Drug Abuse

The Council of the League had called for the convening of two conferences in November 192.4. At the suggestion of the Assembly, and over the objection of the British, the Council specified that the parties to the Hague Convention and all members of the League should be invited to participate in the second conference. The British had opposed this on the grounds that the inclusion of nonmanufacturing and nonproducing countries, which were not directly concerned with the drug problem, might hamper, through the presentation of im-practical proposals, the reaching of satisfactory and speedy conclusions. The decision to invite these states was made to meet the question raised by Porter as to what would happen if after the manufacturing and producing countries had reached agreements, countries not parties to the agreement began production of the raw materials and the manu-facture of their derivatives. The British maintained that the simpler solution would be merely to invite these states to adhere to the agree-ments reached.' As the issue was of little interest to the United States, it did not insist on the inclusion of these states in the Conference.2 Nevertheless the decision of the Council to invite them stood.

The Geneva Opium Conferences which met in 1924— r925 estab-lished a high water mark in the relations between the United States and the League of Nations. For the first time the United States was formal-ly and officially represented in a League activity. The government cast itself wholeheartedly into the preparations for the conferences. It was not invited, however, to the first conference, as this was confined to the subject of opium smoking and to nations in whose Far Eastern terri-tories such use of opium was permitted. Nevertheless, the United States interpreted the original resolutions of the Advisory Committee as sup-porting the assumption that the second and larger conference dealing with production and manufacture would have the results and con-clusions of the first conference before it for study.3

To prepare the American program for the forthcoming deliberations the State Department appointed Porter, Neville, and Mrs. Wright. Neville attended the sessions of the Preparatory Committee called for by the Council, which was to draft a program for the second confer-ence. Because of the highly technical nature of much of the work be-fore the committee and the great stress in Geneva placed upon the desirability of an American delegate of "expert knowledge and well trained in negotiations," he had at his disposal the assistance of M. R. Livingstone, the assistant secretary of the Narcotic Control Board; H. F. Worley, customs narcotic representative in Zurich; and Surgeon W. W. King of the Public Health Service, who was then in Paris. Other members of the committee were Sir Malcolm Delevingne of Great Britain, Gaston Bourgois of France, W. G. Van Wettum of the Netherlands, and the two European assessors of the Opium Ad-visory Committee, Sir John Jordan and Henri Brenier.

Neville's instructions, which he drew up himself, laid down in general terms the items which the United States insisted should be included in the program for the conference. In regard to the produc-tion of raw materials the American proposals called for the restriction of the cultivation of the opium poppy and the coca leaf to medicinal and scientific needs and no encouragement of such cultivation by the state; no reliance by governments on the revenue derived from the con-trol of opium and coca leaf production and trade, except to regulate the narcotics traffic; the consideration of treaty provisions preventing certain states from substituting increased customs taxes for the taxes on opium and coca leaves and their products; and the application to coca leaves of the provisions of the first five articles of the Hague Con-vention. As for the transportation of drug products, it was proposed to confine the international trade in them to medicinal and scientific pur-poses, except for the temporary traffic in prepared opium, which should cease after a fixed period of about ten years through the strict applica-tion of the import-export license system among the parties to the Hague Convention. In addition, strict measures to control the trans-shipment of drugs and their transportation on the high seas, including the reciprocal right of search, were recommended. With respect to manufacture, the instructions called for the application of Articles 9 through r 3 of the Hague Convention to all derivatives and preparations of opium and coca leaves, the prohibition of the importation by manu-facturing countries of manufactured drugs, and the restriction of the exportation of manufactured drugs and preparations to only those parties to the Hague Convention having "adequate" systems of domes-tic control. Several administrative measures were also suggested. The most important of these called for the establishment of "a permanent central organization" with sufficient powers to carry out the adminis-trative features of the agreement arrived at; the submission of annual reports by all the powers showing the amounts of raw materials and their derivatives "produced, imported, exported or used for local con-sumption"; making illegal possession of the various forms of the drugs a penal offense; and bringing within the scope of the convention drugs subsequently discovered to be dangerous as narcotics.4

From March 6 to July 16, 1924, the Preparatory Committee held several meetings without being able to agree on a draft program for the conference. A significant drawback was the lack of sufficient data to ascertain the quantity of the world's needs of raw materials for the production of the world's requirements of drugs for medicinal and scientific purposes and for the production of prepared opium. An-other obstacle was the view of many of the delegates that conditions in China, Turkey, and Persia precluded effective measures to bring about a reduction in the production and exportation of raw opium. Sir Malcolm Delevingne favored confining their efforts to a restriction of manufactured drugs and coca leaves, the less difficult problem.5 The French delegate, Bourgois, however, was less than keen on the idea of the restriction of manufacture, and it was only after representations at Paris by both the British Foreign Office and the American State De-partment6 that he came forward with any proposals at all.

Five different plans were finally presented, of which the most im-portant were those of Neville, the British, and the Dutch. The main features of Neville's plan, based on and supplementing the principles laid down in his instructions, were the establishment of a fixed quantity for all countries or for each country individually of opium and coca leaves to be produced for export and the restriction of such production to states then producing; the confining of the importation of a fixed quantity of raw materials for manufacture to the countries then manu-facturing, and the restriction of manufacture for export to the states then manufacturing for export; and the establishment of a permanent central board, consisting of two members each from producing and manufacturing countries in Europe, the Americas, and Asia plus an expert jurist, a board which would collect, collate, and publish statistics in regard to production, manufacture, importation and exportation, consumption, stocks on hand, and the domestic requirements of each state for raw and manufactured drugs and which would regulate and adjust necessary modifications in the schedules of quantities allotted on the basis of estimates of needs submitted to manufacturing and producing states.'7

Numerous and varied objections were raised in the committee to Neville's scheme. The more prominent criticisms were that it was impossible to determine the per capita need for the various forms of the drugs; that a rationing of quotas of production, manufacture, and export would be difficult, would inhibit fair competition, and- would deprive purchasing countries of the right to choose their markets; that the scheme would cause a too sudden decrease in production with a consequent rise in prices which in turn would cause an increase in smuggling and in the manufacture of drugs for consumption by coun-tries not then manufacturing; and that varying conditions between countries producing opium and countries producing coca leaves would preclude the same measures for control of excessive production of both these products. Other objections to the scheme were that it would result in too much official interference with trade, necessitate the ap-pointment of too many new government officials, and would incur too much expense.8

The British plan was similar in many respects to that of Neville, except that it contemplated only the control of the production of coca leaves and of the manufacture of opium and coca leaf alkaloids and derivatives. The principal steps called for were the manufacture on the basis of the estimated needs of each state of a fixed quantity of drug products and the proportionate distribution of the amount to be manufactured among the manufacturing states; the restriction of the importation of raw materials to the amount needed to meet the manu-facturing quota, and of the importation of manufactured drugs by consuming countries to the quantity stated in their estimates; the setting of a fixed export quota of coca leaves for each producing state; the institution of a system of import certificates and export licenses; the providing of means for future new manufacturing and producing countries to enter the quota system through agreements with the old manufacturing and producing states revising the quotas; and the estab-lishment of a permanent board consisting of representatives of the manufacturing and producing countries to administer and supervise the scheme. The British felt that of the two parts of their plan, the part relating to control of manufacture was the more important and could operate without the part relating to control of production.9

The British scheme attracted virtually the same criticisms as those directed against the American plan. Additional objections, however, were the contentions that it would be impossible for new producers and manufacturers to get an agreement with the old producers and manufacturers for a share of the quotas, and that the supervisory body's composition would not lend itself to impartial decisions." Thus a cen-tral objection to both the American and British plans was the fear of the estafilishment of a monopoly of the production of raw materials and manufactured drugs by the then producing and manufacturing countries.

The difficulty of the opium problem led the Dutch to bypass its consideration. Their plan of control was therefore confined to the production of the coca leaf and the manufacture of cocaine. Like the British scheme, it called for the establishment of a monopoly of the international trade in coca leaves and the production of cocaine among the existing producing and manufacturing countries. Unlike the British plan, however, it placed the major emphasis on the restriction of the raw material rather than on the rationing of factories, which the Dutch considered impractical. Specifically, their scheme called for the pre-scribing of fixed amounts to be exported by each producing state, the restriction of the exportation and reexportation of the raw material to countries then manufacturing for export purposes, the reduction by not more than o percent of the amount then produced for export, and the establishment of a permanent committee to supervise exports."12

The Dutch proposals were criticized on the grounds that a mere o percent reduction in production would not limit output to medicinal and scientific needs, that control of manufacture would be easier than control of production, that a monopoly of producers and manufac-turers would be unacceptable, and that there would be no assurance that manufacturers would receive a fair share of the raw product for export, especially since Holland occupied a dual role as a producer—through its possession of Java—and as a manufacturer and could thus establish a monopoly of the trade."

