; and that there was no relation between the quotas and the figures of legitimate export in recent years. The failure of the quotas to cover all narcotic drugs and to deal adequately with the conversion of morphine into codeine was another objection. As revealed in private conversations, it appeared 0that the dissatisfaction of the British delegate stemmed principally from his belief that the morphine quota assigned to British firms was too small.15

Perhaps the most discordant note of the deliberations was struck by the Turkish representative when he demanded that his country be assigned a quota of one-third of the entire world production of manu-factured drugs. This demand was based on Turkey's position as the principal producer of the raw material used by European and Ameri-can manufacturers and Turkey's claim that it had exported for the first six months of 193o over six tons of morphine and heroin. The latter disclosure raised a very serious question. It was clear that these exportations, though legitimate by Turkish law, had gone into the illicit market, for no imports of these drugs from Turkey had been reported to the Permanent Central Board, and the countries to whom the Turkish delegate said the exports had been made—France, Germany, and Italy—denied having received the shipments.16 The delegate promised that if his demand were met, Turkey would become a party to the international opium conventions, all of which that country had so far refused to adhere to.

Dissentient voices to the manufacturers' quota plan were als-i) raised by the delegates of Russia and Japan. Championing the position taken by the United States at the Geneva Conference, the Russian represen-tative suggested that the scope of the conference should be expanded to include discussion of the issues of limiting the production of raw material. This proposal was of course rejected. On the subject of manu-facture, he stated several times during the conference that the situation in Russia was similar to that in the United States—manufacture for domestic needs and very small export to neighboring territories—and that his government wanted this situation maintained. He was opposed to Russian participation in an international cartel." On the same issue, the Japanese representative, whose countrymen had not been assigned quotas by the European manufacturers, took a similar position.18

As instructed, Caldwell's major efforts at the conference were di-rected toward making dear the position of both the American government and American drug manufacturers and in getting a draft scheme formulated that would be acceptable to the United States as a basis for discussion at the forthcoming May conference. For a part of the Preliminary Conference a representative of the American drug interests was present in London and kept in touch with Caldwell. He did not participate in the discussions of the European manufacturers, and when it became clear that the plan they brought forth would not affect the position of American manufacturers unless they wished to become large producers for export, he returned to the United States.1° Caldwell was thus left free to point out to the conference that the main interest of the United States was in seeing improvements in the conditions of the narcotic drug traffic rather than in the protection of its own export trade. Nevertheless, his principal objection to the plan under discussion related to the difficulty that new manufacturing or exporting countries would be likely to experience in negotiating for a share of the quotas which would have already been allocated to the existing manufacturing countries, especially since the latter would not constitute a unity, but would be five different countries which would not even be in agreement among themselves.20

Several different drafts of a limitation convention as well as amend-ments and suggestions were presented to the Preliminary Conference. The draft convention which received the greatest attention was that presented by Sir Malcolm Delevingne, the British delegate. The manufacturers' quota arrangements were designed to fit this scheme. The principal features of the British plan were as follows: each country was to submit to a central office estimates of its annual domestic and re-export requirements of manufactured drugs; a mixed commission con-sisting of representatives of the Permanent Central Board, the Opium Advisory Committee, and the Health Committee of the League would examine these estimates and determine the medical and scientific re-quirements of the countries which failed to furnish estimates; the per-centage of the world's requirements which each exporting country would be allowed to manufacture would be specified; the mixed commission would inform the central office and each government of the total amount of the world's requirements each year and the quantity each quota country would be allowed to manufacture; the quota countries would pledge to have available for export the quantities which they were allowed to manufacture for that purpose and to pre-vent any unwarranted increase in prices; and finally, nonmanufactur-ing countries or countries which manufactured but exported little would nevertheless furnish the central office with information relative to the quantity manufactured or exported, and if they desired to be-come large exporters, they would negotiate with the quota countries for a share of the quotas.21 As already mentioned the main objection to this sort of scheme was the granting of a monopoly of the export trade to the existing manufacturing-exporting countries with which countries deciding in the future to manufacture for export would have to negotiate in order to participate.

No agreement could be reached in the Preliminary Conference on any particular scheme. The conferees therefore prepared a report to which the British plan was annexed and brought their work to a close on November 1. The accomplishment of the conference was largely confined to a sharper delineation of the issues in controversy,-'and as a result, some of the governments began preparations on schemes for presentation to the forthcoming main conference that might provide a satisfactory solution. A secondary achievement was the bringing of Russia and Turkey once again within the orbit of international co-operation on the drug question, from which they had been for some time excluded by international situations and internal conditions in their own territories. Caldwell did not formally accept any of the re-sults of the Preliminary Conference. Although he made no formal reservations for incorporation in the report of the conference, he did make it clear that the United States was not committed to any of the plans discussed. In fact, no government was bound by anything said or done at the conference, for their representatives did not have plenipo-tentiary powers. Thus all governments were free to present amended or entirely different proposals in the forthcoming discussions in the Advisory Committee and in the conference in May.22

At its fourteenth session in January and February 1931 the Advisory Committee devoted most of its time to drafting a scheme of limitation.

The plan finally adopted was based on the principles set forth by the committee during the preceding session, and it contained essentially the features of the British plan annexed to the report of the London Preliminary Conference.23 The Advisory Committee's scheme and the report to the Council were sent to the interested governments by the Secretary General on March 1. The United States had decided by this time, after considerable soul searching in the State Department, to participate fully in the May conference.24 Most private groups and in-dividuals consulted on the matter had urged American representation at the conference. The procrastination in the State Department had not been a result of the narcotics question per se, but was owing to the relation of that question to other issues.25 It was because of these other issues that Porter and Kenneth Clark, a correspondent for the Hearst newspapers, had opposed American attendance.26 Porter's death in June 193o removed the major obstacle to the participation of the United States in the conference. Thereafter, the State Department carefully sought to prevent any one Congressman from becoming so closely connected with its negotiations in regard to the drug prob-lem as to dominate American policy on the matter. Thus the efforts of Representative Hamilton Fish, the second-ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to take Porter's place in represent-ing the United States in international conferences on the subject were thwarted.

The Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs met at Geneva from May 27 to June 13, 1931. The American delegation to the conference consisted of Caldwell as chairman; Harry Anslinger, the head of the recently created Bureau of Narcotics; Dr. Walter L. Treadway, Assistant Surgeon General of the United States; and Sanborn Young, a member of the legislature of California. Ac-ompanying the delegation as disbursing officer and secretary, respec-ively, were Marc Smith, the American vice-consul at Geneva, and Winthrop Greene, the Third Secretary of the American legation at Beme.27 So this time, except for Young, the United States was repre-sented only by officials of the federal government concerned with the narcotics problem.

The American delegation had no plan of its own, nor was it pledged to support any particular scheme, despite the efforts of Crane and Blanco to obtain such a commitment. It was prepared to "support any plan or combination of plans" that would effect the desired limitation either directly or indirectly and which was "not clearly unacceptable" to the American government." Since the United States assumed that it already had an effective system of control, the government was primarily concerned with eliminating the excess production abroad from which the illicit traffic to and within the United States was supplied. The delegation was therefore prepared to support a conven-tion which though unacceptable to the United States in certain particu-lars was nevertheless acceptable to other countries if it appeared capable of effecting the desired restriction of manufacture in those çountries. The American delegation would work for a convention based on either the quota system, the Scheme of Stipulated Supply, a combination of the two, or any other plan so long as it provided for a direct limitation of the quantities to be manufactured, adequate measures for the con-trol of distribution, the limitation of the quantities of raw material available to factories (the American system), the establishment of a central office to receive governmental estimates of drugs required for domestic consumption and to check these estimates against exports from manufacturing countries, and the strict control and limitation of the re-exportation of drugs.29

