The Bush Administration quietly has taken some key legal steps aimed at widening its anti-drug role in Latin America. Mounting violence associated with cocaine has raised the stakes in what has become an all-out war.
In Colombia, Medellin cartel violence fundamentally has challenged the ability of the Barco Administration to govern. In Peru, the Shining Path movement has made agreements to protect coca growers and processors in exchange for their loyalty and financial support.
In response to the growing threat posed by drug criminals at all levels, the Bush Administration has beefed-up suppression of drug production and trafficking at its source. The December 1989 seizure of cocaine kingpin Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha's assets and his death at the hands of a Colombian antinarcotics unit marked the culmination of long efforts by the U.S. and Colombia to apprehend the Medellin Cartel leadership. The role of the U.S. was multifaceted. U.S. intelligence contributed significantly in tracking down Rodriguez Gacha at one of his estates. U.S. logistical support helped coordinate the raid. The U.S. Justice and Treasury Departments helped investigate Rodriguez Gacha's money laundering and froze some $62 million of his wealth hidden in accounts around the world.1 Finally, the Colombian units raiding the estate used U.S. Blackhawk helicopters and other military hardware. The fray ended in a bloody shootout with Rodriguez Gacha himself dying of helicopter gunfire while gripping a Galil submachine gun.
The Administration's recent legal steps open the way to expanding the role of U.S. military personnel in the anti-drug effort. Last November, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) produced an opinion on the 1878 law known as the Posse Comitatus Act, which bars the U.S. military from taking part in law enforcement. The OLC determined that the law applies only to domestically based U.S. troops, not those stationed overseas.2 Under the reinterpretation, American soldiers abroad may now hold power of arrest. Its intention is to enhance the capacity of U.S. forces involved in drug enforcement.
An earlier Bush Administration initiative has similar potential impact. Last June the OLC put forth a separate opinion that FBI and other federal law enforcement officials can seize fugitives overseas without the consent of the host country.3
Currently, the Administration is seeking "new legislation to provide Federal law enforcement agencies with the appropriate authority to order U.S. registered aircraft, or any aircraft flying over U.S. territory, to land if there is reasonable suspicion that the aircraft is in violation of a Federal criminal statute related to aviation drug smuggling."4
From the Bush Administration view, these changes in the rules of engagement will strengthen the U.S. anti-drug hand in Latin America by freeing U.S. agents from prior restrictions on their power. In the nebulous underworld of the drug business, the only prevailing rule is that power itself rules. To bind oneself with legal restrictions in the face of a wild, unruly enemy is seen as imprudent at best, suicidal at worst. From a Latin American perspective, these unilateral reinterpretations in U.S. law are tantamount to declaring that U.S. policy decisions will supersede international law, leaving gringos to maneuver in their territory with virtual impunity. Some U.S. officials are equally alarmed. Representative Don Edwards (D-CA) notes that the OLC opinion on the FBI, "creates the appearance that the U.S. does not respect the laws of other nations. In effect, it makes the U.S. an international outlaw."5
Fear of this scenario may drive foreign governments to question the wisdom of permitting U.S. troops to be stationed or conduct maneuvers on their soil. Consider that American troops at foreign bases intervened in the domestic political affairs of the host country on two occasions in two recent months. Last November in the Philippines, at President Corazon Aquino's request, American troops assisted loyalist troops against uprising rebels. In Panama, U.S. Southern Command troops made up approximately half of the forces engaged in trying to oust Manuel Noriega. Only the Panamanian operation was remotely drug-related, but the precedent is all too clear. These actions by foreign-based U.S. troops are an uneasy reminder to host governments — that U.S. bases abroad provide convenient stepping stones for military intervention.
