Drug Abuse

The trend toward greater collaboration between the United States and the League of Nations in the 193o's that was inaugurated by the Conference on Manufacture and the resultant Narcotics Limitation Convention embraced all phases of the drug problem. The United States played a prominent role in the deliberations of the League on such subjects as the traffic in and the use of prepared opium, the illicit traffic, and the excess production of raw materials—the suppression of which constituted the American program as laid down in the-Geneva Conference of 1924-1925. Aside from the international conferences on these matters, the increased participation of the United States in League narcotic affairs was most evident in the work of the Opium Advisory Committee. As pointed out earlier, relations between the committee and the United States cooled considerably after the Geneva Conferences. By 193o, however, there was evidence of a tendency on the part of the American government to adopt a more cordial attitude toward this body. As early as 1929 the United States had decided to make a financial contribution to help defray the cost of printing the minutes of the committee's sessions. This was not a mere gesture but was designed to facilitate the prompt publication and distribution of these minutes so that public interest in the activities of the Advisory Committee would be maintained constantly.' Publicity was considered to be the most important weapon in the fight against the drug evil.

Much more indicative of the modification of the attitude of the American government toward the committee was the change in the designation and character of the American representative to that organ. Down to 193o the American representatives had been variously desig-nated as serving in an unofficial and/or consultative capacity, or as unofficial observers. For a lesser period, Americans serving with other League committees had been similarly described, but the realization of the absurdity of characterizing a representative of the government as unofficial caused an abandonment of this practice.2 The incongruity was particularly apparent with reference to service on the Advisory Committee where, in most cases, the American representative was a regular official of the State Department. Therefore, in December 1929 the Department adopted the procedure that had been applied a few years earlier to Americans serving on other League committees, of instructing the American emissaries to serve in an "expert and advisory capacity."'3

This new designation did not essentially change the legal relationship of the United States to the Advisory Committee, but it was accom-panied by the renewal of more active participation in the committee's work. While under the existing arrangement the American representa-tive could not vote, place questions on the agenda, nor act as chairman or vice-chairman of the committee, he could fully engage in the com-mittee's deliberations, serve as chairman of the subcommittees, and act as rapporteur. The United States preferred this arrangement to having full membership on the committee. It viewed its limited representation as giving it the independence and liberty of action which it desired, especially since the majority of the most influential members of the committee often did not see eye to eye with the American representa-tive. Being unable to vote, the American representative could dissociate himself and his government from any of the decisions or actions that the committee might take. The State Department also felt that the position of the United States on the committee was actually strength-ened by the inability of the members of the committee to take the regular attendance of an American representative for granted. As to the matter of getting questions placed on the agenda, the United States experienced no difficulty in securing the good offices of other govern-ments for this purpose. Thus several approaches which members of the committee and League officials made to the American representative after 93i as to the possibility of the United States accepting full mem-bership were not seriously considered.4 The State Department took the position that such a step should not be contemplated until the policy of the committee was more in accord with American views, especially in regard to the limitation of the production of raw materials.'5

The degree of influence which the United States exerted on the Advisory Committee depended very largely on the personality of the American representative and the extent to which he was thoroughly grounded in narcotics matters. During the interregnum in American leadership after the Geneva conferences the American representatives were either unqualified or were prohibited by instructions from play-ing a commanding role. This situation was changed during the thir-ties. John K. Caldwell, who had performed most commendably in the Conference on Manufacture and who was largely responsible for nudging the State Department toward the resumption of a more active role in cooperation with the League in the narcotics movement, was succeeded in 1932 as American representative on the Advisory Com-mittee and as the principal officer in the State Department concerned with the problem by Stuart J. Fuller. Prior to i93o the narcotics work in the State Department had been handled as a part-time matter by one officer in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. From July i93o to June 1932 Caldwell and Fuller spent most of their time on this work. From July 193 2 to July 1934 Fuller worked alone, with the occasional assistance of a field officer, while attending the sessions of the Opium Advisory Committee. After 1934 the narcotics work became a full-time job for two and later three officers of the Department. As Assis-tant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Fuller continued to head up the work. From 1932 on, Fuller, accompanied occasionally by Harry S. Anslinger, the Commissioner of Narcotics, represented the United States on the Advisory Committee. In 1935 he was made the regular representative of the United States on the committee.' Fuller, as his State Department and narcotics associates were quick to acknowledge, brought boundless energy and devotion to the drug problem. He worked "incessantly at it, seven days a week, and with definite and very great efficiency."7 He made the role of the American representative on the Advisory Committee a meaningful one, and through his activity on that body he demonstrated that the United States was once again the leader in the international campaign to sup-press the abusive use of dangerous drugs.

One of the subjects to which Fuller gave a great deal of attention in the discussions of the Advisory Committee was the narcotics traffic in the Far East. In the thirties the Far Eastern drug situation had worsened to the extent of embracing not only the older problems of prepared opium and the contraband traffic in drugs manufactured in the West and Japan, but also the newer circumstance by which the Far East developed into the major source of illicit trafficking in manu-factured drugs and raw materials to the West. After 1932 these problems, old and new, became matters of increasing concern to the international community, and Fuller took the lead in the Advisory Committee of pushing the policy of constant exposure of the situation and of calling for immediate and specific remedies.

The problem of suppressing the traffic in and use of prepared opium had been left somewhat in abeyance by the Geneva Agreement of 1925. In essence, except for minor measures to restrict the use of the drug and to control its transport, the Agreement left the existing situation undisturbed. Provisions were made, however, for a subsequent review of the situation not later than '92.9. In August 192.8 the British government, having experienced great difficulty in carrying out its obligations under the Hague Convention because of the illicit traffic stemming from China and the importation of Persian opium into the Straits Settlement, proposed to the League of Nations that a com-mission of inquiry be sent to the Far East to make "a fresh on the spot examination" of the drug traffic there.8 The League Council and As-sembly promptly endorsed the proposal, and the commission was appointed by the Council in March 19 9.

In October 1928 the League Assembly queried the United States whether the proposed commission would be permitted to visit the Philippine Islands.9 This inquiry aroused considerable suspicion as to the real purpose of the commission. There was a view held in the State Department and by Americans associated with the international work on the drug problem that the object of the proposed investigation was to discredit the system of prohibition in the Philippines by comparing it unfavorably with the monopoly system prevailing in most of the other Far Eastern territories of the Western powers and Japan. It was suspected that the commission would merely whitewash the conditions existing in these territories and endorse the current systems of control." Indeed, there was some fear that the investigation might turn up evi-dence that the prohibition system had not been effective in eliminating the opium problem, for there had been no comprehensive survey of the results of the system since it had been put into effect twenty years previously. Furthermore, some doubt had already been expressed in international circles of the effectiveness of the Philippine policy. The failure of the Philippine government to furnish adequate statistics on the extent of the opium traffic in the Islands, despite repeated requests from the League, the United States War Department, and interested individuals, lent substance to these doubts. In addition, Hérbert L. May, after a year of investigating the opium smoking situation in the Far East, had stated in 192.7 that the policy of prohibition in the Philip-pines was a failure. He had recommended a strong government mo-nopoly system on the model of that which prevailed in parts of the Dutch East Indies as likely to be productive of the best results."11

Since refusal to allow the League commission to visit the Philippines would give rise to the view that there was something in the Islands to be concealed, the United States had little choice but to permit the visit. Therefore, after receiving assurances from the Governor General of the Islands that the commission would be welcomed and would be given all possible assistance, the State Department invited the League to send the commission to the Islands.12 It had been initially decided that an American investigatory commission would either precede or accompany the League Commission to the Philippines, but it was sub-sequently agreed to postpone the American investigation until after the visit of the League commission.'13
The Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East was composed of persons who were presumably neutral as to the question of the most effective method of suppressing the traffic in prepared opium. Its chairman, Eric E. Ekstrand, was the Swedish minister to Argentina. The other members were Max L. Gerard, a Belgian, and Jean Havalasa, former Czechoslovakian minister to Brazil. Bertil A. Renborg, the Swedish member of the Opium Traffic and Social Questions Section of the League Secretariat, served as secretary.

