Drug Abuse

At the Shanghai meeting the Americans withdrew their resolution proposing an international conference on the opium problem when the British objected to it. The idea remained alive with the members of the American delegation, however, and they were determined that it should eventually be acted upon. Therefore, in their confidential report to the State Department, they made a strong plea for the calling of such a conference by the United States.' Brent and Wright followed up this proposal with individual entreaties to the Department. They contended that to give binding effect to the resolutions of the Shanghai Commission and to control the opium traffic in general, a conference was needed to adopt measures that would prevent the smuggling of opium from producing countries to the consuming countries which prohibited its entry; would block other producing and manufacturing countries from succeeding to India's position as the supplier of foreign opium to China and other Far Eastern territories, as well as prevent the smuggling of opium from the Native States of India to China; would regulate the manufacture and distribution of morphine, cocaine, and Indian hemp so as to control the growing traffic in these drugs from Western countries to China, India, and other parts of the Orient; and would suppress completely the traffic in certain drug articles by declaring them contraband in both land and sea traffic and by declaring vehicles transporting them open to search.' They also laid heavy emphasis on the need to discuss treaty obligations and agreements hampering China's freedom of action in dealing with the opium trade with a view to their possible amendment.3

Despite divided opinion in the State Department, the proposal was rather quickly approved.4 Wright, who had been retained in the employ of the State Department to investigate the cocaine problem by means of the surplus funds remaining from the appropriation for the Shanghai Commission, was instrumental in getting the hearty endorsement of Secretary Knox.° The British indicated informally that they would not oppose the calling of such a conference by the United States, and the Netherlands suggested The Hague as the meeting place. This offer of the Dutch was particularly welcome and indeed had been informally solicited by the United States, for the holding of the conference at The Hague would serve to emphasize the international character and worldwide aspects of the drug problem rather than just the Far Eastern situation.

The circular letter, drafted by Wright, inviting the powers who had participated in the International Opium Commission at Shanghai to meet again in a conference at The Hague, was sent out on September 1, 1909, just eight months after the conclusion of the Shanghai meeting. As justification for issuing the invitation, the State Department stressed America's own drug problem. It pointed out that because of a large Chinese population, trade relations with the Orient, and the hitherto unrestricted importation of opium and the manufacture of morphine, the United States had a substantial opium problem in both the Philippines and within its own continental borders. The letter declared that the United States could not handle its own problem alone; in order for its laws to be effective, international cooperation was needed to control the shipment of opium to this country and its possessions.°

As a tentative program for the conference the State Department suggested the following items:

Control of the production, manufacture and distribution of opium and its products through uniform national laws and regulations;

Restriction of the number of ports through which opium producing countries might ship the drug;

Prevention at the port of departure of the shipment of opium and its products to countries prohibiting their entry;

Reciprocal notification of the quantity of various forms of opium shipped from one country to another;

Regulation by the Universal Postal Union of the transmission of opium and its derivatives and preparations through the mails;

Restriction and control of the growing of the poppy so that countries not currently producing would not become producers, and thereby replace the reduction made in India and China;

Application of the pharmacy laws of governments to their subjects in the consular districts, concessions, and settlements in China;

Restudy of the treaties and international agreements under which the traffic was being conducted;

Uniform penal law provisions for violation of agreements that the powers might make concerning opium production and distribution;

Uniform marks of identification for packages in international transit containing opium;

Granting of permits to opium exporters;

Reciprocal right of search of vessels suspected of carrying'contraband opium;

Measures to prevent the unlawful use of a flag by vessels engaged in the opium traffic;

An international commission to carry out the international convention concluded.7

Two of the items, because of the reasoning which lay behind them, deserve extended consideration.8 The call for a restudy of the agreements dealing with opium was aimed at the various treaties with China which touched upon the drug and which limited China's freedom of action in regard to it.8 The treaties involved were not only those between China and Great Britain, but those between China and other Western powers as well. In regard to opium they hampered China in several ways. For example, one of the methods by which the United States initially hoped that China might more effectively control the traffic in opium was through the establishment of a government monopoly of the manufacture and distribution of opium and its products. The monopoly articles in the Treaty of Wanghia (1844) with the United States, the Treaty of Nanking (1842) with the British, and the Treaty of Tientsin (1858) with the French, and extended to the other treaty powers by the most-favored-nation principle, by which the Chinese commercial monopoly through the Hong merchants was abolished and such monopolies afterwards forbidden, could presumably block the establishment of such a system. It was also thought that by limiting the number of ports through which opium could be imported, China could more effectively control the importation of foreign opium and thus suppress smuggling. The various treaties with the Western powers which opened the treaty ports to foreign trade served as a possible barrier to this step. Furthermore, the United States took the view that China should have the right to prohibit the importation, except for medical purposes, of all opium as soon as domestic cultivation had been suppressed. The State Department suggested to China that it insist upon the discussion of all three of these proposals at the forthcoming conference."

The State Department also gave a great deal of consideration to the possibility of coupling the opium problem with other desired reforms in China. At the Shanghai deliberations, T'ang Kuo-an, the head of the Chinese delegation, had tried to get the support of the American delegation for a resolution which he had been instructed to introduce after first sounding out the Americans. The proposed resolution provided that in order to replace the loss of revenue incident upon the suppression of opium in China, the delegates should recommend to their governments a revision of the Tientsin treaties in order to allow China to place an import duty of 30 percent ad valorem on petroleum, spirits, and tobacco, to be accompanied by an equivalent internal tax on these articles produced in China. Wright had opposed the proposed resolution on several grounds. His chief objection was that the Shanghai Commission was called to consider only the question of opium. He therefore advised the Chinese delegates that financial matters related to that question might better be considered in a subsequent international conference after the foundation for favorable international consideration of such matters had been laid by the achievement of unanimity in the Commission. T'ang Kuo-an reluctantly agreed not to introduce the resolution, but to advise the Wai-wu pu to hold the matter over for the probable conference." Wright thus felt that as a result of this conversation the United States was morally obligated to support the Chinese not only in bringing the matter up in the pending conference, but also in giving support to the proposal. He also regarded it as a splendid opportunity to induce China, as a quid pro quo, to carry out the reforms relative to internal taxes, mining, trademarks, patents, copyright, and coinage which it had promised to do in the commercial treaty with the United States in 1903.12 The State Department was particularly concerned with currency reform in China. In the course of the deliberations leading up to the conference, Wright and Professor Jeremiah Jenks, the international monetary expert who had already devised a system of monetary reform for China, held several conversations as to the feasibility of tying such reform to the opium question." Finally, it was hoped that all the treaties and agreements between China and the treaty powers in regard to opium and its various products would be incorporated for the sake of uniformity into a general act of the opium conference.

The second item deserving consideration was the proposal for an international commission to supervise the carrying out of any agreement made. What was contemplated in this proposal was a body with a minimum membership of eight persons, each representing an interested power, which would serve as a collector and clearinghouse of information regarding the drug trade. Specifically, it would serve as the centralizing agency for all information, statistics, laws, and regulations relating to opium which the conference might provide for, and as adviser to the interested governments on all aspects of the drug situation. Its expenses were to be shared equally among the interested powers." As it turned out, this suggestion was made some ten years too soon.

In the circular letter the powers were informed that the American suggestions were not intended to be exhaustive, and comments and additional suggestions were requested. Coca leaves, cocaine, and Indian hemp were deliberately left unmentioned in order to avoid creating the impression that the United States intended to prescribe the scope and dominate the activities of the proposed conference. The State Department was confident that other countries would suggest the consideration of these items.

The governments of the invited nations were slow in replying to the American invitation. It soon became obvious that except for the United States and China, no government really wanted an early conference and that some wanted no conference at all. Wright had anticipated that the conference would convene in May 191o. By the end of that month, however, neither Great Britain nor France nor Austria-Hungary nor Turkey had assented to the American proposal. Most of the other powers had agreed to the conference in principle only, and some with rather pronounced reservations. Portugal, for example, made it quite plain that though accepting the conference in principle and this only to please the United States, it was bound to protect the opium trade of Macao and would not take into consideration any decisions of-the conference unless they were adopted unanimously by all the countries present and were applicable to all countries, including those not in attendance at the conference.16

Russia also agreed in principle to the idea of a conference, but with a reservation to the proposal that poppy cultivation be restricted and confined to the existing producers on the ground that as the poppy was grown in Russia for purposes other than opium, there was little opium production there; therefore the restriction of poppy cultivation would be unnecessary and also damaging to one branch of Russian agriculture.16 Italy assented to the conference only after its request was agreed to that the trade in Indian hemp and hashish, for which Italian territory served as a collection and storage center for smuggling into other territories, be considered, and after receiving assurances that the proposed international commission would not have executive powers which would enable it to interfere in the internal administration of a country.'"17

Even the Chinese, who were heartily in favor of the conference, had significant reservations. They opposed the advocacy of uniform national laws on the ground that there should be no interference with the sovereign rights of any country. They also declared that there was no need for an international commission. On the same ground they stipulated that offenses against treaty provisions be punished by each country according to its own penal laws, and that the right of search be restricted to vessels within a country's own territorial waters.18 Thus the Chinese were opposed to any measures that would give other powers the right or opportunity to interfere in Chinese affairs or infringe on Chinese sovereignty.

