Drug Abuse

IMPLICATIONS OF EXPERIMENTALLY INDUCED CONTEMPLATIVE MEDITATION

ARTHUR J. DEIKMA.N, M.D.

Introduction

Unusual perceptions have always been the subject of intense interest, desire, and speculation. In early history it was customary to interpret and seek such occurrences within a religious context. Even the gross disorders of epilepsy and psychosis were thought to be cases of supernatural possession, blessed or otherwise. Strange experiences were valued, and the use of fasting, drugs, ceremony, and dancing to induce a strange experience was common in cultures ranging from the Amazon Indians to ascetic European monks. Only with the rise of Western science did man become dissatisfied with theological inquiry and seek to understand strange experiences as a type of natural phenomena, to be explained by the same powerful mechanical and mathematical models that were conquering the planets and the chemical elements. Psychological science began studying conscious experience, and the advent of psychoanalysis ushered in the exploration of unconscious functioning. The problem of unusual perceptions, however, is still a puzzle, a challenge, and a matter of philosophical dispute.

The classical mystic experience is the prime example of an unusual perception still subject to conflicting interpretations. Both Eastern and Western mystic literature describe an experience that goes beyond ordinary sensory impressions and yet is a perception, a perception of something so profound, uplifting, and intense as to lie beyond communication by language and to constitute the highest human experience. It would appear that contemplative meditation is one instrument for achieving such a state, although not necessarily sufficient in itself.

This paper reports some results of a phenomenological investigation of meditation phenomena and attempts to explain the data and relate them to a broader context.

Procedure

In order to investigate the mystic experience, an experimental procedure was devised based on classical descriptions of contemplative meditation. This procedure can be described as one of perceptual concentration. An initial short-term experimental study showed that very striking changes in the perception of the self and of objects were possible through the use of this procedure, and there were also indications that analogues to the classical mystic experience could be achieved as well. The rationale, procedure, results, and conclusions of this experiment have been reported elsewhere.

The same procedure, somewhat simplified, was then employed to study the effects of perceptual concentration over a longer period of time. Although many of the phenomena that resulted seemed readily explainable on the basis of afterimages, autokinetic movement, phosphenes, and the like, certain data did not seem adequately accounted for by reference to familiar perceptual phenomena or by the use of such theoretical explanatory concepts as are currently available, e.g., suggestion or projection. Additional hypotheses seem necessary, and it is the purpose of this paper to present these data and the postulates derived from them.

The original experiment involved a total of twelve "concentration" sessions. It was hoped that four to six subjects could then be studied over a total of seventy or more sessions. One of the subjects of the original experiment did continue for a total of seventy-eight sessions, at which point she changed jobs, moving to a distant area. Six subjects who began the experiment did not proceed beyond ten sessions for a variety of reasons ranging from job conflict (the procedure calls for three experimental sessions per week, during the day) to an inability to adopt the way of psychological functioning required. Four subjects continued for thirty to forty sessions. One additional subject completed ro6 sessions and is currently involved in a different experiment.

The data with which this paper is concerned came primarily from the two subjects, A and G, who completed the longest series of sessions. These subjects had the most intense and unusual experiences of the group, approximately in direct relationship to the number of sessions. In this connection, it should be noted that vivid experiences seemed, on the one hand, to indicate a tolerance and compatibility with the procedure and, on the other hand, to motivate the subject to continue over a long period of time. Subjects C, D, and L (thirty to forty sessions) appeared to have gone part way along the same paths as A and G in that they experienced the beginnings of breakdown in the self/object distinction, and had some experience of light, strange imagery, and the like.
However, they appeared less able to relinquish control and "accept whatever happens."

Subject A was a thirty-eight-year-old psychiatric nurse who was undergoing psychoanalysis at the time of the experiment.2 Subject G was a forty-year-old housewife. Both subjects were personally known to the experimenter and were asked to participate in the experiment on the basis of their apparent intelligence, interest, and available time. Subject G was paid; subject A was not. It seemed clear that money was not a crucial factor in their participation. There was evidence of neurotic conflicts (by history and MMPI), but both subjects were functioning relatively normally in their environments. The experiment was conducted in a comfortable, carpeted office, the lighting, colors, and atmosphere of which were subdued. The subject sat in an armchair about ten feet from a medium blue vase that rested on a simple brown end table; the experimenter sat to one side and behind the subject, at a desk on which there were two tape recorders. It was necessary to move to a different experimental room twice during the course of the experiment, but the general atmosphere was maintained and the change did not seem to affect the phenomena reported by the subjects.

Contemplative meditation requires that the subject relinquish his customary mode of thinking and perceiving. Thoughts must be stopped, sounds and peripheral sensations put out of one's mind, and the contemplation of the meditative object be conducted in a non-analytic, non-intellectual manner. This aim determined the composition of the instructions that were read by the experimenter to the subject immediately preceding the first few sessions. Subject A, who had begun the first experiment, received the following directions: "The purpose of these sessions is to learn about concentration. Your aim is to concentrate on the blue vase. By concentration I do not mean analyzing the different parts of the vase, or thinking a series of thoughts about the vase, or associating ideas to the vase, but rather, trying to see the vase as it exists in itself, without any connections to other things. Exclude all other thoughts or feelings or sounds or body sensations. Do not let them distract you, but keep them out so that you can concentrate all your attention, all your awareness on the vase itself. Let the perception of the vase fill your entire mind."

