6. 3 The government takes the lead

The Narkomanvård Committee's final report was expected in the course
of 1968 but was delayed and expected to be ready in 1969. The final
report contained further recommendations on the issues of care and
prevention based on a comprehensive analysis of the backgrounds of
drug abuse. At the end of 1968, the government decided not to wait for
the committee's final report, which usually is the most important. The
decision not to wait can be seen against the background of a quick
investigation of the actual state of the drug problem, pursued by the
government in December 1968. The overall conclusion was that the
situation had deteriorated and no further delay of actions was
acceptable. Another explanation for the perception of a deteriorating
situation may be the fact that the National Police Board (NPB) in
autumn 1968 in several press releases had presented alarming figures
on an increased number of arrested offenders against the Drug Act that
came into force on 1 April 1968 (Kassman 1998: 102). Furthermore, the
number of police officers directly involved in drug crimes was
increased substantially (from 76 to 117) and special drug prosecutors
were appointed in the big cities. It is also likely that results of Bejerot's
research at the house of detention, showing a steady increase of needle
marks among the arrested, contributed to the perception of an
emergency situation.43
On 27 December, the government launched a ten-point programme to
combat drug abuse. The programme contained the following measures:

1 Increased resources for the combat against drugs by police and customs.
2 Co-operation between police and customs and their foreign counterparts should be
extended.
3 Legal possibility for the police, after approval by the court, to tap telephone calls
to catch persons suspected of serious drug crime.
4 Increase of the maximum penalty for serious drug crimes to six years'
imprisonment
5 The National Board of Health and Welfare would gather representatives for big
cities, county courts and the National Association of Municipalities in spring 1969
to map and plan increased outreach activities and increased resources for
emergency psychiatric care and aftercare. In order to achieve results rapidly a
redistribution of existing and planned resources was considered.
6 Experiences showed that there was a certain hesitation concerning the possibilities
of providing compulsory care to severe drug abusers after the first acute
detoxification. An elucidation of the Act on Compulsory Psychiatric Care was
under consideration.
7 The government would invite all youth organisations in the country to a
conference in January to hear their opinion on how to best combat drug abuse
among youth.
8 Information and education activity would be strengthened. Special information
about the drug problem for children and youth and for parents with children of
school age as provided by the National Board of Education will be further
intensified. Institutes of higher education would be instructed to monitor
developments in the drug problem similar to primary and secondary education.
9 Sweden had been represented on the UN narcotic committee since January 1969
and would urge that Preludin, amphetamine, and related substances should be made
part of the 1961 Single Convention.

10 A special co-ordination body against drug abuse (SBN) would be established to
monitor developments in the field of drugs closely, to co-ordinate authority actions
and take initiatives for further actions.

The government was not alone when it decided to get tough on the
drug problem. The National Police Board (NPB) held a special position
in the development of Swedish drug policy. Police duties had
previously been a municipal matter but in 1965, the police organisation
was transformed into one single national authority. The role of this new
police organisation on a central level was to inspect, advise, and to co-
ordinate regional and local police activities. In some fields, though, the
NPB also had an operative task. One of these fields was trade in illegal
drugs (Kassman 1998: 49). The NPB would, as we will see, play an
important role in the definition of the drug problem and its solution,
throughout the entire period in this study.44
The Director-General of the NPB, National Police Commissioner
Carl Persson, called police commissioners from all over the country to a
meeting on 17 December at a hotel on the island of Gotland. There he
announced a nationwide concerted police attack on drug dealers (Svensk
polis no. 1, 1969).45 During the action all police units throughout the
country would give priority to drug offences. The manpower available
for combating drug crimes was raised from 117 in 1968 to 541 in 1969
(CAN 2000: table 75). During February 1969, the number was 750
(Kassman 1998: 67). However, the action was not only a matter for the
police and other authorities. Via the media, the National Police
Commissioner appealed to the public for assistance and to report
observations of illegal import, transport, and dealing with narcotics to
the police (NPB, memorandum 13 March 1969). In addition, indeed,
the number of reported drug crimes increased from 7,959 in 1968 to an
astonishing 43,946 in 1969 (CAN 2000: table 75). According to
Persson, the police received on average 150 tip-offs a day (Expressen
11 February 1969).
The "national murder investigation", as Persson had baptised the
action, was proclaimed to be a big success. However, some critical
newspaper articles suggested that the police had caught mainly small
dealers/addicts. At a meeting of the co-ordinating body (SBN) in
November later that year the Chief Prosecutor confirmed that only a
few big profiteers had been convicted, otherwise mainly small dealers
and people guilty of possession for personal use (SBN meeting, 19
November 1969). In addition, the number of drug seizures by the police
also indicated that the result was quite modest, from 1,958 in 1968 to
2,033 in 1969 (CAN 2000: table 70). The investigation was monitored
intensively by the press and it may be suspected that the main goal of
the action was to attract public attention. The picture of the national
murder investigation as a great success would be important for future
drug policy discussions. It proved that control measures could be
effective if they had top priority and were backed up by resources.