Germany, Holland, Japan, Persia, and Siam assented in principle to the conference pending more thorough consideration of the American program. Austria-Hungary and Turkey eventually reported that they would not be represented at the conference."9 The French, while agreeing to the conference, took exception to several of thee items in the tentative program. They contended that the subject of uniform national laws and regulations to control the various drug operations should not be brought up, nor should the matter of uniform penal laws covering the violation of treaties, as this would require the modification of French penal laws, a matter of such grave import that the French government would not be prepared to bring the question before the legislature. France also objected to the suggestion that the powers apply their pharmacy laws to their subjects in China on the ground that this proposal was not likely to be accomplished, for it would place in Chinese hands or those of nationals of other countries not signatory to a convention the practice of pharmacy in the foreign concessions and settlements. On the subject of reciprocal right of search the French declared that French public opinion was sensitive on this matter and that therefore the government would not renounce its principle on the issue just to prevent the traffic in contraband opium. They reserved their opinion on the proposal for a supervisory commission."20

A year elapsed before the British, without whom no meaningful conference could be held, replied to the American invitation. Then they assented conditionally to the conference. The British government explained the delay as being due to the necessity of consulting the government of India and other interested departments of the home government and to the desire to examine fully the report of the Shanghai Commission." In reality, the British and Indian governments thought that the call for the conference was quite premature and that the American program went considerably beyond and was inconsistent with the Shanghai resolutions. They objected to the proposals calling for the mutual right of search and measures to prevent the unlawful use of a flag by carriers of opium. They also opposed the idea of a supervisory commission. They were particularly averse to the inclusion of matters affecting any treaty arrangements between Great Britain and China or the domestic opium situation in India and other British possessions within the scope of the conference. They finally consented to participate in the conference on condition that the other invited powers first agree to a thorough consideration by the conference of the question of restricting the manufacture, sale, and distribution of morphine and cocaine. The other powers should also agree to undertake studies, preliminary to the conference, of these aspects of the subject in their own territories and give an indication of their readiness to impose severe restrictions on the manufacture and trade in these drugs.22 The spread of the morphine and cocaine traffic and habit in India had recently received prominent attention in England, and the State Department had suggested that the British take the initiative in raising the question of these drugs.23 The United States thus readily assented to the British conditions, and desperate for British cooperation, also agreed to the British reservations, specifically disclaiming any desire to discuss the Anglo-Chinese agreements at the conference.24

Even after assenting to the conference, the British were opposed to its early convocation, and several of their actions, whether designed to do so or not, succeeded in delaying it. Their stipulation that each government conduct preliminary studies of morphine and cocaine manufacture and traffic provided the principal means of procrastination, as such studies obviously took some time. To carry out their own study they found it necessary to require that declarations be made in regard to the amount and value of imports and exports of morphine and cocaine so that the necessary information and statistics might be collected to enable the government to determine the extent of the manufacture and traffic in these drugs in the United Kingdom. This, they declared, would take several months." Then the British found fault with Wright's report on the deliberations of the Shanghai Commission. One of the delegates from India, James B. Brunyate, who sat with the British at the Commission, took vigorous exception to many aspects of the report. In general his comments amounted to the contention that Wright had misrepresented the British position at the Commission, had assigned too much credit to the American delegation for the Commission's achievements, and had exaggerated the sense and conclusions of the Commission relative to the condemnation of the traffic in and use of opium. This criticism disturbed Brent and Ambassador Reid to the point that they feared the holding of the conference might be jeopardized. Reid sent the criticisms to the State Department, and Brent wrote Wright suggesting that he withdraw from the opium work for the good of the movement. Fortunately, both the State Department and Wright disregarded Brunyate's remarks."

The crux of the British desire for delay was the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement. Even more so than at the time of the Shanghai gathering the British felt that it was vital that no international discussion of this accord be permitted.27 The Agreement was due to come up for reconsideration in the latter part of 1910, and the British wanted no exertion of outside influences on the negotiations. Thus they desired to have the matter settled before the conference met. The United States repeatedly assured the British that in spite of the subject being an item in the tentative program, it was disinclined to bring the matter up in the conference.28 And during the course of the negotiation of the revised agreement, the American minister in China turned down repeated requests from the Chinese for advice.29 Yet some American influence was informally exerted on the matter. Bishop Brent, while in England in the summer of 1910, had several conversations with Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, and other British officials. Acting in his private capacity he urged the British to get together with the Chinese before the conference and modify the Ten Year Agreement so as to bring to a close the Indian traffic as soon as China had suppressed domestic production. Though Brent was not authorized to speak officially for the United States, the British knew that this was the view of the State Department."30

As already mentioned, the British and Chinese signed in May 1911 a revised agreement providing for the ending of the Indian-Chinese traffic not later than 1917, but earlier if the Chinese in the meantime had suppressed domestic cultivation. Just what effect the American attitude f6k1 on this agreement cannot be determined. Wright claimed, however, that the British were persuaded to sign the treaty by "a bit of informal diplomacy" exerted by the State Department.31 Whether this "bit of informal diplomacy" was as great a factor as Wright claimed is doubtful. Both the British and Indian Governments had already decided that the traffic should be brought to an end. The details of a working agreement and the desire to hold China to its domestic anti-opium campaign were the main factors causing delay. 32 There can be no doubt, however, that the pressure being exerted for international consideration of the Agreement was an element in inducing the British to consent to a rapid settlement of the matter. The Chinese were quite prepared to carry the terms of their demands for a revision of the Agreement before the proposed conference if these demands were not met by the British beforehand." As the British wanted to participate in the pending conference from a stronger moral position than they had enjoyed at Shanghai, they agreed essentially to the terms which the Chinese requested.

Contributing also to the strengthening of this moral position were the steps the British took to carry out Resolution 4 of the Shanghai Commission. In the spring and summer of 1910 Brent met with British colonial officials in the Far East and with officials of the Foreign Office in London in an effort to secure measures to stop the smuggling of opium from such British possessions as Hong Kong, British North Borneo, the Straits Settlements, and India to the Philippines." The result was that several months prior to the conference Hong Kong and India prohibited the export of opium to countries prohibiting its entry."

The British were not alone in their opposition to an early convocation of the conference. To the Americans there appeared to be a conspiracy afoot to block the meeting. The United States had first suggested September 15 in 1910 as the tentative date for the conference. The proposed date was later changed to October 15. As the conference was to meet at The Hague, the Netherlands government assumed the obligation of arranging for its actual meeting. By the time of the first suggested date Great Britain and several other powers had not even indicated whether they were prepared to participate in the conference. The British reply of September 17 making their participation conditional on a study of the morphine and cocaine question naturally precluded the October 15 date. The Netherlands government then suggested May 30, later changed to July 5, 191i, as the date for the proposed conference.36 As this date approached, however, the British announced that they could not participate, since several powers-France, Germany, Japan, and Portugal—had not completed their studies of the morphine and cocaine situation.3' The State Department replied that it would urge the governments to try to meet the British conditions by the July x date, but that as the governments had agreed in principle to those conditions the United States hoped that Britain would not insist on their extreme letter.38 Sir Edward Grey replied that the conference should not assemble before it was ready to do its work, for the result would be a decline of public interest in the drug problem as well as in future conferences in genera1.33 As a result, and in spite of the fact that France had indicated that it was ready for a July r conference, the Dutch postponed the conference sine die.4° The United States then suggested the date of October 16, 1983, after having received assurances from the four powers that they would be ready by October 1." In spite of the statement of the four powers by August that they would be ready to meet in October, the Dutch refused to endorse the October 16 date and suggested the postponement of the conference until the spring of 1912.42 When the United States pushed the matter, the Dutch declared that they would not call the conference until they received direct intimations from the four powers and Great Britain that they were ready for the conference.43 Thus Huntington Wilson's prediction in 1909 that it would take two years for the United States to get a conference was borne out.

The State Department's suspicion that there was complicity to delay the conference was based on information from several different sources. It appeared that the main culprits were Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. As early as May 1911 the American minister at The Hague, Arthur Beaupre, confided his suspicions to the State Department that neither the British nor the Dutch wanted an early conference." He supported his contention in regard to the Dutch by enclosing correspondence between the United States and the Netherlands in 1908 which revealed the reluctance of the Dutch to participate in the Shanghai Opium Commission if the decisions of that commission was later to be incorporated in a convention. The State Department agreed with the minister's analysis of the situation. In July the State Department then received information from its embassy in Germany that Germany, influenced by the large chemical manufacturing interests, who wanted no interference with the manufacture of and traffic in morphine and cocaine, was opposed to a conference before the end of the year."45

That Britain and Germany were using their influence to delay the conference was confirmed in private and confidential conversations that Beaupre had with officials of the Dutch foreign office and with the French minister to The Hague, M. Marcellin Pellet. On August 25 the Dutch foreign minister, Van Swinderen, in rejecting the plea for convening the conference before the end of the year, informed Beau-pre confidentially that Great Britain did not want an early conference." Then in early September, Pellet confidentially informed Beauyre of the substance of the former's conversation with Count van Limburg Stirum of the Dutch foreign office in charge of the conference arrangements. Van Limburg Stirum had told Pellet that the reason for the delay of the conference was the fact that only the United States and China desired the conference at an early date, and that Germany, influenced by her large chemical manufacturers, had been opposed from the beginning to the holding of the conference; and that thus hostile German influence was partly responsible for the delay. This view was confirmed in Pellet's mind by the attitude of the German minister with whom he had conversations on the matter.47 Thus long before the suggested October date the State Department knew that it was working for the conference against both the active and passive hostility of several of the major powers.

Overcoming the prevailing sentiment against the conference on the part of some and the inertia on the part of others was a difficult and tedious task. Bishop Brent, in his private capacity, and Wright, in his official position of being charged with the conduct of the negotiations under the Solicitor of the Department, James Brown Scott, bore the brunt of the work. They had succeeded, after some initial lukewarmness on the part of the State Department, in getting President Taft and Secretary Knox squarely behind the movement for the conference." Thereafter the State Department applied increasing pressure on the powers. In addition to addressing repeated notes to the powers concerned, the Department pressured the Dutch, German, and British ambassadors to the United States to move their governments to act.

On the same day (August i i) that the State Department was informed that the Dutch opposed the October 16 date and suggested instead the postponement of the conference until the spring of 1912, but prior to receiving the message, Wright, armed with a letter signed by Knox expressing the personal interest of President Taft in the conference and the desire that there be no further delay, went to Maine to discuss the matter with Jonkheer Loudon, the Dutch minister to the United States. Wright intimated to Loudon that if the Netherlands did not call the conference, the United States might convene it in Washington. Loudon promised to push the matter with his government and suggested that the United States urge the four powers and Great Britain to inform his government directly that they were prepared for the October date." This was done.