Subject G received a differently worded set of instructions, as an attempt had been made to present the required concept more clearly for the second experiment and thus decrease the need for additional explanations: "This is an experiment in how we see and experience things. Ordinarily we look at the world around us with only part of our attention; the rest is taken up with thinking about what we are seeing or with unrelated thoughts. This experiment will explore the possibilities of seeing and experiencing when you cease thinking altogether and concentrate your attention on only one thing: the blue vase on the table in front of you.

"Look at the vase intently; focus all your interest on it; try to perceive the vase as directly as possible but without studying or analyzing it. Have your entire mind concentrated on the vase; at the same time, remain open to the experience—let whatever happens happen.

"All thinking must come to a stop so that your mind becomes quiet. Do not let yourself be distracted by thoughts, sounds, or body sensations—keep them out so that you can concentrate all your attention on the vase."

The intent of both sets of instructions was the same, and the different wording did not seem to be significant; the same types of questions were raised by both subjects, and the experimenter was required to amplify and explain the instructions in the early sessions in approximately the same way. The principal difficulty encountered by subjects was grasping the concept of not thinking: to cease actively examining or thinking about the vase. The main problem that required additional explanation was the confusion about whether to try to block out all sensations arising during the session. They were told that insofar as the sensations were part of the experience of concentration rather than distraction or interference, they should accept them.

Both sets of instructions concluded with the directions: "While you concentrate I am going to play music on the tape machine. Do not let the sounds occupy your attention or disturb your concentration. If you find you have drifted into a stream of thought, stop and bring your attention back to the vase. At the end of minutes I will tell you that the session is over, but take as much time as you like to stop."

After a few initial sessions of ten and fifteen minutes of concentration, with cello music played as a background on the tape recorder, the concentration period was extended to thirty minutes and performed in silence. At the end of the designated time, the experimenter gave the signal "thirty minutes" and the subject could stop or continue longer if he desired. All subjects were able to complete thirty minutes, but they seldom continued much longer.

After the subjects had finished concentrating, the experimenter conducted an inquiry based on the following questions: 1) "How did it go?" 2) "Describe the course of the session." 3) "How much of the time were you able to concentrate so that you were aware only of the vase and nothing else?" 4) "'What means did you use to maintain concentration?" 5 ) "What thoughts did you have during the session?" 6) "What feelings did you have?" 7) "What was your experience of the vase?" 8) (Optional; introduced as sessions progressed) "What is your intent as you look at the vase?" 9) (Subject is asked to go to the window.) "Look out the window and describe what you see and the way it looks." As the experiment progressed, the subjects tended to cover the main question areas spontaneously, so the experimenter asked questions mainly to clarify statements of the subject. The interview was flexible, designed to elicit whatever phenomena the subject had experienced and to follow up anything of interest to the experimenter. During the inquiry, the experimenter endeavored to be as neutral as possible, but from time to time it was necessary to reinstruct subjects in the procedure and to deal with a subject's anxiety when startling phenomena occurred. The latter was done by stressing that the experience was under the subject's control, and that the phenomenon was very interesting and, apart from its newness, need not be frightening. The inquiry lasted about twenty minutes and was tape recorded in its entirety.

Results and Discussion

In trying to understand the data that resulted from the experiment, a basic question was asked: What was the subject perceiving? The bulk of the percepts resulting from the experiment seemed readily explained in terms of such familiar concepts as afterimages, phosphenes, stabilized retinal images, projection, and distortion. The data selected for discussion below consist of perceptual phenomena whose explanation may require the construction of additional hypotheses. For the purpose of clarity, the data will be presented in three groups, each followed by discussion. It should be noted that these phenomena did not occur in every session, but once the subject experienced a percept it tended to recur in later sessions, usually with greater intensity.

LIGHT

G; 28th session: ". . . the vase changes in concept for me; then shortly after that, suddenly, I begin to feel this light going back and forth. It's circular. I can't follow it all the way to my forehead but I can certainly follow it about as far as my hand . . . and I can feel it go the rest of the way."
G; 67th session: ". . . somewhere between the matter that is the wall and myself, somewhere in between the matter is this moving, this vibrating light and motion and power and very real substance . . . it's so real and so vital that I feel as
though I could reach out and take a chunk of it and hand it to you."
C; 41st session: "It seems as if you were turning a light down, that you were turning the intensity of the light down and yet I still had this kind of shimmering sensation of very
bright light simultaneously with the idea that everything is getting dark."
G; 87th session: "This circle of light, this area that goes in and then out to encompass me. . . it's not like sunlight. . . it isn't even like moonlight, it's kind of cold light in a way . . . it's jagged in a way around the outside. . it's a kind of compaction or compression and suddenly out of this com-
pression comes a light. It's not like a searchlight, it isn't like a beacon, it's very irregular in its outline."
G; 104th session: "You can't discern a shimmering in the
room, can you, a color or bright shimmering in this whole area?"
(Experimenter): "No."
G: "Well, it's very real to me; it's so real that I feel you ought to be able to see it."