For Andean coca-producing nations — Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia — where small numbers of U.S. Special Forces and Coast Guard, in conjunction with Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) advisors operate, the issue is an especially sensitive one. Latin Americans of all political.ilks criticize the U.S. approach to the drug situation as overly reliant on shortsighted measures to confront drug lords and coca farmers, the very existence of whom, they feel, are the product of poverty and injustice. Indeed, the FY 1991 Bush drug program proposal allocates seventy percent of its funds to reduce supply and thirty percent to reduce demand.6 This is simply out of step with the priorities of Latin America. Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora states in an October 1989 speech,
Narcotrafico is a consequence of poverty. .. Coca must be replaced by development. Money should be invested in Bolivia to fight narcotrafico. Development and new jobs must be promoted.7
The Bush Administration's approach has complicated the effort. The December 1989 invasion of Panama incurred heavy costs and poisoned the atmosphere for inter-American diplomacy. The death of untold numbers of Panamanians,8 U.S. forces' corralling of several foreign embassies (including the Peruvian embassy) in Panama City,-and the forced entry and search of the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence by U.S. troops all served to compound Latin American enmity toward U.S. intervention. The sound rejection of the Bush Administration's subsequent plan to deploy warships, including an aircraft carrier, off the coast of Colombia does not come as a surprise. It proved politically harmful to Bush, and underscored the bad mood of our southern neighbors. In light of the overwhelming disapproval expressed by Latin American governments in the Organization of American States after the U.S. expedition into Panama, it is astonishing that the Bush Administration approached the carrier group initiative with such detachment, even failing to consult with the Colombian government before news leaks got the word out.
The poor judgement exhibited by the Bush Administration points to a deeper imbalance underlying the U.S. relationship with Latin America. The basic problem is Washington's long-harbored mentality that its own policy interests in Latin America override the interests and needs of those nations themselves. For decades the U.S. has sounded off its policy priorities to the region, as evident in recent policy pronouncements directed at the debt, Nicaragua, and Panama, and now drugs. President Bush, in a press conference in Barranquilla, Colombia after the February 1990 drug summit, admonished that "growing coca for the international drug market is immoral and wrong."9 Marilyn McAfee, a U.S. embassy officer in Bolivia typifies the attitude in her blunt remarks,
We need to see the [Bolivian] government demonstrate that it can execute the eradication program stipulated by its own law. We need to see the government take a very hard position against corruption.. .William Bennett was clear when he said the U.S. awaits the active help, cooperation, and political will of Bolivia and Peru, and if these do not occur, we would be forced to reallocate our money and assistance into projects and opportunities that may offer a better chance of success. . .10
The White House is clear in demanding its own priorities, but somehow turns a deaf ear to Latin Americans' own outcries. So yet again, Latin American is expected to follow suit as Bush catapults drug enforcement into the international policy limelight.
The drug issue is a complicated one. Perhaps more than anything, Colombians, Peruvians, and Bolivians perceive that the Bush Administration intends to fight the lethal drug war on their soil. This has them understandably worried. But little is known about the feelings of the citizens of those countries toward the drug issue. Hence, it is appropriate to examine popular opinion in Latin America more closely in order to gauge the acceptability of a range of policy alternatives.
The Survey
How do people whose lives may be profoundly affected by anti-drug policy react to domestic government and U.S. initiatives? During the month of September 1989, I surveyed 108 individuals in the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia on the drug issue. Cochabamba is unique in that it is the only major city in the vicinity of Chapare, the nation's largest coca growing region. The capital of its province, Cochabamba is clearly influenced by cocaine, coca, and drug money. Respondents were generally not coca growers nor obvious drug dealers, yet all were aware of the drug situation.
The reaction of the media, political parties, and the government to the September 5, 1989 national drug policy speech by President Bush was so striking that I felt compelled to investigate popular attitudes toward the issue. This study is a modest effort to record Cochabambinos' thoughts toward coca, cocaine, the antidrug campaign, and U.S. involvement. It does not imply that the opinions recorded are necessarily representative of the population of Bolivia nor of Cochabamba itself.11
Respondents were asked to select as many items as they agreed with per multiple-choice question. Since the survey was administered in written form, all subjects are literate. By virtue of this fact, the poll excludes a major portion of the population. Generalizing broadly, informants in the sample are mostly urban, young, educated, single, male, and middle class.
Results
Over ninety percent of all respondents said that illicit drugs are "a problem" and that it is "correct to have an anti-drug campaign in Bolivia." This indicates that nearly all subjects surveyed view illicit drugs in a negative light and feel it is appropriate to take action to remedy the condition. When asked why, seventy-five percent responding mentioned that drugs threatened the youth in Bolivia. Although only a recent phenomenon, cocaine addiction is a growing problem in Bolivia, primarily among teenagers.