For the first time the American government had to take into con-sideration the economic interests of a segment of its population directly involved in the problem under discussion—the manufacturers of nar-cotic drug products. In its participation in the previous international conferences, there had been virtually no economic concerns whose views had to be taken into account. This handicap had been confined to other governments. Fortunately, however, the views of the Ameri-can manufacturers were generally in accord with those of the govern-ment, despite their dislike of both the quota system and the Scheme of Stipulated Supply. As already pointed out, their opposition to the quota system was based on the fear that they would be foreclosed, by the allocation of the quotas on the basis of existing exports of countries, from significant future participation in the export trade if conditions ever permitted an increase in this phase of their activities. As for the Scheme of Stipulated Supply, they feared that they would come out second best in the competition for the market of the consuming coun-tries, which, they felt, would not be willing to commit themselves in advance as to the countries from which their drug supplies would be purchased. The principal weakness in both plans in the view of the American drug interests was the lack of adequate provisions for the control of distribution, which they regarded as the vital point of the control problem, much more important than the curtailment of the quantities produced. They therefore urged that the American delega-tion push for the adoption of the American system of control, which they regarded as the only effective method. Its virtue, besides pro-viding effective regulation of distribution, lay in allowing freedom of competition within the sphere of the legitimate trade as to markets, source of supplies, and prices.3° As they had indicated before the London Preliminary Conference met, what the American manufac-turers really wanted was to place their European competitors under the same system of regulation as themselves, for they claimed that the profits -of the European factories were partly based on drugs which went into the contraband traffic.

All the governments of the world were invited to attend the full conference, and fifty-seven did participate. The plan of the Advisory Committee was accepted as the basis for discussion, but it was agreed that amendments or entirely different projects were in order. The Advisory Committee's plan was vigorously championed by the British delegate, Sir Malcolm Delevingne. He spent several weeks of fruitless efforts to work out quota percentages that would be acceptable to all the manufacturing countries. There was little optimism among the other delegations that such could be achieved, and there was thus an early disposition to consider other plans.

The attitude of Turkey was a major stumbling block to any agree-ment on quota allocations. In recent years Turkey had furnished up to 61 percent of the raw opium imports of the manufacturing countries. The Turkish delegate therefore insisted privately on a large percentage of the world's export trade in manufactured drugs and demanded publicly a guaranteed market at a predetermined price for Turkey's raw opium supplies.31 The Turkish government claimed that to allow its citizens the right to manufacture opium derivatives from the raw materials in their own country was "but logical and fair" and certainly as justifiable as the manufacture of these products in other European countries which had to import the raw materials.32 Efforts throughout the conference to get Turkey to modify its demands failed, but some progress was made toward inducing Turkey to ratify the Hague Convention. Anslinger gave the Turkish delegation a copy of a bill concerning narcotics which had been introduced in the American House of Representatives and explained that an amendment would likely be introduced to the bill which would call for the prohibition of the importation of raw opium from countries which had not ap-plied the principles of the Hague Convention. This information was communicated to the Turkish government, which in turn instructed its delegate to inform the American delegation that as Turkey did not wish its legitimate export market for raw opium cut off, it would very probably ratify the Hague instrumentas Largely as a result of this threat and the repeated urgings of American diplomatic officials in Turkey, the Turkish government announced on April 27, 1932, its intention to adhere to both the Hague Convention of 1912 and the Geneva Convention of 9 2, 5.34

Major opposition to the quota plan of the Advisory Committee came also from the delegates of Russia, Yugoslavia, Japan, and France. The Russian delegate reiterated the position his government had taken in the London Preliminary Conference. He insisted that the conferees consider the question of the restriction of the production of raw ma-terials, and he proposed an amendment to this effect. Any other measures short of this, he maintained, would be futile. The American delegates expressed sympathy with this Russian promotion of the old American principles, but refused to support the contention that this phase of the question was within the competence of the conference. Caldwell promised that he would later propose an amendment for the limitation of the supplies of raw materials allocated to factories, thereby dealing with the issue of raw material production in an oblique way. By a vote of 43 to 3 vvith 3 abstentions the conference voted not to discuss the Soviet proposal.' The Yugoslav delegate did not object to the quota plan per se, but his insistence on a large share in the system for his country contributed to the failure to reach agreement on the percentages to be apportioned among the manufacturing countries. The same was true of Japan, whose delegation demanded an equal allocation of quotas among the manufacturing states. As Japan had not previously manufactured for export, and as one country had furnished up to 4o percent of the world's requirements, this demand was patently unacceptable. The Japanese therefore proposed that manufacture by each country be limited to the annual estimate of its domestic requirements for medical, scientific, and conversion pur-poses plus an amount to fill actual export orders accompanied by an import certificate. The French introduced a brief amendment to the Japanese proposal calling for the filling of drug orders of a nonsigna-tory country by signatories only with the permission of a central authority. The amendment, by agreement between the two delega-tions, was added to the Japanese plan.3°

At the fifth meeting of the conference, Caldwell, at the specific request of the president of the conference, made a brief statement of the American position which was "well received" and pointed out that no plan thus far suggested was entirely acceptable to the United States.37 The delegation had early reservations concerning the Advisory Committee's quota scheme, but refrained from acting upon a too hurried inclination to reject it. Thus for two weeks after the opening of the conference the delegation confined its major formal activities to introducing amendments embodying the American principles to the quota plan in order to obtain a discussion of basic alterations in the plan or the consideration of other alternatives. On June 13, how-ever, the delegation came out squarely for the Japanese-French plan, which in its essentials embodied most of the American principles, as a preferable basis for a limitation convention.38

The American delegation also submitted a plan of its own which it had worked out after the conference had begun. The scheme, known as the Stock Replacement or Rotating Stock Plan, was based on two fundamental principles: the limitation of the quantity of raw ma-terial available to factories to amounts necessary for the production of the strictly medical and scientific requirements of narcotic drugs as estimated by countries, and the extension of such limitation to all harmful derivatives of opium and the coca leaf. The main features of the plan called for:

Submission to the Permanent Central Board by each country of advance estimates of its annual needs for domestic consumption;

Submission to the board by each manufacturing country of annual estimates of its needs for raw opium, coca leaves, and drugs ob-tained from these commodities for manufacturing or conversion purposes;

Restriction by each country of its imports of raw materials and their derivatives to the quantities appearing in their estimates and the limitation of the export of these materials to the estimates of the countries receiving them;

Freedom of each country to manufacture for domestic consumption and for a "reasonable working stock," with manufacnirers being allowed to maintain a stock of drugs for export equal to 50 percent of their exports of the previous year, provided, however, that manufacturers were not to be permitted additional supplies of raw materials for manufacture and drugs for conversion until export orders had been shipped from the country;

The right of countries not currently manufacturing or manufactur-ing only for domestic consumption to fill legitimate export orders out of their stocks for domestic consumption and to replace these depleted stocks by subsequent manufacture;

Coverage of the trade in all dangerous narcotic substances by the import and export certificate system.39

In short, the American scheme provided for a free competitive market in opium and coca leaf derivatives. Their manufacture was to be limited to quantities needed for medical and scientific purposes by restricting the raw products available to factories to the quantities necessary for the production of the required refined products.

Although the Crane scheme was given no independent considera-tion by the conference, the American and the Japanese-French plan did embody some of its concepts. Annual estimates of drug needs, manufacture up to these needs for domestic consumption and to fill export orders, a free competitive market and the right to choose the source of supply, and even the control of the importation of raw materials were all encompassed in the Scheme of Stipulated Supply.

