"It's ours. We stole it fair and square."
Ronald Reagan referring to the Panama Canal.

"The president of the United States is a fool, or he thinks the rest of us are."
Richard Reeves, syndicated columnist writing about the Administration's rationales for the invasion of Panama.1

Two years ago, at the second conference of the Drug Policy Foundation, I presented a paper in which it was argued that even though the War on Drugs had been a dismal failure in accomplishing its stated goals, and had brought about additional social costs, the War on Drugs was likely to be not only continued, but expanded. My argument was then, and is now, that the War on Drugs is less about stopping drug use and trafficking than about expanding state control both domestically and internation-ally. The War on Drugs as a pretext for the expansion of state power is, simply put, too valuable to be given up. The invasion of Panama was a text book illustration of this argument. The War on Drugs was successfully used as a major part of a justifying rationale for the invasion of another country.

The Reagan and Bush Administrations had conducted a concerted campaign to depose Noriega since at least 1987. Between June of 1987 and the invasion, the U.S. had been involved in at least five attempts to either talk Noriega out of power or force him out (Kempe, 12/21/ 89). The administration had also been encouraging contra-style guerrilla forces to harass or overthrow Noriega for at least two years. But this economic, para-military, and military campaign came after years of support for Noriega from a number of U.S. Administrations. According to a PBS "Frontline" special, Noriega first went on the intelli-gence payroll as early as 1964. Frederick Kempe (1990:48) in his book, Divorcing the Dictator, maintains that Noriega received his first payment from U.S. intelligence in 1958. Noriega, then, remained on U.S. intelligence payrolls for at least twenty years.

The reasons for the Administration's shift in support for Noriega are unclear. But there were many factors at work which together made Noriega's ouster, especially by invasion, an attractive alternative.

First of all, Noriega was supplying materials and intelligence to the Contras, the Sandinistas and Cuba at the same time (Lewis, 1J3/90; Reeves, 12/25/89). Noriega in fact, established close relations with the DEA, the Colombian drug cartel leaders, Israel, Libya and Nicaragua (Sciolino, 12/21/89). Frederick Kempe (1990:119) cites U.S. military sources as saying that Noriega was on the payroll of at least ten intelligence agencies around the world.

Even though for most of the time he was on the payroll of U.S. intelligence agencies, officials considered Noriega to be giving more than he was getting, Noriega's involvement with so many agencies made him increasingly powerful and increasingly difficult to control.

Another factor which may have contributed to Noriega's forcible ouster was that he had simply become less effective in controlling popular organizations in Panama. It may be that at some point, administration officials began to realize that Noriega rather than stifling dissent and maintaining the status quo was, through his behavior, contributing to the organization of popular dissent in Panama. If this is the case, it would not be the first time that the titular head of a client regime was sacrificed "in order to reform and re-invigorate the state's capacity for repression against the social movements" (Petras, 1987:91). The preference of the U.S. administration is to have repression in Latin America conducted by technocrats, not generals.

Third, Noriega himself steadfastly maintained that the Administration's hostility had always been designed to legitimate the abrogation of the Panama Canal Treaty (Alabama Journal, 12/18/89b). Left-wing parties and newspapers in many Latin American countries also expressed the opinion that the United States was less concerned with ensuring democracy in Panama than in abrogating the Panama treaty. Mexico's newspaper UNOMASUNO editorialized: "To a large degree, the destiny of Panama can be a mirror of the region's future." (Rohter, 5/11/89).

Another factor which may well have led to the actual military invasion of Panama was the insecurity of the U.S. military at a time of decreased East-West tensions. The Army's role in Third World conflicts depends on foreign military bases (New York Times, 12/18/89), and the headquarters for the Defense Department's Southern Command is located in Panama, as is a National Security Agency electronic eavesdropping facility. With one enemy decreasing in seriousness, another was needed to take its place. Daniel Shore characterized the war against Noriega and the drug cartels as fulfilling the function for the administration of a new 'evil empire' (National Public Radio, 1/27/90).