When asked what the goals of an anti-drug campaign in Bolivia should be, no consensus emerged. Forty percent selected the choice, "reduction of cultivation of coca (only that which is used for cocaine production)," suggesting that the concept of coca reduction is at least acceptable to nearly half of the respondents. However, only seven percent selected "termination of all coca production." Fifty-one percent cited "ending cocaine production" as a desirable objective. The most popular choice, selected by sixty-four percent, is "termination of narcotrafficking (narcotrafico)." Replies to this question signal that respondents tend to target cocaine producers and narcotraffickers (narcotraficantes), not coca growers (cocaleros).
Although respondents support the theme of antidrug action in Bolivia, they are at odds over the question of what specific measures should be taken. In the most common selection, sixty-four percent supported "education against the use of illicit drugs." This, in fact, was already evident as illustrated by "Say No to Drugs" banners written in Spanish and draped over conspicuous locations. Tellingly, forty-eight percent called for "social development in the countryside" as a measure to combat the drug situation. Those respondents seem to draw a link between underdevelopment and the propensity to become involved in some aspect of the drug production process. Only fourteen percent favored "opening a dialogue with narcotraffickers."
Forty percent supported "financial and material aid from other countries." Twenty-one percent backed "logistic and intelligence cooperation with other countries." Twenty-three percent supported "extradition of narcotraffickers to other countries." Surprisingly, forty-two percent supported the "death penalty for captured narcotraficantes." This implies that respondents prefer dealing with the drug situation through domestic Bolivian means, however harshly, rather than with outside assistance, guidance, or justice.
Regarding the Bolivian military, thirty-two percent backed "launching a military fight against narcotraficantes." Yet only seven percent supported "enlisting the military to respond against coca growers." This adds support to the notion that prevailing attitudes are more favorable toward coca growers than narcotraffickers. Finally, the "use of herbicides to eradicate coca" had the backing of only five percent.
When asked whom anti-drug actions should target, a hierarchy of villains emerged. Only twelve percent selected coca growers as proper targets, while thirty-eight percent determined drug consumers as such. A bony finger jabbing skyward, one elderly man bellowed,
There is only one way to solve the drug problem. Only one solution will work! We have to concentrate on the consumers. All male drug users must be castrated, and all women users must be sterilized! That way they won't continue the cycle by having children who are addicts. I guarantee that the problem will disappear in one generation. This is the only solution!
This informant demanded more draconian action than most, but his point that consumers lie at the foundation of the problem was echoed by many.
Fifty-eight percent implicated cocaine producers as appropriate targets of anti-drug efforts, and sixty-eight percent chose narcotraffickers. Eighteen percent responded that local authorities mandated to fight against drugs should themselves be the objects of anti-drug actions. Again, the inquiry reveals a tendency to defend coca farmers and concentrate upon narcotraffickers and producers. Even anti-drug authorities are more suspect than coca farmers. A man in his mid-30s lamented,
The police here are so corrupt. They have been in alliance with the drug dealers for so long, none of them even know how to be law enforcers.... The narcotraficantes pay the police for protection. Even when the police make a bust, they keep part of the seizure and sell it themselves. How else could a mere police officer afford to own a beautiful house and new cars?
The level of confidence in local authorities appears low. In response to the query, "Who should be mobilized in the anti-drug campaign in Bolivia?" subjects' selections sound a strong anti-interventionist beat. Forty-nine percent maintained that the national police should be involved in the effort, while forty percent supported the involvement of Bolivian special anti-drug agents (UMOPAR)12 and the same proportion backed the involvement of the regular Bolivian military. Nineteen percent favored enlisting multinational United Nations advisors, and only fourteen percent backed mobilizing U.S. DEA advisors. Thirteen percent supported using UN troops, and seven percent, the lowest figure, invited U.S. troops to join the effort. Generally, as the magnitude of proposed foreign intervention increases, respondents' support for the action wanes.
The issue of U.S. troops is an especially sensitive one among Bolivians. The 1986 "Operation Blast Furnace" wherein 160 U.S. soldiers engaged in joint expeditions with Bolivian troops to destroy cocaine processing laboratories, brought widespread jeers from Bolivian citizens at the time. One male survey respondent soberly said,
I respect the U.S. for its power and leadership. .. But I don't want your government to ever come into my country again. Your government killed Che Guevara. The CIA assassinated him right here in Bolivia.... For that, I can never forgive the U.S.
His poignant remarks unmasked a deep-seated resentment of the U.S. which may be typical of Latin Americans. Such sentiments cannot be patched over easily through some quick fix or whirlwind diplomatic tour. This point should not be lost upon policy makers.