On June 20, the conference voted 2 7 to 3 to scrap the quota plan and to adopt the Japanese-French plan as a basis for discussion. At informal conferences among the Japanese, French, Spanish, German, and American delegations, the first draft of a convention based on the Japanese-French plan was drawn up. From this draft the final conven-tion was soon developed.°

The American delegation devoted most of its energies during the course of the deliberations on the new scheme to getting the bulk of its plan incorporated in the convention. It especially desired the coverage by the convention of all dangerous and potentially dangerous drugs currently being produced or which might be produced in the future, including such products as codeine and synthetic drugs. It also sought the coverage of solutions and preparations containing narcotics and the inclusion in the estimates submitted by countries of the preparations exempted in the previous conventions. Limitation of the factory stocks of raw materials was a cardinal point in the American plan, and the delegation also wanted the convention to provide for an assay of these raw materials to determine the quantities of derivatives they would yield. And finally, a stricter control of the distribution of drugs was sought.41

The American delegation did not get all it wanted. It was not until near the end of the conference that an agreement to apply the import and export certificate system to codeine was extracted from the Ger-man delegation, which heretofore had absolutely refused to agree to such a step.4-2 Other manufacturing countries had strongly opposed this step also. But the Americans did not win their point without a concession. As the result of including codeine in the list of drugs to be brought under control, the final convention divided these drugs into two groups. Group I consisted of the more dangerous drugs, to which the strictest degree of limitation and control was applied. In Group II the less dangerous drugs, including codeine, were subjected to a less severe system of control." Another difficult issue was what disposition to make of heroin. The insistence by the Austrian and Polish dele-gates that its manufacture be totally prohibited was strongly supported by the Americans, but was vigorously opposed by the British and Swiss delegates." A compromise proposal was finally incorporatéd in the convention which prohibited the export of the drug except on the request for it for medical and scientific purposes by the government of a country where the product was not manufactured. The import-ing government was required to consign it to a government depart-ment for distribution.

The American proposal to limit the amount of raw materials allowed to factories also met with much opposition, especially from the German delegation. As a result, direct limitation of these commodities was not provided for in the convention. Nevertheless, the Americans achieved essentially what they wanted, for the convention did call for the strict supervision of the quantity of raw materials in the pos-session of each manufacturer and the prevention of the accumulation of excess stocks of these products." In regard to drugs seized in the illicit traffic, the American delegation supported proposals for their destruction. When these proposals were opposed, the Americans were satisfied with the arrangements for alternative methods of disposing of these drugs, such as converting them, under government control, into nonnarcotic substances or using them for medical and scientific pur-poses under government supervision and accounting for them, if not destroyed, within a country's estimates." The Americans failed to bring all preparations containing narcotics under the import and export certificate system. In addition, they were disappointed that preliminary authorization by a central office was not required for drug shipments to countries which applied the system and for shipments of less than five kilograms to any country.47

Although they worked energetically for their objectives, the Ameri-can delegation did not insist on an absolutely perfect convention. Rather, they sought a practical and effective treaty that could be ac-cepted generally. They deliberately avoided a repetition of the discord which had characterized the Geneva conferences. Even Porter had eventually admitted that "while the methods of the American delega-tion in 1924-1925 were proper at the time," these methods should not be followed a second time." As a matter of fact, a view had long pre-vailed in the State Department that the withdrawal of the American delegation from the Geneva Conference had been unwise and that con-tinued participation by the delegation might have resulted in a better convention. Furthermore, the action had created an atmosphere of hostility which had made subsequent cooperation between the United States and other nations on the narcotics problem more difficult. By precluding American adherence to the Geneva Convention, it was felt that the withdrawal had very much weakened the international position of the United States in the antidrug campaign."49

The American delegation at the Conference on the Limitation of Manufacture therefore abstained from extended speeches and sought to avoid exchanges of recriminations. An occasion for the latter had been presented by Sir Malcohn Delevingne's hostile criticism of the Americans for opposing the quota plan and suggesting amendments to it. Caldwell, realizing that Delevingne's cooperation was needed and could be eventually obtained, wisely refrained from replying in a sim-ilar vein. This attitude paid off, for Sir Malcolm was subsequently very helpful in putting the American points across.50 The maintenance of such decorum, however, was not without certain risks. The Hearst press accused Caldwell of buckling under to Delevingne and was very critical of the American proposals. During the course of the con-ference and after, it headlined its criticism of the delegation by such phrases as "Caldwell Colorless," his "Attitude Apologetic," "Britain Leading America by the Nose," "U.S. Yields at Geneva on Limitation of Dope," "Caldwell Backed Down," and similar expressions." Similar criticisms were later echoed by A. E. Blanco and Miss Ellen La Motte.52 These attacks on the conduct of the American delegation were patently unjustified. The delegation achieved by quiet diplomacy nearly all the objectives laid down in their instructions. This was indeed a com-mendable achievement in a conference of fifty-seven participating states. The State Department and the rest of the American press in general realized this and praised the resultant convention."

The Narcotics Limitation Convention consisted of seven chapters and thirty-four articles." Chapter I (Article ) defined the terms used in the Convention and divided the drugs covered by the instrument into the two groups mentioned above.

Chapter II (Articles 2-5 ) dealt with the estimate system. It provided for the submission by each country of annual estimates of the quantities of drugs needed for medical and scientific purposes, for conversion, and for the maintenance of reserve and government stocks to the Permanent Central Board. These estimates were to be examined by a Supervisory Body consisting of four members, one each appointed by the Opium Advisory Committee, the Permanent Central Board, the Health Committee of the League, and the Office International d'Hygiène Publique, and by a secretariat provided by the Secretary General of the League. The Supervisory Body was empowered to make estimates for countries which failed to furnish them and to for-ward to the signatory powers a statement of the annual estimates of each country accompanied, if it so desired, by any comments it cared to make on them.

Chapter III (Articles 6-9) dealt with the limitation of manufacture. It specified that manufacture by each country was to be limited to the quantities stated in its estimates and quantities needed to fill export orders, minus imports and confiscated drugs used for domestic con-sumption or converted into other products.

Chapter IV (Articles 0-12) covered the subject of prohibitions and restrictions. It called for the prohibition of the export of heroin except at the request and on the responsibility of an importing country which did not manufacture the drug and which ensured that it would be used only for medical and scientific purposes. The production or manufacture of narcotic drugs of no scientific value was prohibited, and the control of newly discovered narcotic drugs was provided for.

Chapter V (Articles 13 and 14) dealt with the subject of control and provided for the application of provisions of the Geneva Conven-tion, of measures in conformity with it, to the drugs listed in the Limita-tion Convention. The Permanent Central Board was authorized to check the import and export returns of governments, and in the likeli-hood that exports to a country would create a supply in excess of that country's estimates, further exports to that country were to cease for that particular year. In addition, the exportation of quantities of drugs of more than five kilograms to any country not applying the import certificate system was prohibited until authorization had been obtained from the Permanent Central Board.

Chapter VI (Articles 15-19) consisted of administrative provisions. The chapter called for the creation by each country of a special nar-cotics administration to apply the provisions of the Convention, to regulate, supervise, and control the trade in narcotic drugs, and to organize a campaign against drug addiction. In addition, strict super-vision of the quantity of raw materials and manufactured drugs in the possession of each manufacturer was required, and the accumulation of quantities of raw products by a manufacturer in excess of the amount necessary for manufacture during the ensuing six months, unless under exceptional conditions as determined by the government, was prohibited. The chapter also required the strict supervision of the quantities of drugs and preparations produced, the destruction or con-version into nonnarcotic substances or the appropriation for medical or scientific use of confiscated drugs, the destruction or conversion of seized heroin, and the labeling of packages containing drugs as to the kind and percentage of the drug contained.
Chapter VII (Articles 2o-34) contained general provisions relating to such matters as the exchange of information among the signatory powers, the sending of annual reports to the Permanent Central Board in regard to drugs used to make preparations for which export au-thorizations were not required, the settlement of disputes over the interpretation of the Convention, and the signing, ratification, and coming into force of the Convention. The Convention was to be open for signature until December 3r, 1931, after which date it might be acceded to and ratifications might be deposited with the Secretary General of the League. The Convention was to come into force ninety days after the deposit of ratifications or the accession of twenty-five governments, including any four of the following: France, Ger-many, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands, Switierland, Turkey, and the United States. The Protocol of Signature provided that if the Convention had not come into force by July i3, 1933, the Secretary General should so inform the Council of the League, which would either summon a new conference, which the signatory powers would be obligated to attend, or take other measures it considered necessary.

