7. 2 The first governmental reaction

In a letter to the second chamber dated July 1972, the government
explicitly expressed its satisfaction about the fact that the
recommendations from the Baan Committee were unanimous. This is
understandable because it showed that the conflicting views between
departments (which were represented in the committee) were solved or
at least a compromise was reached. The government also stated that it
shared the analysis by the committee.
The (confessional/liberal) government underlined the goal for a drug
policy as formulated by the committee and especially the phrase:
"making a contribution to the prevention of the use of drugs as part of
total welfare". After all, by the expression "making a contribution" it
was stipulated that the primary responsibility lies elsewhere than in the
government:

The first matter of importance is everybody's own responsibility to take care of his
own welfare and of those that are consigned to his care. Next to this, social
organisations fulfil an important role in this branch of welfare care. The formulation
also alerts against isolation of the drug issue, against selective attention to this
phenomenon (Memorandum 11 742, no. 2: 2).

The primary goal for the drug policy was to prevent the use of drugs.
The government agreed with the committee that priority should be
given to drugs with an unacceptable risk (Ibid. 2).


Control

In a discussion of how legislation could contribute to the drug policy,
the committee proposed priorities for action based on the assessment of
risks:

1 Trade in drugs that, according to the committee, produce an unacceptable risk.
2 Use of drugs that, according to the committee, produce an unacceptable risk.
3 Trade in and use of cannabis (products) (Ibid. 67).

Current drug legislation concerning cannabis neglected the fact that the
risk of cannabis for the individual could not be equated with substances
that also cause strong pharmacological effects in a normal dosage.
Consequently, drug legislation has lost prestige and information
referring to the law had little credibility. The committee described the
situation as unsatisfactory and explored some alternatives (Ibid. 67).
The first option was to regard use, possession for personal use and
retail trade in cannabis a misdemeanour. Wholesale trade (250 g or
more) would remain a criminal act with a maximum penalty of one
year's imprisonment. The advantages of such regulation would be
numerous. The differences between risks would be expressed in law
and prevent the drug that is less effective from being the first to be
wholly pushed out of the market. The committee referred to previous
occasions when a switch to hard drugs was noticed due to reduced
supply of cannabis on the illegal market (Ibid. 70).
Another possible alternative was to refrain from penalising use and
possession of cannabis for personal use at all and making all trade a
misdemeanour. Especially in the case of cannabis, use and trade were
intertwined. Big dealers were few and cannabis entered the country by
many hands and was distributed along smaller channels. Many users
were involved in this process and it was not certain that this type of
supply could be suppressed to such an extent that any preventive effect
could be expected (Ibid. 71).
The great advantage of both alternatives would be a loosening up of
the drug subculture. Under current conditions, being part of using peer
groups was the most important condition for regular hard use of
cannabis. This could also lead to making friends who used opium,
amphetamines or LSD, meeting dealers, and that entailed the risk of
finally using such drugs. Without contacts with hard drug users, these
substances could hardly be obtained (Ibid. 72).
The committee also discussed some disadvantages. More people
would use cannabis, and even if a substantial percentage stopped after a
short period of experimenting, the absolute number of people that
encounter serious trouble would increase. Unforeseeable risks would
occur due to rapid dissemination in all strata of the population. Use of
cannabis was not yet sufficiently ritualised and normalised. Norms
could not be given either, due to the many uncertainties concerning the
extent and duration of the impact of cannabis on performance (Ibid. 73).
The committee emphasised that sites where cannabis could be
"officially" used (cannabis cafés) should be prohibited. However, a few
months after the release of the committee's report the first coffee shop
(unofficially) opened in Amsterdam (van Es 1997).
The committee stated that its ideas were theories that should be
subjected to experiments. After an experimental period (about 3½
years) of the risks emanating from the control system, it should be
evaluated before deciding on a drug policy. A "drug advice committee"
(DAC) in all court districts would advise prosecutors and collect
information needed to evaluate the experiment (Ibid. 77). The
experimental period can be understand as a classic strategy in Dutch
politics to avoid a yes/no decision, as described by Andeweg and Irwin
(1993: 36). The balance between minority groups is very sensitive to
zero-sum games, yes/no decisions. The first step in avoiding zero-sum
decisions is the decentralisation of policymaking, not to local
authorities, but to the corporate minorities. If this cannot be achieved,
non-decision making often seems less harmful than forcing a solution.
This can be done in several ways: postponement of the decision,
defusing the political dispute by technical arguments (depolitisation) or
removal of the responsibility from the government. These three are
often used in combination (Ibid. 38). The government supported the
idea of establishing DACs but added that other professions should
participate as well to avoid a distorted picture of the situation (11 742,
6).
The government announced that it intended to make use and
possession for personal use of cannabis a misdemeanour in the new
Opium Act. In this way, the undesirability of its use remained
underlined. There were too many uncertainties to justify a legalisation
of use and possession of cannabis. It was true that the harm for the
individual was disputable but the fact that cannabis primarily occurred
among young people did call for precaution. Cannabis was dangerous
for the individual and society when used at work or in traffic. Besides
these considerations, the Netherlands was not an isolated territory and it
was important to avoid Dutch drug policy interfering with the combat
against drugs in neighbouring countries (Ibid.4).