Fifth, after years of covert dealings with Noriega, which went on during the Administrations of at least four U.S. presidents, the Administration needed to discredit Noriega, if not silence him. There is evidence that the administration never wanted a negotiated settlement in Panama which might leave Noriega free to tell what he knew. The failure of the Administration to support the coup in October of 1989, led by Giroldi, may have been motivated by the fact that plans were already under way for a U.S. invasion, and that Giroldi and his people were not sufficiently under Washington's control. As Kempe (1990:371) noted: "... the Bush Administration at first tried to deny any involvement at all in the coup and thereafter attempted to discredit a man who was trying to achieve one of the Bush administration's toughest foreign policy goals — ousting Noriega." Even Giroldi's wife blamed the U.S. for the death of her husband (Kempe, 1990:393).

There were many benefits to be gained from letting the situation in Panama deteriorate to the point where an armed invasion could be "sold" to the American people, not least of which was a unique opportunity to accustom the U.S. population to armed intervention in Latin America. William Safire (12/21/89), praising the invasion, hailed "[n]o more post-Vietnam failures of nerve."

There was as well, indication that the Administration never intended to bring Noriega to trial. As William Kunstler argued, the clear intent of the invasion had been to kill Noriega, not bring him back for a trial (CNN, 1/6/ 90).

Government lawyers began immediately to lit-tempt to hide any information that might come out of the prosecution of Noriega. In late January, prosecutors filed a motion that none of the classified documents in the case would be made public since their revelation would cause "exceptionally grave damage" to the national security (Berke, 1/24/90).

The invasion also allowed the Administration to seize Noriega's documents. Even though the Government was ordered on January 19, to destroy nothing and to produce an inventory of documents seized from Noriega's residences by January 26, prosecutors did not meet the deadline and requested more time (Berke, 1/26/90). In February of 1990, lawyers for Noriega charged before the federal court in Miami that the government was "dragging its feet" in producing the inventory and that personal effects of Noriega's which might be needed for the case were lost or stolen during the invasion (Brannigan and Lambert, 2/8/90).

It is, of course, impossible to know what informa-tion Noriega could reveal. It is, however, possible to speculate. Alexander Cockburn, writing in the Nation (1/ 29/90) noted as possible embarrassing knowledge of Noriega, U.S. encouragement to organize the assassination of Sandinista leaders, and U.S. complicity in the death of Hugo Spadafora. On this last point, Kempe (1990:129) notes that Spadafora, like Eden Pastora (who was almost killed by an assassin), was operating outside the control of the Contra faction favored by Washington. In addition, Spadafora was talking openly of a Noriega-Israeli connection in Contra funding.

Mike Harari, one of Noriega's closest associates, was Israel's honorary consul in Panama and a former Mossad intelligence agent. Harari is reported to have recruited and trained members of the Panamanian security forces and is "reputed to have made millions in illicit business ventures with Noriega" (Pitt, 12/31/89). Jose Blandon, Noriega's former consul general in New York, at one point was openly talking in Washington about a connection between Donald Gregg, Bush's national security adviser and Harari. Blandon was promptly relocated outside of Washington (Kempe, 1990:334). Notes from Oliver North's diary released in 1990, indicated that immediately after the Reagan Administration revealed the diversion of funds to the Contras, North made a note to phone Bush to ask him to phone Perez to get him to take some of the responsibility (CBS News, 5/18/90). After the invasion, U.S. officials first maintained that they had captured Harari, then maintained that this report was based on erroneous information from the military (Pitt, 12/ 31/89). One Embassy official offered this explanation to reporters: "They had someone at one time they thought was Harari, who convinced them he was not" (Hockstader and Ornang, 12/31/89). Israeli newspapers, however, reported that Israel's Foreign ministry had been formally advised of Harari's arrest by the U.S. Justice Department (Pitt, 12/31/89). Harari subsequently appeared in Israel. Some Panamanian government officials speculated that because of Harari's extensive intelligence contacts, he was captured and then turned over to U.S. intelligence agents (Pitt, 12/31/89).

In May of 1990, an associate of Harari's was linked to a shipment of arms approved by the Israeli government which ended up in the hands of Colombian drug traffickers. Israel maintained that the arms were approved to be sent to Antigua, but the Antiguan government said it had neither ordered nor received the arms (Gerth, 5/6/90). Some speculate that the activities of the Israelis in Latin American were coordinated by Harari and that the U.S. government was using the Israelis to do work the CIA didn't want to handle (Mossberg, 1/17/90). Part of this "dirty work" was reportedly Harari's "work as a supplier of arms bought with drug proceeds...shipped to United States-backed rebels in Nicaragua" (Pitt, 1/3/90).