The Final Act consisted of the following ten recommendations to the League Council:

Creation of a single narcotics agency by each country;

Preparation by the Opium Advisory Committee of a model code for the application of the Convention;

Coverage of certain drugs not currently covered by the Geneva and Hague Conventions;

Establishment of government monopolies of narcotic drug trans-actions;

Conclusion of a convention for the prosecution and punishment of narcotic law violators;

Prohibition of the use of heroin;

Application of the system of control of the Geneva Convention to all preparations containing any of the drugs listed in Group I of the Limitation Convention;

Exclusion of substances covered by the Geneva and Narcotics Lim-itation Conventions from the benefits of the most-favored-nation clause in future commercial treaties;

Publication of certain statistics prepared by the League Secretariat concerning the world medical and scientific requirements of mor-phine, heroin, and cocaine;

Awarding of prizes for research into possible substitutes for addiction-producing drugs.

The American government thoroughly approved of the Convention. In addition to having secured most of the points it advocated, the gov-ernment realized that because the United States was the worst sufferer among Western countries from illicit traffic in drugs fed by the excess manufactured in Europe, the strict control over the manufacture and distribution of these drugs in European and other countries as provided for by the Convention would make the United States the greatest beneficiary of its provisions. Many of the features of the Convention were similar to American legislation, and all were in accord with the American system of control. American drug manufacturers found the Convention "highly satisfactory" and private Americans interested in the narcotics problem hailed it as a great advance over the previous agreements.55 For these reasons the State Department was anxious to have the Convention signed and ratified by the United States as quickly as possible.56

Two questions not necessarily related to the narcotics problem still appeared capable of complicating matters. One was the perennial issue of the nature of proper American relations with the League of Nations. The other was whether American adherence to a convention to which the Soviet Union would also probably become a party would constitute de facto recognition of the Soviet regime. Closely related to these two questions was the problem of the attitude the Senate would choose when the treaty was submitted to it for ratification.

Since various provisions of the Convention were to be carried out by the Council and Secretary General of the League, and by the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body through the in-strumentality of the League Secretariat, the question of whether American endorsement of these arrangements would involve the United States in such intimate relations with the League as to jeopar-dize Senate approval of the Convention was a disturbing issue to the State Department. Yet examination of the issue led to the conclusion that the United States had already acquiesced in activities of the League similar to those provided in the Convention. The American government had signed the Protocol of Accession to the Permanent Court of International Justice under which the United States might participate in the proceedings of the Council or the Assembly for the election of judges to the Court. The United States had also ratified the Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export restrictions, which provided for the communication of the parties with each othefihrough the medium of the Secretary General, the settlement of disputes con-cerning the convention by referral to the Permanent Court of Interna-tional Justice, and the receipt of ratifications, accessions, denunciations, and requests by the Secretary General. Finally, the United States had already cooperated with the organs of the League concerned with narcotics matters. Thus on the issue of association with the League, the State Department concluded that ample precedents existed for validly assuming that the Convention could be safely signed. Furthermore, Senate reaction to the Convention would furnish the Department with guidelines on how to proceed on other League-connected matters, especially in regard to the negotiations on disarm-ament and participation in the Permanent Disarmament Commission.57

Extensive consideration of the relationship of signature of the Con-vention to recognition of the Soviet regime did not take place until after the United States had signed the instrument. When the American dele-gation signed the Convention and the Final Protocol on July 18, 1931, thirty-five other countries had already signed, including such major manufacturing states as Germany, Great Britain, France, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The United States did not sign the Final Act, since this consisted of recommendations to the Council of the League which the government thought it would be improper for the United States, not being a member of the League, to make. Instead, the United States assured the president of the conference that its failure to sign the Final Act "should not be construed as indicating any lack of sympathy with the general objectives of the recommendations themselves."58

Despite the warm approval given the Convention, six reservations were attached to the American signature of the instrument. In the first two the United States reserved the right to impose measures stricter than those in the Convention for the control of the domestic and inter-national traffic in narcotic substances and of the transit of these products through its territories. In resolutions three and four the United States objected to the period allowed in which statistics of imports and exports were to be submitted to the Permanent Central Board as too short, and complained that the necessity of designating separately the quantities of drugs purchased or imported for government purposes was impractical. The last two reservations were aimed at the Soviet Union and were designed to forestall the misconception that American signature' of the Convention and participation in its provisions con-stituted de facto recognition of the Communist regime. The reserva-tions therefore stipulated that

The plenipotentiaries of the United States of America formally declare that the signing of the convention for limiting the manufacture and regu-lating the distribution of narcotic drugs, by them on the part of the United States of America, on this date, is not to be construed to mean that the Government of the United States of America recognizes a regime or entity which signs or accedes to the convention as the government of a country when that regime or entity is not recognized by the Government of the United States of America as the government of that country.

. . . The plenipotentiaries of the United States of America further de-clare that the participation of the United States of America in the con-vention . . . does not involve anv contractual obligation on the part of the United States of America to a Country represented by a regime or entity which the Government of the United States of America does not recognize as the government of that country, until such country has a government recognized by the United States of America.59

The necessity and practicality of making these reservations in regard to the Soviet Union were the subject of much discussion and some controversy in the State Department. The American minister to Swit-zerland, Hugh Wilson, urged that these reservations be withdrawn. He maintained that Russia was not contemplating signing the Con-vention, and that even if it did, logic would demand that the United States attach similar reservations to all multilateral treaties which it had signed or might sign in the future and to which Russia might be expected to accede. Furthermore, he felt that the procedure followed would cause a problem with the Senate in regard to more vital treaties and might also discourage Russian adherence to future treaties to which her accession would be essential or desirable.° Dr. Wallace McClure, Assistant Chief of the Treaty Division, concurred in Wilson's views. He maintained that the reservations were unnecessary and that "un-necessary provisions which complicate treaties should be avoided." He also pointed out that the actual practice of the United States in regard to this issue was inconsistent in that the United States had signed in r92 8 the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris for the Rerninciation of War without such reservations even though it knew that Russia would be invited immediately to adhere." McClure's views were also those of the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Stanley K. Hornbeck. Hornbeck had doubted the wisdom of the reservations from the beginning, but had approved the instructions to the American delegation containing them on the grounds that they represented a matter involving general policy which he presumed had already been decided on. However, Hornbeck believed that it would be unwise to withdraw the reservations since they had already been made, but that in the future, if America's overall policy in regard to Russia was clear, such reservations should not be made.62

It had been the policy of the American government not to recognize the Soviet government ever since that regime had been established. There was no conclusive authoritative opinion on whether participa-tion in a multilateral convention implied recognition of the other participants, but the view that such was not the case was supported by most writers on the subject as well as by international practice. The State Department had also generally adopted this view. However, it had found the policy of attaching reservations to conventions to which the Soviet Union was or might become a party to the effect that American signature, ratification, and implementation of such con-ventions did not imply recognition of the Communist regime, a de-sirable means of preventing a misconstruction of the United States' position. This procedure had been first adopted in May of 192.5 in relation to American participation in the Arms Traffic Conference and was subsequently endorsed by the Department in the same year when the issue was raised as a matter of policy. After this date, the treaties signed by both the United States and Russia to which such reservations were made were the International Sanitary Convention signed on June 2I, 1926; the Kellogg-Briand Pact; the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, signed on May 31, I929; and the International Load Line Convention, signed on July 5, 193o. The only convention signed by both powers during this period to which such reservations were not made was the Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Cur-rency signed at Geneva on April z o, 1929. On this occasion the question of reservations was not even considered.63 Thus since 1925, Americap policy and practice on this matter had been relatively un-varying.