About three weeks before the Wright-Loudon conference the State Departnient had decided to send Wright to Berlin to persuade the Germans to give their approval to the October meeting. On the day he was supposed to leave, the Department was informed by the German ambassador that Germany agreed to the October I date.50

Although the State Department had ample evidence that neither Germany nor the Netherlands wanted an early conference, many in the Department thought that the attitude of Great Britain constituted the chief obstacle. In response to the American request of August 19, 1911, urging the British government to inform the Netherlands directly of its readiness for an October meeting, the British reply was that the Netherlands had informed them that the October date was too early.

Wright was thereupon sent to Maine to confer with the British ambassador, James Bryce. After being shown Beaupre's cables accusing the Dutch, the British, and the Germans of complicity in delaying the conference, Bryce agreed on September 6 to send a cable to London urging that Britain inform The Hague that it was satisfied with the assurances of the four governments.5' The British, however, after much pressure from the United States, had already informed the Netherlands on September 5 that they were prepared for the conference if the other governments were also ready." On September z o the Dutch foreign minister informed Beaupre that owing to the changing attitude of Great Britain the conference might be called for December 1.53

When the International Opium Conference convened at The Hague on December I, 1911, the American tentative program had been considerably modified—restricted in some aspects and broadened in others. As already indicated, several of the suggested subjects had been objected to by one or more of the powers, and as a result were presumably barred from discussion. On the other hand, the scope-of the conference had been broadened to include the consideration of Indian hemp drugs as suggested by the Italians and of morphine and cocaine as suggested by the British. The powers which offered no objections or suggestions accepted the American program as a basis for discussion pending the expression of their views at the conference.

When the conference met there was therefore no definitive single program before it. Instead of drawing up such a program based on the suggestions and views of the invited powers as promised, the United States decided merely to collate and prepare for circulation the proposals and reservations of the powers and leave the drawing up of a program based on them to the conference itself. This was all that could reasonably be done as most of the powers failed to send the American government any definitive views on the suggested tentative program. Of the fourteen powers invited, twelve attended. Austria-Hungary and Turkey declined the invitation, and the Italian delegation met with the conference only once.

The American delegation consisted of Brent as chief delegate, Wright, and Henry J. Finger, a physician who had been active in the fight against the opium menace in California as a member of the California State Board of Pharmacy. Frederic Huidekoper and Wallace J. Young of the State Department accompanied the delegation as secretary, and assistant secretary and disbursing officer, respectively. In their instructions the American delegation was advised to keep in mind the fact that while the United States had a material interest in the problem it had "no revenue of moment at stake, and that primarily the international movement for the suppression of the opium evil was initiated by this government with the object of assisting China in her recent and energetic effort to suppress the opium evil." 54 Another matter on which the delegation was instructed had occasioned considerable controversy in the State Department. As already mentioned, Wright had wanted the conference to consider the matters of financial reform in China and the revision of treaties with that nation to allow her to raise her tariffs in order to replace revenue lost as a result of the opium-suppression movement. Others in the Department, like Huntington Wilson and R. S. Miller, thought that such matters were outside the scope of the conference and would cause complications that would jeopardize its success. Furthermore, it would mean consideration by the conference of tariff provisions of American treaties with China, something which, paradoxically, the Department did not favor.55 The result was a compromise suggested by the Acting Secretary Alvey A. Adee, which was incorporated in the delegation's instructions. They were thus advised:

If in the course of the deliberations the point be raised in any quarter that economic disturbances have resulted from the Anti-opium movement in China and Siam, with their bearing on treaties now in force between these countries and the treaty powers, you should not oppose its consideration, inasmuch as it is a matter in which any interested Power may legitimately express its views. Where the United States is not an interested party in this regard, it would not wish to participate in a discussion of the conventional rights and interests of other Powers. These economic disturbances have not yet been clearly defined. However, as Dr. Hamilton Wright has made a close study of them, much dependence must necessarily be placed by you upon his good judgment and discretion in the event of the interested Governments bringing them forward for discussion; but any commitment of this Government in respect to the revision of its convential tariff with China would not be considered germane to the scope of the Opium Conference.56

Thus the effective participation of the American delegation in discussions which might arise in regard to the treaty relations of other powers with China was precluded by the unwillingness of the United States to have certain of its agreements with China bearing on the same matter considered by the conference.

Bishop Brent was chosen president of the conference. In his opening statement he defined the scope of the conference as being the conventionalization of the Shanghai resolutions and the consideration of such other matters as Indian hemp and cocaine. As in the Shanghai Commission, the work of the conference consisted of the consideration of the reports and resolutions of the various delegations. After the tremendous effort required to bring about the convening of the conference, its work, to the American delegation at least, must have seemed anticlimactic.

Unlike the discussion at the Shanghai Commission, the greatest controversy at The Hague was not based on the merits and demerits of the Far Eastern opium trade. This question was indeed given much attention. But thanks to the settlement by the Chinese and the British, prior to the conference, of their major differences over the Indian-Chinese trade, much of the heat that would otherwise have accompanied this phase of the drug problem did not arise. As a result of the settlement of the Indian-Chinese situation, China was in a much better position to demand concessions from the other powers. The British delegation was again headed by Sir Cecil Clementi Smith and consisted of Sir William Meyer, chief secretary of the government of Madras, William G. Max Müller, counselor of the embassy, and Sir William Collins, deputy lieutenant of the county of London and an antidrug advocate. This time the British proposed very progressive measures, which formed the basis of Chapters I and III of the Convention that was finally adopted. The Germans now replaced them in bearing the odium of being the major recalcitrant delegation.

The deliberations in which the provisions of the Convention were finally hammered out were characterized by both controversy and compromise. Chapter I of the Convention dealt with raw opium and consisted of five articles regulating the domestic and international traffic in it." Under Articles I, z, 4, and 5 the powers pledged to control the production and distribution of raw opium by passing effective laws and regulations limiting the number of ports, cities, and places through which it might be imported or exported; providing for the marking of packages containing over five kilograms of the drug; and restricting to duly authorized persons the right to import and export it. The most controversial and most important provision of this chapter was Article 3, by which Resolution 4 of the Shanghai Commission was to be conventionalized. Under Article 3 the powers pledged to take measures to prevent the exportation of raw opium to countries which prohibited its import and to control exportation to countries which regulated its import. The Portuguese delegation had attempted to weaken this British proposal through an amendment specifying that by special agreement or otherwise the powers would take measures to carry out the provision of the article." Obviously the Portuguese objective was to leave the problem of the trade in raw opium, especially the importation of opium into China from Macao, to the meanderings of bilateral diplomacy between the countries concerned. Their amendment would either permit them to claim most-favored-nation treatment on the basis of the Anglo-Chinese Agreement or confine the problem of the opium trade between China and Macao to negotiations between China and Portugal, thereby stalling or preventing China from prohibiting such trade.

Eight delegations initially voted for the Portuguese-amended British resolution, while the United States, China, and Persia reserved their votes. When the matter was brought up again for final consideration, the United States supported the Chinese objection to the Portuguese amendment on the ground that it weakened the entire article. Wright aptly pointed out that the conference was being held to "conventionalize something, not to provide that special conventions might be made."59 On the basis of the assurance which the Chinese delegation gave to the British delegation that the existing agreements between China and other powers would not be affected, a Chinese amendment that the words "by special convention or otherwise" be deleted was carried by an 8-to-3 vote, with France, Russia, and Portugal in the negative." A Persian amendment, similar to that of the Portuguese, calling for the insertion of the words "by special convention or through diplomatic channels" was likewise rejected by a 7-to-2 vote, Persia and Portugal voting in the negative and France and Germany abstaining." Portugal subsequently withdrew its vote against deletion of the words and urged Persia to do likewise." Another Persian amendment to insert the words "as soon as possible" was rejected 7 to 3, with one abstention.63

The conventionalization of the principle embodied in Article 3 was a most important development and its meaning was not lost on the powers. It established a new principle of international commercial law which might later be applied through other conventions to other commodities considered undesirable and prohibited by a country. Chapter I, as a whole, was a commendable achievement. Its weakness, which was subsequently to become very apparent, lay in the fact that while it called for the regulation and restriction of the traffic in raw opium, no specific mention was made of the suppression or reduction of the cultivation of the poppy from which raw opium was derived. As a result, limiting the quantity of drugs available by limiting production at the source was to remain a constant but unattainable goal throughout the period of this study.

Chapter II of the Hague Opium Convention dealt with the traffic in prepared opium and was based on resolutions submitted by the American delegation. In the three articles (6, 7 and 8) which constituted this chapter, the powers pledged to adopt measures for the control and gradual and effective suppression of the domestic traffic in opium prepared for smoking and its manufacture and use. Their promise to prohibit immediately the external trade in the drug was modified, however, by the stipulation that a power not ready to prohibit the export of prepared opium would limit the number of places through which it was exported, prohibit its export to countries prohibiting its entry, control its export to countries restricting its import, and require a special mark of identification on packages exported as well as restrict export transactions to authorized persons."64

While Chapter II was aimed at the traffic in prepared opium and its extensive use in China and the Far Eastern possessions of Japan and the European powers, it was also of concrete significance to the United States. Portuguese Macao was the center of the export trade in prepared opium, and from it the colony derived a substantial revenue. From Macao opium was smuggled directly or indirectly into the Philippines and the continental United States. Much that came into the United States was imported first into Canada and Mexico and then smuggled overland.

Chapter II aroused very little controversy, for the American delegation acquiesced in weakening it for the sake of harmony. Its defect lay in the fact that in calling for the gradual and effective suppression of prepared opium it set no time limit for the achievement of this objective. This defect was to be a major weakness of the Hague Opium Convention as a whole and was to constitute a divisive element in the relations of the United States with the other powers having possessions in the Far East.

The most controversial of the substantive chapters of the Hague Convention was Chapter III, which was based on resolutions introduced by the British delegation.65 This chapter dealt with the domestic and international traffic in cocaine and the derivatives of opium—medicinal opium, morphine, and heroin. It will be recalled that the British, alarmed at the flooding of their Far Eastern possessions with morphine and cocaine, had insisted upon an investigation of the manufacture and traffic in these drugs as a sine qua non of their participation in the conference. The British delegation therefore came armed with strong proposals to deal with the problem. The measures finally adopted, however, constituted the weakest articles of the Convention. By Articles 9, r, and 12 respectively, the powers pledged to enact pharmacy laws and regulations to confine the manufacture, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine, and their salts to medicinal and legitimate uses; to prohibit in their domestic trade the transfer of these products to unauthorized persons; and to confine their import to authorized persons.