FORCE

A; 54th session: "It was also as though we were together, you know, instead of being a table and a vase, and me, my body, and the chair, it all dissolved into a bundle of something which had . . . a great deal of energy to it but which doesn't form into anything; it only feels like a force."
G; 55th session: ". . . like a magnetic attraction as though I had iron in me and there was a magnet pulling but you would have to imagine that I had iron in every one of my
cells. . . ."
A; 53rd session: ". . . at the point when I felt as though everything was coming from there directed against me . . . some kind of force, I can't say what it was, as though a force were enveloping me."
G; 93rd session: ". . . I felt this strong, strong pull in my thoughts. I could feel it as I have never felt anything before . . . one instant there was this tranquil sort of thing and the next minute there was this vital, pulling, pushing force . . . it felt as though somebody had hooked up or made a connection with a vital thing that was real, that was pulling my thoughts. Not only pulling them but compressing thoughts,
too."

MOTION

A; 17th session: ". . . the table and the vase were rocking. Now I was conscious that they were not in any sense moving, but the sensation of rocking, their rocking or rocking inside of me back and forth, was quite prominent for quite some time."
C; 21St session: "I had the distinct impression . . . that what I could see of the vase was drifting. . . it was in motion just very slightly . . . it just seemed to be wavering somehow . . . the whole thing seemed to be moving."
(Experimenter): "You saw it move or you had the impression it was moving?"
C: "I had the impression that it was moving."
G; 5th session: "It's almost as though within that cone, movement is taking place back and forth. I'm still not sure, though, whether it's the motion in the rings or if it's the rings. But in a certain way it is real . . . it's not real in the sense that you can see it, touch it, taste it, smell it, or anything, but it certainly is real in the sense that you can experience it happening."
G; 8th session: "It's the feeling of something pulling your whole being together to a point, and you can feel it in an actual sensation of motion."

These perceptual experiences were characterized by: ) an unusual way of perceiving (e.g., light is felt; motion of the vase is felt but not seen; force envelops), although the usual perceptual routes are also employed; 2) the percepts are primitive and basic (i.e., force, light, and motion); and 3) the percepts are intensely real.

To answer the question, What was perceived? we must consider both the possibility that the relevant stimuli were of internal origin and the possibility that the stimuli orignated externally to the subject. In the discussion that follows, the assumption of internal stimuli and the possible explanations of suggestion, projection, dreaming, and hypnagogic state will be taken up first, followed by a consideration of the hypotheses of sensory translation and reality transfer. Then, assuming external stimuli, the hypothesis of perceptual expansion will be presented.

Internal Stimuli

SUGGESTION

"Suggestion" refers to a subject's reporting a perception corresponding to some previous overt statement by the experimenter pertaining to what the subject would perceive. This concept is often extended to include cues, given unconsciously by the experimenter, that indicate to the subject what phenomena are expected. The subject may make suggestions to himself, producing autosuggestion. In the perceptual concentration experiment, the experimenter's verbalizations were recorded, transcribed, and compiled under the category "Experimenter's Role." These records indicate that no direct verbal suggestion pertaining to expected phenomena was made by the experimenter, with the exception of such statements as "most people have found this (concentration) to be interesting and rewarding." In no case was a statement made indicating the actual phenomena reported by other subjects or reported in the classical meditation literature. None of the subjects had read about meditation phenomena, and all were instructed not to discuss the phenomena with anyone else. (One subject began reading mystic literature toward the end of the experiment and was excited to note the similarity between her experiences and those described by various authors.) None of the subjects were close friends, and the identities of the experimental subjects were unknown to each other. In one instance during the first experiment, when an exchange of information did take place between subject A and another subject, the phenomena reported were quite different and, indeed, subject A felt very disappointed that, both prior to the conversation and afterward, she was not able to have the experiences reported to her by the other subject. In addition, this subject and most of the others demonstrated on many occasions their resistance to statements made by the experimenter that did not seem accurate to them when he attempted to paraphrase their own reports.

There were some indications of the experimenter supplying covert cues. From time to time, subjects remarked that they felt he expected them to report new phenomena as the experiment progressed. In one case, subject A felt aware, correctly, of the experimenter's interest in a particular phenomenon (disappearance of the vase) and remarked that she therefore thought that he wanted such phenomena to occur. She stated in this connection that this was the only cue she had detected in the course of the experiment. There was also some opportunity for extraexperimental covert influence, since all the long-term subjects were personally known to the experimenter, and G, C, and D were social acquaintances and friends of his. The possibility for covert suggestion cannot be eliminated and, to some extent, was always present. If the experimenter gave covert cues to the subjects as to what phenomena delighted and fascinated him, this would undoubtedly result, at the least, in a biased selection by the subject of the phenomena reported. In a broad sense, this may well have taken place, since the interview did not consist of systematic questioning of all areas of perceptual phenomena but was largely a following up of the subject's report plus questions directed at main subject categories. As sessions progressed, fewer such questions were asked of the subjects as they reported striking phenomena that spontaneously covered the areas of questioning themselves. There was no evidence of successful autosuggestion. On different occasions, subjects would try to repeat an experience they had had, and usually found this very difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, such attempts were found to be an interference in the concentration process.