Bourgois, the French representative, and Brenier, one of the assessors, also presented proposals," but like those of the American, British, and Dutch, they were found unacceptable. Thus the grand result of the work of the Preparatory Committee was five different schemes. At its meeting in August 1924, the Advisory Committee, on the motion of Mrs. Wright, appointed a subcommittee consisting of those who had served on the Preparatory Committee and representatives of Germany and India to try to reconcile the different projects. After extensive dis-cussions and a great deal of hard work, the subcommittee brought forth a draft scheme which was accepted by the Advisory Committee. In brief, the scheme called for the establishment of a central board com-posed of experts to be chosen by the Council of the League on the advice of the Advisory Committee. The board would receive the re-ports of governments on estimates of their annual import requirements of raw opium, coca leaves, and certain of their derivatives and prepara-tions for medicinal and scientific purposes and annual statistics on im-ports, exports, consumption and stocks on hand. It would be em-powered to set the requirements for countries which failed to submit estimates or submitted estimates which appeared to be greatly in excess of their requirements. Each government would pledge that it would not import drugs in excess of its estimates and that it would limit ex-ports to a country to the quantity set by the board. The scheme also provided for amendments to the Hague Convention which would place coca leaves in Article 2, and include synthetic cocaine in the definition of cocaine in Chapter III; establish a system of import certif-icates and export licenses for the international trade in both raw ma-terials and their manufactured products; and institute measures to prevent drugs stored in bonded warehouses or free ports or shipped in transit across a country from being diverted to the illicit traffic. Finally, the plan suggested that governments adopt specific measures to prevent their subjects from promoting the illicit traffic in other countries and to prevent the use of their merchant marine for carrying unlicensed shipments of drugs.14

The Advisory Committee's plan represented the very maximum on which agreement could be obtained in the committee. The American proposals for direct limitation of the production of raw materials and the British scheme for direct limitation of manufacture were both re-jected because of the objections raised to giving a monopoly of pro-duction and manufacture to the countries currently engaged in these activities and because of opposition to any degree of coercion. In return for dropping his insistence on direct limitation of production, Neville was able to get accepted the idea of a central board to which estimates of needs and reports on consumption would be submitted as an indirect approach to the same goal.15

The Dutch and French representatives opposed the suggestion that the board be composed of representatives of the producing and manu-facturing countries on the ground that it would lead to the suspicion that they would favor large sales of narcotics to benefit their respective countries. These objections were responsible for the decision that the board should be chosen by the Council on the advice of the Advisory Committee.i° Five months were thus consumed in arriving at a scheme that would serve as an acceptable basis for discussion in the Second Conference. The difficulty involved in this achievement augured ill for the success of the conference.

The forthcoming deliberations were in the meantime arousing in-terest in the United States. While general sentiment appeared to be in favor of American participation, there were some objections to hold-ing the meetings in Geneva because Switzerland, an important manufacturing country, despite repeated urgings from the United States and others, had failed to ratify the Hague Convention." As the con-ferences were being held under the auspices of the League of Nations, however, Geneva was the logical site, and there was little that the American government could or wished to do about it. Of more signifi-cance was the work of Congressman Porter, who undertook the mission of securing a congressional appropriation to finance American participation. He therefore introduced a joint resolution in Congress which, after reviewing the role of the United States in the international movement and setting forth the American principles for the control of the narcotic drug traffic—the use of drugs for only medicinal and scientific purposes and the limitation of production of the raw ma-terial to amounts needed for such purposes—called for an appropria-tion of $4.o,000 for American participation in the conference.

The resolution, considered in the House on April 7, 1924, brought up the issue of the relations of the United States with the League, but surprisingly aroused only slight controversy. Representative Thomas L. Blanton, Democrat of Texas, chided Porter for sponsoring a prop-osition for cooperation with the League, since Porter and the Republi-can Party "have not only ignored and disregarded it [the League] but turned it down.'"8 Instead of the $4o,000 appropriation Blanton recom-mended first $1o,000 and then $2o,000 as being adequate for the purpose. On the other hand, Representative J. Charles Linthicum, Democrat of Maryland, came out wholeheartedly for the resolution, regarding it as indicative of one among many steps toward further American cooperation with the League. He deplored the halfhearted pace at which such cooperation was proceeding and urged that the United States become a full member of the League and thus assume the responsibilities and leadership in world affairs to which it was entitled.'8 Porter, however, was by no means willing to have his actions interpreted as favoring closer American ties with the League—of going into the League, as some of his colleagues suggested, by the back door. He explained that the basis of the dealings of the United States with the League were treaties with the member states, treaties that had been in existence long before the League came into being. Thus, he contended, the United States was merely asserting "our rights and dis-charging our obligations under the terms of these treaties." "In every instance," he declared, "where the United States representatives have negotiated with the league it had been to assert a right or perform a duty under an existing treaty, and I confess frankly I cannot see any distinction between negotiating with those nations en bloc and nego-tiating with them individually."2° Thus Porter revealed that he still had not disabused himself of the notion of the League as an entity with which the United States should deal on a basis of equality.

The resolution received the overwhelming approval of the House. The Senate, however, on the recommendation of the Foreign Rela-tions Committee, attached what came to be a crucial qualification whereby the American representatives were forbidden to sign any agreement which did not embody the American position in regard to the legitimate use of opium and other dangerous drugs and the neces-sity for the limitation of the production of raw materials. As adopted unanimously by both houses in early May, the resolution, with the exception of the preamble, resolved:

That the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary, not to exceed $4o,000 for the participation of the United States in one or both of these conferences . . . to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized: Provided, That the representatives of the United States shall sign no agreement which does not fulfill the conditions necessary for the suppression of the habit-forming narcotic drug traffic as set forth in the preamble.21

Since the United States placed most emphasis on the curtailment of the production of raw materials, the State Department approached the various producing states prior to the conferences and expressed the hope that they would attend and agree to reduce their production to medicinal and scientific purposes.22 Typical of the position of the producing countries and illustrative of the complexity of the problem as well as of the task that would face the American delegation at the conference was the reply of Bolivia. The Bolivian foreign office promised to be represented at the conference but stated emphatically that they could not agree to restrict the production of the coca leaf.23 Their position was explained to the State Department by the American legation, which pointed out that the coca leaf was such an integral part of the Bolivian economy that it would be very difficult to even get an agreement not to increase production and quite impossible to extract a promise to reduce production. Aside from the fact that the Bolivian government depended upon coca leaf cultivation for a large part of its revenue, prominent political leaders of both political parties were great producers of the commodity, and employers universally believed that the Indians needed it to work.24 This attitude of the producing states signified another ill omen for the American position at the conference. In regard to the coca leaf the situation in Peru was like that in Bolivia, while the major opium-producing countries could see no way of effecting restrictions on their product without incurring disastrous political and economic consequences.25

Although the United States did not participate in the work of the First Geneva Opium Conference, it watched its proceedings with great interest. As the moral champion, historically, of the East on the opium question, it regarded the suppression of the traffic in prepared opium as only slightly less vital than the solution of its own domestic problem. Besides, the United States was under the impression that the results of the First Conference would be open to review by the Second Geneva Opium Conference, a view largely responsible for the controversy which characterized the deliberations of the latter assembly.

The major work of the First Conference was done in its first twenty meetings from November 3 to December 5, i924. The final four meet-ings, from December r 3, 1924, to February 1, '925, were closely bound up with the deliberations of the Second Conference and consisted of efforts to alleviate some of the dissatisfaction in that body with the results of the previous performance of the First Conference.25 The mandate of the First Conference, as expressed in Resolution 5 of the Fifth Committee of the Assembly, was the consideration of measures to carry out the obligations assumed under Chapter II of the Hague Opium Convention calling for the gradual suppression of the use of prepared opium. Its agenda, therefore, based on the proposals of the Advisory Committee at its fifth session in May 192. 3, included the ex-amination of conditions in the Far East relative to the use of smoking opium and its suppression, the consideration of measures to suppress more effectively such use of opium, and the discussion of the situation in China in regard to the illegal production and use of opium and measures to be recommended to China for the solution of the problem. The conference, which consisted of representatives of Far Eastern nations or of nations with Far Eastern possessions,27 had before it specific measures, suggested by the Advisory Committee, for discus-sion. These called for the replacement of the farm system by a govern-ment monopoly, the establishment of a maximum quantity of opium to be imported, the inauguration of a system of registration and rationing of addicts, the institution of a system of uniform retail prices for the drug and of uniform penalties for violation of the laws, and the holding of periodic reviews of the opium situation.28

For a considerable period the work of the First Conference was overshadowed and even hindered by the controversy between the British and Japanese delegates over the import certificate system as applied to imports into Formosa from Hong Kong. The British had recently begun to follow the practice of refusing to honor suspicious import certificates issued by Japanese authorities for the export or transshipment of opium from Hong Kong to Formosa because much of this opium had found its way into the illicit traffic. The Japanese contended that they were being discriminated against on national grounds in the application of the system. They maintained that the powers should allow the export or transshipment of opium on the pre-sentation of import tickets without question and that they could not sign an agreement unless their demand was met. As the matter threat-ened to break up the conference, the British urged that it be made the subject of direct negotiations between the two governments. They appealed to the United States for representations at both Geneva and Tokyo in this regard." As the United States was not a producer of raw opium and did not allow its re-exportation from the country, it was not directly concerned. Nevertheless, the State Department responded to the British request." Meanwhile the First Conference adjourned from November 16 to November 2 to enable the two disputants to reach an accord. The result was embodied in Article 6 of the Agreement of the Conference as follows:

1. The export of opium, whether raw or prepared, from any Possessions or Territory into which opium is imported for the purpose of smoking shall be prohibited.

2 . The transit through, or transshipment in, any such Possessions or Territory of prepared opium shall be prohibited.

3. The transit through, or transshipment in, any such Possessions or Territory of raw opium consigned to a destination outside the Possession or Territory shall also be prohibited unless an import certificate, issued by the Government of the importing country, which can be accepted as af-fording sufficient guarantees against the possibility of illegitimate use is produced to the Government of the Possessions or Territory.al

It can be seen that the British were able to retain essentially what they had insisted on, while the Japanese apparently obtained satisfac-tion through the extension of the demand for trustworthy import cer-tificates to other powers, thus removing the onus of being discriminated against.