In Chapter III the weak articles were Articles tO, 13, and 15. In Article 10 the powers promised to "use their best efforts to control or cause to be controlled" persons and buildings engaged in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of morphine and cocaine and their salts, and suggested specific measures by which this was to be effected.

Under Article i3 the powers undertook the obligation to "use their best efforts to adopt, or cause to be adopted, measures" to prevent the shipment of morphine, cocaine, and their salts from areas under their jurisdiction to persons unauthorized by the importing country and the areas under its jurisdiction to receive them. Finally in Article 15 the powers promised to apply their laws and regulations in regard to the manufacture, sale, importation, and exportation of morphine, cocaine, and their salts to medicinal opium; to preparations containing more than certain percentages of morphine, cocaine, and heroin; to heroin; and to new forms of the drugs which might prove to be harmful. The weakness of the above articles obviously lay in the fact that no definite pledge was undertaken to perform certain acts but merely a promise to "use their best endeavors to take" certain measures. The exemption of preparations containing certain minimum percentages of the drugs in question and of codeine from regulation and control constituted another major weakness. This defect was partly offset, however, by the provision made to bring new drugs discovered to be injurious under control.

The delegation most responsible for the watering down of the British resolutions regarding the manufactured drugs was the German. The German chemical industry had put much pressure on the German government not to attend the conference. Germany was a major manufacturer of opium derivatives and had almost a monopoly of cocaine production. The German delegation therefore was out to scuttle any strong measures that might jeopardize the favored position of their manufacturers. They argued that to be effective any convention for the control of these drugs would have to be adhered to by all the nations of the world; otherwise, Germany and the other powers participating in the conference would be merely sacrificing their industry and trade for the benefit of the industry and trade of other countries nonadherent to the convention. They further contended that Germany already had an effective system of domestic control and therefore other countries should similarly protect themselves through effective police and customs systems. They pointed to constitutional difficulties blocking acceptance of the British resolution: the Convention, if ratified by the Reichstag, would become a part of German law, and as the cocaine and morphine articles dealt with matters within the sphere of the individual states and not within that of the imperial government, as drawn up, the Convention was not likely to be ratified, for the articles mentioned would infringe on state autonomy. Upon its return to The Hague after the Christmas recess, the German delegation was even more adamant in its opposition to the British measures.66 Obviously its government had instructed it not to yield.

Faced with the fact that the German delegation would not acquiesce in the British proposals and that without German approval the proposals would not be effective even if adopted because of the prominent place Germany occupied in the production and trade in the manufactured drugs, the British yielded, after a week's deadlock, to the compromise propositions of the Germans by agreeing to the insertion of the phrase "the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to take" the measures indicated. It was on German insistence also that codeine was exempted from the drugs to be controlled on the grounds of lack of evidence that the drug would produce habituation. Because of American and Chinese opposition to this deletion, Germany lost by a vote of 8 to 2. (Russia supporting Germany) on the original vote. The amendment was later carried, however, for the sake of harmony and unanimity when Germany still insisted. Even in their weakened form, the articles of Chapter III still did not satisfy the German delegation, and that dissatisfaction was primarily responsible for the novelty of the clauses outlining the procedure for putting the Convention into effect.

The resolutions of the Chinese delegation (T'ang Kuo-an was again a member) constituted the basis of Chapter IV of the Convention, which suggested measures to be taken by China and the treaty powers for the control of the drug traffic in China.67 Under Article rg China and the treaty powers pledged to adopt measures to prevent the smuggling of the various drugs covered by the Convention into each other's territories or areas under their jurisdiction. Under Article 16 China was to adopt pharmacy laws for its subjects which, on communication to the treaty powers for examination and if found by them to be acceptable, were to be applied to the nationals of those powers residing in China. By this article China attempted to get around the barrier of extraterritoriality in dealing with the foreigners in China engaged in the drug traffic. In Articles 17 and 18 the treaty powers placed themselves under the obligation of adopting measures to restrict and control the consumption of smoking opium in areas under their jurisdiction in China, to close pari passu with the Chinese government opium divans and similar establishments, to reduce gradually pari passu with the Chinese government the number of opium shops, and to restrict and control the retail trade in opium in these areas. Under Article 19 the powers having post offices in China promised to adopt measures to prevent their use for illegal transmission into and within China of the drugs covered by the Convention.

In Chapter IV China obtained the confirmation of principles for which she had long been contending and was thereby able to block the other treaty powers from taking advantage of the revised Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement through the application of the mostfavored-nation principle and continuing to export opium to China. That this was a definite danger had been made clear early in the conference when the Portuguese insisted that because China was pledged to receive Indian opium for six years, she was not permitted to prohibit the importation of foreign opium from other sources except by special agreement with the other powers. T'ang Kuo-an held that special conditions applicable to the Indian-Chinese opium trade would not exist in regard to other trade; therefore Portugal and other nations should not insist on similar privileges." The adoption of Chapter IV as well as Article 3 of Chapter I was a victory for the Chinese.

To assure that the victory should not be tarnished, Wright backed the Chinese in opposing the suggestion of Sir William Collins that the Chinese resolution be embodied in a separate convention. This proposition stemmed from the fact that Persia and Siam, not being treaty powers, felt that they should refrain from taking a position on the resolutions, as these resolutions did not apply to them. Therefore it was suggested that in order to get unanimity on questions in which all were concerned, Chapter IV should constitute a separate convention. Wright took vigorous exception to this proposal on the ground that it "would distinguish China invidiously from the rest of the sovereign Powers here represented," and that China's participation in the conference represented "a new era—an era of greater comity between China and the Western Powers which should not be diminished."69 His countersuggestion that all the powers should sign a general convention with Persia and Siam attaching a note excepting them from articles not applying to them was the procedure finally followed.

Chapter V consisted of only two articles. Article 20 called for the consideration of the possibility of enacting domestic legislation providing penalties for the illegal possession of the drugs covered by the Convention. This was implicit acceptance, but only after some opposition, of the American view embodied in the Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, that illegal possession should be regarded as evidence for conviction. Article 21 was based on an American proposal. Under it the powers agreed to exchange through the medium of the Netherlands government the texts of laws and regulations and statistical data regarding the drug traffic."70

Several resolutions of substantive content which were considered by the conference and either withdrawn or rejected deserve brief mention here. Early in the conference, Wright announced his intention of introducing a resolution providing for the outlawing of the drug products of opium-producing countries which failed to adhere to the Convention within two years after its adoption.71 There is, however, no record that the resolution was ever presented or considered. Undoubtedly it would have failed of passage. Wright withdrew his resolution ,calling upon the powers to forbid their citizens and subjects to supply opium, morphine, and cocaine and their various products to the unprotected natives of the Pacific islands when the other delegations pointed out that they could accept it only ad referendum, as they had no instructions on the matter." The proposal was similar to the American law of 1902. The American delegation objected to a proposal of the Netherlands delegation that the purchase of raw opium and wholesale transactions in it should be made a government monopoly, on the grounds that such a system was so adverse to American principles in regard to any article of commerce that Congress would be unlikely to consider it.73 This was surprising in the light of the fact that the United States had proposed such a system for China. A proposal from a member of the French delegation, who claimed that there was increased consumption of alcohol in Indochina as a result of the decrease in the consumption of opium, that the conference express the desire that governments mutually aid each other and take measures equal to those in regard to opium to suppress the evils of alcohol, was objected to by Wright and Sir Clementi Smith on the grounds that the opium question and parallel matters should be kept separate."'74

Even more controversial than the substantive articles of the Convention were the proposals for putting it into force.75 The German delegation, supported by the French, had insisted throughout the conference that in order for the measures adopted to be effective, they would have to be adopted by the powers not represented at the conference, for the matters dealt with were of worldwide concern and many of the powers not represented at the conference occupied a very important position in these matters, especially Turkey in regard to raw opium, Bolivia and Peru in regard to cocaine, and Switzerland in regard to manufactured drugs. They therefore insisted that the adherence of the outside powers should be obtained before ratification of the Convention took place. Many of the other delegations, desirous of putting the Convention into effect as soon as possible, objected to the delay that would be caused by the necessity of getting the adherence of thirty-four powers. ,

The crux of the difficulty was Chapter III relating to morphine and cocaine drugs. The German delegates were adamantly opposed to having their government make any pledges in regard to the control and restriction of the traffic in these drugs while other powers might remain free to do as they like. Furthermore, they cast doubt upon American sincerity in the matter by putting to the American delegation the following rather impertinent questions: ( 1 ) "What guarantee can they [the American Delegation] give to the other delegations that the United States Government, after having signed and ratified the treaty . . . will pass the necessary legislation to put the stipulations of the treaty into force?" (2) "What guarantee can the American Delegation give that the stipulations of the convention, after having been put into force, will not be invalidated by subsequent laws not in harmony with the convention?" The questions were embarrassing to the American delegation not only because of their rudeness, but also because, in spite of Wright's efforts to get the Congress to pass drug-control legislation before the conference met in order to strengthen the American position at the conference, Congress had not responded. The result was that the American delegation entered the conference, which the United States had called, lagging behind all the Western nations and Japan in legislation to control the domestic traffic in the drugs under consideration. Wright's reply was to the effect that "the good faith of the United States was a sufficient guarantee that Congress would pass the necessary legislation to enforce the Convention if Germany would sign and ratify it.”77