The commission spent nearly eight months in its investigation (Sep-tember 4, '929, to May II, 193o) and visited or covered by inquiry all the territories in the Far East where the smoking of opium was prevalent except China. The Chinese government refused to allow the investigators to enter its territory because of the refusal of the Ninth Assembly of the League to accept China's proviso that the inquiry be extended to all countries which produced or manufactured opium products and that China be represented on the commission.14

Nearly two weeks were spent by the commission in the Philippines, but only three places were visited—Manila, Cebu, and the town of Dirmaguete in Negros Oriental. The commissioners conducted a num-ber of interviews, but left a general impression with Philippine officials that they were on a pleasure trip and that their investigation was a farce.'5 Obviously coloring the viewpoint of the officials in the Philip-pines was their firm expectation that the commissioners would be critical in their report of the prevailing policy of prohibition. Yet, contrary to American presumption, the commission was eminently fair in its appraisal of the situation in the Islands. They pointed out in their report that the Philippines had been moderately successful in keeping the opium smoking vice under control, but that it was still a significant problem because of the inability of the prohibitive system to deal effectively with smuggling. The commission itself favored gradual suppression of the opium smoking habit by "legalizing smok-ing by confirmed addicts and by supplying such smokers with gov-ernment opium," thus reducing individual consumption and preventing the spread of the habit to others. It pointed out, however, that regard-less of the method of control, government monopoly or prohibition, success could only be achieved through the suppression of the illicit traffic, a problem common to all the systems of regulation.16

The commission's observations on the Philippines were later con-firmed by an investigation conducted by Mrs. Hamilton Wright from the beginning of December 193o to the last of March 193r. Mrs. Wright was sent to the Islands by the Bureau of Narcotics in lieu of the proposed American commission. She reported that the consump-tion of prepared opium had not been suppressed, that a greaf deal of this type of opium was smuggled into the islands, and that most of the contraband opium was a mixture of Persian and Yunnan opium which carne from Hong Kong, North Borneo, and Amoy. She blamed the lack of an adequate and efficiently equipped preventive establishment in the islands as being responsible for this traffic.17 Thus it was clear from her report and the observations of the League Commission that the Philippine government needed to take more vigorous steps to suppress smuggling if the system of prohibition was to be defended as being more effective than the government monopoly systems in the neighboring territories.

The Commission of Enquiry made a host of recommendations for dealing with the opium smoking problem. These included

Taking measures progressively and concurrently in each territory for the gradual suppression of the vice;

Scientific research into the opium smoking problem in each territory with government support and on an international basis;

Calling a conference by the League of Nations to secure the gradual restriction and control of poppy cultivation;

A public educational campaign against opium smoking;

Effective steps to suppress smuggling;

Reduction in the price of government opium so as to make smuggling unprofitable;

Extension of government monopolies to retail distribution;

Registration, licensing, and rationing of addicts, and the restriction of the consumption of the drug to smoking establishments owned and managed by the govermnent;

Prohibition of smoking by minors;

Strict control over the residue (dross) left over from smoked opium;

Provisions for the cure of addicts and follow-up attention to cured addicts;

No budgetary dependence by governments on revenue derived from opium, and the application of such revenue to an antiopium campaign and other social and sanitary purposes;

Establishment in the Far East by the League of Nations as "part of the Opium Section of the Secretariat, a central bureau for the opium smoking problem which should serve as a distribution centre for information and facilitate cooperation between the Govern-ments concerned.""18

From the above recommendations, it can be seen that the commission, like previous international groups which had studied the opium smok-ing problem, steered clear of proposing abrupt and drastic measures for solution of the problem.

The study of the Commission of Enquiry was designed to be preparatory to a conference on the prepared opium situation. As the commission did not complete its work until the spring of 193o, the Conference on the Suppression of Opium Smoking which, according to Article 2 of the Geneva Opium Agreement, was to meet not later than 1929, could not be convened until r93i. It met at Bangkok from November 9 to 27, and was thus the second international conference on the drug question to meet during that year. Great Britain, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Siam, and British India—the signa-tories of the Geneva Agreement—were represented at the conference. China refused to attend. Although the United States was not a signatory of the Geneva Agreement, it accepted the League invitation to attend the conference, but only in the capacity of an observer. The United States decided to be represented at the conference, though in a restricted manner, because of its interest, historically, in the opium problem in the Far East, the bearing of the Far Eastern situation on the Philippines, and the desire to forestall the criticism that the United States would not cooperate in international action except on its own terms.19 Caldwell and Colonel Lucien R. Sweet, Assistant Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, represented the United States at the confer-ence. Caldwell's selection as the American delegate initially aroused protest, inspired by the Hearst press, from various individuals and groups in the United States because of the belief that he had failed to represent the United States in a competent and vigorous manner at the recently ended Conference on Manufacture." In a release to the press, the State Department, however, fully backed Caldwell and credited his "quiet and effective persuasion" with achieving the incorporation of practically all the American principles of limitation and control of manufacturing in the resultant convention.21

The American government was not very sanguine about the prob-ability of the conference taking any drastic steps to deal with the opium smoking problem. It was therefore certain that as the con-ferees would not be inclined to accept the American policy of strict prohibition, the United States would be unable to sign any agreement brought forth. The government hoped, however, that the American representatives, through both formal and informal discussions, would be able to promote closer cooperation among the territories concerned on measures for the suppression of both opium smoking and the smug-gling of manufactured drugs." Thus the formal activities of the American delegates were confined mainly to firm statements of the American policy on the question under discussion and explanations of the American system in the Philippines. The informal activities were largely devoted to trying to convince the other delegates of the soundness of the American position."23

In order to prevent the Hearst press from accusing Caldwell of "buckling down to the British," the statement of the American position was written in the State Department after Caldwell had arrived in Bangkok, and was sent to him by telegram.24 Caldwell delivered the statement at two of the early sessions of the conference. While express-ing American support for any concerted action among the Far Eastern territories to suppress opium smoking, he qualified this pledge by stating categorically that the United States would not cooperate with any of the other governments in the perpetuation of the monopoly system and would not adopt such a system itself. He asserted that there was no moral justification for nations to prohibit absolutely the non-medical use of opium in their home territories and yet permit the use of smoking opium in their Far Eastern possessions. He maintained that the American system of absolute prohibition had worked satisfactorily in the Philippines despite the problem of smuggling, a problem com-mon to any system of control, which could only be eliminated by the limitation and control of poppy cultivation. Nevertheless, even the problem of smuggling, he contended, would be considerably reduced if all the Far Eastern territories "conscientiously enforced" a policy of proscription of all phases of the opium traffic. In conclusion he declared that:

The Government of the United States most strongly urges frank recogni-tion of the fact that there is but one real method by which to suppress the evil of opium-smoking in the Far East or anywhere else, and that this method is complete statutory prohibition of the importation, manufacture, sale, possession or use of prepared opium, coupled with active enforcement of such prohibition. Cooperation among the interested Governments in the suppression of smuggling is a necessary corollary. In measures of this kind, the United States is prepared wholeheartedly and cordially to co-operate.25