To maintain the relative consistency of this policy, the State De-partment, on the advice of the chiefs of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, the Treaty Division, and the Solicitor's Office, decided that the reservations to the Narcotics Limitation Convention should not be withdrawn. Nevertheless, they proposed that such reservations should be considered desirable only in the case of the signature or probable signature of a treaty by both the United States and an unrecognized regime and not in cases of the later adherence of an unrecognized regime to a treaty already signed by the United States." Other factors influencing the Department's decision were the views that withdrawal of the reservations might be interpreted as the adoption of a policy by the United States contrary to that expressed in the reservations, an interpretation which "might give rise to unde-sirable public discussion," and that since the reservations merely re-peated the well-known position of the United States, Russia was not likely to refuse to sign or ratify the Convention merely because of them. Furthermore, the Senate had already approved two treaties containing such reservations, and another treaty with similar reserva-tions was currently before that body.66

The Russians did not entirely ignore the American reservations. On July 2 2, 1931, the Moscow lzvestiia, in an article entitled "A Clumsy Policy of 'Stipulations,' " blamed the American action on the government's attempt to indicate a policy that would refute the con-tention made by John Bassett Moore in 193o that the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact by both the United States and Russia constituted recognition of the Soviet government. It castigated the American reservations as part of the ridiculous and ineffectual effort of the United States to aid its European debtors and American bankers by the mani-festation of an unfriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union.66 Several months later the Soviet government explained its refusal to sign the Limitation Convention not only because of what it considered to be the Convention's inadequacy, but also because of the refusal of the United States to enter into contractual relations with the Soviet Union on the "purely humanitarian" problem with which the Convention sought to dea1.67 American recognition of the Soviet government (in November 1933), however, was not followed until two years later by Russian adherence to the Convention.68

Indicative of the general endorsement of the Convention by the United States was the ease with which ratification was achieved. Various segments of American society interested in the drug question—the drug interests, religious and humanitarian organizations, labor groups, antinarcotics organizations, and political groups—all urged prompt American ratification of the instrument.69 The Convention, contrary to expectations, sailed smoothly through the Senate. The Senate For-eign Relations Committee, under the chairmanship of the isolationist and anti-League Senator Borah, manifested much interest in the docu-ment. Many questions were asked as to the nature and extent of the narcotics problem in the United States, the probable effect of the Con-vention upon it, the sources of the illicit traffic, and the purpose and effect of the American, Japanese, and Swedish reservations to the Convention. It was pointed out to the committee that the only ob-jection to the Convention by anyone in the United States was to the failure to provide for the absolute destruction of all drugs seized in the illicit traffic. It was contended, however, that this objection was not valid in that confiscated drugs were useful for the accumulation of emergency war stores, for during World War I the United States had been dependent largely on England for drug supplies. No hostility was displayed toward the Convention by any member of the com-mittee, and it was approved unanimously.7° In presenting the treaty to the full Senate for ratification, Senator Borah called it "an exceeding-ly imp'Ortant treaty," and Senator Robinson of Arkansas commended it as representing "a distinct forward movement in the control of the manufacture of narcotic drugs and the distribution of such drugs through the channels of commerce."71There was no opposition to ratification expressed in the Senate, and that body approved it unanimously on March 31, 1932. It was signed by the President about a week later.

The United States deposited its ratification of the Convention with the Secretariat of the League on April 2 8, 1932, and was thus the second nation to do so.72 It then set about the task of helping to secure the ratifications and accessions of other nations. From March 8, 1932, to April 1, 1933, the State Department sent a series of communications to other governments urging them to ratify or accede to the Convention and to appeal to other countries to do likewise." The Department also pressured the Secretary General to work toward the same end, but ever mindful of the possible hazards of a too intimate association with the League, it refused to permit the circulation by the League Secre-tariat of an American appeal for early ratification." The purpose of these activities was to secure enough accessions to the Convention by April 13, 1933, to enable the instrument to go into effect ninety days later without the necessity of convening another conference. These efforts met with success, for as early as April o twenty-nine states had ratified or acceded to the Convention, including the required number of manufacturing countries—France, Germany, Great Britain, Turkey, and the United States.75 The Convention was thus to go into force on July 9, 1933, ninety days after the necessary twenty-five ratifications and accessions had been made. It was generally acknowl-edged that the activities of the United States were primarily responsible for this achievement."

The Narcotics Limitation Convention, when put into effect among a sufficient number of powers and properly applied, effectively achieved its purpose—the limitation of the legitimate manufacture of narcotic drugs to the world's medical and scientific needs and the restriction of the quantity of these drugs available to each country. It therefore constituted a significant advance in the antidrug cam-paign." At the same time it also represented an important development in international law and administration. As the Twelfth Assembly of the League of Nations pointed out: "This is the first time that an industry has been brought under international regulation, and that manufacture in its economic aspect has been wholly subordinated to higher humanitarian and moral aims."78 The parties to the Convention gave up a not inconsiderable degree of their authority when they agreed to extensive restrictions on their right to manufacture and dis-tribute narcotic drugs. Moreover, by providing for an embargo on exports of drugs to states which imported in excess of their require-ments, the Convention provided for the coercion of noncooperative states.79

For the United States, the Convention was significant in a special way. It gave the country a legal basis for cooperation with the League on the narcotics problem, and through such cooperation, for reas-suming its leadership in the international movement. It was thus only through the relinquishment of the goal of avoiding entanglement with the League that the United States was able to enter once again the vanguard of the campaign to control the traffic in dangerous drugs.
Having committed itself to a degree of collaboration with the League, the United States nevertheless sought to confine this collabora-tion to what it considered to be proper limits. In implementing the Convention, the United States tried to cooperate fully with the inter-national administrative agencies specified in that instrument. On the other hand, the government sought to make these agencies as indepen-dent of the League as possible. The two agencies primarily involved were the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body. The Supervisory Body had been established under the Limitation Conven-tion, and as the United States was a party to this treaty, there was little hesitation as to whether the United States should fully cooperate with that body, even to influencing the selection of its members. The ap-pointment of an American to the agency was regarded as crucial to the creation of "an international balance of control" and to the pre-vention of severe criticism of the government by Americans interested in the drug question.8° Of the four bodies which were to appoint the members of the Supervisory Body—the Opium Advisory Committee, the Permanent Central Board, the Health Committee of the League, and the Office International d'Hygiène Publique at Paris—the United States had membership only on the last. But it was through the Permanent Central Board that the United States, by tactful influence, obtained the selection of Herbert L. May, already a member of the board, to membership on the Supervisory Body."81

The Permanent Central Board had been established under the Geneva Convention of 19z 5 and had been given additional functions by the Narcotics Limitation Convention. Participation in the nomina-tion and selection of its members raised a more difficult problem. The United States began to consider this matter as early as September 1933, as the terms of the current members were to expire on January 1, 1934. Although the United States had cooperated fully with the board in the matter of furnishing information, it had balked at submitting nominations and sitting with the Council of the League in electing its members. This refusal was based on dissatisfaction with the Geneva Convention, the assumption that the board was in reality an organ of the League and would therefore lack the independence necessary for the vigorous and objective performance of its duties, and fear of the domestic political repercussions that might ensue from American participation in the work of the League Counci1.82 Under the new situation created by the Limitation Convention, the first objection was considered to be no longer valid. The Convention had assigned ad-ditional duties to the board, and the United States was a part-y to the Convention. This constituted American approval of the current inter-national narcotics policy and the role assigned to the Central Board in carrying it out. As to the second objection, the United States had become convinced by 1931 that the Central Board, as evidenced by its conduct, was capable of resisting undue interference in its work by the League, despite the fact that the League Council chose its members and the League Secretariat provided its clerical staff. Con-tributing to this confidence in the board's ability to be independent was the fact that the members of the board did not sit as representatives of governments but in their private capacities, and they received no compensation beyond a small allowance for expenses.83