A number of Israeli "ex"-spies have appeared in Latin America playing questionable roles to say the least. In 1989, a film clip was aired in which Israeli military trainers were teaching assassination techniques to Colombian "students" one of whom was later arrested for the murder of eleven judicial investigators in Colombia. Israelis associated with the Defense Forces anti-terror apparatus have trained military officers in Guatemala, and Contras in Honduras.

Noriega had long boasted of having information on Bush. There have been two known meetings between Bush and Noriega — one in 1976 when Bush was CIA director, and another in 1983 when, as Vice-president, Bush met with Noriega in Panama. Bush at first denied having met with Noriega and then after photographs of the two were produced, he maintained that he didn't remember anything of the meeting (Kempe, 1990:30). The Wall Street Journal noted that it would be "troublesome" if Noriega could provide evidence of other meetings (Mossberg, 1/17/ 90).

Jose Blandon testified before Congress that Noriega interpreted Bush's remarks at their 1983 meeting as indicating tacit tolerance of Noriega's drug involvement. Blandon has also said that Noriega claimed to have secret material which could be used against Bush (Mossberg, 1/ 17/90). Noriega has maintained as well that Carlos Duque, a business partner, had funnelled large amounts of money to the Bush campaign through another party (Kempe, 1990:32).

While Bush was CIA chief, U.S. officials discovered that Noriega had bought tapes of secret U.S. electronic-eavesdropping operations in Panama from U.S. Army sergeants. These tapes might have told Noriega who the U.S. was spying against, and possibly how. Bush has been named by some as having made the decision to forgo prosecution of the soldiers involved and as having made the decision to keep Noriega on the U.S. payroll. Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner said of Noriega: "I don't think we can afford to let him tell everything he knows about the U.S. intelligence organizations" (Mossberg, 1/17/ 90).

There were other reasons why the Administration would have benefited from an invasion of Panama. The invasion ensured that a government to Washington's liking would take control. And control of Panama was needed. Noriega's Panama had played an important part in Cuba's and Nicaragua's ability to soften some of the harsh effects of the U.S. embargoes against those countries. A Panamanian government more obliged to the U.S. would curtail those activities and thus put more pressure on the Nicaraguan and Cuban economies. This may have been considered especially useful in the case of Nicaragua, two months before elections in which the economy was an important issue.

In addition, the Administration was clearly using the situation in Panama to discredit the upcoming elections in Nicaragua, making veiled comparisons between the two countries. A senior Sandinista leader maintained that the events in Panama demonstrated: "the danger that the United States [would] turn itself into the only great judge of democracy in Latin America" (Rohter, 12.31.89).

The Administration has done just that.

Whatever the real reasons for the invasion, the justifications presented by the Administration were patently absurd.

Lies to the Nation: The Restoration of "Democracy"

Much of the Administration's rhetoric justifying the overthrow of Noriega and the invasion centered around Noriega's anti-democratic tendencies, specifically, the vote fraud and nullification of the 1989 elections. There was fraud in the 1984 election as well, but in 1984, the Pentagon and the CIA considered Noriega to be an important asset.

Another factor which gives lie to administration claims of restoring democracy in Panama is their position on the Panamanian Defense Forces. Washington assisted in the development of the PDF. The fact that some PDF forces with U.S. encouragement eventually attempted to overthrow Noriega demonstrates very little. As Richard Koster, an American novelist living in Panama wrote in the New York Times: "...when at last in October some of them, seeing that his days were numbered, attempted to unseat him, it was not to bring democracy to Panama, but to perpetuate their dictatorship more securely" (Quoted in Carter, 1/4/90).

Bush and the State Department, however, made it apparent before the invasion that the Administration would be satisfied with the present military as long as Noriega was deposed. This was, and continues to be the case even though many U.S. officials have pointed out that senior Panamanian military leaders were heavily involved in the drug running and corruption (Lewis, 1989). Even U.S. military officials have characterized the PDF as a "totally corrupt criminal enterprise" (Rohter, 12/24/89). Hodding Carter III characterized the PDF in the Wall Street Journal as "a confederacy of goons trained by the U.S. that has been routinely stealing elections for more than 20 years while we either averted our gaze or applauded" (Carter, 1/4/90).