To meet the dilemma presented by the German attitude, and to provide for the normal procedure for ratification and adhesion, Wright proposed that the Convention be divided into two parts. Chapters I, II, and IV relating to raw and prepared opium, on which there had been no substantial disagreement, should constitute a separate convention from Chapter III, on which there was major discord, in order that the former might not be pulled down to the level of the latter and thus make difficult the adhesion to and ratification and effectuation of the whole work of the conference. The British, French, and Siamese delegations objected to this resolution on the grounds that it was contrary to the agreement with Great Britain preliminary to the conference stipulating that the morphine and cocaine question would be considered on the 'same level as opium. They maintained that the morphine and cocaine problem was as important as the opium problem, and that it should not be relegated to second place. Wright's motion that his proposal be discussed was defeated, with only Germany and China supporting it.78

A compromise scheme was drawn up by the drafting committee which, amended along lines suggested by the British delegation, formed the basis for Articles 22 and 24. Article 22 provided for the adherence of nonsignatory powers through a special Protocol. Article 23 provided for the ratification of the Convention and the supplementary Protocol after all the powers had signed the Convention or the Protocol. If this were done by December 31, 191 2, the Netherlands government was to invite all the signatory powers to another conference at The Hague to consider the possibility of fixing a date for the depositing of ratifications. Article 24 stipulated that the Convention should go into effect three months after the Netherlands government had given notification of its ratification by all the signatory powers. Not later than six months after the Convention went into effect the powers were to have drawn up measures called for in the Convention and recommended their enactment to their respective legislatures. Article 25 provided for the denunciation of the Convention and stipulated that questions arising in regard to the ratification and effectuation of the Convention or in regard to its substantive measures might be settled in a subsequent conference of the signatory powers at The Hague."79

The provisions embodied in Articles 22-24 were quite new in that they represented a radical departure from similar provisions in other international conventions. Though novel, they were necessary, for without them unanimous adoption of the Convention and the Protocol of Cloture would have been impossible. The Protocol of Cloture contained two main provisions. The part based on an American proposal requested the International Postal Union to take steps to prevent the transmission of drugs through the mails. The other called for a scientific and statistical study of Indian hemp looking toward its domestic and international regulation." The Convention and Protocol were unanimously adopted by the participating powers, and the conference came to a close on January 23, 1912.

It was generally agreed that the Hague Convention was a distinct advance in the antiopium movement, that it represented a new standard of international morality in that the participating powers agreed to help each other in the solution of a problem that was beyond the control of any individual state, and that it firmly established the principle of the necessity of such international cooperation.8' In addition to conventionalizing the Shanghai resolutions, which were concerned primarily with the opium problem in the Far East, the Convention contained measures designed to deal with what was rapidly being recognized as truly a worldwide problem. It marked the beginning of sincere British cooperation in at least one aspect of the antidrug campaign—that of the manufactured drugs. For China it was another step forward in her relations with the West after the Shanghai Commission, in that for the first time she participated in an international conference and signed a treaty on terms of equality with other states.

Despite the fact that it stood as a landmark in the drug movement, in international comity, and in the foreign relations of China, the Hague Convention was an imperfect instrument. It was, as is usual in international conventions, necessarily a compromise: a compromise between the powers whose governments or citizens had an economic interest in the drug traffic and the powers who would subordinate or even disregard all economic considerations in favor of the humanitarian goal of eliminating the misuse of these drugs. The strongest provisions of the Convention were in Chapters I and IV. Chapter II was weak in that the powers were not pledged to suppress the use of prepared opium within a specific period of time, but only promised to take steps to suppress gradually the traffic and use. Chapter III was the weakest. No distinct pledges were made to control and restrict the traffic in and manufacture of morphine and cocaine and their products; it contained merely the hollow promises of endeavoring to take certain measures. In addition, one of the Convention's greatest defects was the lack of an organ of administration to supervise the carrying out of the provisions of the Convention. Fear by the powers of an international body that would infringe on their sovereignty prevented even the consideration of this step at the conference.

Nevertheless, the Convention was probably the best that could be obtained at the time and under the circumstances. It fell short of the goals set for it, and probably no participating power was totally satisfied with it. In the United States there was initially a great deal of disappointment and suspicion, official and unofficial, at the results achieved. Closer examination, however, led the President and the State Department to conclude that a significant advance had been made." This view was shared by the American delegation, which though cognizant of the outstanding shortcomings of the Convention, nevertheless found much in it to applaud." They regarded the conventionalization of the American principle, first raised at Shanghai and strenuously opposed there by the British because of the Indian-Chinese trade, that the export of opium to countries prohibiting or regulating its entry should be similarly prohibited or regulated, as a most significant step forward and capable of application to other products and other situations. This principle was embodied in Articles 3, 7, 8, and 13 of the Convention. The British were the first to apply it in relation to the export of opium from Hong Kong, the Straits Settlement, India, and Canada. Equally significant in their view, was the recognition in Chapter II of the Convention of the principles of the Opium Exclusion Act of 1909 and of the opium legislation in the Philippines to the effect that the use of opium for other than medical purposes was unjustified and should be suppressed. Despite American disappointment with the Convention, it was to remain until 1931 the only foundation on`which the United States was willing to base its international drug policy.

By Articles 2 2 and z 3 of the Convention the government of the Netherlands was entrusted with the task of securing the signatures of the states not represented at the conference and of receiving the deposits of ratification of all the states. As informally prearranged with the American delegation, the Dutch requested the aid of the United States in obtaining the signatures of the Latin American countries. To this end the State Department addressed a long and urgent appeal to these states for their cooperation." The Latin American nations responded heartily to the request, and by the end of 2982 all of them except Peru had notified the United States that they had signed or would do so. Peru hesitated because of her deep economic involvement in the cultivation of the coca leaf and (with her large Chinese population) her revenue interest in the opium trade." Despite serious differences on other matters, this response of the Latin American States was typical of their relations with the United States on the drug problem throughout the international movement, a situation about which the United States was most appreciative.

As the signatures of all the powers were not obtained by December 31, 1912, the Dutch, pursuant to Article 23 of the Hague Opium Convention, called on the signatory powers to meet in a second conference at The Hague on July 1, 1913, in order to examine the possibility of nevertheless depositing ratifications. When the conference convened, thirty-four powers had signed the Convention and twenty-four of these, as compared to the twelve present at the First Conference, were represented at the conference. Twelve powers had not signed the Convention, and of these, four—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Norway, and Uruguay—had indicated that they would sign, four—Montenegro, Peru, Serbia and Sweden—had not replied, one—Rumania—was still considering the question, and three—Greece, Turkey and Switzerland —had said they would not sign. Greece had given no specific reasons for refusing to sign; Turkey merely stated that it would not sign for economic reasons; and Switzerland claimed that her cooperation would be valueless as she neither produced nor exported opium and already had effective domestic legislation on the matters in question.86 In face of the above situation the prevailing attitude among diplomats and others at the opening of the Second Conference was one of pessimism. Most thought that the work of the conference would be marked by much talk and little or no action.87

The American delegation was this time headed by Hamilton Wright, who was accompanied by Lloyd Bryce, the American minister at The Hague, and Gerrit John Kollen, president emeritus of Hope College. After ascertaining the somewhat hopeless attitude prevailing in the first session of the conference the American delegation obtained a twenty-four hour adjournment in order that informal conversations on various aspects of the Convention might take place. Private discussions were held among the British, French, German, Dutch, Russian, and American delegations for the formulation of measures to give effect to a British proposal that a combined effort be made by the signatory powers to secure the signatures of the states which had not signed, including those which had expressed their intention not to do so. Out of these discussions came a resolution calling upon the governments of the Netherlands to clear up the misunderstandings which many of the recalcitrant powers seemed to have as to both the purpose and the provisions of the Convention, and at the same time to urge these states to sign immediately and agree to ratify the Convention. The supplications of the Dutch government were to be supported at the capitals of the nonsignatory countries by the diplomatic representatives of the states which had signed the Convention. After only minor objections, this proposal was unanimously adopted and embodied in the Protocol of Cloture, which was signed by the representatives of the members of the conference on July 9.88 Before the conference adjourned, Uruguay and Peru, after urgent appeals from the United States, agreed to sign the Convention. The Protocol was thus directed at only ten powers.

The adoption of the above resolution constituted the major work of the Second Conference. During the course of discussion on the proposal, the Chinese delegate had suggested that representations be made to the nonsignatory powers at once, and that pending the receipt of replies, the conference should adjourn and then reassemble when the results had been ascertained. Hamilton Wright endorsed this proposal, but a majority of the other delegations rejected it on the ground that as several of the nonsignatories were at war (the Balkan States), the replies might be slow in forthcoming. Moreover, they contended, the conference had already discharged its duty by examining the possibility of ratification as specified in Article 23 of the Hague Opium Convendo n.89

Some difficulty arose over the question of whether the powers had to meet again to deposit ratifications after the nonsignatory powers had been heard from. Early in the conference several delegations had declared that their governments were not ready to ratify the Convention. France declared its readiness to ratify for France proper, but not for Indochina, because of the smuggling on that territory's frontier with China. On the other hand, Portugal and Russia expressed their unwillingness to deposit their ratifications until certain other powers had signed the Convention. The crucial attitudes were those of the British and the Germans. The Germans reiterated their First Conference argument that the efforts of a limited number of powers to regulate the narcotic drug trade would be futile so long as other powers, not bound by the Convention, were free to engage in the manufacture of and trade in these products. Germany therefore would not ratify the Convention until all the powers had signed. The British delegation took a similar position. The nonadherence of Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and Norway, they declared, would make ineffective the proposals for preventing the exportation of morphine and cocaine, while the nonadherence of Peru alone would render the articles relative to the coca leaf worthless.9° Thus the process of ratification was delayed by the unwillingness of several of the major powers involved in the drug traffic to sacrifice their commercial interests for fear that other countries might profit at their expense and at the same time render ineffective the provisions of the Convention. It was finally decided that powers which were prepared to do so might deposit their ratifications according to Article 23 of the Hague Convention.9' Embodied in the Final Protocol of the Second Conference was the stipulation that a third conference should be held if the signatures of all the powers were not obtained by December 31, 1913, to consider the possibility of putting the Convention into effect.°

The Second Conference had no spectacular achievements to its credit. Its accomplishments were merely procedural. Nevertheless some impetus was given to the antidrug movement. At the close of the conference, thirty-six nations had signed or indicated that they were ready to sign the Convention, and several were ready to ratify.° Only a small, though powerful, minority delayed ratification, which was no longer dependent on universal adherence to the Convention. The conference itself attracted little public attention, since it was overshadowed by the several international crises in Europe.