In regard to the major problem under consideration—steps to sup-press gradually the use of prepared opium—the delegations showed little inclination to take significant action. Aside from the Chinese, the Japanese delegation was the most vigorous in pressing for strong mea-sures. They urged that the Formosa system of control, characterized by the registration and rationing of habitual users, should be adopted. The representatives of the other powers demurred, on the ground that the mobility of their populations would render such a system ineffective. The British suggestion calling for a system of government monopoly of all transactions in opium, even including retail sales, met with more general approval. But other progressive measures to suppress the use of smoking opium were generally opposed. China served as the convenient scapegoat, for all the other delegations, except the Japanese, maintained that as long as China continued to be a major producer of opium and the principal source of the illicit traffic, efforts to suppress the use of prepared opium in adj acent territories would be futile.32 The Chinese naturally opposed this view, but they could only promise that the problem would be ended as soon as conditions permitted. Most of the powers simply preferred to maintain the status quo so far as systems of control in their own territories were concerned. In the light of this attitude it is not surprising that the agreement reached consisted of innocuous provisions that would have little effect, if any, on the opium problem in the Far East.

The First Conference completed its Agreement by early December. In essence, it called for a government monopoly of the importation, sale, and distribution of opium; prohibition of the sale of opium to minors and exclusion of minors from opium dens; prohibition of the export of prepared opium from, transit in, and transshipment through territories which imported such opium, and a similar prohibition of the same kind of traffic in raw opium with respect to such territories except on the furnishing of a valid import certificate; exchange of information and views among the various territofies in the efforts to suppress smug-gling; and the holding of joint periodic reviews of the situation in regard to prepared opium—the first such review to be held not later than 1929.33 December 13 was set as the date for the signing of the Agreement. In the meantime, the work of the First Conference had come under the surveillance, though not within the competence, of the Second Conference, and thereafter the deliberations of the two as-semblages were inextricably bound up with each other.

The American delegation to the Second Geneva Opium Conference consisted of Porter as chairman; Bishop Brent, who reluctantly con-sented to serve just once more; Mrs. Hamilton Wright; Edwin Neville; and Rupert Blue. William B. Morris, the Assistant Solicitor of the State Department, accompanied the delegation as an expert in international law. Whereas only eight powers, including India, participated in the First Conference, forty-one powers, including the participants in the First Conference, were represented in the Second Conference. The American delegation was privately opposed to the separate representa-tion of India, both because India was not a sovereign entity and her representation gave Great Britain an additional vote in the conference, and also because the most vigorous and bitter opposition to the Ameri-can proposals came from the Indian delegate, John Campbell. The Second Conference held thirty-eight plenary sessions, beginning No-vember 17, 1924, and ending February i9, 1925. An extended Christ-mas recess was taken in the proceedings from December 16 to January 19 in order to permit the settling by the governments involved of the controversies which had arisen in the conference. In fact controversy characterized by bitter recriminations, especially between the Ameri-can and the British delegations, was the most notable feature of the Second Conference. The roots of the conflict lay in the American pro-posals which led to the raising from the very beginning of the con-ference of the question of the competence of the conference to consider certain matters.

The proceedings of the Second Conference revolved around the draft conventions submitted by the United States and the Opium Ad-visory Committee. The American scheme incorporated, in the form of amendments to the Hague Opium Convention, the principles and proposals previously enunciated by the United States and covered all matters in that convention except Chapter IV relating to China. Its main points were (1) the restriction of the production and distribution of raw opium and coca leaves to medicinal and scientific needs; (2) the gradual suppression of the traffic in prepared opium within a period of ten years by means of a io percent reduction per year in the importa-tion of raw opium for the purpose of making prepared opium; (3) the establishment of a permanent central board to which governments would submit annual estimates of their narcotic drug needs and quar-terly statistics of their production, importation, exportation, and con-sumption of narcotic drug products, and with authority to question the estimates of countries deemed to be in excess of reasonable require-ments and to recommend the cessation of the export of drugs to such countries; and (4) the adoption of an import-export system for con-trolling the international traffic.34

The scheme of the Advisory Committee, which served as the basis of the work of the Second Conference, was very similar to the American proposals with respect to the import-export certificate system, the permanent central board, and minor amendments to the Hague Con-vention.35 It did not contain, however, proposals for the limitation of the overall production of raw opium and the suppression of the traffic in prepared opium. This was due to the fact that the committee put emphasis on the first part of Resolution 6 of the Fourth Assembly authorizing the Second Conference. This part of the resolution speci-fied as subjects to be considered

limitation of the amounts of morphine, heroin or cocaine and their re-spective salts to be manufactured; the limitation of the amounts of raw opium and the coca leaf to be imported for that purpose and for other medicinal and scientific purposes; and . . . the limitation of the production of raw opium and the coca leaf for export [italics added] to the amount required for such medicinal and scientific purposes. . .36

The American program, on the other hand, involved emphasis on the latter part of the resolution which requested the Council

as a means of giving effect to the principles submitted by the representa-tives of the United States of America, and to the policy which the League, on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee has adopted, to invite the Governments concerned to send representatives with plenipotentiary powers to a conference for this purpose. . . .37

Thus, there were two different approaches to the agenda of the Second Conference: that of the Advisory Committee, which was based on the view of most of its members that the matters to be discussed should be confined to the subjects listed in the first part of the resolu-tion, and the American viewpoint which held that any proposals de-signed to give effect to the principles of the United States as endorsed by the League were within the competence of the conference and that the subjects mentioned in the first part of the Assembly's resolution were not intended to be exhaustive but suggestive as to the measures to be taken to carry out those principles. Out of these different inter-pretations came the first major difference of opinion in the conference.

The American delegation presented its complete program to the conference at the fourth meeting on November 19.38 In a statement preliminary to the presentation of the proposals, Bishop Brent empha-sized the need to help China and asserted that the crux of the drug problem was money. He urged the conferees to place morality above practical and material considerations and to adopt the same measures for the welfare of other nationalities and races as for their own.39 The American proposals regarding limitation of production of raw ma-terials and the suppression of prepared opium immediately raised the question of the competence of the Second Conference as prescribed in Resolution 6 of the Fourth Assembly to consider these matters. Several days were spent in discussing this question in relation to Article of the American suggestions calling for the limitation of the production of raw materials to medicinal and scientific needs. The Indian delega-tion, supported by the British and the Dutch, maintained that as the American proposal envisaged limitation of production for internal consumption, it was beyond the competence of the conference, for the agenda adopted permitted only the discussion of limitation of the pro-duction of raw materials for export. The American response to this contention was that Resolution 6 of the Assembly "constituted in effect the agenda of the conference" and that as the resolution stated that the conference was called to give effect to the principle's of the United States and the policy of the League, these principles and policy called for the limitation of production so that there would be no surplus available for nonmedicinal and nonscientific purposes. Thus, the Ameri-can proposal was clearly within the purview of the conference. After a lively discussion, the conference upheld the American position by a vote of 26 to with 9 abstentions, and Article I was referred to the appropriate subcommittee for consideration.40

Productive of much more difficulty was Article 8 of Chapter II of the American scheme, which called for the suppression of opium smok-ing within ten years. At the first plenary session of the Second Con-ference the American delegation served notice that they would move to amend the agenda of the Second Conference so as to provide for the consideration of the problem if no significant progress was made in the First Conference. At that time the First Conference had reached no agreement, but the probability was strong that no meaningful meas-ures would be forthcoming. Nevertheless, when the Agreement was finally brought forth the American delegation was shocked at its weakness. In a written communication to the participants of the con-ference, Bishop Brent unleashed a scathing attack upon the provisions of the document. He examined each provision clause by clause and pointed out their various deficiencies. In his view the principal weak-nesses of the Agreement were the failure to establish a time limit in which the use of prepared opium would be suppressed, lack of a call for measures to prevent the spread of the habit to adults, the establishment of a government monopoly of transactions in opium, thereby giving governments an interest in revenue from this source, and the failure to recommend measures for the cooperation of neighboring territories in the solution of the opium problem in China. In language full of sarcasm Brent flayed the results of the First Conference as follows:

When we contemplate the tremendous machinery called into being for the creation of the document that lies before me—Advisory Committee, Council, Assembly of the League of Nations, International Conference with plenipotentiary representatives—it is like requisitioning a steam ham-mer for splitting a rock and then cracking a walnut with it . . . . I fear the best I can say about the document is in the terms of a Latin proverb—Montes parturiunt, nascitur ridiculus mus [the mountains are in the pangs of birth; there is born a ridiculous mouse] .41

Bishop Brent urged that the Second Conference disregard the ques-tion of competence and proceed to do what the First Conference failed to do; that it not confine itself to dealing with only the o percent of the subject which affected Europe and America, but that it also seek a solution of the 90 percent of the problem affecting Asia; and that in the interest of good relations between the East and West, the Western powers adopt the same standards for their Eastern territories and peo-ples as for their own nationals. He implored the participants in the First Conference not to sign the Agreement.42

Bishop Brent conducted a virtual one-man campaign against the Agreement. After addressing his "Appeal to My Colleagues" he left Geneva on December 7 for France and England in an effort to persuade the officials of those countries not to sign the document. In Paris he saw Premier Herriot. In London he saw various officials of the British Government—Waterlow of the Foreign Office, Sir Arthur Stelle Mait-land, Secretary of Labor, Lord Cecil, and the Archbishops of York and Canterbury, and he corresponded with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain.° While there he took advantage of the occasion to answer the charges against the American delegation, printed in the London Times, of John Campbell, the Indian delegate, who had pre-ceded him to London. Campbell had severely criticized the American delegation and its program. He charged them with having presented in their draft convention matters that went beyond the scope of the agenda of the Second Conference and which they had previously agreed specifically to exclude from the agenda. He contended further that the American principles on which their draft convention was based represented an incorrect interpretation of the Hague Opium Conven-tion, and he criticized the American delegation for refusing to accept his suggestion to refer the question of the meaning of the Convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an ad hoc con-ference of the signatory powers. Finally, he complained that Article of the American draft convention interfered with the domestic con-cerns of India. He could not agree, he asserted, that "the only- thing which can solve the opium problem is the reduction of the original crops," for the production of opium in India did not affect in any way the amount of opium available for consumption. He concluded that the action of the American delegation on these matters jeopardized the success of the conference."