The third point, however, was considered to be still a matter for concern. The appointment of an American representative to sit and vote with the Council would constitute a new step in the relations between the United States and the League. The American consul at Geneva had sat with the Council in 1931 to discuss the Manchurian affair, but he did not vote. The question of the propriety of such action did not then arise.84 The expediency of taking the step now contem-plated was not confined to the question of American relations with the League on narcotics. It also had to be considered in connection with the general subject of overall American relations with the League, and more particularly, with the probable effect of such action upon the chances for ratification, without crippling amendments, of the World Court Protocols of Accession which the United States had signed and which provided for American participation in the proceedings of either the League Council or the Assembly for the election of the judges of the Court. In the opinion of the State Department, American participation in the selection of the members of the Permanent Central Board offered "an excellent opportunity" for determining the probable reaction of the American public to the carrying out of the World Court protocols. Considerable adverse reaction to American cooperation in the selection of the board would indicate to the government the in-advisability of currently pushing the World Court issue. If not much interest was aroused, "a useful precedent in favor of the provisions of the Protocol of Accession to the World Court" would be established."85

On the basis of these considerations and the conviction that Amer-ica's position as the largest legitimate consumer of narcotic drugs and the worst sufferer from the illicit traffic gave it a vital interest in having an American on the board, the United States decided to sub-mit nominations for membership on the board and to appoint the American minister to Switzerland to sit with the Council "solely in an electoral capacity."" At the meeting of the Council in October 193 3, Wilson supported, as instructed, the reelection of all eight mem-bers of the board, and particularly that of Herbert L. May, with whose. work the State Department and other interested officials of the Ameri-can government were highly pleased." With the exception of then selection of a replacement for a member who declined to serve again, the old board was reelected. Thereafter, the American minister at Berne sat with the League Council in all cases in which members were elected to the board. The principal qualification which the United States always stressed for such members was their "complete indepen-dence" of their respective governments." This, however, was not en-tirely possible, for when Germany and Italy withdrew from the League in 1934 and 1938, respectively, and Japan severed all connec-tions with League-connected organizations in 1939, they also recalled their nationals on the Central Board. In each case the United States urged these nations to continue to cooperate with the board, maintain-ing that the board was independent of the League, and pointing out how the United States, not a League member, nevertheless fully col-laborated in the selection and work of the board.89

By 1939, then, the United States had become one of the major champions of the activities of both the Central Board and the Super-visory Body. When the War in Europe threatened to interrupt their work, the government expressed interest in the urgent necessity for arrangements for their continued functioning. The United States asserted that "it is upon the operations of these two boards, supplement-ing and coordinating the efforts of individual nations, that the entire fabric of international drug control ultimately and principally rests."" During the war the two agencies carried on their operations from the United States.

The United States did not regard its cooperation with the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body as constituting a fundamental alteration in its policy toward the League. In fact, the government insistently proclaimed that these bodies were independent of the League. It sought to insure and bolster that autonomy in every way possible. Making financial contributions to support the activities of these agencies was one of the principal ways in which the United States tried to do this. There were ample precedents for such contributions. Since 192 2 the United States had paid to the League Secretariat a share of the extraordinary (secretarial) expenses of the League equal to that of Great Britain, the largest contributing League member, for con-ferences, commissions, and committees in which the United States had participated!' By the end of 1937 nearly $7o,000 had been ex-pended, either from specific appropriations or from the State Depart-ment's emergency fund, for this purpose.92 There had been no public outcry against these expenditures. No money had been contributed, however, for the regular work of the League except for the secre-tarial expenses of the Opium Advisory Committee.

In 1934 the State Department decided that the United States should help defray the financial expenses of the Permanent Central Board, the Supervisory Body, and the Opium Section of the League Secre-tariat. This decision was based on two considerations: that as a party to the Narcotics Limitation Convention, the United States was morally and contractually obligated to help pay the cost of its implementation and that such payment was necessary to establish and carry out the principle that the operation of the Convention, especially in regard to the, Central Board and the Supervisory Body, was not subject to the budgetary control of the League. The latter consideration was regarded as the most important. The United States had been much disturbed by the action of the Supervisory Commission of the League in striking from the League budget in the fall of 1932 sums for the functioning of these two bodies on the grounds that the Convention would not likely come into force in r 933, or even if it did, provisions for their expenses could be held over until 1934. The American gov-ernment feared that the League, through its control over finances, was trying to undermine the independence of these organs. In response to this action of the League, the American representative on the Advisory Committee, Stuart J. Fuller, contended that the expense of the implementation of the Narcotics Limitation Convention should be borne by the parties to it, and not by the League. He argued further that the work of the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body, as independent agencies, could not be blocked by the refusal of any League commission to advance funds. As a result of this protest, the Supervisory Commission restored the funds to the budget."93

The United States remained suspicious of the motives of the League. These suspicions were strengthened when by the spring of 1935 the League still had not provided an independent staff for the Supervisory Body and from the American viewpoint had also failed to provide sufficient funds for an adequate staff for the Permanent Central Board." The United States desired to contribute to the financial support of these organs and the Opium Section of the League Secretariat in such a way as to make it clear that the payments were being made as part of its obligation of implementing the Limitation Convention and not as a contribution to the general funds of the League." It was decided that the United States should pay its proportionate share of the expenses of the body—the same as the British share of about 10 to 11 percent of the total—from the time the Convention came into force in 1933. This amounted to $ 12,086 for the calendar years 1933 and 1934 and was included in the urgent Deficiency Bill of 1935.

The government would have preferred and did try to make the pay-ments directly to the Central Board and the Supervisory Body, but did not object to transmitting them to the Secretary General so long as they were not regarded as contributions to the League's general funds. The Secretary General, however, refused to permit the ac-ceptance of the payments except as a voluntary contribution to these funds to be made directly to him. He maintained that the two bodies had no financial autonomy and were thus not empowered to authorize any person to receive payments in their behalf. His maximum con-cession to the American position was to describe the payments as a voluntary contribution towards the reimbursement of the cost of implementing the Narcotics Limitation Convention.96 The United States refused to accept this formula, taking exception to the use of the terms voluntary contribution. Therefore no agreement could be arrived at. When the United States still insisted on the acceptance of its principle by sending the payments to the chairmen of the Central Board and the Supervisory Body in September 192 5, the money was refused.97 Further negotiations between the State Department and the Secretary General proved unsuccessful. The matter was finally turned over to the Supervisory Commission," but the issue was still unsettled at the close of i939. Meanwhile, the United States decided to pay the League a lump sum annually for its share in those activities, except narcotics, in which the United States participated officially, semiofficially, and unofficially which were of interest and benefit to the United States." Narcotics activities were not included in these payments, for the United States refused to surrender its position on the matter and there-fore preferred to treat the issue as a separate question.'" There the matter rested until the eve of World War II, when it lost all significance along with the whole question of American relations with the League.

The important point to be remembered is that through the Narcotics Limitation Conference and the implementation of the resultant con-vention, the United States had regained its place of prominence in the international drug control movement. However, this achievement came only at what turned out to be the rather insignificant price of giving up its opposition to closer cooperation with the League of Nations. Increasing participation in League affairs was by no means confined to the drug problem, but was representative throughout the 1930's of American practice in other matters as well."'101

 

 

1. Memorandum by Caldwell to Johnson, Oct. 8, tozo, SDR 511.4A6/I1/2.

2. "Memorandum of a Conference Held in the Office of the Honorable Stephen G. Porter on Wednesday, October 16, tozo," between Porter, Johnson, Caldwell, Tenny-son of the Narcotics Unit of the Treasury Department, and John D. Farnharne, repre-sentative of Arthur Woods and the Bureau of Social Hygiene, Oct. 17, iozo, SDR 511.4M/4.

3. Memorandum by Caldwell of telephone conversation with Harry Anslinger of the Narcotics Unit of the Treasury Department, Oct. 23, 1929, SDR 811.114 Ni6/17oi.