Assistance

The committee had proposed a network of assistance facilities58 for
youngsters in every region:

a first-echelon assistance in crisis situations. Mainly ambulatory and provided by
general and categorised, medical and non-medical (alternative) facilities.
b second-echelon assistance for supervision and treatment. Mainly ambulatory and
provided by general and categorised, medical and non-medical (alternative)
facilities.
c third-echelon assistance for intensive treatment. Intramural assistance by general
and categorised, sometimes non-medical facilities (Ibid. 84).

Establishing specialised (categorised) assistance services was justified
only if such facilities conveyed assistance that could not be provided by
existing assistance services and was indispensable for the category
concerned. The term "alternative" facilities referred to the assistance
organisations that had been established during the sixties as a
counterweight to traditional assistance institutions.
The committee identified some bottlenecks in the assistance system.
A "very big" problem concerning assistance to drug addicts was
constituted by the fact that many showed no or very little willingness to
seek and accept assistance. Assistance that sits and waits for this kind of
clients to show up will not reach them and the establishment of
assistance centres with a social work model was to be considered. More
active "case-finding" could hardly be done by established curative
facilities. When it comes to mobility and mentality, alternative
assistance like Youth Advice Centres (JAC), Release, and Social Units
would be more capable. A second problem was that many facilities
showed an aversion to a motivation imposed by a conditional sentence
to persuade addicts to enter treatment. However, this instrument would
be meaningless if assistance agencies did not co-operate with the courts
(Ibid. 83).
The Baan Committee also discussed the issue of compulsory care.
Concerning young drug users, coercion was possible according to the
law on child welfare. However, the committee noticed a lack of juvenile
institutions possessing the competence to take care of addicted youth.
Applying the law on child welfare without such institutions would be an
empty gesture. As far as the committee knew, addiction had never been
used as the sole criterion for intervention. For adult addicts who
constitute a danger to themselves or others, a compulsory admission
according to the Insanity Act was possible. However, the committee
referred to the fact that it was hard to find a place for severely
behaviourally disturbed clients in psychiatric hospitals, and establishing
special drug clinics had to be considered in case of admission according
to the Insanity Act (Ibid. 83).
According to the government, the policy as worked out by CRM was
to be continued, and especially the establishing of Youth Advice
Centres (JAC) was crucial as a contemporary kind of assistance. Also
important were facilities like street-corner work to assist homeless
youth living in urbanised anonymity and street groups that developed a
lifestyle of their own. Also experimental job centres for young people,
who had developed their own attitude to labour and performance, were
needed. The mosaic of facilities as proposed by the Baan Committee
could only be developed in close co-operation between NGOs and
municipal authorities. It also presupposed good co-operation between
different disciplines because specific preventive and curative aspects
were intertwined (Ibid. 6).
While the Baan Committee refrained from making any
recommendation concerning the goal of assistance, the government was
somewhat more specific. It had become obvious that assistance to
addicts (different from experimental or incidental use) could only be
successful if sufficient attention were paid to combating dependency.
However, a lack of experts, proven treatment methods and facilities was
noticed. For the category of deprived, criminal and socially isolated
(approximately 1000 persons) living and work experiments should be
developed. Some would be helped by admission to small communities
(under expert supervision) whether or not located outside urbanised
areas and others by foster families (Ibid. 7).


Information

According to the government (and the Baan Committee), the drug issue
should not be addressed in an isolated way. Excessive selective
attention to drug use as harmful behaviour could create imbalance with
other forms of risky lifestyles. Therefore, information and education
concerning drugs should be part of a package of health information and
education in the school curriculum (Ibid. 5). The organisation and co-
ordination of information was a responsibility of municipal health care
or the school system, as well as agencies financed by the government
like the Federation of Agencies for Alcoholics (FZA) (Ibid. 6).


International level

The committee had pointed out that some options (licence
system/total decriminalisation of possession) could not be realised
within the provisions of the Single Convention. In theory a cancellation
of the Single Convention could be a solution but was ruled out by the
committee. Such a step could lead to an embargo on opium from the
other parties as stated in the Single Convention. Instead, a change of
provisions on cannabis to enable states to make a reservation in cases of
limited trade in and production of, use, and possession of cannabis
should be aimed for (Ibid. 73). The government was sceptical to this
recommendation. To be successful, such an initiative required support
from important countries, and furthermore it remained to be seen
whether developments in the national situation could form the basis for
such a change (Ibid. 9).


Another government

A few weeks after the governmental letter on drug policy in July 1972
the cabinet went out of office and the parliamentary procedure on the
drug policy was postponed. After new elections in November 1972 and
a long process of formation (163 days), a new cabinet dominated by the
Social Democratic Party started its work in May 1973.59
Quite soon after the new government had taken office, the standing
committee on drug policy sent a letter calling for a new governmental
position on drug policy (Letter from the chairman E. Veder-Smit to the
government, 19 September 1973). According to the committee, there
was no time to lose. The drug situation had deteriorated. Trade in
cannabis and use of heroin had increased heavily.