The United States deposited its ratification of the Hague Opium Convention on December io, 1913. But by December 31, 19x3, several powers still had not subscribed to the Convention. Thus the Dutch called for a third conference to meet at The Hague in May 1914 in order to consider the possibility of putting the Convention into effect even though it had not been signed by all the states. Meanwhile, the United States sought to put its own house in order. The change in administrations in Washington in 1913 had occasioned no slowing down of the campaign in the United States. President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan gave their hearty support to the work." A report by Wright to the Secretary of State on the opium question was submitted without change to Congress on April 2 I, 1913, as President Wilson's first special message." The State Department hoped that before the third conference met, Congress would pass all the proposed narcotic legislation pending before it. It was also hoped that in order for the United States to have Mexico's support at the conference, relations with that country might be cleared up. Therefore, at America's request, the conference was postponed until June 15, 1914."96

When the Third Conference convened, forty-three powers had signed or had declared their intentions of signing the Convention. Austria-Hungary had not signed for constitutional reasons, but had finally declared that she would adhere to the Convention. Greece was prepared to adhere for Greece proper, but with a reservation exempting her newly acquired territory from the provisions of the Convention. This reservation was later withdrawn, however. Thus only two recalcitrant powers remained. Serbia still pleaded lack of sufficient time to give consideration to the question as its reason for not subscribing. On the other hand, Turkey had categorically refused to sign, citing economic reasons. Only eight powers had ratified the document."97

For the first time Hamilton Wright did not represent the United States in an international gathering on the drug traffic. As a result of financial difficulties with the State Department concerning claims of back salary due him and a resultant petty dispute with Secretary of State Bryan, Wright was unceremoniously dropped from the American delegation.98 The United States was represented at the conference by Henry Van Dyke, the American minister at The Hague, and Charles Denby, the American consul general at Vienna. The British were again represented by William Max Müller and Sir William Collins; the French by Marcellin Pellet, French minister to the Netherlands; the Germans by Felix von Müller, the German minister to the Netherlands; and the Chinese by Yen Hui-ch'ung and T'ang Tsai-fou, the Chinese ministers to Germany and the Netherlands, respectively. Altogether envoys of thirty powers were in attendance.99

The question which the Third Conference had to consider was essentially whether the Convention should come into force without the signature of two powers, Turkey and Serbia. The American position was summed up by Van Dyke both at the beginning and at the end of the Conference to embrace the following points:

1. An earnest desire to make the Anti-Opium Convention of 1912 effective soon.

2. A sincere wish that all nations shall join.

3. A willingness to put it into force between a limited number of Powers under proper conditions.

4. A definite intention to do this only in such a form as will not foster or [will] prevent a profitable monopoly in opium for the abstainingPowers."°

In support of the American position and as proof of the absolute sincerity of the United States, Charles Denby reviewed the legislation and other measures taken by the United States to make the Convention effective.101 As a result of the passage of several measures by Congress shortly before the conference convened, the American representatives could point with pride to the fact that their country was once again in the vanguard of the antidrug campaign.

In their preliminary statements the French and German delegates reiterated the arguments they had made in the Second Conference. Marcellin Pellet took the position that to put the Convention into effect without the adhesion of all the powers would result in the creation of a very lucrative commercial monopoly for the nonadhering states, while Felix von Müller pointed to the absence of Turkey and Serbia, to the reservations accompanying the signatures of Sweden, Montenegro, and Greece, and to the "unsatisfactory declaration" of Austria-Hungary as the reasons why Germany had not ratified the Convention and could not agree to put it into effect.'°2

The British delegates had reversed their attitude of the previous conference. Sir Edward Grey had instructed them to work for the signature and ratification of the Convention by as many states as possible, even if this meant the support of proposals for signatuies with reservations by those powers who would not otherwise adhere. As a result of the expressed intentions of Greece, and more especially of Austria-Hungary, to sign, and the reversal of technical obstacles to signature and ratification on the part of Britain's dominions and possessions, Great Britain, he declared, was ready to ratify. He therefore advised them that if the conference decided that the Convention could go into force without the signature and ratification of all the powers, they should direct their principal attention to the date of its going into force.103 The British delegates therefore maintained that as forty-three out of the forty-six states had signed, nine had ratified, and others were ready to do so, the putting of the Convention into force should not be thwarted by two or three powers whose abstention might well "be neutralized" by certain measures. Furthermore, the decision of the Second Conference that ratification should not remain dependent on universal adherence to the document implied that its effectuation should similarly not be blocked by the failure of a few powers to subscribe to it."'

The views of the American and British delegates were strongly supported by Van Deventer of the Netherlands. He emphasized the success of the two previous conferences in securing the signatures of thirty-two of the thirty-four nonsignatory powers, an achievement which he felt should not be allowed to go to waste. Giving voice to those measures which the British had implied might be adopted to bring the recalcitrant powers into line, he pointed out that if all the powers but Turkey and Serbia put the Convention into effect, the unregulated production and traffic in opium and other drugs would be confined to the abstainers' own territories, and they would thus be forced to come into the Convention.105 The Russian delegate took his position with the French and Germans. While expressing the readiness of his government to ratify the Convention, he stated that Russia's willingness to put it into force depended largelyan the preparedness of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland to do likewise.'106

At the first session of the conference Van Dyke had offered a resolution which "resolved, that the Signatory Powers pledge themselves to ratify as soon as possible the Convention of 1912, and to put it into effect from the first of December, 5914•1" This resolution was referred to the Redaction Committee which was instructed to draft a formula providing either for the coming into force of the Convention on a fixed date as suggested by Van Dyke or after ratification by a certain number of powers. The plan brought forth specified that the Convention might be put into force without the signatures of all the powers; its coming into force among all the signatory powers should take place as soon as they had ratified it; and the date of its coming into force should be either three months after all the signatories had ratified as stipulated in paragraph one of Article 24 of the Convention, or on December 1, 1914, whichever was earlier. Twenty-five powers voted for the first proposition while one, Luxembourg, abstained. Sixteen favored the second proposal, while eleven, including the United States, abstained. Only Germany and Portugal opposed both recommendations. The third proposal was referred again to the Redaction Committee when an amendment, suggested by the Chinese, calling for the putting into force of the Convention on December x, 1914, for the powers which had deposited their ratification and on the date of the deposit of their ratifications for powers which had delayed ratification for constitutional reasons, was objected to by several powers as an improper inquiry into the reasons for nonratification.'"

The United States was hopeful that the conference would unanimously agree to the coming into force of the Convention among all the signatory powers. When it became obvious that Turkey could not be induced to sign the document, the State Department, at Van Dyke's request, tried to persuade Germany to ratify the Convention nevertheless and agree to put it into force.'" But Germany remained adamant in its insistence on the "unconditional adhesion of all the powers" as a preliminary to its confirmation of the Convention."°

Realizing that Germany's intransigence would affect the willingness of other powers, including Great Britain, to put the Convention into effect, the American delegation therefore requested permission of the State Department to agree to put the Convention into force even among a limited number of powers, that is, among those who would agree to do so. The Department suggested instead a three weeks' adjournment of the conference so that the United States and the Netherlands might exert pressure on Turkey, Greece, and Serbia. Fearing that an adjournment might cause the dissipation of sentiment among the powers which were then prepared to act, the American delegation advised against such a step. They maintained that in order to avoid losing the advance already made in the international movement, the United States should consent to putting the Convention into force even among a limited number of states."111

Meanwhile the Redaction Committee had come forward with a formula which was acceptable in most of its aspects to all the delegations and which was embodied in the Protocol of Cloture. It included the two proposals already approved which provided that the Convention might be put into effect despite the failure of some powers to sign, and that it should come into force among all the signatory powers three months after they had ratified it. The additional provisions specified that if by December 31, 1914, all the signatory powers had not deposited ratifications, the signatory powers which had done so might put the Convention into force; that accession to the Convention remained open to the states which had not yet signed it; and that a protocol should be opened at The Hague whereby the signatory powers which had not ratified might declare their intention of putting the Convention into effect. Also embodied in the Protocol was an Anglo-American resolution requesting the Dutch government to urge the signatory powers to ratify the Convention as soon as possible so that it might go into effect at an early date.112 On June 25, at the last session of the conference, it was announced that Greece had signed the Convention without reservation. The Protocol of the Conference was also signed by all the delegates without reservation. Portugal had in the meantime withdrawn its opposition to the putting into force of the Convention without its being signed by Turkey and Serbia. Although the German delegation signed the Protocol, it was obvious that their government would neither ratify nor put the Convention into force.

At the close of the conference forty-four out of forty-six governments had signed the Convention or had expressed their firm intention of doing so; eleven had ratified it—the United States, Belgium, China, Denmark, Guatemala, Italy, Portugal, Siam, Sweden, Venezuela, and Honduras; four were ready to ratify—Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, and Persia; ten were ready to ratify as soon as legislative approval could be obtained; eighteen signatories had not announced their intention of ratifying; and two—Turkey and Serbia—had not signed nor announced their intentions of doing so.113

This was the third and final conference on the drug question at The Hague. These conferences had resulted in a widening of the sphere of attention from the Far Eastern drug traffic to the universal aspects of the problem, with increasing emphasis on the situation in the West. A concomitant development was the extension of the realm of responsibility or blame for the traffic. At Shanghai the British were regarded as the principal villains, in American eyes at least. At The Hague the Germans were similarly regarded. Germany's intransigence slowed the movement, particularly on the part of Great Britain, France, and Russia, toward the ratification and execution of the Convention, which in turn lightened the pressure on other powers which otherwise might have been induced to take decisive action. In defense of Germany, however, it may be pointed out that subsequent developments were to support her contention that as long as any single great producer remained outside international control, no effective check on the drug traffic was possible. Turkey was adamant in refusing to cooperate. No amount of pressure could induce her to change her policy. In fact, it was not until 1932, after virtually all other nations had adhered, that Turkey agreed to put the Convention into force. Furthermore, as war enveloped Europe in 1914, very little progress in carrying out the international aspects of the Convention was possible anyway. The failure of the powers to put the Convention into effect during the war years was thus not a significant drawback to the movement.