On the issue of coca reduction or eradication, fifty-three percent say a favorable method of reducing coca output is to "support social development in the countryside." That majority recognizes rural poverty as a debilitating condition that drives campesinos to engage in coca cultivation. Seventy-one percent support "encouraging growers to gradually reduce coca cultivation by offering them substitute crops that earn them the same as coca." Relatively broad support for this choice signals that Cochabambinos surveyed sympathize with coca farmers and do not wish to see their livelihoods suddenly destroyed without adequate alternatives.
All suggestions of using force through either military troops or spraying herbicides to eradicate coca were soundly rejected. Employing Bolivian military troops to pull up coca received the most backing of these unpopular options, yet had only twelve percent approval.
One middle-aged man declared,
I'm tired of hearing talk about the coca "problem" and how we can eliminate the coca fields. And I'm sick of your President Bush complaining that we don't have the will to crack down on coca growing. Hell no, we don't have such a will! Why should we destroy the campesinos' lives and screw-up our economy? If he's so concerned about peoples' health, why doesn't he eradicate the tobacco fields in Virginia?
This vocal opponent of coca eradication and U.S. intervention epitomizes widely shared sentiments: many Bolivians surveyed feel the U.S. anti-drug program is insensitive to their realities and dumps the burden of displacement and adjustment squarely upon their society.
When asked how they consider coca leaves, seventy percent responded that they are "something beneficial for those who know how to use them." Only eleven percent maintained they are "something dangerous that should be eradicated." Response to this question alone is instructive. When considering the coca plant itself, respondents tend to see it as an innocuous or positive entity. Probably for this reason, coupled with the fact that coca farmers are a long-standing indigenous enclave in Bolivia, the majority of respondents defend and even embrace the cocaleros. Conversely, the cocaine producers and narcotraffickers are disliked and discredited for the most part, because it is they who convert the beneficial coca into the deadly chemical mix of cocaine.
Finally, only seventeen percent responded in the affirmative when asked if the anti-drug campaign in Bolivia were a success. Forty-seven percent replied in the negative and twenty percent claimed it is only a partial success. Thus, while most believe it is "proper" to have an anti-drug campaign in Bolivia, few called it successful to date, and half were openly dissatisfied with it.
Implications for Policy
This unscientific poll of Cochabambinos lends insight to devising U.S. international drug policy. First, apparent far-reaching support for an anti-drug program in Bolivia warrants that some action be taken. Besides respondents' support, the major media and state officials also embrace the idea of drug control. Minister of Interior Guillermo Capobianco calls the drug fight "vital."13 The President of the Narcotics Commission of the Bolivian House of Deputies characterizes it as "deserving support.""14 Even the Non-Aligned Movement has denounced drugs as a "scourge" and calls for international cooperation to combat it.15 Evidently, the issue retains legitimacy beyond the borders of the U.S.
It is important to note that participants in this survey distinguish between coca and cocaine. While most did not claim to use coca leaf themselves, it is widely recognized as an important element of Andean culture, used for chewing, medicine, tea, and ritual. A 1979 survey of 3,513 campesinos in seven different departments in Bolivia shows ninety percent regularly consume coca leaves.16 To attempt to eliminate it would be seen as an attack upon the heritage of both the Aymara and Quechua ethno-linguistic Indian groups, who comprise over half of the population in Bolivia.17 Conversely, cocaine powder is seen as a harmful, unnatural product — a perversion of the coca culture. It is still perceived as mainly a product of U.S. and European appetite, but now that the consumption problem is hitting closer to home — there are 100,000 cocaine and crack addicts in Bolivia 18 — they have their own reason to join the battle against drugs. U.S. policy would do well to capitalize on Bolivians' concerns and promote rehabilitation centers and further education against the use of cocaine there, while leaving the traditional use of coca unmolested. U.S. policy should frame the anti-drug program in terms of Bolivian interests, not only U.S. interests.