Deliberations between departments to prepare a new governmental
position on a drug policy took place in another setting. The Baan
Committee had recommended that departments involved in drug policy
issues had to co-ordinate their policymaking. Instead of provisional
talks between departments on single subjects, a permanent steering
group was necessary (11 742, no. 2: 5). The government had adopted
this recommendation in 1972 and officials started to elaborate the
structure and composition of the steering group. Members of this
Interdepartmental Steering Group on Drug Policy (ISD) were high-
ranking officials from the Departments of Justice, Health, CRM, and
Foreign Affairs. The inclusion of the latter shows the importance of the
international context. Other departments could denominate
correspondents that could be contacted by the ISD when needed. Due to
the responsibility of the Department of Health for co-ordinating the
drug policy both the chairman and secretary would be officials from the
department. The ISD was to prepare a drug policy on both the national
and international level and advise (called and uncalled) the government.
If needed the ISD could appoint sub-working groups to study special
conditions or problems.
As for opinions on cannabis, a new situation had emerged within the
government. Both the Minister of Health and the under-secretary of
state for CRM had publicly stated that use, possession, and trade of
cannabis should be lifted out of penal law. This was far too radical for
the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs because they foresaw
international complications. Therefore, officials had to work out a
compromise between departments. In the meantime, another
development had taken the authorities by surprise.


Heroin

Heroin was introduced into Amsterdam on a large scale in the summer
of 1972. Ironically, a few months before the introduction, the Baan
Committee had concluded that "hard drugs" were still a minor part of
total drug use, which could point to a process of consolidation (Baan
Committee 1972: 34).
The sudden appearance of heroin on the drug market can be
explained by several factors. The apparently orchestrated introduction
of heroin into the Netherlands can be ascribed to developments in
international politics. When the Vietnam War was over and American
soldiers moved out, Hong Kong triads lost an important market.60 New
markets had to be explored and the choice of the Netherlands and in
particular Amsterdam as a new distribution centre for heroin was only
logical (McCoy 1972; Booth 1990; van de Wijngaart 1991). The
infrastructure for the supply of opiates to the Netherlands already
existed due to the presence of large Chinese communities in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The habit of smoking opium had been
common in these communities since the beginning of the century.
However, authorities did not prosecute users as long as smoking opium
was confined to the Chinese population. Secondly, the position of the
Netherlands as a central distribution point for world trade strongly
facilitated the illegal supply of drugs.
The dissemination of heroin went very fast, and in 1973, the number
of heroine addicts in Amsterdam was estimated at 1500 (de Kort, 1995),
reaching 5000­7000 in 1976 (TK 26 February 1976: 3016).
The new government responded relatively quickly. On 4 January
1974, the Minister of Health sent a memorandum (co-signed by her
colleagues in Justice and CRM) to the chairman of the Lower House.61
Due to the current developments around heroin, the focus of drug
policy would be on trade in drugs with an unacceptable risk and on a
separation of markets for drugs with unacceptable risks and cannabis
products. To chronic users of drugs with an unacceptable risk there
should be a search for other possibilities to get addicts into assistance
than by criminal law (Memorandum 11 742, no. 3: 3).
As regards cannabis products, the government held the view that the
possession for personal use and use of cannabis products should be
lifted out of criminal law. However, this was impossible at that moment
because it would bring the Netherlands into conflict with its obligations
to the Single Convention. The government announced its intention to
discuss in international contacts a change of the Single Convention that
enabled countries to develop a policy on cannabis that was adjusted to
the country's situation. In the meantime, the penal status of use and
possession of cannabis for personal use should be changed from a
criminal offence to a misdemeanour, which would not be against
international obligations. In everyday practice, this distinction already
existed. The government's conclusion was that the differences in harm
should also be expressed in the Opium Act.

After this governmental position the standing committee could
proceed. In a public hearing in March 1974, organised by the Special
Committee for Drug Policy, about thirty organisations and agencies
were invited to express their opinion on drug policy issues (11 742, no.
4). Most organisations were in favour of a decriminalisation of use of
and trade in cannabis. Some also predicted that intensified prosecution
of trade in drugs with an unacceptable risk would have serious
consequences; professionalisation of trafficking, higher prices,
increased drug-related criminality, isolation of the user. Some
advocated controlled prescription of substitute drugs as the only way to
take the wind out of the sails of the illegal trade in drugs.
After the hearing and interviews with experts, the parties in the
special committee declared their view on the government's
memorandum in May 1974 and asked for a number of clarifications (11
742, no. 7). After one year, 20 May 1975, the government responded
(11 742, no. 8). On the same day, a bill for a new Opium Act (13 407)
was put before the Lower House. The government justified this unusual
step by the argument that discussing the bill separately would mean a
further delay.