The Federal grand jury in Florida that indicted Noriega considered indicting several other military officers. The grand jury came close to indicting the entire Panamanian Defense Forces as a criminal conspiracy involved in drug trafficking (Lewis, 1989). As Koster (quoted in Carter, 1/4/90) noted: "General Noriega did not tyrannize by himself. He had 20,000 uniformed accomplices." Before the invasion, Ambler Moss, U.S. Ambassador to Panama from 1978 to 1982, stated: "Noriega is no lone wolf... so if you get rid of him you still have to deal with the rest of the corrupt officers who will fight not to lose their place at the trough" (Apple, 10/10/89). Just after the invasion a spokesman for the Southern Command was quoted as saying: "The P.D.F. has finally joined forces with the people. It's the beginning of a kinder and gentler P.D.F." (Gruson, 12/24/89).

One of the most ludicrous légitimations used by Bush was that an invasion was necessary to protect American lives. But, Americans are harassed and/or killed in different parts of the world every day. As Richard Reeves (12/25/89) noted:

The evidence of danger cited to justify the invasion of Panama was the killing of one soldier, the harassment of one male civilian, and the near rape of a female civilian. If it is harassment, rape and murder Bush objects to, he should dispatch the paratroopers into the New York subways.

The Administration also claimed as an aim to stop drug trafficking through Panama. Noriega had been charged (despite the objections of the Reagan Administration) in 1988 along with fifteen other people, with conspiracy to smuggle drugs and with taking more than $4.6 million to protect the Medellin drug trafficking organization (Johnston, 1/9/90). But, Noriega's involvement in drugs had been well known for years, and he had become less rather than more important to the drug traffickers. Jack Blum, who investigated Noriega's drug involvement for over two years for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on narcotics, noted that during the two years preceding the invasion, Noriega "was too hot and nobody wanted to do business with him" (Isikoff, 1/7/90). One source in Panama told Frederick Kempe that capital flight from Panama during the years preceding the invasion had a great deal to do with the fact that many launderers were afraid that Noriega's men would steal the money before it got to the banks (Kempe, 1990:4).

One former CIA analyst maintained that there was hard evidence as early as 1971 of Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking and that this evidence subsequently disappeared (PBS, 1/30/90). Frederick Kempe (1990:76,97) maintained that U.S. agents had suspicions in 1971 that Noriega was involved in heroin transshipment to the U.S. from Europe, the Far East, and South America, and also in illegal gunrunning. A New York Times source with access to Justice Department files, asserted that the government had intelligence reports that Noriega was involved with drug traffickers in 1972 (McGee and Hoffinan, 1988). John Ingersoll, the director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, even talked with Torrijos in 1972 regarding the smuggling of drugs in Panamanian diplomatic pouches and Noriega's facilitation of this drug trade (Kempe, 1990:78,79). In the mid-seventies, the Administration considered Torrijos and Noriega's drug involvement so serious a plan of assassination was considered and then because of the distractions of Watergate, abandoned (Kempe, 1990:78).

Reagan administration officials stated that Bush was told of allegations of Noriega's drug involvement in 1985. The then Ambassador to Panama, Edward Everett Briggs, sent strongly worded cables to the State Department recounting drug involvement and Noriega's possible role in the assassination of Hugo Spadafora. Briggs pushed strongly for a change in policy in relation to Noriega and Panama, but he was unsuccessful. Characterizing his cables to Washington, two former White House officials and a former senior State Department official said that they were "extremely strong" and noted that nobody seemed interested (Engelberg and Gerth, 1989). Bush denied ever seeing the cables. CBS news (5/18/90) revealed that North's diary indicated that he was aware of Noriega's involvement with drug trafficking when he was negotiating with Noriega for support for the Contras.

Two former Reagan Administration officials told the Congress in 1988 that their superiors had ignored the allegations against Noriega in the early 1980s because of his key position as a source for the CIA (McGee and Hoffman, 1988).

According to Frederick Kempe (1990:170), when Casey met with Noriega in November of 1985, Southern Command had sent to the CIA clear evidence of Noriega's drug trafficking involvement. This was two years before Noriega was indicted in Miami. Kempe (1990:170) quotes from a memo from Southern Command:

Although relatively effective, the leadership of the FDP (Panamanian Defense Forces) disregards human rights, is often arbitrary and high-handed, and is involved in illegal activities (e.g. drugs). The U.S. Government is aware of this situation and in one form or another attempts to change the behavior and attitude of the Panamanian military.