In a letter to The Times dated January 3, Brent denied Campbell's charges. He pointed to the fact that the Second Conference had already decided that it had competence in regard to two articles of the Ameri-can suggestions, including the controversial Article . Besides, not only the United States but other nations also had presented proposals in addition to those of the Preparatory Committee, since it was never understood that the proposals made in that committee were exhaustive. Furthermore, he argued, the American interpretation of the Hague Convention had been "explicitly accepted by the Advisory Committee, the Council, and the Assembly of the League, . . . India's reserva-tion being duly recorded." Finally, the American representatives had never agreed in any form that certain subj ects included in the American scheme would be excluded from discussion, and if they had, such an agreement would have been repudiated by the American government. Brent concluded that Campbell's whole position was weak and his statement without foundation." Thus, the differences between the participants in the conference were placed in the arena of public opinion where, because of the nature of the problem, the United States, as the champion of morality, had the advantage.

Brent's efforts to persuade the powers to reject the Agreement of the First Conference were temporarily rewarded with success. The day (December 3 ) when the First Conference participants were to sign passed with only the signature of the delegate of India, who had signed on December 6, attached to the Agreement. At the last moment the British and French delegations had received instructions from their governments not to sign." The other governments followed suit. Thus hope remained within the American delegation that the Second Con-ference might salvage something of substance from the discussions on the problem.

The most obvious explanation for the decision of the British and French-to postpone the signing of the Agreement of the First Confer-ence was their hope that they could persuade the United States to withdraw its controversial proposals, both in regard to limiting the production of raw opium and suppressing the traffic in prepared opium. As early as December 3 the British Foreign Office appealed to the State Department not to insist on bringing these proposals before the Second Conference, as they were clearly beyond its scope. They suggested in-stead that as a compromise, the United States endorse a proposal which the British would bring forth and which would call for the appoint-ment of an impartial commission, headed by an American and not containing nationals of the powers with Far Eastern possessions, to conduct an investigation in all the Far Eastern Territories concerned, including China, as to the nature of the opium problem and the feasibil-ity of measures for its suppression. A full knowledge of the nature of the problem, and of British administrative difficulties in dealing with it, would, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, induce sympathetic un-derstanding on the part of Americans of the British position."47

The State Department rejected the British plea. It cited House Joint Resolution 195 instructing the American representatives not to sign any agreement which failed to fulfill the American principles as the reason for its inability to acquiesce in the British suggestions." How-ever, the Department suggested to Porter that in order to facilitate a compromise with Great Britain and thereby avoid jeopardizing the success of the conference, he might become more flexible about the fixed term of ten years for the suppression of the traffic in prepared opium.° Porter agreed not to insist on the ten-year limit, but held that if the menace of prepared opium was to be eliminated, the United States would have to insist on some time limit in which this would be brought about."

On December the American delegation presented its suggestions on prepared opium and moved their referral to the appropriate sub-committee. As predicted, this aroused a storm of protest from many nations represented in the First Conference, particularly the British, the French, and the Dutch. They contended that the proposal was out-side the competence of the Second Conference. Furthermore, they did not wish to repudiate an agreement they had just completed and had authority to sign. Although, as already mentioned, the signing of the Agreement was postponed, the battle over the competence of the Sec-ond Conference to consider the American proposal continued to rage. On December 16 the conference voted to adjourn all plenary sessions until January z, when the discussion of the issue would be resumed.51' It was hoped that in the meantime the major disputants would be able to work out some compromise. If a vote had been taken on the question at this time, the Americans could probably have carried the conference by a large majority." This might have availed them nothing, however, because the British and several other delegations might then have with-drawn from the conference.

Had the State Department been willing to exert firm control over the American delegation at Geneva, a compromise might have been worked out. While in London, attempting to persuade the British to postpone the signing of the Agreement of the First Conference, Brent was fully exposed to the considerations underlying the British position. Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, set forth convincingly that position in a letter to Brent. The situation in India was the root of the difficulty. Chamberlain pointed out that the reports of both the American and British delegates on the Hague Opium Conference in 1912 agreed with India's present interpretation of Article I of the Hague Convention to the effect that the purely domestic production and use of opium in India was not open to international consideration. He also pointed out the difficulties standing in the way of confining "by a single stroke of the pen" the production and export of opium to medicinal and scientific purposes. Prominent among these were the opium situation in China, lack of controls in other producing states, the illicit traffic and the absence of measures by certain countries to suppress it, the presence of large numbers of Chinese in Britain's Far Eastern possessions, and the customs of the people in these territories and the need for a proper regard for them. Chamberlain cited Britain's withholding of its signature to the Agreement of the First Conference and the -proposal for sending an impartial commission of inquiry to India and other British possessions as evidence of the serious concern of the government with the problem and the desire to do what was right about it."

Brent was almost completely won over by Chamberlain's arguments. He suggested to the State Department that the United States should refrain from interfering in India's internal affairs, but should confine its importunings to the restriction of production for export, a position which he had urged on the American delegation before he left Geneva for France and England. He likewise recommended that the United States support the British proposal for a League of Nations investi-gatory commission to the Far East. Finally, he endorsed Chamberlain's view that the complexity of the opium smoking problem precluded solution by a "simple stroke" and that because of chaotic conditions in China the fixing of a specific time when adjacent territories should be-gin to reduce imports would not be feasible."
In the State Department the views of Chamberlain and Brent were given respectful consideration. In a memorandum from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs it was recommended that Porter be sent excerpts of their remarks and also selections from the Department's instructions to Blue on December 14., 192 2., disavowing the desire or intention of the United States to interfere in the internal and purely domestic mea-sures of governments in regard to the drug traffic in their own terri-tories. It was hoped that these statements would induce Porter to refrain from risking the loss of British cooperation by insisting on a fixed number of years in which the use of prepared opium in India and other British possessions should be suppressed. It was suggested that the adoption of the British proposal for a commission of inquiry to the Far East might be the maximum which the American delegation could obtain if it was not to risk wrecking the conference."55

The State Department endorsed the views set forth in the memo-randum, but merely contented itself with sending the recommended excerpts to Porter for his careful consideration in the light of the atti-tude of the government and the provisions of House Joint Resolution 195 authorizing American participation in the conference." No specific instructions were sent, nor was Porter apprised of the recommendation in the memorandum on the possibility of the American delegation abandoning its insistence on a fixed time limit for the ending of the traffic in prepared opium. The Department preferred to leave matters to Porter's discretion.

During the period of adjournment, the British, French, and Dutch governments appointed new men to head their delegations. The British first chose Lord Salisbury to succeed Sir Malcolm Delevingne as head of the British delegation, but after failing to recover from a riding accident in sufficient time for the resumption of the Second Conference, Salisbury was succeeded in turn by Viscount Cecil. Because of the accident, the reconvening of the conference was postponed from January 2, to January 19. The French appointed Edouard Daladier, Minister of Colonies, to head their delegation. The Dutch appointed as their chief delegate Jonkheer Loudon, who was formerly Dutch minister to the United States and who later became the head of the Dutch foreign office. The appointment of these men was obviously designed to give greater prestige to their respective delegations. At the same time, it gave a heavier political cast to the deliberations and con-stituted as well the recognition of the political importance of the conference and the possibly harmful repercussions, especially to the League of Nations, if the conference should fail.

When the Second Conference reconvened on January 29, the dis-cussion of its competence to consider the question of prepared opium continued. It soon became clear that there was no change in the basic positions of the principal contending nations. The plenary sessions from January 19 to January 22 were dominated by the chiefs of the American and British delegations, who defended the positions of their respective countries with angry words and mutual recriminations. Viscount Cecil's statement that the per capita consumption of opium in the United States was greater than that in India was characterized by Porter as "a vile slander upon the American people.”57 Although Cecil later withdrew the allegation, Porter's subsequent remarks strong-ly implied that Great Britain, motivated primarily by financial consid-eration, had disregarded her obligations under the Hague Convention and was seeking further to evade them. Cecil replied angrily to the charge a's wounding to the national feeling, honor, and reputation of his country and ample justification for the withdrawal of his delegation from the conference."58

Out of the heat of these three days of discussion there emerged the virtual certainty that the positions of the American and British dele-gations were irreconcilable. The British were adamantly opposed to being placed under the obligation of reducing the production and con-sumption of prepared opium and the traffic in that commodity so long as China remained a huge producer and a major source of the illicit traffic. They were not prepared to repeat the sacrifice they had made in the prewar period for the benefit of China. They therefore insisted that the question of prepared opium was not within the competence of the conference. They based their argument on the fact that the Fourth Assembly of the League had in two separate resolutions called for two separate conferences. Resolution 5 had called for a conference of those powers with Far Eastern territories in which prepared opium was used, while Resolution 6 had called for a second conference to follow to deal with the manufacture, production for export, and the international traffic in the various narcotic products. They therefore concluded that since the issue of prepared opium was being considered by the First Conference as authorized by Assembly Resolution 5, it had no place in the deliberation of the Second Conference, whose agenda had been defined by Resolution 6.59 The French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Indian delegations fully supported the British view.