Caldwell's statements provoked no discussion, and the Philippines were seldom mentioned during the Conference. Caldwell reported, however, that in private conversations Ekstrand stated that the Ameri-can position was the only sound one, and that even Sir Malcolm Delevingne appeared to admit as much.26 But the prevailing attitude among the delegates throughout the conference was that nothing basic could be done or should be attempted until the problem of smug-gling was eliminated. They were thus unprepared even to consider measures that might radically affect the use of prepared opium. There was little disposition to put into effect the recommendations of the Ekstrand Commission of Enquiry, most of which the delegates re-garded, variously, as being either inconsistent one with another, or of little or no value, or as retrograde measures. Even some minor pro-posals put forward by the British were rejected. Van Wettum, the chief delegate of the Netherlands, led the opposition to proposals of novel measures. He maintained that the system of government monop-oly in effect in the Dutch East Indies was the result of careful study and experience, was the best that could be devised, and was working wel1.27 The interest of the conferees was mainly centered on the illicit traffic, and their discussions dwek principally on the uncontrolled production of opium in China and the smuggling of the Chinese prod-uct into other Far Eastern territories. On this matter the delegates drew up an emphatic statement putting on record their view that "no strong measures for the suppression of the practice of opium smoking" would be practicable while the overproduction of opium and the illicit traffic from producing countries remained unchecked, a situation on which they hoped the governments concerned would immediately take ac-tion.28 This was the only problem on which the conference did take a firm position.

The attitude displayed by the delegates made it a foregone con-clusion that the resulting Agreement, signed by all the full participants on November 2 7, would contain no significantly new measures. It consisted of only four articles covering substantive matters; the last three articles dealt with territories covered by the Agreement and such procedural questions as ratification and denunciation. The Agreement merely provided for an end to retail sales on a commission basis, the sale of prepared opium for cash only, the prohibition of opium smoking or the entering of opium smoking establishments by minors, and the right of a government monopoly in one territory to be supplied with prepared opium from the factory of a government monopoly in an-other territory of the same power so that the number of opium factories in the territory of one power might be reduced.29 The Final Act, consisting of eleven recommendations to governments, likewise con-tained no radical suggestions for dealing with the opium smoking problem, except for the call for an international agreement to limit the production of opium. The other recommendations dealt with the ra-tioning and licensing of addicts; the keeping of records, the making of reports, and the exchange of information on all aspects of the prepared opium traffic; the punishment of participants in the contraband traffic; and the treatment and aftercare of addicts and research into the effects of opium smoking and means of cure."

The Bangkok Opium-Smoking Conference concluded the interna-tional action devoted primarily to this particular problem until after the end of World War II. The conferees simply endorsed the status quo with respect to carrying out the obligations of their governments under the Hague Convention to adopt effective measures for the gradual suppression of the traffic in and use of prepared opium. Abso-lutely no advance was made by the conference toward solution of the problem. No basically new proposals were brought forth to deal with it. From the American viewpoint, only two developments kept the conference from being a complete waste of time and effort. These were the general and implicit recognition and endorsement of the view that the final solution to the problem could only be achieved through the limitation of the production of the raw materials from which smoking and other forms of opium were derived, and the impetus which this recognition gave to the consideration by the Advisory Committee of measures to effect this fundamental result. The Agreement did not come into force until April 1937, and this in itself, in view of the fact that none of the signatories had expressed any serious objections to the document, indicates that few of the powers took the instrument seriously.

Paradoxically, full adoption of the American position on the prob-lem of opium smoking came less as a result of international cooperation than as an outgrowth of international conflict. In 1942, several dis-cussions were held at the Bureau of Narcotics in Washington with the nationals of several governments and international experts on the question of abolishing government opium smoking monopolies in the territories held by Japan when these areas were liberated. In September 1943 the United States made representations in this regard to the gov-ernments concerned. Less than two months later, both the Dutch and British governments announced that a policy of absolute prohibition of opium smoking and the abolition of all smoking monopolies would be put into effect in their territories which were or had been conquered by the Japanese as soon as these territories were freed. The French government made a similar announcement in 1945. With the defeat of the Japanese, Japan's opium monopoly was also liquidated on orders of General Douglas MacArthur.31 Thus war served as the instrument for the achievement of a goal for which the groundwork had been laid by nearly four decades of international discussion and peaceful co-operation. The policy which the United States had inaugurated in 19o5 in the Philippines and subsequently urged upon other powers was thus ratified.

While the use of prepared opium was a serious problem in the Far East, it was overshadowed by far in international deliberatiofis in the rn3o's by concern with the rapid transformation of the Orient into the world's principal base for the clandestine manufacture of opiates and cocaine and the illicit traffic in these drugs. By 934 the operation of the Geneva and Narcotic Limitation Conventions had virtually ended excess manufacture in the principal European manufacturing coun-tries, but it had driven such activities to previously nonmanufacturing countries in southern Europe where the raw products were produced. Both licensed and clandestine factories were established in these coun-tries for the purpose of feeding the illicit traffic. Pressure from individ-ual governments and the League of Nations forced the respective governments to bring this situation under control." As a result, the Far East, because of unstable political conditions, became the main center of the illicit activities.

The political instability which prevailed in China after World War I was accompanied by the increasing cultivation of the poppy and the production of raw and prepared opium. This situation continued throughout the 193o's. In the meantime the Chinese government was devoted to a system of prohibition which it could not enforce. Suggestions from various sources, foreign and domestic, that a govern-ment monopoly be established were opposed by such varied groups as missionaries, the National Anti-Opium Association, illicit traffickers, and the military leaders. The American government too, as the only Western power with Far Eastern possessions in which the policy of prohibition was in effect, also opposed the establishment of a govern-ment monopoly in China. Since there was no improvement in the situa-tion, the Chiang Kai-shek government finally decided in '934 to ignore objections and to abandon the completely ineffectual prohibition sys-tem in favor of the monopoly. Under the new system a program for the gradual but complete suppression of poppy cultivation and opium smoking within a six-year period was instituted." The United States disapproved of this action,84 but the progress which the Chinese gov-ernment made during the next three years served to refute the Ameri-can contention—at least as regards China—that the prohibition policy was the only effective one.

As in the pre-World War I period the antiopium campaign was infused with the spirit of Chinese nationalism, which was spearheaded by the New Life Movement led by Madame Chiang Kai-shek. An educational and propaganda campaign against opium which included the contention that the use of the drug would aid China's enemy, Japan, and the enactment of strict laws and their enforcement by de-termined leaders of the government had produced by 1937 significant inroads on the traffic in and production and use of the drug. Unfortu-nately, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 193 7 reversed the progress that had been made."