Casey, however, never mentioned drug trafficking with Noriega (Kempe, 1990:170).

In 1986, the New York Times published an article citing a Defense Intelligence Agency study which concluded the Noriega was involved in drug activities. Bush, however, maintained he had no clear knowledge of Noriega's involvement until February of 1988 (Engelberg and Gerth, 1988). Bush then maintained that he knew nothing of Noriega's drug ties until the indictment in Florida. After Donald Gregg testified in a sworn deposition that Bush and Everett Ellis Briggs, then ambassador to Panama had discussed Noriega's drug ties, Bush aides then claimed that Bush had no "certain knowledge" (Kempe, 1990:336).

Norman Bailey, a former National Security Council aid, said in an interview in 1988 that he had seen references to meetings Noriega allegedly had with major Latin American drug traffickers in a daily summary of top secret U.S. intelligence. Bush's advisor, however, maintained that Bush never saw these intelligence reports.2 Bailey, speaking before a House subcommittee hearing in 1988, stated: `The only possible reason or excuse for being ignorant of [Noriega's ties to drugs] would be because the person involved did not want to know or find out, or willfully ignored the overwhelming evidence" (Kempe, 1990:335).

Some in Congress have pointed out that Noriega's drug-running and dealings vvith the Colombian cartels were overlooked by the DEA because Noriega was giving them valuable intelligence on drug "kingpins," turning over minor drug dealers to them and that he even allowed a raid of Colombian-owned drug lab (Mossberg, 1/17/90). Noriega, however, used his status as a DEA informant to turn in rival cartel members from the competing Cali Cartel (Kempe, 1990:4). As Kempe (1990:203) noted: "Noriega was using the DEA as his own private enforcer." He also arrested drug traffickers and then extorted money from them for their release (Kempe, 1990:94). The cocaine processing lab that Noriega turned over was not fully operational and those who were arrested were released. Enough ether to produce 100 tons of cocaine was seized and then disappeared. Noriega had pushed the raid ahead despite arguments that more would be gained from waiting until it was operational (Kempe, 1990:202-203).

The DEA's involvement and cooperation with Panamanian authorities did not cease due to allegations of drug involvement. In April of 1986, the DEA arranged for a plane carrying around 752 pounds of cocaine seized in an undercover drug operation to stop in Panama. A special Panamanian police narcotics force under the control of Noriega obtained 52 pounds of the cocaine and the remaining 700 pounds were flown to the United States. DEA agents testified before a federal court in Roanoke, Virginia that they had intended the cocaine left in Panama to be used in joint DEA-Panamanian operations. A spokesman for the DEA, however, told Washington Post reporters that they did not know what happened to the cocaine. "What they [the Panamanians] did with it or how they used it is something we don't necessarily ... have knowledge of," the DEA spokesman told reporters (Pichirallo, 2/17/89).

Francis M. Mullen, Jr. head of the DEA from 1981 to 1985 wrote numerous letters to Noriega praising his cooperation in assisting the U.S. in drug operations (Pichirallo, 2/17/88). Kempe (1990:204) describes these letters as reading like "an exchange of love letters between the DEA and Noriega." John C. Lawn, DEA administrator continued writing letters congratulating Noriega for cooperation in stemming the flow of drugs. These "Attaboys" as they are called, were sent even after prosecutors had begun indicting Noriega. In one letter to Noriega as late as July 1986, the DEA's country attache wrote a letter praising Noriega for helping to stop the drug organization of one man. The man happened to be another of the Medellin Cartel's competitors. The letter also noted that Noriega retained "a small amount of cocaine!' This cocaine also disappeared (Kempe, 1990:204).

All through the process of bringing the indictments against Noriega prosecutors viewed the administration as their main adversary, and the DEA as an obstacle. Richard Gregorie, prosecuting in Miami threatened at one point to call DEA agents stationed in Panama before the grand jury. An informant, who later passed a lie detector test, provided evidence that DEA agents in Panama had tampered with a box of documents given to them to forward to Miami. The agents admitted opening the box but denied the informant's charge that they had removed Noriega's bank records. The agents never explained what they were searching for and a DEA investigation found no wrongdoing (Kempe, 1990:252).