Perhaps the most important argument against suggestion being an important determinant is the fact that, on the one hand, the very striking phenomena reported were quite unexpected and surprising to the experimenter, who had not believed that classical phenomena such as "merging" or unity experiences could occur without years of practice but, rather, had expected the phenomena to be mostly that of image breakdown. Further evidence against suggestion or autosuggestion is the fact that phenomena such as animation of the vase and currents of force are not part of classical meditation reports. (It should also be mentioned that there are almost no published accounts of the day-by-day phenomena of longterm "meditation" practice, and none that I know of dealing with long-term concentration upon an object such as a vase.) Also very significant in this connection was the subjects' experience of anxiety and disbelief at the initial appearance of a phenomenon. The subjects often stopped the process quickly the first time it occurred. Only as they became more familiar with it were they able to let the phenomena develop further. It would seem reasonable that suggested phenomena would not elicit such a response of anxiety unless the experimenter had also suggested an anxious response—but there is no evidence that he did so. For all these reasons, suggestion does not seem to be an adequate explanation of the subjects' experiences.

PROJECTION

In terms of psychoanalytic theory, such perceptions as have been quoted could be regarded as "projections" of internal stimuli. The usual explanation of mystic experiences, and of unusual experiences in general, is to regard them as a "projection" and reinterpretation of repressed infantile memories, or in the case of psychotic hallucinations, as a synthetic product re-establishing object relations. In his paper on Schreber, Freud defined projection: "The most striking characteristic of symptom formation is the process which deserves the name of projection. An internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain kind of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception." In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud discussed the genesis of this mechanism: ". . . a particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations that produce too great an increase of unpleasure: There is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting not from the inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation as a means of defense against them. This is the origin of projection, which is destined to play such a large part in the causation of pathological processes." The basic phenomenon to which Freud applied the concept of projection consisted of paranoid hallucinations and delusions. In this view, the function of projection is to defend the person against awareness of his own internal psychological contents, and, consequently, it is these contents that are "projected" and perceived as external to the subject. Although later workers have attempted to broaden the concept of projection, nothing further seems to have been hypothesized about how projection takes place, and the broadened definitions gain wider scope at the expense of explanatory potency.

For the purpose of this discussion, "projection" shall refer to Freud's definition emphasizing its function of defense against the awareness of anxiety-provoking internal content. If we apply this concept to the subjects' experiences already quoted, we see that the content of their perception did not consist of affect, motives, or ego-alien ideation but, rather, was composed of sensations referable to such qualities as force, light, and motion. Such sensory qualities do not lend themselves readily to explanations centered on defense against drives (or even the effect of style on stimulus interpretation). Although a "need" may be ascribed to the subjects (e.g., to have unusual experiences), it is not at all clear what the mechanism would be that would give them the experiences they had. Neither do the experiences seem to be reconstructions of lost objects. The classical concept of "projection" does not seem to explain these data.

DREAMING

Were the subjects asleep, and were their experiences actually dreams? When occasionally questioned specifically by the experimenter, A and B felt sure they had not been asleep when the reported phenomena occurred. They referred to the continuity of the vase and the table percept throughout most of the experiences in question. The vivid phenomena seemed to be superimposed on that continuity. On some occasions, the subjects specifically mentioned that they had fallen asleep for a brief time, as they had become "suddenly" aware that their heads had fallen forward and that there had been a break in the continuity of the concentration. Nevertheless, the subjects could have had brief periods of sleep of which they were not aware. The perceptual continuity they experienced would argue against a dream state, as does the fact that their experiences did not have the complex structures normally associated with dreaming.

HYPNAGOGIC STATE

However, there are important similarities to be noted between the subjects' experiences and the hypnagogic state described by Silberer. Silberer defined hypnagogic phenomena as being a regression to autosymbolic thinking, an "easier" way of thinking, occurring when an effort to think took place in a state of drowsiness. Although the subjects stated that they were not asleep during the occurrence of vivid phenomena, they did report episodes of drowsiness in many of the experimental sessions. Thus, one of Silberer's defining conditions for hypnagogic phenomena was present. The other necessary condition, the effort to think, was not present in the specific sense indicated by Silberer's examples, as these subjects were performing a type of perceptual concentration or perceptual thinking, with abstract thinking specifically blocked. However, if we accept Silberer's generalization of the second condition (the effort to think) as "an interference with falling asleep," then both conditions would appear satisfied, since the effort to concentrate on the vase would constitute such an interference.