Japan had long been accused of deliberately drugging China to obtain money and to weaken the character and fiber of the Chinese peo-ple in order to gain political ends.36 Prior to 193o, Japanese nationals had been engaged in promoting the drug traffic in China from the Japanese leasehold in Kwantung, and there was also an immense traffic in drugs under the control of Japanese and Korean nationals in Man-churia. A new element was added to the situation when in 193 z the Japanese transformed Manchuria and Jehol into the puppet state of Manchukuo. In the same year the Manchukuo regime established a government monopoly of smoking opium transactions, and eventually opium became one of the three main sources of the regime's revenue. Virtually no controls were placed on the traffic in other opium prod-ucts, and the manufacture and distribution of morphine and heroin were freely permitted. Huge quantities of raw opium were imported from Persia.37

The Japanese adventure in Manchuria was followed by other in-cursions into China. As other areas of China came under Japanese political, administrative, or military control, the traffic in opiates fol-lowed a pattern similar to that in Manchukuo. The renewal of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937 accelerated both the Japanese occupa-tion of Chinese territory and the spread of the drug traffic. Wherever the Japanese military went in China the virtually unrestricted traffic in opium and other narcotics followed. Restrictions which had been put in effect by the Chinese were removed by the puppet regimes established in China by the Japanese army. Thus, largely as a result of deliberate Japanese actions, the extensive production and use of pre-pared opium, the excess production and importation of raw opium, and the clandestine manufacture and consumption of opiates and co-caine characterized the Far Eastern drug situation in the dec'ade pre-ceding the Second World War. It was estimated that in China roughly 90 percent of the world's total raw opium supply was produced, and to this quantity were added the huge importations from Persia through Japanese-controlled territory and Macao. In addition to areas in China under Japanese control the British colony of Hong Kong, Portuguese Macao, and the French-leased territory of Kwangchowan became centers of the illicit traffic." While the shipment of European manu-factured drugs to the Far East practically ceased, the Far East became the major source of the illicit traffic to the West in raw and prepared opium and the refined products.'

The revival of the prominence of the Far East in the international drug traffic occasioned great alarm in Western circles. The American interest in the situation was direct and concrete. In early i933 the State Department expressed grave concern at the appearance of increasing quantities of morphine of Japanese manufacture in the clandestine traffic on the Pacific Coast, and the American ambassador in Japan communicated this concern to the Japanese government.° As time passed, the illicit drug traffic from the Far East became somewhat reminiscent of the pre-World War I situation in that increasing though relatively small quantities of smoking opium consisting of a mixture of Chinese and Persian opium were smuggled into the United States from China. As there was little or no market for this type of smoking opium in China, the American government assumed that it was prepared for the illicit market in the United States. Heroin smuggled into the United States also came from China; after 1935 it came mainly from the Japanese concession in Tientsin. In addition, a contraband traffic to the United States in raw opium originated also in China, where Persian opium was imported for the clandestine manufacture of morphine and heroin and for smuggling into the United States, Canada, and some countries of western Europe.41

Although the United States protested unilaterally against this state of affairs to the Chinese and Japanese governments, its principal efforts at amelioration were made in conjunction with the League of Nations, mainly through the Opium Advisory Committee. By focusing "pitiless publicity" on the situation, the United States hoped that Japanese au-thorities could be induced by international public opinion to remedy conditions. Thus, after 1932, the American representative on the Ad-visory Committee, along with his Chinese and Egyptian colleagues—whose countries were major victims of the Japanese-sponsored traffic —called attention at virtually every session of the committee to the Far Eastern situation and demanded that Japan live up to its obligations under the various drug treaties to which it was a party. The earliest con-sideration was given to the conditions in Manchuria and was entwined with the question of the recognition of the state of Manchukuo. Both the League and the United States refused to recognize Manchukuo. The United States maintained that since it was the Japanese govern-ment which exercised de facto power in the territory, Japan was responsible for any of the narcotics activities carried on there. Thus, early in 1933, the State Department instructed the American embassy in Japan to apprise the Japanese government informally of the American view that the establishment by the Manchukuo regime of a govern-ment monopoly for the sale of smoking opium was contrary to both the Hague Convention and the Geneva accords in that the monopoly system did not embody or envisage measures for the gradual suppres-sion of the traffic in and use of such opium.42

The principal issue in regard to narcotics activities in Manchukuo was whether or not to legalize the trade in raw opium between that territory and Persia through the recognition of import certificates is-sued by the Manchukuo regime. The issue was raised by the British in May 1933 before the League Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese conflict. The British contended that the refusal to recognize these certificates might drive this phase of the opium traffic underground and thus impair the whole system of international drug control." The feasi-bility of taking the step contemplated by the British required the an-swer to two questions: ( ) whether the proposed acceptance of the Manchukuo import certificates would constitute de facto recognition of the Manchukuo regime and thus contravene the nonrecognition policy adopted by the League; and (z ) whether, in fact, legalization of the Manchukuo-Persian raw opium trade would facilitate or prevent the use of Manchukuo as a base for the uncontrolled manufacture and distribution of narcotic drugs.

To get around the issue of recognition the Secretary General of the League suggested an ingenious procedure. A firm wishing to export opium to Manchukuo would secure a Manchukuo import certificate whose possession by the firm would be duly noted by the government of the exporting country and on the basis of which the exporting country would issue an export license to the firm but would not send a copy of the export license to Manchukuo.44 The Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese Conflict unanimously approved of the procedure recommended.45

At the subsequent discussion of the issue at the seventeenth session of the Opium Advisory Committee in the fall of 193 3, the American representative came out vigorously against the proposal. The United States had opposed from the very beginning the British suggestion that the raw opium trade between Manchukuo and Persia be legalized. It took the position that the recognition of import certificates of Man-chukuo would indeed constitute de facto recognition of the regime and that adherence to the principle of nonrecognition was more important than an attempt "to regularize in theory and in form shipments of narcotic drugs to and from Manchukuo."46 The American govern-ment also maintained that instead of preventing a gap in the inter-national system of narcotics control, the proposed legalization would produce just the opposite effect in that it would validate an already illicit traffic in narcotics. The government contended that the proposed legalization would facilitate the importation and accumulation of Persian and Turkish opium in the territory which, under the existing opium policy of the military regime there, would be transformed into manufactured and smoking opium and smuggled into the United States.47 It regarded the procedure proposed by the Secretary General as contrary to Articles 3 and 15 of the Hague Convention and Article 6 of the Geneva Agreement of 1925, since Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria was still recognized by the powers and Chinese law pro-hibited the importation of raw opium."48

Aside from the political principles involved and the possible effects of the British proposal on the international narcotics traffic as a whole, the American opposition to the British suggestion was based on the strong suspicion that the motive behind the proposal and the support given it by several of the European governments was the desire to per-mit European shipping, importing, and financial interests to profit from the Persian-Manchukuo opium trade as carriers, financiers, handlers, and insurers of shipments of the drug." Fuller, especially, believed this to be the case. His strong objections prevented the outright endorsement by the Opium Advisory Committee of the Secretary General's suggested procedure. Although many members indicated their approval of the scheme in a private session of the committee,50 the committee as a whole recoiled from publicly supporting the project. Instead, in its report to the Council it asserted that "in accordance with Articles 3, 8, and 5 of the Hague Convention of 91 2, exports of opium (raw and prepared) to the territory in question cannot be authorized."51

The continuous disclosures and denunciations in the Advisory Com-mittee of the conditions prevailing in Manchuria and other areas in China under Japanese control aroused Japanese sensibilities. The Japa-nese denied responsibility for the situation on the grounds that the regimes set up in China by the Japanese army were independent gov-ernments which Japan recognized as such. In cases where it did admit responsibility, the Japanese government made only vague promises to reform its legislation to remedy the situation.52 While Fuller's state-ments in the Advisory Committee were irritating, their accuracy was not successfully challenged, and on occasion it was even tacitly ad-mitted by the Japanese representative on the committee." Thus the Japanese government did not remain totally unresponsive to the ap-peals of the League and individual governments. In 1937 the Japanese authorities were reported to have begun a vigorous campaign against the Japanese and Korean drug traffic in China, especially in the Peiping; and Tientsin areas, on instructions from the Foreign Office.54 In the same year the Manchukuo regime, as a result of the criticism at Geneva and the realization that widespread addiction to opium was hampering the economic development of the area, put forth a plan to end the use of the drug within ten years.55 Despite these pretentious steps, no measures were consistently followed up. The Japanese government in Tokyo, and especially the Foreign Office, seemed to be sincerely desirous of rectifying the drug situation, but its power over Japanese nationals and the army in China appeared to be limited. The civilian authorities in Tokyo were quite sensitive to the adverse publicity Japan received, but the military forces in China remained unaffected by it just as they were insensitive to the criticism of other aspects of their activities in China.586

Being either unwilling or unable to effect reforms, the Japanese government resorted to the expedient of responding to the criticism of Fuller and others on the Advisory Committee with the charge that their statements constituted a political attack on Japan. When the criticism continued unabated, the Japanese in 1939 withdrew their representative from the Advisory Committee on which they had been represented even after their withdrawal from the League in i933. The cessation of cooperation with the committee was not an isolated event, however. As early as the fall of 1938 the Japanese government had come to a decision to sever all of its relations with the League and League-connected organizations.57 Thus the decision to end participa-tion in the Advisory Committee was part of the whole complex of political considerations in which the Far Eastern drug problem was entangled.