Yet, by providing for the execution of the Convention even among a limited number of powers, the Third Hague Conference represented a step forward. Enough powers did take sufficient action to keep the issue alive. Since not all the signatory powers had ratified the Convention by the end of 1914 (as everyone knew would be the case), the United States, China, and the Netherlands put the Convention into effect among themselves by signing the Protocol on February ii, 1915.h14 They were joined later the same year by Honduras and Norway. By the fall of the year sixteen powers, including Great Britain, had deposited their ratifications.115 The preoccupation of the powers with World War I hampered further action. By the time of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 only two other nations, Belgium and Luxembourg (on May 14, 1919), had put the Convention into effect.

Aside from administrative agreements and bilateral smuggling and extradition treaties, the Hague Opium Convention remained the sole international arrangement down to 1933 on which the United States was willing to base its international drug policy. Yet, some fourteen years after it had put the Convention into effect, the question arose in the State Department whether the United States was legally a party to it. The matter became of concern in connection with investigations of the history of the Harrison Narcotics Act, the basic federal statute controlling the narcotics traffic in the United States, in relation to the status of the Convention. Congressman Stephen G. Porter wanted this information for use in preparing another narcotics bill. The question of the validity of the Convention had been brought up in 1926 before the Supreme Court in Alston v. the United States,'" but the Court had ignored the question and merely ruled on the constitutionality of the Harrison Act, which it upheld. The crux of the matter was that the Final Protocol of the Third Hague Opium Conference providing for the bringing of the Convention into force, though signed by the United States, was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. The government, however, had proceeded to act as if it had Senate approval and put the Convention into effect. If it were held that the failure to submit the Protocol to the Senate meant that the United States had not legally ratified and put the Convention into force, then acts of the United States to carry it out might be ruled invalid. It would also mean that the United States was not legally a party to the Convention, and this would furnish ammunition to foreign critics who resented the part played by the country in the antidrug movement.

The Treaty Division of the State Department maintained that the question of the validity of the ratification and the putting into effect of the Convention revolved around the issue of whether the Final Protocol added something of substance to what had previously been approved by the Senate—the Hague Opium Convention and the final protocols of the First and Second Conferences. If nothing of substance was added, then the action of the government was valid. It was finally decided by the Solicitor, the Treaty Division, and the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to let matters lie and accept the Convention as validly ratified and in effect and not to submit the question to the Attorney General for a ruling. Cited in support of this decision was the argument of the current Attorney General before the Supreme Court in 1926 when, as Solicitor General, he maintained that the United States had legally become a party to the Convention, an argument to which the Court had not expressed any views to the contrary in its opinion."7 Furthermore, they maintained, the government of the United States had regarded the Convention as being in force since 1915, and Congress had sanctioned that view by several acts and resolutions. In addition, the United States had long acquiesced in general, they noted, in the Convention. Thus the question was buried, but not without some trepidation that it was not permanently settled and might give future trouble."' There is no evidence, however, that the issue was ever given further consideration.

 

1. Confidential Report of the American Opium Commission, p. 8.

2. Memorandum by Hamilton Wright to William Phillips, May 18, 1909, SDR 774/633; also Wright to Brent, June 9, 1909, Brent Papers, Box 8. The proposal of mutual right of search of carriers of contraband opium calls to mind the fact that prior to 1862 the United States consistently rejected repeated overtures from the British government for a treaty embodying this principle with reference to the slave trade. The old issue of impressment and the influence of the South were responsible for this recalcitrance. See Samuel Fagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (3rd ed. revised; New York: Henry Holt and Co., ro), pp. 330-333.

3. Brent to the Department of State, July 2, 1909, SDR, RG 43, E 36.

4. Huntington Wilson, the Assistant Secretary of State, had little faith in the idea and only reluctantly cooperated in its effectuation once it had been adopted. See Huntington Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, April 29, 7909, SDR, RG 43, E 36; also Wright to Brent, Washington, D.C., Nov. 12, 1909, Brent Papers, Box 8.

5. Wright to Brent, Washington, D.C., Nov. 12, 1909, Brent Papers, Box 8.

6. Acting Secretary of State Adee to the Diplomatic Officers of the United States Accredited to the Governments Which Were Represented in the Shanghai International Opium Commission, Sept. 1, 19o9, SDR, RG 43, E 46. Also in Brent Papers, Box 9.

7. /bid. The first, third, and seventh items were expressive of Resolutions 5, 4, and of the Shanghai Commission. The second, fourth, tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth items were presumably suggestions of measures to give effect to Resolution 4 of the Commission, which was repeated in the third item. The eighth item, however, because of the opposition of the British, had been specifically rejected at Shanghai. The remaining proposals were new but could be interpreted as coming in a general way within the spirit and purpose of the Shanghai resolutions.

8. For the reasoning which lay behind the various items in the tentative program see "Bases," SDR, RG 43, E 37.

9. Ibid., "Bases" X.

10. Huntington Wilson to Minister William J. Calhoun (Peking) , June 30, 1910, SDR 774/761a.

11 Memorandum by Wright to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1910, SDR 774/715; also Memorandum by Wright to Baker, May io, 1909, SDR 774/623 1/2.

12. Ibid.

13. Wright to Jenks, March 18, 1910, SDR, RG 43, E 36.

14. "Bases" LXXI, SDR, RG 43, E 37.

15. George Lorillard, American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim (Lisbon), to the Secretary of State, May 18, 1910, SDR 774/735, 745; May 31, 1910, SDR 774/751.

16. Minister Rockhill (St. Petersburg) to the Secretary of State, Jan. 29, 1910, SDR 774/693 a.

17. Baryon Mayor, Italian Ambassador (Washington), to the Secretary of State, Feb. 12, 1910, SDR 774/697; Secretary Knox to the Italian Embassy, March 2, 1910, NA 774/694; The Italian Undersecretary of State, P. Di Scalea, to the American Ambassador, John G. A. Leishman, April 8, 1950, SDR 774/722. The above are also in RG 439 E 38-

18. Huntington Wilson to William J. Calhoun (Peking), June 30, 1950, SDR 774/ 761a. Also in RG 43, E 38.

19. Secretary of State Knox to Ambassador Reid (London), May 24, 1910, SDR 774/682. Also in RG 43, E 38. The Acting Secretary of State to Messrs. Charles H. Brent, Hamilton Wright, and Henry J. Finger, Delegates of the United States to the International Opium Conference, Washington, D.C., Oct. 18, 191t, Brent Papers, Box 9.

20.lbid.

21. Ambassador Reid to the Secretary of State, Nov. 29, 1909, NA 774/682. Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, Vol. LXVIII (Accounts and Papers, Miscellaneous No. 3, 1913) Cd. 6605, "Instructions to the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference Held at The Hague, December, 1911—January, 1912," P. 2.

22. Reid to the Secretary of State, Sept. 19, 1910, SDR 511.4AT/594; see also Accounts and Papers, Miscellaneous No. 3, 1913, Cd. 6605, pp. 2-3.

23. Huntington Wilson to Reid, Aug. 5, 191o, SDR    4AI/789.

24. Adee to Reid, Sept. 24, 1910, SDR 5 ri.4A1/794.

25. Reid to the Secretary of State, Dec. 2, 1910, SDR 511.4M/9z7.

26. For Brunyate's comments and the discussion of them, see Reid to the Secretary of State, Dec. 27, 1910, SDR 511.4A1/956; State Department Memorandum, Jan. 12, 1911, RG 43, E 38; Brent to Wright, Jan. 24, 1911, RG 43, E 51; Brent to Mrs. Reid, Manila, Dec. 24, 1910, Jan. 26, 1911, and March 23, 1911, Brent Papers, Box 66; Ambassador Reid to Brent, London, April ii, 1911, Brent Papers, Box 9.

27. Wright to Brent, Washington, D.C., May 17, 1910, Brent Papers, Box 9; SDR, RG 43, E 51. Brent to Wright, July 8, 1910, SDR, RG 43, E 51; Brent to Knox, July 8, 1910,   SDR 774/765. Also in RG 43, E 38.

28. Ibid.

29. William J. Calhoun to the Secretary of State, May 15, 1911, SDR 774/761a. Also in RG 43, E 38.

30. Wright to the Archbishop of Canterbury, July 25, 1910, SDR, RG 43, E 36. Brent to Mrs. Reid, Jan. 26, 1911, Brent Papers, Box 66.

31. Wright to Henry J. Finger, May 18, 1911, SDR, RG 43, E 36

32. Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India, p. 353.

33. Calhoun to the Secretary of State, Jan. 26, r911, SDR 774/761a.

34. Sir Frederic D. Lugard, Governor of Hong Kong, to Brent, April 1, 191o; Brent to Lugard, April 9, 1910; Brent to Secretary of State Knox, April 12, 1910; Brent to Wright, April 12, 1910; Knox to Brent, June 18, rgro, Brent Papers, Box 9; also Brent to Knox, June 1, 1910, SDR 774/753.

35. Huntington Wilson to Brent, May 25, 1910, SDR 774/734. Copy of Wright to Cameron Forbes, Governor General of the Philippines, May 31, 1911, Brent Papers, Box 9.

36. Jonkheer Loudon, Minister of the Netherlands (Washington) to the Secretary of State, March io, 1911, SDR 511.4A1/989.

37. Ambassador Reid to Knox, May 5, 1911, SDR 511.4A1/1055. Also RG 43, E 38.

38. Knox to Reid, May so, 1911, SDR 51 r.4A1/1092a. Also RG 43, E 38.

39. Reid to Knox, May It, 1915, SDR 511.4A1/1o83. Also RG 43, E 38.

40. Beaupre to the Secretary of State, May to, 1911, SDR 511.4A1/1o94. Also RG 43, E 38.

41. Knox to Reid, Aug. 2, 1911, SDR 5 t.4A1/1166b; Knox to the American Legation (The Hague), Aug. 2, 595!, 5114A1/1166a. Also RG 43, E 38.