4. Memorandum by Caldwell to Ward, Dec. 18, io2o, SDR 511.4A6/2o.

5. Memorandum by Caldwell to the Undersecretary of State, Nov. 15, 1929, SDR 511.4A6/231/2.

6. Memorandum by Caldwell of conversation with Porter, Dec. 14, 1929, SDR 811. ri4N16/17181/2.

7. Consul Blake (Geneva) (from Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, Jan. 25, 193o,SDR soo.C1197/34o.

8.League of Nations, Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Report to the Council on the W ork of the Thirteenth Session, C.138.M.51.193o.XI (Geneva, 193o), pp. 2o-24. See also Blake (from Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, Feb. 7, 193o, SDR 5oo.Cii97/347, and Feb. 8, 193o, SDR 5oo.C1197/348.

9. Memorandum by Caldwell to Cotton and Shaw, March 21, 193o, SDR 5 r 14A6/46; memorandum by Caldwell to the Secretary of State, May 23, 193o, SDR 511.4A6/571/2; Secretary of State Stimson to the American Legation (Berne), July 22, 1930, SDR 511.4A6/ioo.

10. For the steps leading up to the convening of the preliminary conference, see memorandum by Caldwell, Oct. 2., 193o, SDR 511.4A6/141. See also Foreign Relations, 193z, I, pp. 646-648.

11. France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, USSR.

12. J. P. Cotton (for the Secretary of State) to Caldwell, Oct. lo, i93o, SDR 5 I T .4A6P43 /8.

13.Memorandum by Caldwell of conference held at Anslinger's office on Oct. 7, 193o, Oct. to, 193o, SDR 51 i.4A6/155. See also the transcript of the conference in SDR r.4A6/168.

14. Ibid.

15. "Report on the Preliminary Conference ... ," Caldwell to the Secretary of State, Dec. 12, 1930, SDR 511.4A6/184. pp. 3-5.

16. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

17. /bid., pp. 1, 12.   

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

20. Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs, Preliminary Meeting of Manufacturing Countries, London, October, 1 93o, Verbatim Report, M. C. (Lond.), pp. i—zo, mimeographed, PV 4, p. S.7; PV    p.

21. Caldwell's Report on the Preliminary Conference, pp. 15-16, SDR 511.4A6/184. \

22. Secretary of State Stimson to the American Consul (Geneva), Dec. 23, ro3o, SDR 5r1.4A6/i94. Also in Foreign Re/ations, 1931, I, 649-65o.

23. For the discussion of the plan and its formulation, see League of Nations, Ad-visory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Minutes of the Fourteenth Session . . . , C.88.M.34.1931.XI. Vol. I (Geneva, Top ), pp. To-85. For the Draft Convention itself see the Annex 4 to Vol. 2, pp. 242-25o.

24. Secretary of State Stimson to President Hoover, Jan. zo, 193 r, SDR 511.4A 1/2 To. Also in Foreign Relations, 193r, I, 650-651; see also Foreign Relations, 1934,17 653-

25. Undersecretary of State Cotton to Arthur Woods, Dec. 26, Tozo, SDR sir.4A6/ 28.

26. Memorandum by Caldwell of conversation with Kenneth Clark, Dec. 20, To2o, SDR 511.4A6/25.

27. Department of State, United States Delegation to the Conference on the Limita-tion of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, May 27—July 13, 1931, Report of the Delegation to the United States Secretary of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), p. I. Cited below as Report of the American Delegation on the Narcotics Limitation Conference.

28. Memorandum by Caldwell, May 5, i931, SDR 5 .4A6P43/103.

29. F oreign Relations, 193i, I, 657.

30."Statement Presented to the American Delegation to the Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs on Behalf of the American Manu-facturers of Narcotics by Oscar R. Ewing, Esq., Washington, D. C., April 9, 19.3t," SDR 511.4A6/271.

31.Report of the American Delegation on the Narcotics Limitation Conference, p. 5, For percentages of raw materials furnished by Turkey and other countries to manufacturing countries, see Records of the Narcotics Limitation Conference, II, 37.

32. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew (Istanbul) to the Secretary of State, May 23, lop, SDR 5II.4A6/347.

33. Caldwell to the Secretary of State, SDR 5I1.4A2/654.

34. Consul Gilbert (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, April 27, 1932, SDR 511.4A2/

35. For the Russian proposal and the discussion on it, see League of Nations, Records of the Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, May 27th to July 13th, 1931, V ol. I: Plenary Meetings, Text of the Debates, C.509.Mzr4.1931.X1. (Geneva, 193 ), pp. 51-52, 77, 80. Cited below as Records of Nar-cotics Limitation Conference, I.

36. For the presentation of the Japanese and French proposals, see ibid., pp. 42,
102, lo4.

37. lbid., p. 44. The statement of the American position was made in response to the request of the president of the conference, who hoped that it would accelerate the proceedings, for it seemed that many delegations were waiting for the United States to state its position before stating theirs. Caldwell to the Secretary of State, May 30,1931, SDR 51 I.4A6/341. See also Foreign Relations, 1931,1, 657-658.

38.Foreign Relations, lop, I, 659-66o. See also Records of the Narcotics Limitation Conference, II, 31-3z.

39. For the plan see, Records of the Narcotics Limitation Conference, I, 3o8-315.

40. Report of the American Delegation on the Narcotics Limitation Conference, PP. 8-9.

41. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

42. Caldwell to the Secretary of State, July 12, 193z, SDR 511.4A6/388.

43.Report of the American Delegation on the Narcotics Limitation Conference, pp. 12-13.

44. Ibid., pp. 14-15.   

45. Ibid., p. 17.

46. Ibid.   

47 . Ibid., p. 7 .

48. Memorandum by Caldwell to the Secretary of State, Sept. 27, 1931, SDR 5".4A6/444.

49. Ibid.

50. Memorandum by Caldwell to Hornbeck and Stuart J. Fuller, Sept. 14, 1931, SDR 51 1.4A6/447. For Delevingne's criticism and Anslinger's calm and reasoned reply, see Records of the Narcotics Limitation Conference, II, 37-38, 41-46.

51. For an analysis of the newspaper clippings from the Hearst press, see Helen H. Moorhead to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Dec. 14, 193T, SDR 511.4A6/481.

52. For Blanco's criticism see Anti-Opium Information Bureau, Geneva, Communi-qué No. r6 (Aug. zo, 1932) in 51 1.4A6/447. For Miss La Motte's statement see "Limit-ing Drug Manufacrure," The Nation, CXXXIV (April 13, 1932), pp. 418-419; for Caldwell's replies to these criticisms see Caldwell's memoranda of Sept. 14, 1931, SDR 5ir.4A6/447, and of April 20, 1032, SDR 511.4A6/56o.

53. Memorandum by Hornbeck to the Secretary of State, Sept. 23, 193r.

54. A convenient summary of the major provisions of the Convention, Protocol of Signature, and Final Act as well as the text of these are contained in the Report of the American Delegation on the Narcotics Limitation Conference, pp. 29-76. Foreign Relations, 193i, I, pp. 675-699 also carries the text of the Convention and the Protocol of Signature. All three documents are contained in Records of the Narcotics Limitation Conf erence,l, 367-4n.

55. Wilson (Berne) to the Secretary of State, July 14,    SDR 521.4A6/395. As
already indicated, the greatest dissatisfaction with the Convention was expressed by the Hearst press and Miss La Motte. In her article condemning the Convention, Miss La Motte invalidated most of her criticisms by expressing the fear that the Convention would not be ratified because "it was so good that the scoundrels in the manufacturing countries would never stand for it." See above, p. 25o.

56. State Department press release, July 27, 2932, SDR sri.4A6/412.

57.For the discussions leading up to this conclusion see Minister Wilson to the Secretary of State, July 14., top, SDR 511.4A6/395; memorandum by Stuart J. Fuller to the Division of Western European Affairs, July 16, 1931, SDR 51r4A6/4o7; memo-randum by Pierrepont Moffat of the Division of Western European Affairs, July 15, in3i, SDR 511.4A6/406; and memorandum by the Division of Western European Af-fairs, July 16, io3r, SDR 51T4A6/4o8.