The onset of World War II interrupted efforts to deal with the narcotics traffic in the Orient. By that time the Far Eastern situation had amply demonstrated two major points of weakness in the existing system of international control. First, it was clear, as conditions in China had long made apparent, that in the absence of political stability in areas where the production and consumption of drugs were part of the economic and social fabric, effective suppression of the drug traffic there was impossible, regardless of the commitment to strict measures of control. Furthermore, any exposed point in the world scheme of control weakened the whole system. Second, it also became clear that "pitiless publicity," the basic weapon in the fight against the drug traffic, was inadequate for the task. Even in countries where political conditions were stable, world public opinion would not be sufficient if the social conscience of the people in the offending territory was not in accord with that opinion. Because of these facts it was impossible to make any substantial progress during the 193 o's toward the ameliora-tion of the drug traffic situation in the Far East.58

Despite the insoluble difficulties presented by the narcotics traffic in the Far East, the League of Nations continued its piecemeal approach to a mitigation of the drug problem. One aspect of the problem, the illicit traffic, had engaged a major share of the attention of the Advisory Committee ever since its inception. In 193 the committee gave recog-nition to the prominence of this phase of the narcotics question by creating a Permanent Subcommittee on Seizures and Illicit Traffic. Prior to 193o the emphasis was on the traffic as fed by the manufacture of excess quantities in legitimate factories in Europe. After 193o, as a result of the coming into force of the Geneva Convention in 92 8 and the Narcotics Limitation Convention in 193 3, attention shifted to the supplying of smugglers by clandestine factories established in various parts of the world, but particularly in southern Europe and the Far East. After the mid-thirties the matter became predominantly a Far Eastern problem.59

Aside from legalizing the use of drugs by addicts—an idea anathema to the United States—suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs required three main steps: the exchange of information among govern-ments as to the nature, organization, and sources of supply of the traffic and the names and methods of operation of those participating in it; the cutting off of the sources of supply; and the severe punishments of of-fenders. All the existing international conventions had provided in some measure for the first step, and through the work of the Advisory Committee and the Permanent Central Board as well as bilateral co-operation among governments, the scrutiny of the international traffic was consistently, though inadequately, provided for. The Narcotics Limitation Convention had made a great contribution to the achieve-ment of the second step so far as manufactured drugs were concerned. The supply of raw materials, however, remained uncontrolled. The international instruments of agreement covered the third point only by general admonitions to the signatories to take adequate steps to prevent transactions in dangerous drugs by unauthorized persons and to sup-press illicit traffic. Thus, it was on this third point that international deliberations in the 193 o's were concentrated.

The Advisory Committee began serious work on the problem of the illicit traffic at the beginning of 1930. At its thirteenth session in January and February the committee addressed an appeal to govern-ments to set up in their countries a centralized and unified police con-trol of narcotic drugs so that international cooperation might be facilitated through the quick exchange of information on cases of illicit traffic. A year later the committee invited the delegates of the international Criminal Police Commission to the meetings of its four-teenth session in order to discuss means of obtaining effective inter-national cooperation. At this session the Police Commission presented the committee with a draft convention providing for the establishment of a central police office for drug control in each country. These offi-ces would maintain close contact with each other and with the League Secretariat. This draft convention and questions in regard to it were referred to a subcommittee for study.

Further impetus to action on the problem was the recommendation in the Final Act of the Narcotics Limitation Convention that a con-vention be concluded on the basis of the work already done by the Advisory Committee for the prosecution and punishment of violators of narcotic laws, and that the Council of the League call the attention of governments to the importance of such a step. Consideration of this recommendation by the Council and the committee led to the adop-tion of a draft convention by the committee at its sixteenth session in May 103. The draft convention provided severe penalties for narcotic law violations and for punishment of persons who arranged or facili-tated smuggling in territories outside the country in which they were residing. This draft and revised versions of it were presented in 1933 and again in 1934 to the respective governments for their views. On ascertaining that a large majority of governments favored the con-clusion of a convention, the League Council decided definitely in May 1935 to call a conference for this purpose. In January '936 the Council designated June 8 as the date for the convening of the conference. A special committee of experts was assigned the task of revising the text of the draft convention in order to bring it into conformity with cer-tain of the views and suggestions of the interested governments.60

The American government regarded these activities of the League without enthusiasm. As early as February 193 2. it expressed a disinclina-tion to participate in any new convention on the grounds that the provisions of existing treaties, if effectively carried out, furnished an adequate basis for measures to suppress the traffic. The United States maintained this view up to its reception in February 1936 of the invita-tion from the League to participate in the conference. The American position was based on the steps that the United States had taken to deal with the illicit traffic. As in other phases of the narcotics problem, the United States was well ahead of most other governments in control measures. In addition to its domestic legislation, the United States had concluded a number of treaties and bilateral agreements with foreign governments. In 194, 1925, and r9z 6 model smuggling and extradition treaties covering the subject of narcotic drugs were concluded with Canada, Mexico, and Cuba, respectively." By 193 6 the United States was party to treaties providing for the extradition of narcotic drug offenders with twelve countries.62 In addition, bilateral administrative agreements with twenty-three countries for the exchange of informa-tion and closer cooperation among their various preventive agencies had been concluded.63 If other nations took similar steps, the United States maintained, no new convention would be necessary.

Despite this long-held position, the State Department decided that the League invitation to participate in the pending conference should be given friendly consideration. Most of the other governments had expressed a desire for a new convention and the American government did not want to appear uncooperative. Besides, a new convention might well strengthen existing measures and provide eifective deterrent pen-alties for illicit transactions in all the drugs covered by the various conventions, including both raw and refined products."64 The United States was not satisfied, however, with the draft convention which was to serve as the basis for discussion at the conference, regarding it as much too limited in the subjects covered. Therefore, before deciding whether to participate in the conference, the State Department sought definite assurances from the Secretary General that additional matters might be included on the agenda. The Department was particularly desirous that the conference be competent to consider any subject con-nected with the prevention and punishment of illicit activities, espe-cially questions involving cannabis (Indian hemp or marihuana), illicit traffic in raw materials, and the clandestine manufacture of deriva-tives.° When the Secretary General informed the United States that the scope of the conference was not limited to the draft convention but that any delegation could propose any matter for inclusion in the convention, the United States accepted the invitation to the con-ference.°
The Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dan-gerous Drugs convened at Geneva from June 8 to June 2 6, 193 6. Forty-two governments participated. Fuller and Harry S. Anslinger, with Frank S. Ward as legal adviser, composed the American delega-tion. Early in the conference the Americans proposed an amendment to the draft convention which sought to bring within the scope of the proposed convention all drugs covered by the existing treaties, in-cluding raw materials and smoking opium.67 This amendment was designed to put into effect the American contention that the drug treaties already in effect required the parties to them to suppress the abuse of all narcotic drugs—raw opium and its derivatives, prepared opium, the coca leaf and its derivatives, and cannabis. The proposal in effect included in its scope all activities—cultivation, production, manufacture, and distribution—in relation to these drugs for nonmedical and nonscientific purposes within the meaning of the term illicit traffic and the imposition of severe penalties on anyone promoting or engaging in them.