None of the charges against Noriega covered activities after 1986 (Isikoff, V7/90). In addition, there was little physical evidence in the case against Noriega when he was indicted. The case relied primarily on the testimony of two men, Jose Blandon, General Noriega's former consul general in New York, and Floyd Carlton Caceres, a former pilot of Noriega's. In 1988 Carlton was sentenced to nine years in prison on drug conspiracy charges. The credibility of Blandon has been challenged by the administration itself (Johnston, 1/9/90). Another potential witness was Steven Michael Kalish, also a convicted drug smuggler turned government informant (Berke, V8/90).

'When in 1990, the Federal Government brought a case against a Luxembourg bank for money laundering, lawyers for the bank threatened to show that much of Noriega's money deposited in the bank came not from drug smuggling but from the United States Government. Those familiar with Noriega's finances both inside and outside the government maintained that the account held in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International under the name of the Panamanian Defense forces, was the account through which the U.S. government funnelled money to Noriega while he was an informant for U.S. intelligence agencies (Gerth, V15/90).

Panama has never been more than a minor producer and transit state for drugs (MacDonald, 1988:5). And, Panama's importance as a transit state waned due to the exploitation of other routes — through Haiti, Honduras and especially Mexico (Isikoff, V7/90). Even DEA officials admitted after the invasion that in the several years prior to the invasion, there was little evidence of large cocaine shipments through Panama. Panama's primary importance in the drug trafficking business has been as a site for money laundering and even this function had waned since the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions.

After the invasion of Panama, the Administration put pressure on the new government for modification of Panama strict bank secrecy laws. Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics matters, noted: "...if Panama is pictured as a place where you can still launder money, it's not good for banking, it's not good for commerce, it's not good for the country." Panama's strict bank secrecy laws, however, had helped transform Panama into a major international banking center (Pitt, 1/11/90), and this transformation, according to Jack Blum, a congressional investigator for Senator Kerry's narcotics subcommittee, was encouraged and assisted by Washington (Kempe, 1990:74). As Pitt (V1V 90) notes:

The institution of the bank-secrecy laws ... helped build a network of more than 600 banks and bank offices in Panama, whose deposits totaled $40 billion in 1987.

And, the banking laws assisted not only those involved in laundering drug profits. Corporations uged Panama to hide profits, and avoid taxes, and individuals and companies used Panamanian banks as a haven for flight capital (Kempe, 1990:74). Pitt continues:

But after the imposition of a series of economic sanctions by the Reagan Administration which led to a general strike and the shutdown of the banking system in March 1988, deposits shrank to $15 million as customers took their money and ran. As a result, American officials say, Panama's importance as a money-laundering center waned as drug traffickers shifted their accounts to other offshore accounts in such places as the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Uruguay, and Europe.

For that reason, Panamanian bankers say that modifying the bank secrecy laws is equivalent to closing the barn door after the horse is long gone. Worse, they say, it will hurt customers at precisely the time when Panama needs all the help it can get rebuilding its shattered economy, whose gross national product dropped 20% in 1988 alone.

Panamanian bankers largely resented Administration attempts after the invasion to force on them a new set of banking regulations. It is estimated that at least 15% of the Panamanian economy is dependent on banking and the banking industry is seen as crucial to Panamanian economic recovery. Bankers also resented regulations that meant that U.S. investigators would be allowed to go on fishing expeditions against investors (PBS, 2/14/90).

While the general public largely accepted the Administration's claims legitimating the invasion they did not feel it would make a difference in stopping the flow of drugs into the country. A Wall Street Journal/NBC News Poll conducted in mid-January, found that only 10% of those polled felt the invasion would affect the drug trade. This was fewer people (18%) than felt the invasion was a "bad idea" (Wall Street Journal, 1/19/90b). Some have argued that far from decreasing the amount of drugs flowing into this country, the resentment of the action in Latin America and refusals to support" further plans may have the effect of increasing it (Oakes, 1/26/90).

Summary

John B. Oakes, former Editorial Page Editor of the New York Times, wrote after the invasion:

The President's rationale for this long planned, clumsily executed and cynically named Operation Just Cause was hypocritical and false. Not one of his reasons for pressing the Panama button stands up under scrutiny. Mr. Bush showed contempt for truth, contempt for domestic and international law, contempt for the norms of diplomatic decency (Oakes, 1/26/90).