Porter was just as unyielding as the British. Obviously the not too subtle hints sent him by the State Department in the form of excerpts from the letters of Brent and Sir Austen Chamberlain and from the Department's instructions to Blue in 1922 failed to impress him. By rather tortuous reasoning the American delegation contended that the conference did have competence to consider the question of prepared opium. They maintained that in accordance with Resolution 6, in order to provide for the reduction of the production of raw opium to world medicinal and scientific requirements through the establishment of machinery for the determination of these needs, the amount of raw opium needed for the manufacture of prepared opium and die time when the use of such opium would be ended had to be ascertained. In support of this contention they referred back to the fact that in the Fifth Committee of the Assembly the American representatives had favored one conference to cover all phases of the drug problem. They tacitly admitted, however, that on technical grounds the British had the better case. They therefore urged that technicalities be put aside in view of the fact that the subject of prepared opium was covered by the Hague Convention and could not be separated from the genera.1 problem.°

While not yielding their basic positions, the two sides did make an attempt at compromise. The maximum British concessions were their proposals for a commission of inquiry to the Far East and an agree-ment to suppress the traffic in prepared opium and the use of the product within a fifteen-year period beginning after China had suppressed the illicit production of and traffic in opium within her borders.5' On the other hand, the Americans expressed their willingness to extend the period during which the traffic in prepared opium should be sup-pressed to fifteen years beginning immediately.° Thus the crucial issue was when the fifteen-year period should begin.

After several days of deadlocked discussion the conference adopted a resolution offered by the Finnish delegation which provided that the American proposal and all other suggestions and declarations in re-gard to it be referred to a mixed commission of sixteen to be composed of representatives of the eight nations constituting the First Conference and of eight nations participating in the Second Conference. This com-mittee was then to submit a report to both conferences. The British, French, Dutch, Indian, and Portuguese delegations accepted the reso-lution, with the observation that they still maintained their position on the question of competence and reserved the right to bring it up later.°

The Committee of Sixteen held four meetings. At the third meeting a subcommittee of five consisting of representatives of Great Britain, France, Finland, Japan, and the United States was appointed in an effort to reconcile the two conflicting plans embodied in the British and American compromise proposals. In a tentative protocol to the pro-spective agreement of the Second Conference the British had proposed a five-year period in which producing nations would suppress smug-gling, a fact to be determined by a League commission. Thereafter, presumably, the Far Eastern powers would take steps to abolish the use of smoking opium within a period of fifteen years. Porter's maxi-mum concessions were to grant to any contracting party the right to appeal to the Council if internal and external difficulties prevented it from carrying out its obligations, to extend to three years the period of grace which would precede the fifteen-year period, and to allow provision to be made for addicts who, as certified by competent medi-cal authorities of the states concerned, could not be deprived of the drug without a serious danger to health and life.° The crux of the argument of the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese was that Articles and 3 of the Hague Convention calling for the control and regulation of raw opium production and distribution had to be carried out before Article 6, calling for the gradual suppression of prepared opium, could be carried out. The United States contended that these obligations were independent of each other. No agreement could be reached in the subcommittee, and this fact was reported to the Com-mittee of Sixteen at its fourth meeting on February 6." The United States was not present at this meeting; it had already withdrawn from the conference.

The question of the suppression of prepared opium was the most controversial of the conference, but the proceedings were by no means confined to it. Most of the heated discussion took place in the plenary sessions, but the bulk of the work was done in the various subcom-mittees. Subcommittee A considered the problem of the limitation of manufacture, the importation of manufactured drugs, and the im-portation of raw materials for manufacture. All of the manufacturing countries were represented on this subcommittee. Its discussions were confined to various suggestions for a central board to which estimates of requirements and statistics of production, consumption, importation, and exportation were to be submitted. On this matter the suggestions of the United States and the Advisory Committee were nearly identi-cal. Both called for the submission of advance estimates by states of their annual requirements of raw material and manufactured drugs to be imported annually, such estimates to be binding on the respective governments. The central board would have the power to revise any estimates of a government which it considered to be greatly in excess of requirements and to recommend the cessation of exports to a coun-try in excess of that country's needs.

Objections to these ideas were forthcoming from the French, Swiss, and Dutch delegations, who wanted the powers of the board confined to that of an information bureau. The French held that it would .be impossible to submit estimates in advance that would be binding in view of the fluctuations in the annual opium crop and the speculative character of the drug trade, which made it impossible for a country manufacturing for export to determine in advance its requirements for export purposes. They also contended that limitation of imports to a country would necessitate rationing so that particular dealers could not corner the market. The proposal of these governments was that the central board should examine the statistics of the trade at the end of each year for the preceding year and call attention to cases of what seemed to be excessive imports indicating that a country might be a center for an illicit traffic. The resulting compromise provided for a central board whose main function was reduced to watching the international traffic, that is, noting the source and destination of drug products, and to requesting explanations for the accumulation of ex-cessive quantides of drugs and recommending the suspension of exports to the accumulating country if no satisfactory explanation was re-ceived. To aid in carrying out this main function each country would submit to the board quarterly statistics of imports and exports, annual estimates at the end of each year of requirements for the ensuing year which would not be binding, and annual statistics on production, manufacture, consumption, and stocks."66

The American delegation naturally opposed the watering down of its suggestions and those of the Advisory Committee. One of its prin-cipal objections was to the failure to give the central board the right to comment on the quantity of prepared opium manufactured and sold in a country and the quantities purchased by governments. A more substantial objection was raised in regard to the way the central board was to be constituted. The American delegation had wanted the board to be as independent of the League as possible, with the power to make its own-regulations. The subcommittee provided, however, for the appointment of the seven members of the board by the Council of the League in cooperation with Germany and the United States. The secretary and the staff of the board were to be appointed by the Secretary General subject to the approval of the Council. Furthermore, the board had to make its reports to the Council and its requests for explanations in regard to excessive accumulation of drugs had to be made through the instrumentality of the League. This connection of the board with the League organization was deemed sufficiently close, in the eyes of the American delegation, to destroy its independence.67

Subcommittee B dealt with the subject of the limitation of the production of raw opium. It was composed of representatives of the producing and consuming countries. The principal proposal before it was Article of the American suggestion calling for the limitation of production of raw opium to medicinal and scientific needs so that there would be no surplus for illegitimate use. This constinited the second most difficult proposal before the conference. After two months of discussion, only two producing nations—China and Egypt—were prepared to accept the American suggestion unconditionally. This was small comfort, for China could not carry out the obligations and Egypt produced no opium for export. The principal producing nations frankly stated that they could not accept the American sug-gestion. The Persian delegate cited economic reasons for his country's inability to limit production. He declared that in order for Persia to agree to such limitation she would first have to obtain a o,000,000 tomans loan for twenty years with no interest charges for the first five years and only 5 percent thereafter, a moratorium on foreign claims against Persia, and a revision of treaties with her so as to give her liberty of action in regard to tariffs. Turkey likewise cited the need for financial assistance for the substitution of other crops for the poppy in order to reduce opium production. Yugoslavia declared that further reduction on her part would cause "serious economic disorders"; while India declared that Article I constituted "an unwarranted interference with the internal affairs of the country." The Indian delegation offered a proposal embodying substantially the provisions of Article and 3 of the Hague Convention. This was dropped, however, when the Persian and Turkish delegates said they would have to make reserva-tions to it. The American delegation opposed it on the grounds that "it marked no advance over the Hague Convention, and did not require the limitation of production to medicinal and scientific purposes."

The only concrete achievement of Subcommittee B was the unani-mous adoption of a proposal submitted by Mrs. Wright calling for the appointment of a commission of inquiry to visit certain producing countries in order to study the nature of their problems in regard to opium production, use, and traffic with reference to the feasibility of promoting other economic activities as a substitute.68 The subcommit-tee did accept the Australian proposal that countries not currently producing should be prohibited from producing in the future; but as this same proposal, when considered in Subcommittee D, consisting solely of consuming countries, brought forth the condition that the present producers reduce their production, a condition the producing countries could not accept, nothing came of it. The principal concern in Subcommittee D was the desire to bring about the limitation of the production of raw materials and the manufacture of their derivatives in such a way as to avoid placing the consuming countries in a position of complete dependence on the manufacturing countries.°69

Subcommittee C had before it the question of limiting coca leaf production. As Peru was not represented at the conference, the only interested countries were Bolivia and the Netherlands. Taking a cue from Subcommittee B, they concluded that because of conditions in South America the restriction of the production of coca leaves to medicinal and scientific purposes would be impossible, a conclusion the substance of which the Bolivian government had informed the United States prior to the Conference.70

Subcommittee E was concerned with the national and international distribution of narcotic drug products. It therefore had before it the rather detailed suggestions of the United States which were based on America's own narcotic legislation, and the similarly detailed proposals of the Advisory Committee. There was little opposition to these sug-gestions, and the subcommittee adopted substantially what was recom-mended. The conference was therefore urged by the subcommittee to incorporate in the convention provisions putting into effect the import-export -certificate system and calling for national legislation which would have the effect of preventing the illicit transportation of un-licensed drugs and providing punishment for illicit transactions carried on by individuals in one country while residing in another." The work of this subcommittee was more satisfactory to the American delegation than that of all the other subcommittees.