Basic ideas

In the memorandum on drug policy, the basic ideas for a drug policy
were outlined. The government held the view that there was no reason
to presume that all use of a substance by itself carries unacceptable
risks for society. Very few would reject a positive appreciation of
moderate use of alcohol but a majority would condemn drunkenness.
The same goes for heroin, carrying unacceptable risks when used for
pleasure but useful as a powerful painkiller. The leading question
should be: what forms of use are socially unacceptable due to their risks
for society and in what way can risks for the individual and community
be prevented and relieved? (11 742, no. 8: 4).
The central goal for the drug policy would be the prevention and
relief of social and individual risks emanating from drug use (Ibid. 5).
This goal was in accordance with the Baan Committee, namely, that
reactions from society ought to be based on an assessment of risks. The
nature and scope of actions would stand in reasonable relation to the
magnitude of the risks and the circumstances in which drug use occurs.
The government also discussed the mandate of the state to interfere
in private matters. Its basic position was that every citizen is
responsible for preserving and improving his own welfare and that of
the people who are entrusted to him. However, the primacy of personal
responsibility could not be put absolutely: "Situations do exist in which
the individual user is unable to survey the possible consequences of his
use. To take special precautions, aimed at protecting vulnerable groups
is justified" (Ibid. 4).
What the government was discussing here is a theme that will recur
many times in analysis of Dutch documents, the role of the state and its
ability and right to shape society:

The degree to which a policy according to the aim elaborated above will be
effective also depends on factors that cannot in essence or to any great extent be
influenced by the undersigned. This means the structure and maintenance of codes
for social behaviour in our society, the individual motivation of those who will staff
the assistance apparatus, international aspects, and the growth from a welfare
economy to an economy of well-being and other important social developments. All
these and other factors could influence policy now and later; adjustments and shifts
of the main points will be inevitable (Ibid. 5).

The government rejected the proposal of the Baan Committee to
establish a drug advice committee (DAC) in every court district to co-
ordinate and evaluate an experimental period prior to a revision of the
Opium Act.62 The central position of the local prosecutor in the DACs
was criticised by many assistance organisations and politicians because
it placed the control system in the centre of the drug policy. This was
against the spirit of the new bill that, on the contrary, aimed to play
down the role of justice. The government expected that the practice and
evaluation of assistance and specific research could produce further
knowledge about the separate risk factors (Ibid. 4). Co-ordination of
local drug policies could be achieved by a tripartite deliberation in
which the local chief prosecutor, the chief of police and Lord Mayor
discussed drug policy matters.
Another change concerns the image of the user. The government
pointed out that the population of drug users should be regarded as a
continuum in which the objective need for assistance varies from
marginal to very large. In this bill, most attention was paid to assistance
of what the government called "the problematic drug user". The
concept of "problematic" was defined by the government as drug use
that brings about substantial harm (physical, psychological or social) to
the user. This way of using substances often emanates from personal
frustrations and problem situations. In many cases, the drug user is
besides a delinquent or patient also a victim of a social condition (Ibid.
41).


Control by penal law

The concept of risks also permeated the bill for a revised Opium Act.
The judgement that cannabis carried fewer risks than other drugs now
seemed to be an established fact. A distinction between drugs with an
unacceptable risk and other drugs was laid down in two schedules. The
basic feature of the law is that four kinds of criminal acts are prohibited:

a. possession of drugs;
b. import and export of drugs to and from the Netherlands (international
trade);
c. sale, treatment, processing, delivery, supply or transport (within the
national borders);
d. manufacture of drugs.
The controversial provision was that penalties would differ depending
or whether they belong to schedule II or I.63

For drugs in schedule I the penalties were as follows:

a. Possession can be punished by a maximum of four years'
imprisonment and a maximum fine of fl. 50,000
b. A maximum of twelve years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of
fl. 250,000.64
c. A maximum of eight years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of fl.
100,000.
d. A maximum of eight years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of fl.
100,000.
If a, b or c concern minor quantities for personal use the maximum is
set at one year's imprisonment or fl. 20,000.

For drugs in schedule II (cannabis):

a. Possession can be punished by a maximum of two years
imprisonment and a maximum fine of fl. 20,000. The possession of
cannabis up to 30 grams was to be reduced from a serious to a minor
offence, carrying a maximum sentence of one months' imprisonment or
a fine of fl. 500.
b. A maximum of four years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of fl.
50,000.
c. A maximum of two years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of fl.
20,000.
d. A maximum of two years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of fl.
20,000.