The Portuguese delegation led the opposition to the proposed amendment, contending that those parts of it relating to raw and prepared opium were beyond the scope of the conference. But as this contention was contrary to the expressed assurances of the Secretary General to the United States as to the competence of the conference, it could not be sustained. Nevertheless, it was clear that the nations in whose territories the use of smoking opium was sanctioned and those which had a financial interest in the production of raw material re-garded the idea of including smoking and raw opium transactions for nonmedical and nonscientific purposes within the convention with con-siderable disfavor." They pointed out that the question of restricting all drug activities to medical and scientific purposes was not properly within the scope of the conference, for none of the previous conven-tions which the draft convention was designed to supplement went so far in providing for the control of the drug traffic except with refer-ence to the manufacture of refined drugs. None had provided for the restriction of the production of raw materials or other transactions in such products to strictly medical and scientific purposes, and the use of prepared opium had been sanctioned as legitimate.69

The American delegation had anticipated the substantial opposition to their proposed amendment, and on the day the conference opened, it had requested authorization from the State Department to abstain from active participation in the conference if their proposar was refused. They would remain at the deliberations, however, in order to resume their participation if the achievement of an acceptable con-vention seemed probable." But the State Department was averse to any action by the American delegation reminiscent of the situation at Geneva in 1925, which might undermine the principle of international cooperation on the drug problem and detract from the future useful-ness of the United States in the movement and on other matters. Therefore, the American representatives were instructed to acquiesce in the disposition of the matter by its reference to a technical commit-tee." This was the very manner in which the amendment was disposed of. As a conciliatory gesture, however, the conferees agreed to embrace the principle of the proposal as a recommendation in the Final Act.

Their liberty of action thus limited by the State Department's atti-tude, the American delegation resigned itself to trying to obtain the best possible agreement within the framework of the draft convention before the conference. As the draft convention contained measures directly affecting constitutional and legal principles and procedures in the various participating countries, close attention to specifics was extremely important. The two issues most productive of controversy were whether willful commission or intent must be proved in order to punish offenders and whether conspiracy should be included among the punishable offenses. Contending that the requirement regarding intent would render the successful prosecution of many narcotics cases impossible, the American and Canadian delegates led the fight for the deletion of this stipulation from the draft. This was a difficult point to carry, for in most criminal codes proof of intent in criminal cases was required. As to the matter of conspiracy the American delegation supported the insistence of the delegate of Canada that it be included in the list of punishable offenses. They pointed out that since the important members of large narcotics rings did not personally handle the drugs, but confined their activities to promoting and financing illicit transattions, it would be impossible to prosecute them successfully without bringing the charge of conspiracy. Only at the last moment, and after the conference had agreed on the principles of the main articles of the final convention, did the Canadians and Americans win their points. When the Canadian delegate made it clear that his govern-ment would not sign the convention unless its demands were met, the British delegation, fearing for the future of an already weakened League, came to their aid. For this help, the British tried to secure from the Americans a promise that they would sign the convention, but failed. The Canadian delegate, however, gave assurance that he would sign."

Throughout the conference, Fuller and Anslinger opposed the listing in the convention of the specific acts to be penalized. They maintained that such an enumeration was impractical and that it would be very difficult to describe such offenses in a manner that would accord with the different systems of law in the various countries. They also pointed out the inadvisability of dictating in such detail to the legislative bodies the terms of legislation.73 Their protests were ineffective, however. They were also unsuccessful in obtaining tight provisions for the extradition of narcotics law violators, the punishment of offenders in countries where extraterritoriality prevailed, and the confiscation of the profits derived by offenders from their illegal activities.'74

The Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dan-gerous Drugs as finally formulated covered three main subjects. First were the provisions specifying severe punishment, especially by im-prisonment, for the commission in contravention of existing conven-tions of the following acts: "The manufacture, conversion, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, pur-chase, sale, delivery . . ., brokerage, despatch, despatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of narcotic drugs." Intentional participation in, attempts and conspiracy to commit the offenses listed, and subject to the stipulations of national laws, preparatory acts were to be similarly punished. In addition, in countries having national laws regulating the cultivation, gathering, and production of raw materials, violations of such laws were also to be severely punished. Countries which had extraterritorial jurisdiction in the territory of another coun-try were obligated to punish any of their nationals guilty of committing any of the enumerated offenses to the same degree as if the offense had been committed in the home territory. Furthermore, each of the acts, if committed in different countries, was to be considered as a dis-tinct offense to be punished in each country where the act was com-mitted, and foreign convictions for the offenses listed were to be recognized, for the purpose of establishing habitual criminality, in the countries where the principle of the international recognition of pre-vious convictions was recognized. Finally, seizure and confiscation of narcotic substances and instruments intended for the commission of any of the offenses were stipulated.75

Secondly, the Convention contained measures aimed at preventing drug traffickers who moved from one country to another or who aided or promoted illicit activities in a country other than the one in which they resided from escaping punishment. Offenders taking refuge in another country to avoid punishment would either be prosecuted by the country of refuge or be surrendered up by it. Therefore all of the offenses listed, except those relating to the growth of raw materials, were made extraditable crimes for inclusion in extradition treaties already in effect or later concluded, or were to be recognized as extra-ditable crimes among the countries which did not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty or on reciprocity. The require-ment of extradition was circumscribed by certain restrictions, how-ever. The granting of extradition was to be in accordance with the law of the country to which application for extradition was made, and if the offense did not appear to be a serious one in the eyes of the com-petent authorities of that country, extradition did not have to be granted. In addition, a country which did not extradite its nationals was not obligated to prosecute its nationals for committing an offense in another country if, under similar circumstances, it could not grant the extradition of a foreigner. Furthermore, the prosecution and punishment of foreigners by a country to which they had fled for refuge after having committed an offense in another foreign country could be carried out only if extradition had been requested and could not be granted, and if the law of the country of refuge embraced the principle of prosecution of offenses committed abroad by foreigners."76

Finally, the Convention provided for cooperation and collaboration among national administrative services in efforts to suppress the illicit traffic. In this regard each party was required to establish a central office to supervise and coordinate all operations necessary to prevent and punish the commission of any of the enumerated offenses. These central agencies were to cooperate with each other to the greatest extent possible through the exchange of information regarding illicit drug transactions, the identity and description of drug traffickers, and the existence of secret factories and through other activities that would facilitate the suppression of the traffic."