Important differences are present, however. Although it was clear that the meditative state was one differing from normal, awake consciousness,3 the subject described drowsy phases as brief episodes interfering with the special state of successful concentration. "Successful" meant being attentively absorbed in a perceptual experience with the exception that the experience usually included as one of its dimensions a reflective awareness of the experimental situation, except when the process reached a high level of intensity. At such times the subject felt even this connection, or anchor, to be loosening, and experienced anxiety leading to his terminating the experience. According to the subjects, it was during the successful, attentive phase that the vivid phenomena occurred. Also, the content of the vivid phenomena was much more amorphous than the clear, dreamlike symbols described by Silberer and seemed to build up gradually rather than make a sudden appearance.

SENSORY TRANSLATION HYPOTHESIS

To account more adequately for the experimental data cited, I would like to postulate the process of sensory translation. Sensory translation is defined as the perception of psychic action (conflict repression, problem solving, attentiveness, etc.) through the relatively unstructured sensations of light, color, movement, force, sound, smell, or taste.4 This hypothesis is related to Silberer's concept but differs in its referents and genesis. In the hypnagogic state and in dreaming, a symbolic translation of psychic activity and ideas oc-
curs, but, although light, force, and movement may play a part in hypnagogic and dream constructions, the predominant percepts are complex visual, verbal, conceptual, and activity images. "Sensory translation" refers to the experience of nonverbal, simple, concrete perceptual equivalents of psychic action. It comes into operation as a consequence of the altered cognitive mode brought about by the experimental instructions, which focus on perceiving instead of thinking. The altered cognitive mode does not appear to be one of sleep or drowsiness.

This postulate lends itself well not only to the data quoted above, but to the analysis of other, more detailed, reports that suggest a possible retranslation back to the stimuli themselves:

A; 63rd session: ". . . when the vase changes shape . . . I feel this in my body and particularly in my eyes . . . there is an actual kind of physical sensation as though something is moving there which re-creates the shape of the vase." Here, this subject may be experiencing the perception of a resynthesis taking place following the de-automatization of the normal percept; that is, the percept of the vase is being reconstructed outside of the normal awareness, and the process of reconstruction is perceived as a physical sensation.
G; 6oth session: ". . . shortly! began to sense motion and shifting of light and dark as this became stronger and stronger. Now when this happens it's happening not only in my vision but it's happening or it feels like a physical kind of thing. It's connected with feelings of attraction, expansion, absorption, and suddenly my vision pinpointed on a particular place, and this became the center for a very powerful . . . I was in the grip of a very powerful sensation, and this became the center." The perception of motion and shifting light and darkness may be the perception of the movement of attention among various psychic contents. "Attraction," "expansion," "absorption," would thus reflect the dynamics of the efforts to focus attention—successful focusing is then experienced as being "in the grip of" a powerful force.

G; 78th session: ". . . that feeling of pulling on the top of my head, and then this awareness all of a sudden that I wasn't occupying my body, at least not completely, as I usually do." Here the pulling may be the splitting of the normal synthesis of body self and mental self, leading to a feeling of being "suspended," or levitation.

G; 93rd session: ". . . I felt this strong, strong pull in my thoughts. I could feel it as I have never felt anything before—just really making contact, and it was a glorious kind of feeling because it was such a powerful way of thinking, using the mind. It's almost as though something has opened up a whole batch of doors in my mind that haven't been opened before and that all this power had come rushing to and fro, that it was a connecting link between something out of the natural laws of the universe and me, my thoughts. . . ." Perhaps this experience was a relatively direct perception of the release of psychic energy, presumably through a lifting of defensive barriers occurring as a consequence of the experimental program.

REALNESS AND THE REALITY FUNCTION

Not only were these percepts unusual, they were often vividly real, seemingly palpable. Both A and B stated on some occasions that they were sure the experimenter must be able to see what they saw, even photograph it. It is necessary to account for the realness of these perceptions. There are ample clinical data demonstrating the great variability in the realness of our sensory percepts: ) In states of depersonalization or derealization, perception is intact but the percepts "feel" unreal or lack the "feeling" of reality. 2) Persons who have had mystic experiences or who have taken LSD report states of consciousness that they feel are "more real" than normal. 3) In the case of some dreams, their "realism" may persist into the waking state. Thus, realness and sensation are not a unity, but the concurrent operation of two separate functions. Realness (the quality of reality) and reality testing (the judgment of what is external versus what is imaginary) likewise appear to be two different functions, although they usually operate in synchrony.

Freud discussed reality testing as a learned judgment: "A perception which is made to disappear by an action is recognized as external, as reality; where such an action makes no difference, the perception orginates within the subject's own body—it is not real." "The antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there." Freud explained hallucinations as a consequence of a topographic regression, a reversal of the normal path of excitation so that the perceptual systems are stimulated from within. Fedem attempted to deal with the problem of loss of the feeling of reality (as opposed to reality testing) seen in estrangement and depersonalization, by postulating that the sense of something being real required an adequate investment of energy (libido) in the ego boundary. Although his concepts are murky, they point toward the notion of a quantity of "realness."