The invasion of Panama is indeed a "mirror of the region's future." The U.S. government has stepped up its intervention in Latin America in the afterglow of the politically successful invasion, and there seems to be little domestic opposition to stop it.

Christina Jacqueline Johns, Ph.D., is an associate professor of Graduate Criminology at Alabama State University, Montgomery, Ala. 36195.

References

Alabama Journal (12/18/89b) "Panamanians Anticipate U.S. Military Action,":1.
Apple, R. W., Jr. (10/10/89) In a Panamanian Maze, Search by the Cautious. New York Times:12.
Berke, Richard L. (1/8/90) Lawyers For Noriega Spurn Deals and Assail Witnesses. New York Times:9.
Berke, Richard L. (1J24/90) Prosecutors Seek Time on Noriega Data. New York Times:A4.
Berke, Richard L. (1/26/90) Curtain to be Lifted on Noriega Wealth. New York Times:A4.
*Brannigan, Martha and Wade Lambert (2/8/90) Noriega's Lawyers Criticize U.S. Tactics. Wall Street Journal:B3. Carter III, Hodding (I/4/90) U.S. Played God in Panama and Created Its Own Devil. Wall Street Journal:A13. Cockburn, Alexander (I/29/90) Beat the Devil. The Nation:114-115.
Engelberg, Stephen and Jeff Gerth (5/8/88) Officials Say Bush Heard '85 Charge Against Noriega. New York Times. Gerth, Jeff (I/15/90) Case Against Bank May Shed Light on Noriega's Finances. New York Times:l.
Gruson, Lindsey (12/24/89) Troops in Panama Report Gains in R.estoring Order. New York Times:A1. Hockstader, Lee and Joanne Omang (12/31/89) U.S. Officials' Accounts are Contradictory. Washington Post:1A. Isikoff, Michael (1/7/90) Analysts Challenge View of Noriega as Drug Lord. Wa,shington Post:A25.
Johnston, David (1/9/90) Noriega Prosecution May Hinge on Word of a Few. New York Times:6.
Kempe, Frederick (12/21/89) U.S. Policy Errors May Have Forced Nation to Undertake Massive Invasion. Wall Street Journal:A4.
Kempe, Frederick Dicorcint
Lewis, Flora (1/3/90) Tale of Two Dictators. New York Times:A21.
MacDonald, Scott B. (1988) Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade. New York: Praeger. Mossberg, Walter S. (1/17/90) While Noriega May Have Some Secrets to Disclose, His Testimony Isn't Likely to Cause Bush Trouble. Wall Street Journal:A22.
New York Times (12/18/89) "The Army vs. the Ma-rines.":22.
Oakes, John B. (1/26/90) Bush in Panama: A Tragicomedy. New York Times:A15.
Petras, James (1987) "Political Economy of State Terror: Chile, El Salvador, and Brazir Crime and Social Justice (Nos. 27-28, 149-171).
Pichirallo, Joe (2/17/89) DEA Gave Panamanians Cocaine. Wa,shington Post:A8.
Pitt, David (12/31/89) U.S. Denies it Has Top Noriega Aide. New York Times:8.
Pitt, David E. (1/11/90) Panama to Assist U.S. on Drug War. New York Times:9.
Pitt, David E. (1/15/90) New Government Starts to Put Panama on Track. New York Times:8.
Reeves, Richard (12/25/89) Intervention in Panama De-means U.S. Atlanta Journal and Constitution:18A. Rohter, Larry (5/11/89) Latin Nations, Though Disgusted by Noriega, Remain Wary of U.S." New York Times.
Rohter, Larry (12/24/89) Panama Replaces its Army with a New Security Force. New York Times:A4.
Rohter, Larry (12/31/89) Accounts by U.S. Differ on Search of Residence. New York Times:8.
Safire, William (12/21/89) Morning-Show War. New York Times:31.
Wall Street Journal (1/19/90b) Progress in Panama:1A.

Footnotes

1 References for quotes: Carter, 1/4/90; Reeves, 12/25/89.

2 These intelligence reports were based not only on informant testimony, but in one case on electronic intercepts (McGee and Hoffman, 1988).