Subcommittee F dealt with the scientific and medicinal aspects of the drug question. While recommending a number of measures which represented an advance over the Hague Convention, including the restriction of the use of Indian hemp to medicinal and scientific pur-poses, it failed to accept two proposals which the American delegation considered important. One was the suggestion that all opium and coca leaf derivatives be subj ect to the same control as morphine and cocaine and that the manufacture of heroin be prohibited. The other was that the morphine and cocaine content of preparations dispensed without medical prescription be reduced to one-fourth grain to the ounce. The American delegation filed a minority report on the latter suggestion taking exception to the failure of the subcommittee to endorse it.72

To the American delegation, Porter particularly, the results of the work in the subcommittees and in the plenary sessions of the confer-ence were quite unsatisfactory in four major respects. First and fore-most was the refusal of the producing nations to agree to limit the production of raw materials and their export to medicinal and scientific needs—the cardinal point of the American program. Equally disap-pointing was the unwillingness of the nations with Far Eastern posses-sions to begin to take measures to bring about the abolition of the traffic in prepared opium by limiting the importation of raw opium for the manufacture of smoking opium—another chief point in the American program, and one which the American delegation believed would help force a reduction in the production of raw opium by limiting the market. The failure of the First Conference to formulate effective measures in this regard was disheartening, and the refusal of the Second Conference to remedy the situation was even more re-grettable. Less disappointing was the character of the organization and functions of the central board, whose close connection with the League made it, in the eyes of the American delegation, susceptible to political influences, especially to the influence of members of the Leag-ue whom the Americans suspected of being opposed, because of financial considerations, to any effective steps to deal with the drug problem. It was also felt that the imagined subservience of the central board to the League Council would defeat ratification of the Conven-tion by the Senate, or at least provoke a bitter fight in that body. Fin-ally, there was dissatisfaction with the lack of provisions for the control of the alkaloids and derivatives of opium and the coca leaves other than morphine and cocaine. Aside from the fact that some of these com-modities were considered dangerous by the United States, another factor for consideration was the difficulty the uncontrolled market in these products would cause in efforts made to arrive at an accurate determination of the overall world medical and scientific requirements of raw opium and coca leaves.

The only provisions with which the American delegation expressed unconditional satisfaction were those relating to the giving of statistical information to the central board and the import/export certificate system and other measures for the control of transportation. These were regarded as representing a distinct advance over the provisions in the Hague Convention, but not sufficient to overcome the other weak-nesses in the proposed convention to the extent of warranting Ameri-can approval."73

The above dissatisfaction with the work of the Second Conference, and the unlikelihood that the deficiencies would be corrected, con-vinced Porter, even before the Committee of Sixteen had completed its deliberations, that further participation of the United States in the conference was useless. Therefore, on February Porter cabled the State Department for permission to withdraw the American delegation from the conference, citing the above factors and "the political aspect of the proposed agreement, the small gain to be hoped for over the control of the traffic and the terms of the resolution of Congress under which the delegation proceeded to Geneva," as reasons for the request. He contended that the United States might promote greater progress in the control of the narcotics traffic by remaining aloof from the League and retaining its liberty of action—asserting its rights and de-manding performance of the obligations of the parties to the Hague Convefition." The State Department sent a reply the next day giving him authority to withdraw at his discretion, but with the admonition that in order to avoid damaging the relations of the United States with the other nations or causing irritation, the statement of withdrawal giving the reason for the action should be so drafted as not to cause offense." Porter then waited to ascertain the results of the work of the subcommittee of five (of which he was a member) of the Committee of Sixteen on the problem of prepared opium. When, after three days of discussion, the subcommittee reported back to the parent committee on February 6 that it could reach no agreement, it was met with the announcement that the American delegation had withdrawn from the conference."76

On February 7 the announcement of the American withdrawal was made to the plenary session of the conference by the president of the conference, Herluf Zahle of Denmark. He likewise announced the withdrawal of the Chinese delegation on the grounds of the failure of the conference to arrive at a satisfactory agreement on measures for the suppression of prepared opium.77 In the letter of withdrawal, dated February 6, and the accompanying memorandum the American dele-gation gave as its principal reasons for the action the failure of the conference to provide for the restriction of the production of raw opium and coca leaves to medicinal and scientific needs of the world, due to the refusal of the producing countries to agree to such limita-tion, and the reluctance of nations in whose territories the use of smoking opium was temporarily permitted to take steps to suppress such use and thereby limit the market for raw opium. Thus, under the terms of House Joint Resolution 195 the American delegation had no alternative but to withdraw, since it could not sign the agreement proposed.78

Despite signs of the impending breakup of the conference as early as January 2i, the withdrawal of the American delegation neverthe-less came as a shock. President Zahle, speaking with emotion, declared it to be the greatest tragedy and disappointment of his life, while Lord Cecil, on hearing the news, buried his head in his hands.78 Many feared that more was at stake than the antidrug movement. There was much apprehension among the members and proponents of the League that the failure of America's first official and formal participation in League activities might fatally jeopardize further cooperation in other and more important areas by furthering anti-League sentiment in the United States.80

Reaction within the conference was varied. The delegations which had opposed the American proposal were unanimous in their con-demnation of the withdrawal. In a somewhat bitter speech, Jonkheer Loudon, former Dutch minister to the United States, traced the source of the misunderstandings to the failure of the American delegation to take into account the reservations of India in regard to raw opium production and those of other powers relative to prepared opium which were made two years previous at the Fifth Session of the Opium Advisory Committee and which, he contended, clearly showed that the American principles in regard to Chapters I and II of the Hague Con-vention were not accepted. He blamed the rigid instructions under which the American delegation operated as precluding the necessary give and take, goodwill, and cooperative atmosphere within which a successful conference must be conducted." Lord Cecil likewise re-futed the American charges on the purpose of the conference and the reason for the difficulties experienced. He asserted that the chief object of the conference was to find ways to arrest the traffic in dangerous drugs and that this goal had been largely attained. He re-iterated the British position that the most effective way to control the drug traffic was by the control of manufacture, not control of the production of raw materials.82 Monsieur Daladier of the French dele-gation criticized the refusal of the American delegation to give due consideration to the illicit traffic in opium from which consuming countries bordering on producing countries suffered and which, in his view, rendered "futile" and even "dangerous" any measures for the suppression of consumption. He chided the American delegation for trying to obtain its objectives all at once and contended that more progress could be made step by step.83

Despite the general condemnation of the American withdrawal, Zahle, in his closing speech to the Second Conference some two weeks later, credited the "boldness," "directness" and "devotion" of the American delegation with giving the "supreme impetus to the whole antidrug' campaign," but he characterized their withdrawal as "the most serious and most unfortunate incident of the Conference." He believed that had they remained to the end, a better convention would have been formulated."

The one nation other than China which consistently backed the pro-posals of the American delegation throughout the conference was Japan. In wooing their support, the Americans took special pains to be friendly to their delegation socially," and Porter, in the interest of Japanese-American friendship, even went so far as to cable the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee urging that com-mittee to condemn a bill calling for a conference of white nations bordering on the Pacific which the Japanese feared was directed against them. The chief Japanese delegate, Sugimura, thanked Porter for this action and pledged Japanese support, with minor reservations, for the American position." After the American delegation withdrew from the conference, the Japanese praised them for their stand and expressed the hope for continued friendly relations between their two countries." Thus, by the slender reed of cooperation in the antiopium campaign the two delegations hoped to contribute to the reestablishment of the accord between the two nations that had been somewhat damaged by the barring of Japanese immigration to the United States in i924.

The departure of the American delegation from the conference and the events leading up to it were, of course, the most publicized aspects of the Geneva conferences. Press opinion in Europe and Asia generally followed the policy lines of their respective governments. Most of the prominent English newspapers, even before the American exit, criti-cized the uncompromising attitude of the American representatives. They defended the practice of opium eating in India and dwelt upon the "alarming growth of the drug habit" in the United States. Many attributed that growth to liquor prohibition and pointed to the in-effectiveness of that experiment as indicative of the probable ineffec-tiveness of a prohibitory system in the Far East for opium, wliose use, they maintained, was as much a part of the habits of the people as the consumption of alcohol in the United States. They defended their government's view that the solution of the problem in China must precede efforts to abolish the use of prepared opium. They argued that America's opposition to the growth of the poppy in India was predicated upon the false assumption that Indian opium was the source of the American drug problem.88 This was, of course, a misrepresenta-tion of the American position, as the emphasis of the United States upon the situation in the Far East was not based at this time on the concern for her domestic problem, but stemmed from an altruistic concern for the Far Eastern peoples and the belief that control of opium production in India was part of the necessary pattern of uni-versal control. The British-owned papers in the Far East followed the same line as the home papers in criticizing the American position."89

Native and American-owned papers in the Far East generally sup-ported the American stand, however.90 Some press opinion, notably the Dutch and the Swiss, while castigating the actions of the American representatives as doctrinaire and unrealistic, nevertheless saw in their withdrawal facilitation of the arrival of the conference at a realistic agreement.91

In the United States and among Americans the reaction to the American withdrawal was most varied. The anti-League Hearst press naturally applauded the action.° The pro-League New York Times, which had hoped for the success of the conference so that a precedent might be set for closer American cooperation with the League on other problems, took a somewhat equivocal position. While acknowl-edging that the "dramatic performance" of Porter and the American delegation had made the American position clear and emphatic in re-gard to the opium traffic and had given impetus to the antinarcotics campaign, the Times regretfully pointed out that if the central board was set up, "it will be another international institution of American conception and suggestion but without immediate American coopera-tion, to add to the list that begins with the League of Nations and the World Court."93 The paper later expressed great misgivings at the position taken by Porter at Geneva in regard to limitation of cultiva-tion and at his undue concern with the Far Eastern problem, and urged close cooperation between the United States and the League on the opium question."