42. Beaupre to the Secretary of State, Aug. is, 1911, SDR 511.4AI/1199. Also RG 43, E 38.

43. Beaupre to the Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1911, SDR 51T.4Az/i 186. Also RG 43, E 38.

44. Beaupre to the Secretary of State, May 13, 1911, SDR 1.4Ax/i i38. Also RG 43, E 38.

45. Irvin Laughlin, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, American Embassy (Berlin) to the Secretary of State, July 14, 191 SDR 511.4A1/116o. Also RG 43, E 38.

46. Beaupre to the Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1911, SDR 511.4A    i86. Also RG 43, E 38.

47. Beaupre to the Secretary of State, Sept. 7, 1911, SDR 5114A1/1195. Also RG 43, E 38.

48. Brent to the Secretary of State, Manila, Dec. 29, 1909; Brent to President Taft, Manila, Dec. 29, 1909, Brent Papers, Box 8; Taft to Brent, Feb. 8, 191o; Wright to Brent, Feb. TO, 1910, Brent Papers, Box 9. Also in SDR, RG 43, E 5i.

49. Knox to Loudon, Aug. II, i911, SDR 511.4AI/1177a; Wright to Knox, Aug. 15, 1911, SDR 511.4A1/117i. Also RG 43, E 38.

50. J. Bernstorff to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1911, SDR 5114A1/1162. Also RG 43, E 38.

51. Wright to Huntington Wilson, Sept. 6, 191r, SDR 511.4AI/1189, Sept. 8, 1911, SDR 5t1.4A1/1z98. Also RG 43, E 38.

52 Reid to the Secretary of State, Sept. 8, 1911, SDR 5ti4Ai/i193. Also RG 43, E 38.

53. Beaupre to the Secretary of State, Sept. 8, 19 1, SDR 5114A0 zoo. Also RG 43, E 38.

54 The Acting Secretary of State to the Delegates of the United States to the International Opium Conference, Oct. 18, Kai, pp. 5-9, Brent Papers, Box 9.

55. /bid., p. 9.

56.1bid., p. 1o.

57. International Opium Conference, The Hague, Dec. 1, 1911—Jan. 23, 1912, Summary of the Minutes (Unofficial) (The Hague: National Printing Office, 1912), pp. 19-24. Cited below as First Hague Opium Conference, Minutes.

58. Ibid., p. 19.   

59. /bid., p. 126.

6o. lbid., pp. 130-31.

61. Ibid., p.  

62.Ibid., p. 143.  

63. Ibid.,PP. 144-145.

64. Ibid., pp. 3o-31, 33-35.

65. For the discussions on this Chapter, see ibid., pp. 36-38, 44-46, 48-51, 76-78, 118-121.

66. For a convenient summary of the attitude of the Germans at the Conference as well as the activities of the Conference as a whole, see Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference Held at The Hague, December 1911— January 1912, Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, Vol. LXVIII (Accounts and Papers, Miscellaneous No. u, 5912) Cd. 6448, pp. 16-20.

67. For the discussion of the measures constituting Chapter H, see First Hague Opium Conference, Minutes, pp. 64-68.

68. Ibid., pp. 19-2r.

69. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

7o. /bid., pp. 75, 141.

71. Ibid., pp. 44, 47.

72. /bid., p. 88.

73. Ibid., pp. 41, 45.

74. /bid., p. 59.   

75. Ibid., pp. 74 f f .

76.Ibid., p. to5. Wright regarded these questions as part of a deliberate plan to embarrass and defeat the objectives of the United States. See Hamilton Wright, "A Recent Deployment of the Latin Americas in Support of a Diplomatic and Humanitarian Policy Initiated by the American Government," AIIL, X (Jan., 1916), 127-128.

77 . Ibid.

78. First Hague Opium Conference, Minutes, pp. 132-136.

79. For the text of the Convention see International Opium Conference, The Hague, 191I-1912, The International Opium Convention . . . (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1912).

80. Ibid.

81. For some representative appraisals of the Convention, see "Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference," pp. 26-27; Confidential Report of the American Delegation to the International Conference at The Hague, Dec. 1, 1911, to Jan. 23, 1912, enclosed in Brent, Wright and Finger to the Secretary of State, Feb. 12, 1912, SDR 511.4A1/1283; U.S. Dept. of State, The Opium Evil: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Communication of the Secretary of State Covering the Report of the American Delegation to the international Opium Conference Held at The Hague from December 1, 191z to January 23, 1912, 62nd Cong. 2nd Sess., 1912, Senate Doc. 733 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19 2 ) p. 27. (Cited below as Senate Document 733). For some unofficial views see Elbert F. Baldwin, "The Background of the Opium Conference at The Hague," American Review of Reviews, XLV (Feb., 1912), 214-218; William J. Collins, "Work of the International Opium Conference at the Hague," Contemporary Review, CI (March, 1912), 317-327; Foreign Policy Association, International Control of the Traffic in Opium: Summary of the Opium Conferences Held at Geneva, November, 1924 to February, 1925 . . . (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1925), pp. 3-4.

82. Wright to Lloyd Bryce, April 8, 1912, SDR, RG 43, E 36.

83. Confidential Report of American Delegation to the First Hague Conference, SDR 511.4A1/1283.

84. Circular Instruction Addressed to Diplomatic Officers of the United States Accredited to the Governments of Latin America, April 15, 19i2, SDR, RG 43, E 40.

85. H. Clay Howard, American Legation (Lima) to the Secretary of State, Nov. 9, 1912; Secretary of State Bryan to the American Legation (Lima), July 7, 1913, SDR, RG 43, E 40. See also U.S. Department of State, Second International Opium Conference. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Communication from the Secretary of State, Accompanied by a Report Prepared by Hamilton Wright, on Behalf of the American Delegates to the Second International Opium Conference Which Met at The Hague . . . July, 1913 . . . 63rd Cong., ist Sess., 1913, Senate Doc. 157 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), pp. 8-11, cited below as Report of American Delegation to the Second Hague Opium Conference.

86. Second International Opium Conference, The Hague, 1-9 July 1913, Summary of the Minutes (The Hague: National Printing Office, 1913), pp. 1-3. Cited below as Second Hague Opium Conference, Minutes.

87. Lloyd Bryce to the Secretary of State, July 14, 1913, SDR 511.4AI/14o8. Also in RG 43, E 40.

88. Second Hague Opium Conference, Minutes, pp. 18-20.

89. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Second International Conference Held at The Hague, July 1913, Miscellaneous No. 2 (1914), Cd. 7276 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1914), p. io.

90. Second Hague Opium Conference, Minutes, pp. zo-14.

91. /bid., pp. 22-23.   

92. ibid., p. 32.

93. Report of American Delegation to Second Hague Opium Conference, pp. 2 1-22.

94. Memorandum by Hamilton Wright, April 28, 1913, SDR, RG 43, E 41.

95. /bid. This was Wright's report on the Second Hague Opium Conference.

96. Hamilton Wright to J. Butler Wright, American Ambassador (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), May 4, 1914, SDR, RG 43, E 36.

97. Henry Van Dyke and Charles Denby, American Delegates to the Third International Opium Conference to the Secretary of State, June 26, 1914, SDR 51r.4A1/1489. Also in RG 43, E 36. Cited below as Report of the American Delegation to the Third Hague Opium Conference.

98. See Bryan to President Wilson, March 21, 1914; Wilson to Bryan, March 23, 1914; Wright to Wilson, June 7, 1914; and Bryan to Wright, June 10, 1914, SDR, RG 43, E 46.

99. For the members of the respective delegations, see Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Third International Opium Conference, Held at The Hague, June 1914, Miscellaneous No. 4 (1915) Cd. 7813 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1915), pp. 13-14.

100. Report of the American Delegation to the Third Hague Opium Conference, pp. 4-6. Italics added.

101 /bid., p. 3. Denby's speech attached. For the legislation discussed see below, pp. 128-129.

102. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Third International Opium Conference, pp. 4-6.

103. Ibid., pp. I-3.   

104. /bid., pp. 4-5,

105 . Ibid., p. 6.   

106. Ibid.

107. Report of the American Delegation to the Third Hague Opium Conference, P. 3.

108. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Third International Opium Conference, pp. 7-9.

109. Report of the American Delegation to the Third Hague Opium Conference, p. 4. See also Van Dyke to the Secretary of State, June 17, 1914; Secretary of State Bryan to J. H. von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, June 18, 1914; Bryan to the American Embassy (Berlin), June 18, 1914, SDR 511.4AT/1477. Also RG 43, E 43.

110.Bernstorff to the Secretary of State, June 24, 1914, SDR 511.4A1/1487. Also RG 43, E 43.

111. Van Dyke to the Secretary of State, June 29, 1914; Bryan to the legation (The Hague), June 22, 1914, SDR 511.4AI/48o; Van Dyke to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1914, SDR 511.4A1/148r. Also RG 43, E 43.

112. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Third International Opium Conference, pp. io—ri.

113./bid., pp. 11-12.

114. Van Dyke to the Secretary of State, Feb. ii, 1915, SDR 511.4Ar/I5o2.

115 Van Dyke to the Secretary of State, Sept. 28, 1915, SDR 511.4A1/1514.

116. 247 U.S. 289 (1926) .   

117.lbid.

118. The following memoranda cover the discussion of the question in the State Department: Conversation between Caldwell and Tennyson, May 14, 1929; Caldwell to the Solicitor, May 16, 1929; Caldwell to Dr. McClure, Treaty Division, May zo, 1929; Treaty Division memorandum, May zo, 1929; Caldwell to the Solicitor, May 23, 1929, SDR 511.4A1/2118. The Solicitor to Caldwell, June 18, 1929; Caldwell to Johnson, June 19, 1929, SDR 511.4Ar/2117. Caldwell to Johnson, June 24, 1929, SDR 5 r .4A1/21 9. Caldwell to Porter, July 5, 1929, SDR 5 r 1.4A1/2 r 19a.

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