This is the (in)famous distinction between hard and soft drugs, not only
in the guidelines or local practices but also in the legislation. We may
also note that use of drugs was lifted out of the Opium Act. Possession
of cannabis up to 30 grams remained criminalised but as a
misdemeanour. However, guidelines from the Chief Prosecutor, which
set local investigation and prosecution policy, would proclaim low
priority for possession of cannabis in such quantities. In this way, a
Dutch policy on drugs could be created without violating the provisions
of the Single Convention that stipulated that possession would be
criminalised but not how the law should be applied.
Possession of drugs with an unacceptable risk remained a criminal
offence for two reasons. Chronic drug users could be brought into
contact with treatment. Secondly, it might have a deterrent effect on
potential users.
Another section (3b) became part of the new Drug Act on the
initiative of the parliament, "It is prohibited to disseminate information
clearly intended to promote the sale, delivery or supply of a drug
referred to in schedules I and II." The inclusion of this section can be
credited to the radio programme "Beursberichten" by Koos Zwart,
which for many years had irritated opponents of the course Dutch drug
policy was taking. It provided a legal basis to act against such radio and
television programmes. However, since this section had not been
incorporated in the initial proposal of the Government bill, it does not
include explanatory notes, nor is it commented on in the guidelines for
the prosecution and criminal investigation (Anjewierden and Atteveld
1989: 239­240).
Also noteworthy is the distinction between cross-border trade and
domestic trade, which was due to the precaution of not interfering in the
drug policy in neighbouring countries. The distinction between trade in
cannabis and trade in other drugs was due to uncertainty among
scientists about the risks of cannabis for the user. The government made
it clear that absolute priority should be given to cross-border trade in
drugs with an unacceptable risk, in particular heroin. Furthermore, the
police had to be reinforced, and a national focal point for intelligence
service established. Co-operation with foreign services should be
stimulated (Ibid. 17).
The drastic increase of the maximum penalty from 4 to 12 years'
imprisonment can be explained by several reasons. First, hard drugs
were considered a very serious problem. Second, it could increase the
chances of having the provisions on cannabis approved by opponents in
the parliament. Thirdly, it could mitigate criticism from abroad.


Assistance

The Baan Committee recommended comprehensive regional assistance
networks for youth. However, the establishment of these networks was
left to the social organisations and local authorities. The ISD had
conducted an inventory of assistance facilities for drug users and
identified several problems. A varied supply of assistance facilities had
only been established in the western part of the country. In the field of
co-ordination and co-operation between actors at the local level very
little had been achieved (Amsterdam excluded). The increase in the
magnitude and dissemination of drug use was not equalled by the
development of assistance. The funding of assistance was cluttered
(ISD 1974). The government also signalled the issue of different
financial sources for assistance. Intramural assistance was financed by a
special health insurance. CRM financed street-corner work and youth
advice centres under the Social Security Act 65, the CADs by Justice and
Health together and social rehabilitation by the Act on Social Workfare.
Complaints about this non-transparent system were made by assistance
agencies but also by MPs who found it difficult to control governmental
expenditure in this field. This situation was perceived as unsatisfactory
but the government wanted to wait for the outcome of an ongoing
discussion of a total overhaul of the social security system.
Furthermore, a working group within the ISD would be established to
co-ordinate a governmental funding policy (11 742, no. 8: 50).
According to the government a differentiation needed to be made
between non-specific and specific assistance. However, at the same
time, this difference should not be too sharp because that would
obstruct the integration between them that the government aimed for
(Ibid. 49). The government ascribed non-specific alternative (JAC,
streetcorner work) assistance an important role in contact with drug
users and locating high-risk groups. Non-specific assistance should be
aimed at youth with a diversity of problems, wishes and needs.
Multifaceted assistance of this kind could be an entrance to specific
assistance facilities.
Treatment-oriented (traditional) specific assistance should aim for
treatment of physical and psychological dependence on drugs. A social-
medical and structured programme was required that enabled the addict
to free himself from his addictive behaviour and to develop social skills
(Ibid. 48). The government emphasised that parallel to improving the
physical condition of the addict a start had to be made in teaching new
behavioural patterns such as discipline and establishing relations.
Otherwise, as practice had taught, the goal of the therapy would not be
achieved:

A key problem is the condition that drug dependence, if not brought under control,
causes such alienation and social isolation among those concerned that they no
longer are accessible to an approach aiming for reintegration in society. Besides, the
poor physical condition of many addicts is a source of concern (Ibid. 48).

This statement from the government illustrates that a new category of
drug users had entered the scene. The gloomy perspective as depicted
by Gadourek had come true, although not concerning cannabis users,
who were not mentioned at all in relation to assistance, but heroin users.
The CADs had since long held a prominent position in assistance to
substance abusers and were allocated a central role in the structured
therapeutic programmes.66 The CADs worked in close co-operation
with Justice. Besides probation assignments, CADs could also be asked
by the prosecutor to collect information on the situation of a suspect,
and as the government pointed out, the assignment from Justice was
indispensable as an important instrument to decide whether to prosecute
or mete out a sentence (Ibid. 56).

The unmotivated

Drug addicts who did not seek assistance constituted a serious problem.
In the philosophy of the government, motivation for treatment is not a
static phenomenon but a state of mind that can fluctuate in motivated as
well as in unmotivated drug users. However, the undermining of
willpower associated with chemical drug use hinders assistance:

The patient has landed in a vicious circle: a weakening or loss of motivation, escape
to drug use causing a further weakening of the will. Therefore, there is reason to
assume that lack of motivation originates in substantial inner lack of freedom rather
than a conscious choice (Ibid. 55).