The Eradication Question
A comprehensive approach cannot ignore the sensitive issue of coca eradication. Informants were generally more concerned about the economic fallout that would ensue from a cut in coca production than its cultural sanctity. Coca farming provides a livelihood for at least one of twenty Bolivians.19
The proposal to use herbicides to eradicate coca was repudiated by nearly all respondents. In addition, few supported total eradication of coca, but nearly three-quarters backed a gradual crop substitution program that would not hurt farmers' incomes. An acceptable policy choice would be to redouble efforts to find a suitable crop substitution program that provides an incentive for reducing coca, rather than imposing it. Herbicidal eradication is considered unacceptable and should not be a U.S. policy option. Coca eradication programs in Bolivia have faltered in the past. Primarily due to the lack of economic alternatives, coca growers vehemently have defended their trade in the face of mounting government pressure. The controversial law (Law 1008) passed by the Bolivian Congress in July 1988 requiring eradication of all coca except in the traditional growing area of the Yungas met with stiff opposition from coca farmers. The Reagan Administration forcefully prodded the government to pass the bill, even threatening to cut aid if the law were not enacted. Consequently, coca growers widely blame the U.S. for the forced reduction of their crops. When the motorcade of Secretary of State George Schultz was bombed the following month in La Paz, retaliation for the coca law was cited as the motive.
In the 1980s, coca grower federations grew increasingly active in protesting government initiatives against coca production and distribution. Numerous non-violent mobilizations have become bloody demonstrations, resulting in several campesino deaths at the hands of government troops and police. In January 1989, more than 200 growers staged a three week hunger strike to protest the new Law 1008, and to demand indemnity for those killed in prior mobilizations. The conflict appears to be hardening on both sides.20 Well-organized coca growers in alliance with workers' and miners' groups have evolved into a politically powerful force. Several left-of-center political parties represent the interests of coca growers.21 With their entry into the political system, coca farmers can no longer be dismissed as marginal. U.S. policy architects must recognize the shifting political landscape in Bolivia, and work respectfully within it.
Some keys to reducing coca cultivation are: (1) Do not attempt to eliminate all coca production — leave enough alone to fill the needs of traditional users who use it in the form of teas, medicine, and for chewing. The quantity used for such purposes is estimated to be about 12,000 metric tons annually.22 (2) Keep eradication voluntary, and avoid the use of herbicides. (3) Continue to search for adequate crop substitutes. (4) Most importantly, support economic sustainability by opening U.S. markets to substitute products — whether they be coffee, nuts, silk, or other commodities. A guaranteed market with stable and fair prices will do more for the security of the Bolivian people and economy than millions in bilateral aid.
The Military Role
On the question of employing U.S. military personnel in drug enforcement, the results of this survey indicate a widely-shared disfavor of any foreign troops. This feeling among respondents may be especially acute, as Bolivia holds the distinction of having had the most changes in government of all nations in the world, largely due to military coups d'etat. 23 This legacy has instilled distrust of its own military, not to mention foreign troops.
But if drug abuse has become a pestilent "national security threat" in the U.S. and is increasingly affecting Latin Americans, does this justify deploying U.S. troops to suppress production, seize drug barons, and interdict shipments?
In the U.S. Congress, calls for a firm military role grew louder as the 1988 elections approached. In May 1988, the House of Representatives voted to demand that the military "seal the borders" to drug traffic within 45 days. The Senate voted 83 to 6 to expand the use of the military for drug enforcement. Representative Arthur Ravenel (R-SC) even called for the military to shoot down on sight any aircraft thought to be carrying drugs.24
Some proponents of military involvement assert that since Naval ships regularly patrol the Caribbean, interdicting drug shipments would require only minor adjustments. 25 But a closer look reveals that interdiction at sea is an extremely demanding assignment. With more than one and a half million square miles in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, and every single craft from barges to pleasure boats a potential drug runner, the task becomes monumental. Critics argue that taking the military out of its element and charging it with interdiction would be pernicious, and could harm troop morale. The U.S. Coast Guard is the best equipped to take on such a task, and has done so for over two centuries, they maintain.