Many prominent Americans were quite critical of the action of the American delegation. John Palmer Gavit, a newspaper correspondent, summed up the views of most Americans critical of the American withdrawal. He pointed out that international negotiations require compromise and concessions and therefore delegations should not be shackled by congressional resolutions and acts of Congress. Even so, he contended, the American delegation should have remained to the end of the conference and lent their support to the strengthening of those provisions of the Convention relating to the control of manu-facture and the international traffic. They still would have been free to refuse to sign the Convention at the end of the conference." In the same vein, Professor Quincy Wright, an authority on international law, pointed out that in international negotiations where important interests are not involved, and common ends are sought, the spirit of the procedure is one of cooperation rather than competition, and na-tional desires are subordinated, if that is necessary, to advance the general object. Citing the instructions of Secretary of State Root to the American delegation to the Second Hague Peace Conference in go7 as an example, Wright pointed out that where a nation's direct interests in the proceedings of a conference are not involved, vis-à-vis the interests of other participants, the emphasis should be on, coming to an agreement on what can be presently achieved with a view to further progress toward the common goal through later discussions. By withdrawing from the Second Geneva Conference when they could not get all that they wanted, he contended, the American dele-gation acted contrary to the procedure of cooperation. Professor Wright placed the major responsibility for this action on the joint reso-lution of Congress authorizing the participation of the United States in the conference. He expressed the opinion that such congressional resolutions attempting to direct international negotiations were of both doubtful constitutionality and doubtful expediency."96

'There is some evidence that the American representatives were not unanimous in the decision to withdraw from the conference, but were forced to follow the lead of their chairman. Mrs. Hamilton Wright said later that she was opposed to the American withdrawal, but whether she indicated this emphatically to Porter before the event is unknown. Bishop Brent was likewise opposed to the American withdrawal, but he was not in Geneva at the time, not having returned after the Christ-mas adjournment. He was not aware of the action until it was publicized in the press." It is doubtful whether his presence in Geneva would have altered the situation, since he had earlier failed to persuade Porter to modify some of his demands.

There is no definite evidence as to opinion in Congress of the de-velopments at Geneva. There appears to have been only one occasion when the proceedings of the conference aroused comment in Congress. This was educed by the bitter arguments that raged in Geneva between the American and British delegates from January 19 to January 22. Representative Blanton of Texas again raised the issue of the propriety of the presence of the American delegation at a League-sponsored conference. He charged that the American representatives were mere-ly on a junketing trip without value to the nation, against the wishes of the European powers, and without the authorization of Congress; that the position of the United States was embarrassing in that while it refused to join the League to stop war, it sent an unauthorized repre-sentative without power to Europe to "sit with a bunch of bullyraggers in a conference over narcotics"; that Porter was being insulted, the American delegation and their plan were being sneered at, and Porter was simply causing friction and ill feeling with foreign governments. Blanton contended that the United States should confine its efforts to its domestic opium problem, especially since ill feeling resulting from interference in European affairs might eventually cause war, which Porter ând the Republicans refused to join the League to prevent." Blanton appeared to be alone in his views, however, as no other Con-gressman spoke in endorsement of them. Several Congressmen, how-ever, took exception to them. Representatives William D. Upshaw of Georgia, Theodore Burton of Ohio, Fiorella La Guardia of New York, and Otis Wingo of Arkansas all backed the Porter mission, pointing out that it was properly authorized by House Joint Resolution 195 and that Porter's efforts were endorsed and supported not only by Congress but by the American people.99 Except for this irrespons-ible and partisan outburst from Representative Blanton, there was no expression of disapproval of the American activities in Geneva from either House of Congress, neither before nor after the delegation left Geneva.

Aside from the Hearst press there were some other defenders of the departure of the American delegation from Geneva. Among them was Miss Ellen N. La Motte, the author of several books and articles on the opium question. She ridiculed the argument that effective coopera-tion on the part of the representatives of the United States was pre-cluded by the rigid character of their instructions by contending that other nations were bound by equally inflexible instructions. She charged that the British, Dutch, Portuguese, and Swiss representatives had secret instructions to protect the opium trade at all hazards."' Another defender of the American action was W. W. Willoughby, a prominent international lawyer, who served with the Chinese delega-tion at the conference."' His viewpoint may well have been colored by that service. Yet the general consensus among Americans who were not professionally hostile to the League was that the American dele-gates should have remained to the end, even if they could not have signed the resultant convention.

The withdrawal of the American delegation was greeted by some participants in the conference with dismay, by others with relief. The conferees continued their work, but with considerably lessened in-terest. The First Conference brought its work to a close on February, 11 having added to the earlier agreement a protocol drafted-by the British and French delegations in the Committee of Sixteen. The main points of the Protocol called for the suppression of the consump-tion of prepared opium within a fifteen-year period to begin after the producing countries had established effective control over exports and had suppressed smuggling, a fact to be determined by a commis-sion appointed by the League. This was closely tied up with the Protocol adopted by the Second Conference calling for the suppression of the illicit traffic in raw materials within five years. As China had withdrawn, the only nation to protest this arrangement was Japan, who repeated the American obj ection to making the obligation to take measures to abolish the use of prepared opium dependent on measures taken by producing countries to control export.'" Nevertheless Japan, along with the other participants in the First Conference, signed the Agreement, Protocol, and Final Act of the Conference.

The Second Conference met for approximately two weeks after the American departure. Its deliberations thus covered a period of seventy days, the longest a League conference had convened up to that time. While some nations would have been happy to adopt an agreement of ineffective platitudes now that the American delegation was no longer present to prod them, others, notably Great Britain, sought con-crete achievements. The result was a convention which in most aspects was a considerable improvement over the Hague Convention, whose Chapters I, II, and V it supplanted. Through its thirty-nine articles, coca leaves, crude cocaine, Indian hemp, and ecogonine, substances not covered by the Hague Convention, were brought under control, and provisions were made for the inclusion of new drugs in the con-trols on the advice of the Health Committee of the League and the International Health Office; an intricate system of import and export certificates to control the international traffic and designed to curb the illicit trade in both raw materials and manufactured drugs was established; a Permanent Central Board was set up to receive and disseminate information on drug production, consumption, require-ments, trade, and legislation, and also to watch the international traffic; the control of drugs in and transit through free ports, free zones, and bonded warehouses was provided for; and measures to remove national boundaries as a barrier to the prosecution of narcotic law violations were called for. The Convention was to come into force after it had been ratified by ten signatories, seven of which had to be states which were designated to nominate members of the Central Board and two of which had to be permanent members of the Council. The principles which underlay the Convention and which were stated in the pre-amble—"the limitation of the amounts of morphine, heroin, or cocaine and their respective salts to be manufactured; . . . of the amounts of raw opium and coca leaf to be imported for that purpose and for other medicinal and scientific purposes; and . . . of the production of opium and the coca leaf for export to the amount required for such medicinal and scientific purposes . ."—though only partly effected in the provi-sions of the Convention, nevertheless made more definite and extensive the principles of the Hague Convention.103

 

1. Memorandum by Edwin L. Neville to Undersecretary of State William Phillips, Nov. 12, ro24, SDR 5ir.4A2/1.

2.H. G. Chilton, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, British Embassy (Washington) to Secretary of State Hughes, Nov. 8, 1923, SDR 511.4A2/1.

3.Phillips to Chilton, Nov. 3o, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/1

4. The Secretary of State to Neville, Feb. 2 I, r924, SDR 5 11.4Az / 3 lb.

5. American Embassy (Paris) to the Secretary of State (from Neville), April 3, 1924, SDR 51 r.4A2/46.

6. Aide-mémoire from the British Embassy (Washington) to the State Department, A/lay 7, 1924, SDR 5r1.4A2/55; Secretary Hughes to the American Embassy (Paris), May 12, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/55; Ambassador Myron T. Herrick (Paris) to the Secre-tary of State, May 21, 1924, SDR 511.4/12/58.

7. League of Nations, Report of the Opium Preparatory Committee, C.348.M.119. 1924. XI (Geneva, 1924), pp. 24-25.

8. Ibid., pp. 25-27.

9. Ibid., pp. 14-2o.   

10. Ibid., pp. 2o-24.

11. Ibid., pp. 8-13. As there were only three territories in which the coca leaf was extensively produced—Bolivia, Peru, and Java—it was assumed that regulation of the trade in this product would be relatively simple.

12. /bid., pp. I2-I 3.   

13. Ibid., pp. 28-34.

14.Neville to the Secretary of State, Aug. 14, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/83; and Aug. 28, 1924, SDR 5i1.4A2/85.

15. Ibid.   

16. Ibid.

17. See for example the resolutions forwarded to the State Department in the fol-lowing communications: Senator Samuel M. Shortridge to the Secretary of State, Feb. r9, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/28; Senator G. W. Pepper to the Secretary of State, Feb. 23, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/3o; and Representative Scott Wolff to the Secretary of State, March 24, 1924. SDR 511.4A2/37.

18. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 6, 5767.

19. Ibid., 577o.

20. Ibid.

21.U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings . . . on H.J. Resolution 19T, The Traffic in Habit Forming Drugs, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., 2924 (Wash-ington: Government Printing Office, 2924); see also Lewis, Opium and Narcotic Laws, pp.23-24.

22. Secretary of State Hughes to the American Embassy (Lima) and to the Ameri-can Legation (La Paz, Bolivia), Sept. 22, 2924, SDR 522.4A2/9oa; to the American High Commissioner (Constantinople), Sept. 22, 2924, SDR 512.4A2/93; and to the American Legation (Teheran), Sept. 25, 2924, SDR 522.4A2/93a.

23. W. Russell Baker, Third Secretary of the American Legation (La Paz) to the Secretary of State, Sept. 19, it924, SDR six.4A2/106.