For this reason, the government held the view that an attitude of
aloofness to this category would be misplaced. This position was also
reflected in the bill for a revised Opium Act. Possession of small
quantities of drugs with an unacceptable risk (opiates, amphetamines,
LSD etc.) would remain a criminal offence. Compulsory care according
to the Insanity Act was seldom used due to hesitation from
psychiatrists. Another reason was that for patients of this kind no
appropriate wards could be found. According to the government, the
only juridical instrument to persuade drug addicts to enter treatment
was a conditional dismissal of prosecution or conditional conviction.
However, this could only be an additional instrument. The bulk of the
motivational work had to be done by assistance, especially by street-
corner work (Ibid. 56). The establishment of facilities that could take
care of juvenile addicts against their will as proposed by the Baan
Committee was still under investigation.


Methadone

Concerning demands for the prescription of substitute substances
(methadone, heroin) the conclusion was drawn that this in the first place
was intended to improve public order and safety, not as a measure of
assistance. The government rejected this goal. Experiences in the
Netherlands East Indies with a state monopoly on opium (1894­1944)
had failed to offer a solution for opium addiction.67 It also mentioned
(negative) experiences with the prescription of drugs to addicts in Great
Britain. The methadone programme developed by Dole and Nyswander
in the US was discussed as well. A serious drawback of this programme
is the additional uncontrolled use of other drugs that can cause fatal
intoxication. Besides, the state of addiction was not cured and
continuous supervision of the addict remained necessary. In addition,
the perception of the addict as a patient and not primarily a
manifestation of indecent or nuisance-causing behaviour had prevailed
for some decades and should be maintained (Ibid. 53). In other words,
using methadone and other substitute drugs would aim at improving the
condition of the patient, not at protecting society.
CADs, GPs, and psychiatrists had practised methadone maintenance
in the Netherlands since 1969. An inspection of pharmacies had shown
that the frequency and quantities of substitute drugs prescribed by GPs,
especially to foreigners, was increasing. The fact that in these cases a
coherent (integral) approach was not guaranteed was regarded as
worrying. The same problem as in Great Britain with medically
prescribed methadone leaking to the black market was feared.
Obviously, the government took a negative position concerning
methadone. In the long run, methadone would bring about
psychological and physiological symptoms and abstinence should
remain a therapeutic goal for the majority of addicts (Ibid. 54). The
government outlined a clear goal for the prescription of methadone. An
integral approach of assistance in a structured milieu should be the
guiding principle. Therefore, it used the term "programme" in relation
to methadone when an article in the new Opium Act (art. 6) was
included that allowed qualified persons within agencies appointed by
the government to possess substances named in schedule I for the
treatment of addicts (13 407, no. 3: 14).
For substitute programmes, the aim should be "to guarantee the
security of the addict and simultaneously a gradually ending or
stabilising use and a social re-integration" (11 742, no. 8: 55). It is
noteworthy that the government spoke of the "majority of addicts" and
"stabilising use", which indicates that for at least some addicts other
goals were also legitimate.


Prevention

While the government in 1972 was in doubt as to whether it should be
involved at all in information about drugs, the new government was
more detailed and determined. A central theme was that information
could play a role in the prevention of problematic drug use but its
importance should not be overestimated (a weak means). A serious
problem, according to the government, was selective attention to drugs
in relation to other social problems. It was understandable that the
media focused on illegal drugs because of the cultural unfamiliarity
with drug use, the frequent combination with deviant behaviour
(clothing, other values and standards), and the illegality of use (Ibid.
37). However, selective attention should be counteracted for a number
of reasons:

· the phenomenon of selective information is not harmless, for some
drug users it can become a social expectation that can turn into a
stimulant;
· selective attention and especially the sensational and deterrent
aspects can thwart balanced and rational information;
· selectivity can also cause a relative neglect of information about
other psychotropic substances and tobacco.

Governmental involvement in information would be limited to funding
such activities. However, organisations that provided isolated
information or just scary messages about drugs should be disqualified
for governmental subsidy (Ibid. 38). Selective information would be
appropriate only to special target groups such as experimental or
problematic drug users. This would be a task for non-specific
organisations like JAC and street-corner work and specific agencies
such as CADs (Ibid. 39).
Information to the public should include all risky substances
(alcohol, tobacco) and medical drugs. The government was aware of the
discrepancy between the discouragement of use of illegal drugs and the
frequent encouragement of social drugs (alcohol, medical drugs, and
tobacco) but lacked the power to influence this inconsistency.
The government also made it clear that a governmental policy on
information would not be a guarantee for co-ordinated information, free
from contradicting elements. Information about a controversial issue
like the drug problem would always contain the hallmark of the sender:

Given the fact that on one hand, there are divergent views on this issue and on the
other hand, that the Netherlands ­ fortunately ­ has large freedom for the media,
education and the like, this diversity will always be a fact (Ibid. 38).

Information was just one possible way to prevent drug problems.
Concerning the possibilities to remove the deeper causes of
"problematic" drug use, the government was aware of the vagueness of
the term "problematic": "The definition of a social problem is a very
subjective matter, attached to norms. For example, something can be
experienced as problematic just because it is unusual in a particular
situation" (Ibid. 40).
However, some bottlenecks were mentioned that called for an active
policy:

· unemployment among youth;
· limited prospects for education and further development;
· negative social-cultural conditions in the immediate environment.