But a sophisticated study published by the Rand Corporation in January 1988 explodes the notion that interdiction is an efficacious means of combatting the drug trade. The study refutes the convention that spending more money for interdiction maneuvers (by any agency) would yield a proportional reduction in drug imports. Its salient point is that at least seventy-five percent of the money spent to buy cocaine goes to the street and near street-level dealers. Only ten percent of the final price goes to the production and smuggling agents. This equation means that even large seizures have only minuscule impact on the final street price of the drug. As such, interdiction has little effect on demand or on the lucrativeness of the drug industry. The report maintains that even if the present interdiction rate could be doubled, the retail price of cocaine would only see a negligible ten percent increase.26
It is clear by now that analysis of the drug issue must take into account the wider macroeconomic dynamics that stimulate the industry. In view of the Rand report, it appears that devoting money and resources to the interdiction effort, whether it be through the Coast Guard or the Navy, is a losing battle. Even when the Navy is not involved, U.S. attempts to intercept and board vessels on the high seas invoke the wrath of sovereign governments. The Coast Guard's intention to board and search a Cuban-piloted ship under Panamanian registry in February 1990 involved Cuban rejection of U.S. authority in the Caribbean, Panamanian accession to U.S. requests to board the ship, and Mexican denial of permission to U.S. authorities to board the ship once it entered its waters. The incident resulted in the Coast Guard strafing the suspected freighter with gunfire as it defiantly chugged onward to Tampico, Mexico. Searched by Mexican authorities there, it was found to be free of any contraband. The international tension created by the episode, prompted because the vessel matched a "profile" and its captain "acted suspiciously,"27 is incongruent with the limited overall potential gains of interdiction by any means. Including the U.S. Navy would only magnify the difficulties.
On the micro level, the matter of being in one's element is crucial. 28 Military training does not prepare soldiers to make the type of decisions demanded of law enforcement officials. The judgement required of anti-drug officers is different and the mind-set dissimilar to that of military personnel. In combat, troops search out the enemy and destroy it. In drug busts, agents must first identify the enemy among many undistinguished people in a colossal area and apprehend it, non-violently if possible. The captured has the rights accorded any suspect and must be treated fairly.
On another level, employing U.S. troops could jar the authority of civilian government. Intelligence gathering for drug operations would have to include spying on U.S. citizens, since they would be included in the pool of suspects. 289The interdiction task could open the U.S. Navy to arbitrary searches of sea craft. The assignment to seal the nation's borders could be a forerunner to bodily searches of international tourists, business people, and even airlines pilots. The law enforcement side of the antidrug action would necessitate arrests of captured suspects. Since the reinterpretation of Posse Comitatus, Green Berets abroad could now engage in such activity as needed. All of this would clearly infringe upon the civil liberties of individuals as well as upon the sovereignty of nations, and could spell a formula for military hubris. If successful in solving a problem that civilian authorities found too difficult, military leaders may decide that they are the most skilled agents to run the rest of the country as well, and seek enhanced powers or even dominance over the entire governing apparatus. This scenario is unlikely in the U.S., but the message is not to be ignored. In Latin America, it is all too common a refrain.
The expanding role of the U.S. military in the antidrug campaign is alarming. In 1985 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the U.S. military be mobilized in combatting drug production and trafficking in Latin America.30 Unlike his predecessors, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney supports military involvement. In September 1988, Cheney directed all U.S. military commanders to develop plans for a major role in the drug war 31 The Bush Administration National Drug Control Strategy proposal for FY 1991 openly plans a more vigorous role for the U.S. armed forces. Coupled with the recent legal opinions from the Department of Justice, prospects for disastrous confrontations between U.S. troops and indignant, nationalistic Latin Americans on their territory rise precariously.
But rather than U.S. military involvement in Latin American drug wars, Bush should help strengthen Latin American institutions already charged with the task. The U.S. government could cooperate with the governments of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to address glaring weaknesses in the anti-drug program — such as a need for radar detection of major air trafficking routes32 — but only under those regimes' authority and control.
The prospect of foreign military intervention is unpopular and unsettling to many. Besides the fact that only seven percent of the respondents in this survey favored inviting U.S. troops to Bolivia to fight drugs, the Minister of Defense, the Chancellor, and the President of Bolivia all have sought repeatedly to assure its citizens that Bolivia would reject U.S. troops. Political survival dictates the need to make such public reassurances. Mobilizing the U.S. military has ominous implications for Latin America, for civil liberties of U.S. citizens, and for civilian authority in politics. The potential benefits do not warrant the risks run by forcing a military role.
The Drive For Development
Latin American criticism centers on the very premise of U.S. drug control strategy. Numerous Bolivian leaders criticize the policy for "overemphasizing repressive measures." That is, U.S. policies advocating eradication of crops, apprehension of drug dealers, and interdiction of shipments all call for confrontation, a fight. Miguel Urioste, leader of the United Left party worries,
The repressive nature may bring us to what is happening in the Huallaga in Peru where campesinos have decided to take up arms in the face of a purely repressive policy of combatting narcotrafficking.33
Urioste suggests that placing balanced emphases on both social development actions and "repressive" actions will improve chances for success.