REALITY-TRANSFER HYPOTHESIS

The experimental data and clinical examples cited above warrant the hypothesis that there is a specific ego function that bestows the quality of reality on the contents of experience. I would like to hypothesize that this function can be influenced and that the quality of reality can be displaced, intensified, or attenuated—a process of reality transi er. In the meditation experiment, the sensory percepts are invested with this quality, resulting in the vivid, intensely real experiences reported. Why does this take place? An initial speculation is that, since in the meditation experience the object world as a perceptual experience is broken down or dedifferentiated, the cognitive organization based on that world is disrupted in a parallel fashion. An ego function capable of appropriately bestowing reality quality must be linked developmentally with the organization of logical, object-based thought. It seems plausible that an alteration in that organization would affect the reality function. In the meditation experiment, the subject is instructed to banish analytical, logical thought and to allow perception to dominate the field. In a formal sense, these instructions constitute a regression to the primitive cognitive state postulated for the infant and young child, a state in which the distinction between thoughts, actions, and objects is blurred as compared to the adult. Such a regression is likely to be enhanced by the passive-dependent relationship with the experimenter. The body immobility, reduction in sensory input, and the relatively stabilized retinal image, are additional factors capable of producing perceptual and cognitive disorganization. If we add all these forces together, we see that the experimental meditation procedure is potentially a very powerful technique for undoing the normal cognitive and perceptual modes. Such an undoing might be expected to result in a mobility of "reality quality," permitting its displacement to internal stimuli, a displacement congruent with the regressive push of the specific experimental situation.

DE-AUTOMATIZATION

At this point it would be appropriate to discuss the concept of "de-automatization," as it is relevant to the understanding of meditation as well as other altered states of consciousness. Hartmann explicates the concept of automatization as follows: "In well-established achievements, they (motor apparatuses) function automatically: the integration of the somatic systems involved in the action is automatized, and so is the integration of the individual mental acts involved in it. With increasing exercise of the action, its intermediate steps disappear from consciousness . . . not only motor behavior, but perception and thinking, too, show automatization." "It is obvious that automatization may have economic advantages in saving attention cathexis in particular and simple cathexis of consciousness in general. . . . Here, as in most adaptation processes, we have a purpose of provision for the average expectable range of tasks." Thus, automatization performs the function of eliminating details and intermediate steps of awareness so that attention is freed for other purposes. Gill and Brenman developed further the concept of de-automatization: "De-automatization is an undoing of the automatizations of apparatuses—both means and goal structures—directed toward the environment. De-automatization is, as it were, a shakeup which can be followed by an advance or a retreat in the level of organization. . . . Some manipulation of the attention directed toward the functioning of an apparatus is necessary if it is to be de-automatized." Thus, de-automatization is the undoing of automatization, presumably by reinvesting actions and percepts with attention.

The experimental procedure produces a de-automatization of normal perceptual modes, permitting the operation of sensory translation. At the same time, a de-automatization of the reality function occurs such that the sense of reality normally bestowed on objects is now "transferred" to abstract psychical entities. As stated earlier, the experimental pressure away from abstract thought and toward pure perception fits this explanation.

External Stimuli

PERCEPTUAL EXPANSION HYPOTHESIS

A further possibility remains. Some of the visual phenomena of the meditation experience (reported in the first experiment and present throughout the long-term project), such as loss of the third dimension of the vase, diffiusion of its formal properties, and a tendency toward a homogenous color field, appear to be a result of a de-automatization leading to a breakdown of the percepts in the direction of a primitive visual experience. However, the more striking perceptions, of force, movement, and light—as well as other entities to be described below—may possibly be the product of a de-automatization that permits the awareness of new dimensions of the total stimulus array. These experiences are not necessarily in the direction of a less-organized dedifferentiation as such, but of a real sensation that apparently is at variance with everyday perception. Such a concept of de-automatization as a liberating process leads to a third explanatory hypothesis for the meditation phenomena; perceptual expansion—the widening of perceptual intake to encompass "new" external stimuli, with a new perceptual route strongly implied. Perceptual expansion is made possible by de-automatization of: the selective gating and filtering processes that normally are in constant operation.

There is a developmental concept implicit in such a hypothesis; namely, that our earliest experience is probably one of being in more direct contact with numerous, vivid, primitively organized stimuli. As we mature, a learning process takes place in which stimuli and percepts are organized toward a high level of differentiation based on formal characteristics. This learning process not only takes place at the expense of the vividness and variability of sensory stimuli, but possibly involves a loss of special perceptual functions other than those to which we are accustomed. There is evidence to support this concept.