A duty for the state would be to create the necessary conditions to
enable youth to contribute to the modelling of society in its own way.
This is especially valid for youth in disadvantaged positions (Ibid. 41­
42).
Foreign experiences (and pressure) played a very important role in
discussions. The special standing committee on drug policy invited
experts from abroad. One of these was Dr L. Dupont, director of the
White House Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.
According to him a difference between users and dealers should be
made but making a difference between hard and soft drugs was difficult
to accept. Dupont stated that it would be tricky for the Netherlands to
create a balance between its traditional respect for individual liberties
and legislation that would not make the country a transit centre for
drugs. Due to its position as a cloverleaf in international traffic, the
country would not be suitable for such experiments (11 742, no. 10).
The bill was followed by the final remarks from the standing
committee on drug policy (11 742, no. 9). The last response from the
government came in January 1976 and a date for plenary discussions
was set at the end of February 1976 (11 742, no. 11). Two weeks before
the plenary meeting a delegation of MPs, led by the chairman of the
standing committee on drugs, set off for Sweden. The goal for the
mission was twofold: firstly to gain insight into the practice of drug
policy in Sweden and secondly to collect information on the Swedish
reaction to the ideas and proposals from the Dutch government (11 742,
no. 12). According to de Kort (1995: 245), the trip was a last attempt to
convince hesitating MPs to reject the government's proposals. The
delegation met the Swedish Ministers of Health and Justice, the
chairman of the standing committee on Justice, the National Police
Board, and correctional treatment that visited an institution for young
drug abusers. The role of Amsterdam in international drug trafficking
was frequently addressed by the Swedes. Several speakers also warned
that decriminalising small-scale trade in cannabis would make the
country and especially Amsterdam a magnet for drug-using youth (Ibid.
4). Concerning the problematic drugs in Sweden, the delegation quoted
Minster Aspling, who stated that cannabis was not the biggest problem
and possession for personal use was usually not prosecuted (Ibid. 2).

Six days

In Dutch politics it is not unusual that parliamentary discussions about a
controversial question take a long time, especially when a law bill is
discussed.68 Altogether it took eight years from the day the committee
started its work to the approval by the Lower House and the Upper
House. Even by Dutch standards, this was a long period. However, as
the Minister of Health stated in the Lower House:

Hereby an end can be made to a situation that, according to some, took too long,
causing a lack of clarity about the intentions of the government, but to others indeed
a considerable length of time was needed in order to grow to realistic and rational
points of view (TK 26 February 1976: 3088).

Another reason for the long duration was the changing of cabinets in
1971, 1972, and 1973. Finally, on 26 February 1976, the chairman of
the Lower House was able to open the meeting on memorandum 11
742: "Backgrounds and Risks of Drug Use" and bill 13 407: "Changes
to the Opium Act". It took six days to finish the plenary discussion,
partly due to the fact that the bill and the memorandum were discussed
simultaneously.69 Another reason could be that it was a free issue. In the
Dutch context, this means that the coalition partners had made no
agreements on a drug policy and the factions were free to vote. This
also meant that the outcome of the discussions was hard to predict, and
the government could not be sure that MPs belonging to the coalition
parties would support the bill and the memorandum. The long duration
of the plenary sittings also reflects that opinions were divided, and
many motions had to be handled by the ministers and voted on.
The outcome of these plenary discussions was a compromise. Many
MPs from left-wing parties wanted to go further than the government.
Trade in cannabis should be legalised and likewise possession of hard
drugs for personal use. Several confessional and liberal MPs opposed
any distinction between soft and hard drugs. They accused the
government of excluding scientific facts that have proved cannabis-
related harm. These MPs also disputed the rejection of the "stepping
stone" theory. Some MPs accused the government of permitting drugs.
The Minister of Health replied: "The standpoint in this question is that
we have to accept drug use as a fact and our policy must be aimed at the
risks" (TK 26 February 1976: 3099). This statement referred to the
limited possibilities of the central state to influence social
developments. The Minister of Justice also expressed this line of
reasoning. At the time politicians and officials were discussing a drug
policy, local law and order authorities had already implemented a lower
priority for prosecuting cannabis offences according to the guidelines of
the general prosecutor since 1969. This was reason for the minister to
state during the plenary meeting that the policy developed in practice
was sealed by the revised Opium Act (Ibid. 3117).
Many left-wing MPs pleaded for a regulation for compulsory care in
a non-penal setting, mainly because of the effect of stigmatisation of
penal law. The Minister of Justice (also professor of law) warned
against the illusion that it would be possible to create, in a trice, a
regulation of compulsory treatment that was acceptable from the
perspective of legal rights. He also stated that compulsory treatment
was nobody's first choice, voluntary treatment prevailed, but
compulsory care would sometimes be better than no treatment at all
(TK 3 March 1976: 3173). However, there was broad agreement among
all MPs on the view of addicts as patients. They were "poor souls".
There was no disagreement on the importance of an extensive
assistance system. However, the government was criticised for not
taking a leading role in building a coherent system and securing co-
ordination. The reply from the under-secretary of state for CRM,
Meijer, was very clear:

The government does play a role in creating conditions for the development of
assistance but this should not be overestimated. These economic and structural
conditions will not be sufficient if the relief worker in practice and on private
initiative do not succeed in developing those models and methods which lead to
effective assistance (Ibid. 3121).