58.Report of the American Delegation on the Narcotics Limitation Conference, p. Io. F oreign Relations, i931, I, 673.

59.Report of the American Delegation on the Narcotics Limitation Conference, pp. 9-I0. See also Foreign Relations, 1931, I, 672-673.

60. Wilson to the Secretary of State, July r, 193r, SDR 511.4A6/413.

61. Memorandum by McClure to Frank X. Ward, July 15,    SDR 51r.4.A6/421.

62. Memorandum by Hornbeck, July 25, 1931, SDR 5i 1.4A6/423.

63. For this summary of American policy to To3r, see the memorandum by Frank X. Ward, July 24, 193i, SDR 511.4A6/419. See also Foreign Relations, 19311 II 674.

64. Ibid. See also memorandum by Robert F. Kelly, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, to Ward, July 25, 1931, SDR 5 ii.4A6/422.

65.Foreign Relations, 1931, I, 674-675. Another argument presented in the Depart-ment against the withdrawal of the reservations was that if both the United States and Russia became parties to the Convention without these reservations, the United States would be bound to allow the transit of narcotic substances through American territory to and from Russia; and that as transit shipments were the favorite method of smuggling manufactured narcotics, Russia, which was "notorious for its disregard of contractual obligations" and very badly in need of cash, might take advantage of the situation in order to promote smuggling into the United States to secure cash. See memorandum by Stuart J. Fuller, July 24,193r, SDR 51 1.4A6/42o.

66. Translation enclosed in Felix Cole, Chargé d'Affaires (Riga, Latvia) to the Secretary of State, July 28,1931, SDR 511.4A6/433.

67. Winthrop S. Greene, Secretary of the American Legation (Berne), to the Secre-tary of State, April 14, 1932, SDR 511.4A6/559.

68. Stanley Hawks, Secretary of the American Legation (Berne), to the Secretary of State, Nov. 25,1935, SDR 5 r 1.4A6/1421.

69.For statements of representative groups see SDR 511.4A6/473, 477, 478, 495, 497, 503, 505, 5oo, 516, 52r, 523, 528.

70.For the account of the reception accorded the Convention in the Foreign Relations Committee, see memorandum by Caldwell to Rogers and Hornbeck, March 3o, 1932, SDR 511.4A6/553.

71. Congressional Record, 72d Cong., ist Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 7; see p. 71o1 and 72o7 for Borah's comments, and p. 7208 for Robinson's statement and Senate approval of the Convention.

72.Nicaragua was the first on March 16, 'op.

73.For these representations see SDR 511.4A6/86z-866, 9°9-915; memorandum by Fuller to Undersecretary Phillips, March 9, 1933, SDR gin4A6/835; and Foreign Relations, 1932, General, 897-898.

74. Foreign Relations, 1932,1, General, 897-9oo.

75. State Department press release, April io, 1933, SDR 511.4A6/981.

76. Blanco to Cordell Hull, April to, 1933, SDR ti.4A6/963; American Legation (Berne) to the Secretary of State, April iz, 1933, SDR 5r1.4A6/loo6; and Secretary of State Hull to Fuller, April 12, 1933, SDR 511.4A6/984. The going into force of the Convention was heralded in the United States with speeches and a radio broadcast in a celebration sponsored from New York City by the World Narcotics Defense As-sociation, a private antidrug organization headed by Captain Richmond P. Hobson, a former naval officer and Congressman and Spanish-American War hero. See the New York Times, July to, x933, p. i5.

77. Bertil A. Renborg, International Drug Control: A Study of International Ad-ministration By and Through the League of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940, p. 24.

78. Quoted in ibid., p. 26.   

79. Ibid., p.25.

80. Anslinger to Ernest L. Ives, May 4, 1933, SDR 5 1.4A6/4.

81. Consul Gilbert (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, May    1933; Fuller to Ives and Hornbeck, May ro, 1933, SDR 5r1.4A6A/13.

82. See above, pp. no-22.1.

83. For the neW attitude of the State Department toward the feasibility of Ameri-can representation in the Council for the election of members to the Central Board, see memorandum by Stuart J. Fuller to Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Sept. 5, 1933, SDR 511.4A2A/3oo.

84. Memorandum by Fuller, Sept. 12, 1593, SDR 511.4A2A/3o3.

85. Ibid. See also memorandum by Moffat to Fuller, Sept. 6, 1933, SDR 5i1.4A2A/r 1.

86. Secretary of State Hull to the American Legation (Berne), Sept. 18, ro33, SDR 511.4AzA/298.

87. Memorandum by Fuller to Moffat, Sept. 5, 1933, SDR 5i 1.4MA/3o°. Memo-randum by Fuller to Assistant Secretary of State Harry F. Payer, Sept. 8, 1933, SDR 511.4A2A/3o2.

88. Secretary of State Hull to the American Delegate (Wilson), Sept. 27, 1933, SDR 5ii.4A2A/3o7. For American participation in subsequent elections to 1939, see Wilson (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, Sept. 26, 1935, SDR 511.4A2A/486; State Depart-ment press release, Sept. z, 1938, SDR 511.4AzA/792; the Secretary of State to the Sec-retary of the Treasury, Jan. 31, T939, SDR 511.4A2A/844.

89. William Phillips (for the Secretary of State) to the American Embassy (Berlin), April 9, 1934, SDR 511.4AzA/346; Consul Howard Bucknell, Jr. (Geneva) to the Sec-retary of State, Jan. i7, 1938, SDR 511.4A2A/722; and the Secretary of State to Am-bassador Joseph C. Grew (Tokyo), May 8, 1939, SDR 511.4A2A/875.

90. State Department press release, Oct. 24, 1939, SDR 511.4A2A/916.

91. Among these were the Arms Traffic Conference of 1925, the Economic Confer-ence of 1927, the Conference on Communications and Transit, 2927, the Conference on Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions of 2927, the Preparatory Commis-sion on the Limitation of Armaments of 1926-1927, the General Disarmament Confer-ence of 1932-1935, the International Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933-1934, the Opium Advisory Committee, and the Geneva Opium Conference of 1924-25. See memorandum of the Bureau of Accounts, State Department to Carr, March 12, 1929, memo SDR 5oo.C3/29; and memorandum by Achilles, Division of European Affairs, Dec. 28, 1937, SDR 5oo.C3/i29.

92. Memorandum by Achilles, Dec. 28,2937, SDR 5oo.C3/129.

93. Memorandum by Fuller to Carr, July 5, 1934, SDR 4A6/1267.

94. Memorandum by Fuller, March 6, 1935, SDR 5 ii.4A6/1371.

95. William Phillips to Minister Wilson (Berne), Oct. 14, 1935, SDR 511.4A2A/494; Carr to Wilson, Dec. 2, 1935, SDR 51 1.4A2A/512; and the Secretary of State to Wilson, Dec. 26, 1935, SDR 511.4A2A/536.

96. Stanley Hawks, Chargé d'Affaires of the American Legation (Berne), to the Sec-retary of State, Feb. 12, 1936, SDR 511.4A6/446; July 1, 1935, SDR 51 r.4A6/1388.

97.C. M. P. Crass, District Accounting and Disbursing Office (Paris), to the Sec-retary of State, Sept. 5, 1935, SDR 511.4A6/141o; March z5, 1936, SDR 511.4A6/1449,

98. Memorandum by Achilles, Sept. 16, 1937, SDR 511.4A6A/1411/2.

99. Memorandum by Achilles, Aug. II, r938, SDR 5oo.C3/136; the Secretary of State to Howard Bucknell, Jr. (Geneva), April 19, 1939, SDR 5oo.C3/141A; Bucknell to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1939, SDR 5oo.C3/14.2.

100. Assistant Secretary of State G. S. Messersmith to Bucknell, May 6, 1938, SDR 500.C3/136.

101. Ursula P. Hubbard, "The Cooperation of the United States with the League of Nations, 193r-1936," International Conciliation, No. 329 (April, r937).

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