Werner, in a statement based on studies of eidetic imagery in children as well as on broader studies of perceptual development, states that the image ". . . gradually changes in functional character. It becomes essentially subject to the exigencies of abstract thought. Once the image changes in function and becomes an instrument in reflective thought, its structure also changes. It is only through such structural change that the image can serve as an instrument of abstract mental activity. This is why, of necessity, the sensuousness and fullness of detail, color, and vividness of the image must fade." The experimental work of Kohler illustrates this concept. In reviewing his experiments on the effects of wearing distorting lenses for days at a time, Kohler concludes, "We are confronted here with a peculiar relationship between optical and physical facts. We always find that it is the physical dimensions of things which have a tendency to become visually correct. This is due to the fact that physical dimensions are among the most frequent and symmetrically distributed stimuli. Consequently, it is with these stimulus qualities that unique perceptual experiences of straightness, right angularity, and good form tend to become associated. It is always the physically unique stimuli which gradually become the reference standards for our percepts. This is the reason why in the process of adaptation it is always the world with which we are familiar which wins out in the end. It does so in the interest of simplicity and economy." From another field of inquiry, Shapiro has summarized evidence for the primacy of color responses in children, with particular emphasis on Rorschach data. He writes ". . . although the Rorschach data did not indicate that color responsiveness per se diminishes with development, they do indicate unmistakably that the relative significance of the color as an essential and overriding aspect of the percept diminishes." Shapiro concluded, ". . . color perception as such is a more immediate and passive experience than form perception, requiring less in the way of perceptual tools for organizing capacity. It is associated with a passive perceptual mode, and it becomes more dominant, more compelling in quality, and perhaps antagonistic to form articulation in conditions in which active perceptual organizing capacity is impaired or only rudimentary." Further support for the concept of selective autornatization is found in the report by Von Senden of the visual experiences of congenitally blind persons who began using the visual function for the first time following surgery for removal of lens cataracts. His accounts support the idea that, as perceptual learning takes place, the vivid qualities of stimuli decrease in proportion as formal organization is imposed upon them through perceptual learning. The gain in economy and utility through automatization is paid for by a foreclosure of possibilities, a dulling or "jading" of sensory experience that is an all-toocommon occurrence. The extent of this loss of vividness and detail resulting from automatization can be appreciated when one undergoes an experience of de-automatization through such techniques as meditation, use of LSD-25, sensory isolation, or spontaneous mystic experience: colors may appear to have gained (temporarily) a new richness and vividness so that the natural world is seen in a "fresh" state. Again, this makes good sense developmentally, for intensity and sensory richness are usually not important stimulus properties for the accurate manipulation of objects.

If, as evidence indicates, our passage from infancy to adulthood is accompanied by an organization of the perceptual and cognitive world that has as its price the selection of some stimuli to the exclusion of others, it is quite possible that a technique could be found to reverse or undo, temporarily, the automatization that has restricted our communication with reality to the active perception of only a small segment of it. Such a process of de-automatization might then be followed by an awareness of aspects of reality that were formerly unavailable to us.

To return to the data from the meditation experiment, it may be that the simpler perceptions of color, light, energy, force, and movement represent a shift of the normal perceptual processes to aspects of the stimulus array previously screened out—or it may be that these percepts are registered through the operation of new perceptual processes. In the course of the experiment, certain reports of A and G were very suggestive of this latter possibility. They seemed to be struggling to convey their perception of unfamiliar reality dimensions, difficult to verbalize exactly, requiring metaphors, and seemingly encountered in another realm so that they spoke of "coming back," "elsewhere," "the other place." The following data are very striking in their implication of a type of new perception:

G; 14th session: (While looking out the window after the meditation period) "I am looking differently than I have ever looked before. I mean it's almost as though I have a different way of seeing. It's like something to do with dimensions. It's as though I am feeling what I am looking at. It's as though I have an extension of myself reaching out and seeing something by feeling it. It's as though somebody added something, another factor to my seeing."
G; 62nd session: ". . . things seem to sharpen and there is a different nature to the substance of things. It's as though I'm seeing between the molecules . . . the usual mass of solidity loses its density or mass and becomes separate."
A; 58th session: "The only way I can think of to describe it is being suspended between something and something, because the world all but disappears, you know, the usual world, while some sounds intrude very little, so that I'm in a world of converging with that, whatever it is, and that's all there is."
G; 64th session: ". . . I've experienced . . . new experiences and I have no vehicle to communicate them to you. I expect that this is probably the way a baby feels when he is full of something to say about an experience or an awareness and he has not learned to use the words yet."
A; 60th session: ". . . it's so completely and totally outside of anything else I've experienced."
G; 66th session: "It was like a parallel world or parallel time. . • .”
A; 26th session: ". . . it's the only way I can describe it . . . walking through the looking glass. . . in walking through the looking glass I would become ethereal and, you know, filmy and somehow don't have the same kind of substance to me that I do otherwise and then when it begins to come back . . . it was like having walked back out of the clouds somehow and becoming solid as I did so."
G; 74th session: ". . . solid material such as myself and the vase and the table. . . seems to be attributed then with this extra property of flexibility such as in its natural, fluid state. It's almost as though we are, myself and the vase and the door, a form which has lost its fluidity the way water loses its property of fluidity when it is frozen. . . we're without the ability to exercise one of the properties that we have when we think of ourselves in the conditioned state of solid matter, but if you can remove that impediment . . . of a way of thinking (and this is what this condition seems to do), this new element gives the ability to recognize this validity that otherwise I'm not aware of."

The postulated new perceptual route is possibly that referred to by the subjects when they use the term "feeling." By this they do not mean feeling in the usual sense of touch, nor the sense of feeling an emotion, but rather perception that cannot be located in the usual perceptual routes of sight, hearing, and the like. In summary, it may be that the unusual experiences here cited are perceptions of unusual stimulus dimensions, modified in some way by the subject, but nevertheless constituting a new perceptual experience made possible by the de-automatization of the ordinary perceptual routes that normally dominate consciousness.