The Final Act consisted of four recommendations. The first was the principle underlying the amendment which had been proposed by the American delegation. Thus the governments were urged to abolish, without undue delay, the use of opium in their territories for other than medical and scientific purposes. The second recommendation called on countries which recognized the principle of extradition of their nationals to grant the extradition of those nationals who com-mitted offenses abroad even if the applicable extradition treaty contained a reservation on the subject. In the third reconunendation the conference urged the parties to the Convention to create a specialized police service to help carry out its provisions. The final recommenda-tion was simply a suggestion that the Opium Advisory Committee con-sider and give to the Council of the League its opinion on the question of the desirability of meetings among the representatives of the central offices of the various powers to facilitate the international cooperation provided for in the Convention.79

On the day the conference ended, twenty-six governments signed the Convention. The United States was the only nation which indicated that it would not sign.79 Although the American delegates regarded the Convention as containing some worthwhile provisions which, if carried out by other governments, might effect some improvement in countries with weak systems of control and thus also improve the international situation, they were highly displeased with the loopholes in the Convention relative to extradition, the situation in coimtries where extraterritoriality existed, and the failure to provide for the confiscation of profits derived from the commission of the offenses enumerated in the document. They were also disappointed over the refusal of the conferees to agree to adequate coverage of the illicit traffic in raw materials, smoking opium, and cannabis. They maintained that the Convention weakened rather than strengthened the existing international arrangements for the suppression of the illicit traffic, and by failing to cover effectively all forms of narcotic drugs, limited the scope of the obligations imposed by the drug treaties already in force. They therefore recommended that the United States refrain from sign-ing the instrument as it would require the United States to replace its existing system of control by a weaker system and might also imperil the effectiveness of America's extradition treaties. Because of the enu-meration of the acts to be penalized as criminal offenses, Congress might also regard the Convention unfavorably as a "unwarranted in-vasion of the legislative field" by the executive branch. An additional reason offered for not signing the Convention was its failure to provide the one advance in America's own domestic legislation that the United States had hoped to derive from the Conference—a constitutional basis, by treaty, for the regulation by the national government of the produc-tion of opium and cannabis and the cultivation of the raw plants from which they were derived.80

This conference was the last that was held on the drug question until after the end of World War II. It did not provide a very auspicious conclusion, in the eyes of the American government, to the inter-national movement up to that date. Like several of the preceding conferences, it served to reinforce the opinion long held by many Americans, officials and private citizens, that many of the nations involved in the narcotics traffic as producers and manufacturers or as beneficiaries of revenue derived from such traffic did not seriously desire to take effective steps to eliminate the drug problem." This pessimistic view was strengthened by what the United States regarded as an inexcusable misrepresentation of its position as contained in the French translation, incorporated in the printed records of the confer-ence, of the American statement explaining its refusal to sign the Con-vention. This misrepresentation was perpetuated by the Portuguese representative who, acting as rapporteur, stated in his report to the Council on the proceedings of the conference that the American Government had refused to sign the treaty "because it did not provide for the criminal prosecution of the habit of opium smoking."82 "This preposterous misstatement" of the American position was subsequently corrected through the circulation by the Secretary General, at the American government's request, of the text of the American statement in English, French, and Spanish as prepared by the State Department." It might be noted from this little controversy that international con-sideration of the drug problems had come full circle since the convening of the Shanghai Commission in 1909 and was once again focused on the Far East and the problem of opium smoking.

Like the other drug conventions, the Convention for the Suppres-sion of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs marked another milestone along the road toward the limitation of national sovereignty in the interest of the common welfare. It represented an admission by national states that the full exercise of their own authority was not sufficient to protect and maintain the well-being of their citizens. Thus they sought to achieve through international criminal law what their own penal laws were unable to effect. However, the reluctance with which they gave up their freedom of action in this sphere was clearly illus-trated by the fact that even after the relatively long period of five years in which the preliminary convention was drafted, the conference still had to iron out considerable differences in the points of view of the participating states. Yet, a treaty providing in many respects substantial modifications in national laws as well as innovations in international law did emerge with the endorsement of most of the participants. Un-like the other drug conventions, which were primarily concerned with the regulation and supervision of legitimate drug activities, the Con-vention of 1936 was directed exclusively against illicit transactions, making such activities an international crime." The Convention went into force on October 26, '939. There was no chance to ascertain how it would affect the illicit drug traffic as the war which soon engulfed the world interrupted the international control movement.

1.For the reasons underlying the American decision to make this contribution, see memorandum by John K. Caldwell to Nelson T. Johnson, Aug. 9, 1929, SDR 5oo.C1197/303; Aug. 17, 1929, SDR 500.Ci 197/304; Secretary of State Stimson to the American Legation (Berne), Aug. 2t, 1929, SDR 5oo.Cit97/3o4a.

2. Memorandum by Caldwell to the Division of Western European Affairs, Dec. 5, 1929, SDR goo.Cizo7/631.

3. Johnson to Caldwell, Dec. 26, isao, SDR soo.Ctio7/33oa.

4. Memorandum by Stuart J. Fuller to J. Pierrepont Moffat and Stanley K. Horn-beck, Jan. 27, 1934, SDR 5oo.C1197/663.

5. Ibid.

6. For a summary of the handling of the narcotics work in the State Department and of American representation on the Advisory Committee to 1939 see ibid.; memoran-dum by Hornbeck, Aug. 24, 1935, SDR 5oo.0 1197/894; and memorandum by George A. Morlock to R. Walton Moore, March 7, 1939, SDR 5oo.0 1197/13o2.

7. Memorandum by Hornbeck, Aug. 24, 1935, SDR 5oo.0 1197/894.

8. Sir Eric Drummond to Hugh Wilson, Oct. 16, 1928, enclosed in Wilson to the Secretary of State, Oct. 18, 1928, SDR soo.0 1197/233. See also memorandum by John-son to the Secretary of State, April 17, 1929, SDR soo.0 ii97/2731/2.

9. Wilson to the Secretary of State, Oct. 28, 2928, SDR soo.0 I 197/218.

10. Ellen La Motte to Johnson, Sept. 19, 2928, SDR soo.0 2297/225; memorandum by Caldwell to Johnson, Nov. 9, 2928, SDR soo.0 2297/2261/2; memorandum by Caldwell of conversation with Porter, Dec. 3, 2928, SDR 5oo.0 2297/24o1/2; memorandum of conversation between Herbert L. May, Johnson, and Caldwell, Dec. zo, 2928, SDR 522.4A2/26.

11. Herbert L. May, Survey of Smoking Opium Conditions in the Far East (New York: Foreign Policy Association, um), pp. 22-12,    22-26.

12. Secretary of State Kellogg to the American Legation (Berne), Dec. 8,1928, SDR 5oo.0 1197/239.

13. Memorandum by Caldwell, Sept. 5, 1928, SDR 5oo.0 rio7/218; memorandum by Caldwell to Johnson, Nov. 9,1928, SDR 5oo.0 1197/2261/2.

14. League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East, Report to the Council,V ol. I: Report with Comparative Tables, Maps and Illustrations, C.635.M.z54, i93o.XI (Geneva, 193o), 9—io. Referred to below as Report of Commission of Enquiry to the Far East.

15."Memorandurn by Colonel C. H. Bowers of the Philippine Constabulary in Answer to Mrs. Wright's Questionnaire," Jan. 19, 1931, BIA Toz33-95.

16. Report of the Conrmission of Enquiry to the Far East, I, 53, r 1.

17. Mrs. Wright to Harry J. Anslinger, May 8, T931, "Report on Opium Situation in the Philippines," BIA roz3-4or, Part 5.

18. Report of the Commission of Enquiry to the Far East,I, 137-146.

19. Memorandum by Caldwell and Fuller to Hornbeck, Aug. 18,    SDR 5ii    See also Department of State press release, Nov. 7, 1931, SDR 511.4R1/66.