Despite resistance from some quarters in Bolivia and Peru, now all three of the major coca producing nations (Colombia included) have agreed in principle, under U.S. urging, to consider employing their own armed forces in the drug enforcement program."
Details have not been released, but troops will likely be involved in apprehending drug barons, destroying cocaine processing laboratories, and interdiction. The Bush Administration sees the move as an appropriate response to a serious threat. But will it improve the situation?
Consider that U.S. authorities at the local, state, and federal levels have been unable to stop even smalltime domestic drug dealers from operating all-night drive-through service, unable to close down more than a few "crack houses," and helpless to prevent daily murders in the nation's capital. Surely the U.S. government is one of the best-financed, powerful, and established in the world. The governments of the Andean Ridge countries are immeasurably poorer in resources, power, and popular legitimacy. And their opponents are networks of ultra-wealthy, organized international drug barons. The 1980s is described as the "lost decade" in terms of economic development in Latin America, with mushrooming debt, wild inflation, and endemic unemployment forcing declining living standards. During the same period, narcotraffickers have provided opportunities for employment, scarce hard currency, and prosperous business. This dynamic has strengthened the illicit drug trade in relation to governments preoccupied with crisis management. 35 In some cases, the narcotraficantes become benefactors of their local communities, financing festivals, building roads, community centers, and even schools.36
In this context, it is unrealistic to expect those troubled regimes to make significant strides in the antidrug fight. They simply do not have sufficient financial, material, or popular foundations necessary to defeat drug barons.
But the answer is not to expand the presence and mission of U.S. personnel in the region. On the contrary, the best way for the U.S. to combat cocaine in Latin America is by promoting truly sustainable economic development there. Only the construction and maintenance of a stable and equitable social order where citizens have a position and stake in society will grant those governments the popular legitimacy and revenue base enabling them to win back some of the advantages currently held by narcotraficantes. Long range economic development plans and requisite support that address the needs of the poor are essential and long overdue. After all, it is the poor who take on most facets of the drug supply process as growers, coca processors, or transport "mules?"37 Gradually alleviating poverty removes the primary incentive to engage in such activity.
Real commitment for support is measured in dollars, not rhetoric. The Andean countries need development assistance to ameliorate conditions for the impoverished, as well as balance of payments help with the debt, and funds to help train and equip anti-drug units. But the recent record of U.S. aid to Andean countries is revealing. In 1987-88 Bolivia received only 0.8 percent of all U.S. foreign aid money (17th place among recipients), Peru received 0.7 percent (18th place), and Colombia even less.38 During the same period, four smaller Central American countries each received greater support. The disparity suggests that the Reagan Administration perceived its interests and influence as concentrated on the isthmus, and assigned South America a lower priority. But such a focus is imprudent. With the staggering damage inflicted by cocaine upon the U.S. society, it is unquestionable that U.S. interests warrant directing a larger slice of the foreign assistance pie to the Andean countries.
The U.S. and other developed nations' support for development in Latin America must consider the unique economies of supplier countries. The debt burden, low international commodity prices, and inadequate infrastructures severely hinder their development. Their legacy has been one of reliance on boom and bust commodities like guano, dye, sugar, and tin for sale to developed nations. When demand for a commodity plummets due to shifts in consumer countries' preferences or the emergence of substitutes, the commodity loses its value and producers lose their living.
The International Coffee Agreement that established stable coffee prices and export quotas collapsed last July, largely due, in Colombian President Virgilio Barco's words, "to lack of political willingness on the part of the United States."39 The subsequent fifty percent drop in coffee prices deprives Colombia of revenues on her number one legal export, and Peru of her top licit agricultural export. This shortfall undermines the drug fight. Now the U.S. Commerce Department wants to double import tariffs on Colombian cut flowers, Colombia's number three export.40 It accuses Colombia of selling flowers at below market prices and thereby taking the market unfairly. But a doubling of the tariff would gnaw away at Colombian producers' profits and wound the economy. A weak Colombian economy drives the unemployed to enter the drug trade, and reduces the tax base needed to address development needs and fund the anti-drug program. U.S. drug enforcement officials cry that U.S. trade policy is dictated by other government agencies distant from drug policy, and that trade measures go into effect automatically.41 But the U.S. "Drug Certification Program" slaps drug supplier countries making "insufficient progress against drugs" with economic sanctions, including suspension of bilateral assistance and of support for multilateral loans. If U.S. policy can link the drug issue to economics in punitive ways, why can it not make similar converse linkages to help countries that are making progress through vigilant effort?