Some support for this hypothesis is present in the evidence that there exists in us psychological capacities different from those we usually employ or with which we are familiar. Von Neumann has observed: "Just as languages like Greek or Sanscrit are historical facts and not absolute logical necessities, it is only reasonable to assume that logics and mathematics are similarly historical, accidental forms of expression. They may have essential variance, i.e., they may exist in other forms than the ones to which we are accustomed. Indeed, the nature of the central nervous system and of the message systems that it transmits indicates positively that this is so. We have now accumulated sufficient evidence to see that whatever language the central nervous system is using is characterized by less logical and arithmetical depth than what we are used to." In his discussion of the brain as computer, he advanced the idea that the human brain programs itself to think logically, with the implication that other superordinate thought functions are inherent in our brain. The creative, preconscious solution of problems is a common experience of another mode of functioning. Specifically in the perceptual sphere, it is relevant to cite observations on synesthesia, especially the association of colors with sounds. This function is found more commonly in children, and tends to disappear as the child grows older. From the point of view of adaptation, it seems plausible that synesthesia is biologically superfluous and therefore would lose out to other perceptual and cognitive processes that provide a more direct biological reward. Evidence for parasensory modes in telepathy experiments is difficult to evaluate, perhaps because such possibilities are discordant with our present scientific cosmology. If there is any validity to the work that has been done in such investigations, it would seem reasonable to conclude that telepathic phenomena represent the operation of perceptual channels ordinarily not utilized or available. The subjective data of the classical mystic experience, of drug states, and of acute psychosis can also be cited in support of the hypothesis of perceptual expansion. In these diverse accounts from varied cultures and epochs, we read the claim that new dimensions are perceived, physical, spiritual, or unclassifiable. These widely disparate authors report certain basic, similar perceptions: the unity of existence, timeless properties of the self, and multiple worlds of existence beyond the familiar. The similarity of their perceptions may simply reflect their similar basic psychological structure. Because they are perceiving their own internal psychological structure and modes of activity, their experiences are basically similar despite cultural differences. Logically, however, we must grant the possibility that these unusual experiences contain the percepts of actual characteristics of reality, normally not perceived.

Inside or Outside?

In trying to decide between the two major possibilities for interpreting unusual experiences—the perception of something that is actually internal versus the perception of something that is actually external—and allowing for the presence of both possibilities in one situation, we come quickly to the basic epistemological problem that we have no way of knowing, with certainty whether or not a percept refers to an external source. Why not test the "knowledge" claimed by the subject of an unusual experience and see if it results in greater success in dealing with the world? But which world? Even in the most precise area of physics, we find contradictory worlds—the world of quantum mechanics and the world of special relativity: ". . . any theory which tries to fulfill the requirements of both special relativity and quantum theory will lead to mathematical inconsistencies, to divergencies in the region of very high energies and momenta." If such incongruencies exist there, we can expect even greater difficulty in matching a set of data of the order of mystic revelation with the incredibly complex field of psychological and biological dimensions where a "test" would take place. Unless such a test of new knowledge were in the same dimensional plane as the knowledge itself, the results would not be relevant.
The evidence of scientific experience, thus far, is solidly behind the psychological theories that assume an internal origin of the "knowledge" or stimuli of unusual experiences. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the classical mystic experience, LSD reactions, certain phases of acute psychosis, and other unusual experiences represent conditions of special receptivity to external stimuli ordinarily excluded or ignored in the normal state.

 

Reprinted from The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol. 142, No. 2, February 1966. By permission of the author and the publisher.

1 This investigation was supported by a Research Grant, MHo7683, from the National Institute of Mental Health, USPHS; and by the Austen Riggs Center. The author is grateful to Dr. George S. Klein and Dr. Richard O. Rouse for their suggestions and criticism during the preparation of this manuscript.

2 When questioned (at the end of the experiment) as to any interaction between her psychoanalysis and the meditation, A replied, ". . . my guess would be that, had I not been in analysis, I would have not had the same kind of experience that I did in this. I think I would have been less prone to or I would have been far more restricted . . . there were two very special experiences going on at the same time and there was interaction between them but they both remained separate in their own ways and were special in their own ways." She replied in the negative when the experimenter asked if any of the things she had found out about herself in the analysis had explained any of the experiences she had had in the experiment.

3 The subject would define this different state of consciousness in terms of difficulty in verbalizing what had happened, an inability to maintain a complete and certain memory of it, and the "feeling" of different "dimensions" to the experience. The definition of the state in EEG terms remains to be done, although relevant data have been obtained by other investigators.

4 There is an indication in the New Introductory Lectures that Freud had an idea tending in the same direction: "It is easy to imagine, too, that certain mystical practices may succeed in upsetting the normal relations between the different regions of the mind, so that, for instance, perception may be able to grasp happenings in the depths of the ego and the id that were otherwise inaccessible to it."

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