24. Ibid.

25. W. Smith Murray, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, American Legation (Teheran) to the Secretary of State, Oct. 9, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/129, encloses "Memorandum on Opium" by D. W. MacCormick, Director of Internal Revenue, Persia.

26. League of Nations, First Opium Conference, Geneva, November 3rd, 1924— February nth, ivy: Minutes and Annexes, C. 684. M. 244. 1924. XI (Geneva, 1924). Cited hereafter as Minutes of First Geneva Opium Conference. A convenient summary of the work of the First Conference is contained in the Foreign Policy Association, International Control of the Traffic in Opium: Summary of the Opium Conferences Held at Geneva, pp. 7-9.

27. China, France, Great Britain, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Siam.

28. Foreign Policy Association, op. cit., p. 7.

29. Acting Secretary of State Grew to the American Consul (Geneva), Nov. zo, ioz4, SDR 511.4Az/164d.

30. Grew to the American Consul (Geneva) and the American Embassy (Tokyo), Nov. 22, zoz4, SDR 511.4A2/164.

31. Minutes of the First Geneva Opium Conf erence, p. 107.

32.1bid., pp. 117-118.   

33. /bid., pp. 115-116.

34.A convenient comparison of the Hague Opium Convention and the draft con-ventions of the United States and the Advisory Committee is contained in a printed document in the State Department entitled International Control of the Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs, Fourth International Conference, SDR 511.4A2/315.

35. Ibid.

36. Porter to the Secretary of State, Oct. zo, 1923, SDR 511.4A2/186o.

37. Ibid.

38. League of Nations, Records of the Second Opium Conference, Vol. I: Plenary Meetings: Text of the Debates, C. 76o. M. z6o. 1924 XI (Geneva, 1925), pp• 34-36. Cited below as Records of Second Geneva Opium Conference, I.

39. Ibid. The work of the Second Conference is thoroughly and objectively sum-marized in the "Report of the Delegation of the United States in Attendance at the Geneva Conference held at Geneva, Switzerland, November 27, 1924," typed copy submitted to the State Department, April 3, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/315. Cited below as Report of the American Delegation to Geneva Opium Conference.

40.For the competence of the conference to consider Article of the American proposals, see Records of Second Geneva Opium Conference, I, 68-97.

41.Copy of Brenes "Appeal to My Colleagues" in SDR 511.4Az/—. Also in Brent Papers, Box 16.

42. Ibid.

43. Brent to Sir Austen Chamberlain, London, Dec. T 1924, SDR 511.4A2/251, also in Brent Papers, Box 16. Brent to Porter, en route to United States aboard S.S. Levi-athan, Dec. 14, 1924, Brent Papers, Box 16. Brent to Secretary of State Hughes, S.S. Leviathan, Dec. 16, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/2437. Also in Brent Papers, Box 16.

44. Clipping from The Times (London), Dec. 12, 1924 in Brent Papers, Box 16.

45. Copy of Brent to the Editor of The Times (London), Dec. 13, 192 4, Brent Papers, Box 16.

46. Brent to Porter, S.S. Leviathan, Dec. 14, 1924, Brent Papers, Box 16. For a sum-mary of Brent's activities and their results, see memorandum by F. P. Lockhart to the Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/339.

47. Esme Howard, British Embassy (Washington) to the Secretary of State, Dec. 3, 1924, SDR 5i1.4A2/178.

48. Secretary of State Hughes to the American Consul (Geneva) (for Porter), Dec. 5, 1924, SDR 511.4A2/178.

49. Ibid.

50. Consul Tuck (Geneva) (from Porter) to the Secretary of State, Dec. 8, 192o, SDR 51 /.4A2/185.

51.For the discussion of the issue to December 16, see Records of Second Geneva Opium Conference,l,    14.

52. Tuck (from Porter) to the Secretary of State, Dec. 17, 1924, SDR 511.4A21197.

53.Chamberlain to Brent, Dec. 19, 1924, enclosed in Brent to the Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/251.

54. Brent to the Secretary of State, ibid.

55. Memorandum by F. P. Lockhart to the Secretary of State, Jan. 14, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/251.

56. Secretary of State Hughes to the American Consul (Geneva) (for Porter), Jan. 15, 1925, SDR 5i1.4A2/251.

57.Records of Second Geneva Opium Conference, I, 148, for Cecil's statement; p. 162 for Porter's charge.

58.Ibid.,178-181.

59. /bid., 146-154.

6o. Ibid .,163-168.   

61. Ibid., r53.

62.1bid., 167. For a summary of the respective positions of the Americans and Brit-ish, see Report of the American Delegation to the Geneva Opium Conference, pp.11-13, 19-20.

63. Report of the American Delegation to the Geneva Opium Conference, p. 12.

64. League of Nations, Records of the Second Opium Conference . ..Vol.11: Meet-ings of the Committees and Sub-Committees, C. 76o. M. 26o. 1924. XI (Geneva, 1924), PP. 53-54,59.

65. For the work of the Committee of Sixteen see ibid., pp. 47-79.

66. For the work of Subcommittee A see ibid., p. 97-137.

67. Report of the American Delegation to the Geneva Opium Conference, pp. 13-15.

68. For the work of Subcommittee B see Records of the Second Geneva Opium Cunt creme, II, 153-194.

69. Ibid.,pp• 233-248.

70. Ibid., pp. 225-232.   

71. Ibid., pp. 249-280.

72. /bid., pp. 281-332. For the work of the various subcommittees and the attitude of the American delegation toward the results, see Report of the American Delegation to the Second Geneva Opium Conference, pp. 13-24.

73. Consul Tuck (from Porter) to the Secretary of State, Feb. r, 1925, SDR 511.4AV263.

74. Ibid.

75. Secretary of State Hughes to Tuck (for Porter), Feb. 2, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/263.

76.Records of the Second Geneva Opium Conference, II, 69.

77. Ibid., I, 201-204.

78. Ibid., pp. 201-202.  

79. New York Ti771eS, Feb. 7, 1925, p. 1.

80. Ibid., p. 3.

81. Records of the Second Geneva Opium Conference,l, 204-205.

82. Ibid., pp. 2o5-2o6.

83. Ibid., pp. 2(36-207.   

84. Ibid., p. 362.

85.Helen Howell Moorhead, "The Opium Problem and the League of Nations; An Address . .. Before the Democratic Women's Luncheon Club, Philadelphia, April 27, 1925," Democratic Women's Luncheon Club of Philadelphia Addresses t-48, No. 22 (1922-1930)9 p. 14.

86. New York Times, Jan. 19, 1925, p.   

87. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1925, p. 5.

88. See excerpts from the London Times, Jan. zo, 1925; Manchester Guardian, Jan. 19 and 21, 1925; London Daily Mail, Jan. 22, 1925; and Westminster Gazette, Jan. 21, 1925, enclosed in American Embassy (London) to Assistant Secretary of State John V. A. MacMurray, Jan. 27, 1925, SDR 5r1.4A2/319.

89. See for example the Madras Mail, Jan. 31, 1925, in Alfred R. Thompson, Ameri-can Consul (Madras) to the Secretary of State, Feb. 7, 1925, NA 511.4A2/297; the Peking and Tientsin Times, Feb. 9, 1925, in Consul General C. E. Gauss (Tientsin) to the Secretary of State, Feb. 9, 1925, SDR 511.402/297; the North China Daily Herald, Feb. to, 1925, in Consul General Edwin S. Cunningham (Shanghai) to the Secretary of State, Feb. 2i, 1925, and the Far Eastern Times in Minister Jacob G. Schurman (Peking) to the Secretary of State, Feb. r t, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/308; and The English-nzan, Feb. 9, 1925, in Consul General Julius Lay (Calcutta) to the Secretary of State, Feb. 12, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/296.

90. Such papers as the Far Eastern Times, Feb. ro, 1925; the China Press, Feb. to, 1925; and The Hindu castigated the British and praised the American stand. See ex-cerpts from these papers enclosed in Schurman to the Secretary of State, Feb. II, 1925; Cunningham to the Secretary of State, Feb. 21, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/308; and Thomas to the Secretary of State, Feb. 17, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/297, respectively.

91 r. See excerpts from the Journal de Genève, Feb. 8, 1925, in Alan Winslow, Ameri-can Chargé d'Affaires ad interim (Berne), to the Secretary of State, Nov. 25, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/291; the Handelsblad, Feb. 7, r925, in American Legation (The Hague) to the Secretary of State, Feb. 27, 1925, SDR 511.4A2/3o4.

92. New York American, Feb. 16, 1925, p. 24.

93. New York Times, Jan. 29, 1925, p. 18. For the quotation, Feb. 8, Sec. II, p. 6.

94.Ibid., Sept. 25, 1925, p. 20.

95.Ibid., Feb. 19, 1925, p. 18; see also John Palmer Gavit, Opium (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1925), pp. 225—zz8.

96. Quincy Wright, "The Opium Conferences," AJ1L, XIX (July, 1925), 348-355.

97. New York Times, Feb. 7, 1925, p. 3.

98. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., znd Sess., i924, LXVI, Part 3, 2295-2299, 2316-2318.

99. Ibid. Upshaw and Wingo were Democrats; Burton and La Guardia, Republicans.

100. Ellen La Motte, "The Americans Wouldn't Compromise!" The Nation, CXX (May 6,1925), 511-512.

101.Westel W. Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem: The Geneva Conf erences (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), pp. 452-464.

102. Minutes of the First Geneva Opium Conference, pp. 117-119.

103. For the text of the Convention see Records of the Second Geneva Opium Con-ference, II, so2-519.

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