Decrying the narcotics trade while simultaneously penalizing the economies of Andean countries on the front lines of the drug battle amounts to hypocrisy and puts U.S. resolve into question. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) proposes that the U.S. exempt Bolivia and Colombia from all tariffs and quotas, modeling such a policy on the Caribbean Basin Initiative. 42 His proposal is a wise one, but excluding Peru from favorable treatment because of "the absence of badly-needed economic reforms" 43 (i.e., its independent economic philosophy that does not swallow the World Bank agenda) regresses into politicizing the drug issue.
Supporting development and easing up on "repressive" anti-drug measures hold better prospects for success because they respect the clear preferences of Bolivians participating in this survey and of political leaders in that country. Beset with acute social problems that overshadow the drug situation, beleaguered Latin American governments have no desire to take on unpopular causes. According to this survey the anti-drug cause is popular, but only if pursued through certain limited channels. Attempting to force unwanted "solutions" will undermine support of those governments and weaken them further vis-a-vis the narcotraffickers. Working within the limitations of government institutions and heeding popular preferences will have an opposite, salutary effect. The U.S. should recognize the difference and promote policy accordingly. Simply listening to Latin Americans would mark a welcome change in U.S. policy.
Mark Heil is with the Office of Research Services at The American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016. (202) 885-3440.
References
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Footnotes
1 Isikoff (7 December 1989) 2 Isikoff and Tyler (16 December 1989). 3 The two legal opinions are internal Department of Justice documents and have not been publicly disclosed. As a result, thorough analysis is impossible. For a lucid discussion of the potential Naval extraterritoiral effect of Posse Comitatus, see Coffey (1988). 4 The White House (1989, 67). 5 Edwards (1989, 2). 6 Isikoff (26 January 1990). 7 Opinion (15 October 1989). 8 Estimates on number of Panamanians killed in the invasion vary widely. Branigin writes that "more than 500 civilians and soldiers" were killed. Branigin (1990). The Nation cites Panamanian witnesses who put the death toll at 2000. The Nation 250: 114. 9 The White House (15 February 1990). 10 Los Tiempos (17 September 1989). 11 The pool of respondents is a non-probability convenience sample. Efforts to capture a representative sample were frustrated due to insufficient numbers and skewed response groups. Nearly all informants were approached while at leisure in one of six outdoor plazas in the city of Cochabamba. 12 A series of bilateral treaties signed on 11 August 1983 between the United States and Bolivia included creating the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (UMOPAR). UMOPAR was intended to function as an elite paramilitary unit with a mission to move against major drug trafficking organizations in Bolivia. For a critical assessment of UMOPAR's progress, see Kline (1987, 22- 27). 13 Presencia (23 October 1989). 14 Los Tiempos (24 September 1989). 15 Opinion (4 September 1989). 16 Carter and Mamani (1986, 46). 17 Weil (1974, vii). 18 McCoy (29 September 1988). 19 Kawell (29 September 1988). 20 Latinamerica Press (7 July 1988). Also, see Healy (1988). 21 Realidad Nacional (1989, 67). For example, the United Left (IU) and the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) back the coca growers. 22 Serramp Torrico (1988, 68). 23 Healy (1988, 105). , 24 Ravenel (1988). 25 Kristol (28 March 1988). 26 Science (1988, 14). 27 Bussey (1990). 28 Anderson ( 15 October 1989). 29 Mabry (1988, 62). 30 Wilson (20 June 1985). 31 Zeese (1990). 32 Bagley (1988a, 90). 33 Los Tiempos (8 September 1989). 34 The Washington Post (15 January 1990). 35 Bagley (1988b, 199). 36 Gillgannon (1988, 310). 37 For example, Lee writes that coco growers earn less than one percent of the final street value of their crop. Lee (1988, 91). Lernoux explains that pisacocas, coca leaf treaders who mash the leaves in a vat mixed with kerosene, water, and sulfuric acid into paste, earn $10 to $15 a day. Lernoux (1989, 89). 38 OECD (1989, 255). 39 Treaster (24 September 1989). 40 Isikoff (13 February 1990). 41 Isikoff (13 February 1990). 42 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and the International Narcotics Control Caucus (1990). 43 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and the International Narcotics Control Caucus (1990,108).
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