The great offensive

While the police offensive was proceeding, the government was
vigorous and efficient to realise its ten-point programme.
Point 3 of the programme, to tap telephones after approval by the
court, was realised in March 1969. The fact that tapping telephones was
a serious infringement of personal integrity was outweighed by the
benefits it could have in the struggle against the big dealers.
In the same month, the maximum penalty for serious drug offences
was raised to six years and the minimum penalty from six months to
one year's imprisonment, as announced in point 4. One reason was that
the same changes had been enforced in Norway and Denmark, and
Sweden would put itself in a vulnerable position by lower penalties
(Minutes of governmental meeting on social affairs, 10 January 1969).
In March 1969, the National Board of Health and Welfare sent out a
questionnaire to all municipalities with the aim of mapping resources in
assistance to drug abusers. Furthermore, regional conferences were
organised to promote speeding up care activities. In addition, a special
bureau for care of drug abusers (SN4) was established within the Board.
As announced in point 6, the Act on Compulsory Psychiatric Care
(LSPV) was altered in July 1969 and a special provision for drug abuse
was added to facilitate prolonged compulsory psychiatric care of drug
abusers.
According to point 7, on 10 February the government met over fifty
youth organisations to hear their ideas about the drug problem and how
they could participate in the battle against drugs. Five ministers
accompanied Prime Minister Erlander, a very heavy delegation indeed
that demonstrated the importance of the matter. Several organisations
criticised the governmental ten-point programme for its repressive
nature and pointed out that little attention was paid to the causes of the
problem, e.g. social conditions. The government was also criticised for
focusing on drugs while neglecting a much bigger problem, namely
alcohol. The Prime Minister agreed that alcohol was the main problem
but could not be a reason not to act against drugs (Dagens Nyheter 11
February 1969). It was decided that youth organisations could apply for
governmental funds for drug-preventive information (SBN meeting, 11
February 1969).
Concerning point 8, the Delegation for Information on Health Care
(HVUD) within the National Board of Health and Welfare received
800,000 SKr. to intensify its information activities to the public.
The Swedish initiative to include amphetamines in the Single
Convention as mentioned in point 9, was unsuccessful but the initiative
to put amphetamines and other psychotropic substances under
international control gained support from opium - and cocaine -
producing countries and the Soviet bloc and was achieved by the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.


False prophets and the information problem

The co-ordination body, SBN, that was to monitor and co-ordinate
measures against the drug problem as proclaimed in point 10, started its
work in January 1969.46 The SBN comprised directors-general of public
authorities that were committed to the drug problem, and the directors
of the Association of Swedish Municipalities and the Association of
Counties. The only link to the departmental arena was the appointment
of the Head of Legal Secretariat (Lidbom) from the Department of
Justice as chairman.
The SBN decided at its first meeting in January 1969 to focus on
information issues (point 8 on the list). Already during the
parliamentary debates on the drug policy bill in March 1968, several
MPs had expressed their concern about the content of some television
programmes about drugs. Minister Aspling agreed and according to
him, co-ordination of future information activities was important (Rd
1968, no. 10: 139). The National Police Commissioner, Persson, also
had expressed similar apprehension about the harmful effects of
unsuitable information: "it is not easy for youngsters to know what to
believe when they watch how abuse sometimes is glorified by
television and other media" (Press release NPB, 28 November 1968).
The influence of television on public opinion was recognised by
many. Prime Minister Erlander appealed to the press and the Swedish
Broadcasting Corporation not to play down the dangers of drug taking.
Earlier that autumn the National Police Commissioner had refused to
participate in television programmes unless persons who had expressed
the view that smoking cannabis was not dangerous were banned (Daily
Telegraph, 28 December 1968).


Co-ordination of information

Probably as a result of this criticism, the board of Swedish Radio
decided in December 1968 to appoint a working group that would co-
ordinate/synchronise information and advise programme makers on
drug issues. In its final report in December 1969, the working group
accounted for its policy and activities.47 The goal for the policy on
programmes about drugs had been to contribute to halt drug use and to
obstruct further dissemination. This had been the guiding principle for
the programmes as well as the choice of participants (Report Sveriges
Radio, 24 October 1969). However, Swedish Radio had to be impartial
and the strategy to avoid becoming involved in debates was to focus on
non-controversial information: "one should demarcate the part of the
complex on which there is consensus from those that still are included
in discussions" (Ibid. 3). The co-ordination group stated that it did not
intend to censor programmes but to serve as a reference group in
planning programmes. It was important to achieve a balance of
programme supply, because the information campaign aimed at
providing the public with a ground on which it could value what was
said and shown in other contexts (Ibid. 4). The co-ordination group had
met the Narkomanvård Committee, which had observed a need to
compensate for the large amount of "secondary" information that had
been released through the media. Secondary information was, for
example, reports on criminality and police actions, debates between
scientists, etc. (PM 17 January 1969, Sveriges Radio). Concerning the
question of how to deal with dissenting opinions the co-ordination
group referred to the Narkomanvård Committee. To reach the people,
who were to be influenced, one should use their own arguments.
Therefore the co-ordination group concluded: "it is essential that pro-
arguments are immediately penetrated from a physiological,
sociological, etc. point of view and are confronted with the facts that
can be put forward." Another effect of this strategy was that it could
provide examples of arguments that could be used by opinion-moulding
actors in this field (Ibid. 4).
The SBN meeting on 11 February 1969 was entirely dedicated to the
information issue. Besides the ordinary members of the SBN, a number
of high-ranking politicians from the Cabinet Office, officials from
departments, authorities, and Swedish Radio attended the meeting,
which indicates its importance. The meeting decided to establish a
working group on information. Its first task would be to elaborate an
information leaflet containing the basic facts on drugs and drug abuse.
Several members of the SBN agreed that great harm had been caused
by the public appearance of "false prophets". According to the SBN, it
was important that a high official from Swedish Radio should
participate in the working group on information, to synchronise SBN
actions with Swedish Radio. The Radio Company was accused of
taking matters into their own hands. The director-general of the
National Board of Health and Welfare and chairman of the
Narkomanvård Committee, Engel, held the opinion that:

It is important not to let one's attitude to cannabis as an internationally classified
narcotic substance be altered by the pharmacologically mild effects of cannabis.
Someone who starts using hash breaks an attitude wall, which should be obstructed
(SBN meeting, 11 February 1969: 4).

However, some members of the SBN were critical. The Prosecutor-
General held the view that authorities and the SBN should not be
directly involved in informing the people. The representative of the
Ministry of Education also advocated caution. It was important to avoid
giving young people the impression of society imposing a certain
opinion on them (Ibid. 5). However, these objections were obviously
overruled and the working group was assigned to produce a leaflet
containing basic facts on drugs.
At an extra meeting on 21 February 1969, the SBN decided that
producing the fact-providing leaflet should not delay other, more urgent
matters. Such an urgent matter was an information campaign aimed at
the general population.

The information campaign

A broad and massive information campaign to the public was planned
to take place in May/June that year. The campaign aimed at raising
consciousness of the drug problem and of the need for actions from of
all parts of the population (SBN meeting, 5 March 1969).
The leaflet produced by the SBN was distributed in 130,000 copies to
authorities and organisations directly involved in the drug problem and
the information campaign.48
The Board of Education pursued an extraordinary national seminar
on drugs for all employees on the afternoon of 9 May. Not only
personnel were to participate but also all students aged 13­16 (800,000
of the 1.2 million pupils) would receive information about drugs. They
received a special leaflet about drugs and a special radio programme
produced by the Swedish school broadcasting service heralded the
seminar.
A television programme, Rapport ­ aktuellt om narkotika, was
broadcast twice a week from 25 March to 4 April and once a week
during the period 6­28 May. The serial was closed by a live broadcast
discussion, "Authorities Meet the Public", in which persons who had
participated in previous programmes could develop their arguments
further. Besides in television programmes, the issue of drugs was also
discussed in radio programmes like "Facts on Drugs" and "Questions
about Drugs".
The working group on information had concluded that interest in the
drug problem had declined after the first months that year. Some signs
were the decreased coverage by the press and interest in radio and
television programs on drugs (SBN meeting, 1 April 1969). Two weeks
later, the SBN initiated a campaign aimed at all Swedes who would be
travelling abroad that summer. A warning leaflet, produced by the SBN,
was printed in two million copies that would be inserted in every
passport of Swedish travellers leaving Sweden for a destination outside
Scandinavia (Information office NPB, 27 May 1969). In addition,
advertisements in all national newspapers would warn Swedish
youngsters against experimenting with drugs while abroad. The SBN
also decided to intensify information to the outside world, partly to
inform foreign drug dealers about the higher penalties for drug crimes
and partly to gain support for the Swedish demands to include
amphetamines under international control (SBN meeting, 5 March
1969).

The information issue continued to occupy the attention of the SBN.
Later that autumn, a correspondence course, organised by the Labour
Education Association (ABF), was criticised by members of the
medical profession for factual errors. Other critics were temperance
movements, which in a letter to the Prime Minister accused the course
of expressing a drug-liberal philosophy (Dnr 793/E9, 17 December
1969, SBN archive). This criticism led the SBN to ask a member of the
working group on information, Dr Mårtens, to examine the leaflet. His
conclusion was that it did not contain any serious inaccuracies, but
quite a few assertions that were not backed up by science. As chairman
of a working group on narcotics within the Physicians Association, he
would express the opinion that the course manual was an inappropriate
source of information because it tried to profit politically from a serious
problem (SBN meeting, 19 November 1969).


43 The counting of needle marks continued also after the prescription project in
Stockholm was closed down in June 1967.
44 In this respect, this situation was similar to that of the US where for several
decades the Federal Bureau on Narcotics played the same influential role with its
director Harry Anslingar.
45 Carl Persson was not a police officer but had previously been a social democratic
under-secretary of state of justice and had led the restructuring of the police
apparatus.
46 The SBN would stay in office until 1973. Members of the Riksdag frequently
questioned the existence of the SBN. In their view, the SBN acted too slowly.
Instead, they proposed a parliamentary committee.
47 The report was also sent to the SBN.
48 In July 1969, Minister Aspling approved the printing of a further 70,000 copies.