20. Mrs. Moorhead to Hornbeck, Dec. 14.,    SDR 511.4A6/481.

21. Department of State press release, Nov. 7, Top, SDR 5t1.4121/66.

22. Secretary of State Stimson to Caldwell, Sept. 14, 193T, SDR 511.4R1/14.

23. "Report of John K. Caldwell, Observer on the Conference on the Suppression of Opium Smoking, Held in Bangkok, Siam, November 9, to 27, 1931," typed copy, p. 8, SDR 511.4R1/81. Cited below as Caldwell's Report on the Bangkok Opium Conference.

24. Secretary of State Stimson to the American Legation (Bangkok) (for Caldwell), Nov. 5,1931, SDR 511.416/59.

25. League of Nations, Conference on the Suppression of Opium Smoking, Minutes of the Meetings and Documents Submitted to the Conference, C.577.M. 284.1932.XI (Geneva, top), pp. 24-25,43. Hereafter cited as Minutes of the Bangkok Opium Con. ference.

26. Caldwell's Report on the Bangkok Opium Conference, p. 8.

27. For the prevailing attitude in the conference see ibid., pp. 5-6.

28. Ibid., p. 7.

29. Ibid., pp. 17-19. See also Minutes of the Bangkok Opium Conference, pp. io5— 106, for a brief summary of the Agreement.

30. Caldwell's Report on the Bangkok Opium Conference, pp. 19-21. See also Minutes of the Bangkok Opium Conference, p. ro6.

31. Helen H. Moorhead, "International Narcotics Control: 1939-1946," Foreign Policy Association Report, XXII, No. 8 (July 1,1946), 94-95.

32. Bertil L. Renborg, International Drug Control, pp. A 14--I47.

33. For a discussion of the opium situation in China during the ro3o's see Frederick T. Merrill, Japan and the Opium Menace (New York: International Secretariat, Insti-tute of Public Relations and the Foreign Policy Association, 1942), pp. 20-63.

34. Fuller to the Secretary of State, Feb. 1, 1935, SDR 5oo.0 1197/819.

35. Merrill, op. cit., pp. 28-33,42,48-63.   

36. See above, pp. 138-139.

37. Merrill, op. cit., pp. 93-99.

38. For a discussion of the Far East as the producing, manufacturing and distributing center for drugs in the illicit traffic, see Merrill, op. cit., pp. 64.—iol; and Foreign Rela-tions, 1938, IV, The Far East, 561-567.

39. A convenient summary from the American point of view is contained in memo-randum by Fuller to Morse, July 29, 1937, SDR soo.0 i97/1 io; and Fuller to the Sec-retary of State, Sept. 3, 1947, SDR 5oo.0 '197/1115.

40. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew (Tokyo) to the Secretary of State, Feb. r, r933, SDR 894.114 Narcotics/68, and Secretary of State Hull to the American Embassy (Tokyo), March 27, 1933, SDR 894.114 Narcotics/69.

41. For the effect of the Far Eastern Drug situation on the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1938, IV, The Far East, 563-564.

42. Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, The Far East, 129-133.

43. Ibid., p. 3o3.

44. Ibid., pp. 351-352.   

45-ibid., pp. 35(5-357.

46. Ibid., p. 3o6.

47. /bid., p. 399. See also Fuller's Report on the Seventeenth Session of the Opium Advisory Committee, pp. 39-39, in Fuller to the Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1934, SDR soo.0 97/655.

48. Fuller's Report on the Seventeenth Session of the Opium Advisory Committee, pp. 33-35.

49. /bid., pp. 36-37.

5o. Ibid., pp. 3o-3r.

51. League of Nations, Official Journal (Feb., 1934), p. 159.

52. Foreign Relations, 1938, IV, The Far East, 566. See also memorandum by Fuller, Aug. 18, io38, SDR 5oo.0 1197/1239.

53. See, for example, memorandum by Fuller of conversation with the First Secre-tary of the Japanese Embassy (Washington), Sept. io, 1938, SDR soo.0 1197/1258.

54. Gilbert (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, June 16, 1937, SDR soo.0 zo7/looi.

55. Merrill, op. cit., pp. ioz—io6.

56. Ibid., p. 133. See also Foreign Relations, 1938, IV, The Far East, 569-57i, with reference to the great difficulty experienced by the Japanese Foreign Office on this matter.

57. Consul Bucknell (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, Nov. 2, 1938, SDR 5oo.0 115,7/13oo.

58.For a discussion of these points of weakness as demonstrated by the Far Eastern situation, see Merrill, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

59.A brief summary of the nature and extent of the illicit traffic and the interna-tional measures taken to deal with it is given by Renborg, International Drug Control, PP. 140-152.

6o. A convenient résumé of the steps taken by the Advisory Committee and other organs of the League which led up to the conference is contained in "Confidential Report to the Secretary of State of the Delegation of the United States to the Diplo-matic Conference Held in Geneva in June, 1936, for the Purpose of Drafting a Treaty for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs," pp. 7—ro, typed copy in SDR 511.4Ti/w5. Cited below as Report of the American Delegation on the Illicit Traffic Conference.

61. Edward J. Trenwith (compiler), Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1923-1937, IV (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 3984-3987 for Canada; 4039-4040, 4045-4°48 for Cuba; and 4448-4449, 4452-4453 for Mexico. The smuggling treaty with Mexico was abrogated in 1927.

62. These countries were Albania, Canada, Cuba, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Honduras, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, and Switzerland. See the Secre-tary of State to the American Minister (Berne), April 16,1936, SDR 511.4Tr/21.

63. U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Y ear Ended December 31, i936 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 14.

64. Report of the American Delegation on the Illicit Traffic Conference, p. 3.

65. Ibid., pp. 2 2-23.

66. Ibid., pp. 23-24. See also memorandum by Fuller, Feb. 29,1936, SDR 1.4T1/9; Secretary of State Hull to the American Legation (Berne), March 2, 1936, SDR 511.4T1/8; and Stanley Hawks (Berne) to the Secretary of State, March 24, 2936, SDR 511.4T1/13.

67. Report of the American Delegation on the Illicit Traffic Conference, p. 27.

68. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

69. For the American proposal and the reaction to it, see Report of the American Delegation on the Illicit Traffic Conference, pp. 3-4, 26-28; and League of Nations, Records of the Conf erence f or the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs . . . Text of the Debates, C34i.M.216.1936.X1 (Geneva, 1936), pp. 26-31, 37-39.

70. Gilbert (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, June 8, 1936, SDR 311.4T1/41.

71. Acting Secretary of State Phillips to American Consul (Geneva) (for Fuller and Anslinger), June 9, 1936, SDR 311.4T1/42.

72. For the discussion and final disposition of these controversial items, see Report of the American Delegation on the Illicit Traffic Conference, pp. 30-33.

73. Ibid., p. 4.   

74. ibid., pp. 4-7, 3o.

75. For the text of the Convention, see Records of the Conference for the Suppres-sion of the Illicit Traffic, pp. 216—no.

76.Ibid.   

77.Ibid.

78. Ibid., pp. 230-232.

79.Gilbert (Geneva) (from Fuller) to the Secretary of State, June 26, 1936, SDR 511.4T1/52.

80. Report of the American Delegation on the Illicit Traffic Conference, pp. 4-7, 33-34; Records of the Conference for the SuPPression of the Illicit Traffic, pp. 174— 176; and the Department of State press release, Dec. 8, 1936, SDR 5i1.4T1/66.

81. Report of the American Delegation on the Illicit Traffic Conference, pp. z6, 34.

82. Ibid., p. 37.

83.1bid., p. 38. See also Department of State press release, Dec. 8, 1936.

84. For the significance of the Convention from the point of view of international law, see J. G. Starks, "The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs," AIL, XXXI (Jan. 1937), 31-33, 43; and Renborg, op. cit., pp.
27, 152.

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