The government declared assistance a matter of highest priority and
through the ISD, departmental co-ordination could be achieved.
The item of information was not among the most controversial.
Information on drugs would be integrated in the total package of health
education. On the character of information Minister Vorrink said:
"Information, if worth the name, cannot be other than neutral, impartial
education. Subsequently it is up to those concerned to decide what
consequences they want to relate to that education" (Ibid. 3092).
Concerning international reactions, the government concluded: the
intentions as stated in the memorandum from 1974 have been met with
mixed emotions by other European governments (11 742, no. 8: 75).70
The UN control body INCB had criticised the Dutch policy proposals in
its reports from 1974 and 1975. Reactions had been positive concerning
the plans to sharpen the actions against drugs with an unacceptable risk
but negative about the plans for cannabis. According to the Dutch
government, the anxiety abroad was due to the inaccurate or one-sided
information. The government aimed to adjust this information, and in
February 1975 a memorandum on the Dutch drug policy was approved
that was to be distributed to all diplomatic representations (149731 DG
Vgz/GMB).
This interpretation by the government of these critical reactions from
other countries can be considered quite naive. However, it should be
remembered that committees in countries like the UK, the US and
Canada had reached roughly the same conclusion about a policy on
cannabis as the Baan Committee. The government referred, for
example, to the US state of Oregon, where possession of a small
amount of cannabis was made an administrative offence. Five other
states had made possession of small amounts of cannabis a
misdemeanour and six more were expected to follow suit. Also
concerning the limit of 30s gram as proposed in the Opium Act bill,
reference was made to the limit of one ounce (28g) as applied in some
US states. Further, the recommendations made by the Shafer
Committee in the US made a strong argument for the government. The
Netherlands was not the only country to apply a different position for
cannabis. The Dutch government believed that international support for
a change of the Single Convention was possible but also that this would
take a long time. Until then, it would remain, as one MP put it: "like a
fishbone in our throat" (TK 2 March 1976: 3148). There was also
general concern about the consequences of the Dutch drug policies for
international relations. Especially from neighbouring countries like
Germany and Belgium, critical voices were heard. Sweden had
criticised the Netherlands since the beginning of the seventies. Many
MPs emphasised that the Netherlands was not an island and dependent
on other countries in obstructing trade in drugs with an unacceptable
risk. Minister Vorrink told the MPs that representatives from other
countries privately expressed understanding for the Dutch position. The
problem is that this understanding is not spoken publicly. However,
there was no alternative than to continue explaining the backgrounds
and motives for the Dutch policy (Ibid. 3090).

In the records of the plenary meeting, Sweden was mentioned
frequently. This was certainly due to the working visit made by a
delegation of the special committee for drug policy in February 1976.
Several confessional and liberal MPs held up Sweden as an example of
an alternative drug policy. Others, including the Minister of Health,
mentioned Sweden as an example to illustrate the failure of a repressive
drug policy.
On 4 March, the Lower House adopted the revised Opium Act and
accepted the memorandum. The Upper Chamber followed suit on 22
June. However, the Minister of Justice considered it necessary to send a
pressing letter to his confessional allies urging them to vote for the bill.
His argument was that if the bill would be rejected, the time-consuming
procedure would have to start again. In the mean time, the situation
regarding heroin would deteriorate (Blom 1998: 85).


58 The committee used the term assistance, not care or treatment.
59 After an election, the Queen appoints a "formateur", i.e. a person charged with
the formation of a new government. In Dutch politics, coalition governments are the
rule. This means that the coalition parties have to compromise on important issues
that are laid down in a government policy statement.
60 According to Dr Dupont, 43% of the American soldiers in Vietnam used heroin
in 1971 and 50% of these were addicted (11 742, no. 10: 3).
61 The Minister of Health, Vorrink, took charge of the drug policy issue, which was
unusual; this is normally a task for the under-secretary of state. It shows that she
had a special interest in the matter.
62 However, to collect information on the practice of prosecution and probation
DACs were to be established in three court districts (Ibid. 20).
63 Contrary to the general rule, offences under the Opium Act may carry both a
penalty of a fine and an unconditional term of imprisonment.
64 Offences that are punishable under the Opium Act are subject to the general
criminal law provision whereby the maximum penalty may be increased by one-
third when the offence has been committed more than once. The maximum penalty
would then be 16 years' imprisonment.
65 Formerly called the Consultation Bureaux for Alcoholics, the CBs.
66 The CADs reported an increase from 300 drug clients in 1969 to 3300 in 1973
(11742, no. 4).
67 This was one of the few occasions the government referred to Dutch experiences
with the regulation of use of opium in the Far East before World War II.
68 The average time for bill to be adopted by the Senate is 14 months (Andeweg and
Irwin 1993:143)
69 The record of the meetings fills 167 pages.
70 When discussing Swedish reactions to the Dutch drug policy, the term mixed
emotions is a clear understatement. The Swedes were furious.