As the drug legalization debate develops, the question of the meaning of that word, "legalization," grows in significance. Advocates are obliged to say what legalization means and show how it will work.

Does "legalization" mean that drugs are available to minors? Advertised on television? Sold at the corner drugstore? In vending machines? Distributed by public dispensaries? With prescriptions? At clinics? With licenses, and tax stamps, and sold at retail like alcohol? Used publicly?

Details of various drug legalization plans have been put forward by politicians, organizations, columnists, and private citizens. They have practically nothing in common, except that they all stand for non-belligerence toward drugs.

But what form does that non-belligerence take? This paper attempts to survey the variety of proposals that have been drawn in exquisite detail, and others that have been suggested in more general terms.

The legalization plans seem to fall into three groups, with one very significant other. The three groups may be called decriminalization, limitation models, and regulation and taxation. The significant other is the OMI Initiative.

A. Decriminalization

The term "decriminalization" has often and prominently been used interchangeably with "legalization,"1 but in this paper, it refers to a subcategory of legalization.

The word entered the popular vocabulary in the early seventies, and was used to describe how eleven state legislatures2 relaxed their marijuana laws. Under the new laws, marijuana remained illegal under both state and federal law, and one could be legally convicted and punished for simple possession. Such possession, however, was no longer an offense for which a citizen could lose his liberty upon being charged with the crime, and thereby become saddled with a permanent criminal record. As a result, prosecutions for marijuana came to resemble prosecutions for speeding: a ticket, a fine, and you might have to show up in court, but you could not be arrested and hauled away to the station. And getting busted would not hound you for the rest of your life.

The 80s drug war vanquished the marijuana decriminalization movement. Interestingly, however, no "recriminalization” effort has been successful, although there have been some symbolic stiffenings.

Significantly, one state decriminalized marijuana judicially as well as legislatively. In the 1975 case of Ravin v. State,3 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the prosecution of citizens for cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal use was an unconstitutional violation of the citizens' right to privacy guaranteed in the Alaska constitution.

Ravin did not "legalize" marijuana in Alaska, since marijuana remained illegal under federal law. What Ravin did was to shift the responsibility for law enforcement from the state authorities to the federal authorities.

There is a colorful precedent to this approach to law reform.

The year was 1923, the state was New York, the governor was Al Smith, and the drug was alcohol. Three years had passed since prohibition had been swept into the Constitution, the federal laws, and the state laws. Every state but Maryland had its own version of the Volstead Act, the federal prohibition law.4

The state courts were jammed with liquor cases. Crime and violence were rampant from widespread illicit commerce. In response to the crisis, State Senator Louis Cuvillier introduced a measure he claimed would give badly-needed relief to the criminal justice system. It was ingeniously simple, and cost nothing. The measure merely repealed the state prohibition laws, and replaced them with nothing.

Since federal prohibition laws continued to apply, the legal status of alcohol would not change: it would remain just as illegal as before, but only under federal law. If Senator Cuvillier's bill were to become law, the federal police, the federal courts, and the federal prisons would have to take over the job of enforcing the prohibition laws, if there were to be any enforcement.

With surprisingly scant opposition — consisting largely of tired old jeremiads about the evil of drink — the bill passed the legislature and landed on Al Smith's desk.

Smith, a popular Democrat, was a rising star in national politics. He tormented over whether to sign the bill, fearful that approval would forever cost him the presidential nomination he wanted so deeply. After listening exhaustively to all sides, he waited until the last possible moment to declare his approval.

His long and tortuous statement explaining his decision was classic Al Smith. He was a New Yorker and New Yorkers did not like Prohibition, and it should not be necessary to ask why. But since he could not put it that way, he indulged his fertile wit to build a case that repeal of the state prohibition laws would actually strengthen the national prohibition effort. Here, for example, he dismisses the argument that repeal "sends the wrong message."

The repeal of the [state prohibition laws] will mean that violations of the Volstead Act will hereinafter be prosecuted by the Federal courts. This, to my mind, seems to be desirable, as it will fix in the minds of offenders the thought that they have violated a federal statute intended to effectuate an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, rather than have them harbor the thought that they are simply standing against what a great many of them may be led to believe is merely a local regulation.5

With Al Smith's signature, the bill became law. Responsibility for "street level enforcement" thereby shifted to federal authorities, and that is why, in the late movie, Prohibition-era police in New York are called the "feds." They were the "feds."

Smith eventually received the nomination of his party for president in 1928, but lost the election to Herbert Hoover. His opposition to prohibition, and his Catholicism, are said to have contributed to his defeat.6

The forms of decriminalization described above might be called de jure decriminalization, because all involved some tinkering with the statutory law. None required major policy changes. In the seventies, marijuana remained illegal in all states, and in the 20s, alcohol (commerce) remained illegal in all states, despite repeal of state laws.

As war between nations can be defined as the failure of diplomacy, domestic war can be seen as the failure of policy. Nations may cease hostilities without signing formal peace treaties, and without declarations of victory or surrender by either side. Weapons are put down, but not away. Rhetoric softens. The belligerents cool down. That, in a word, is decriminalization: cooling it in the war on drugs.

The cooling can occur de facto as well, where there are no changes in the statutes, but they are enforced less stringently than before. In his book, Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control, Mark A. R. Kleiman calls this approach "enforcement reduction," and recommends it as the "best alternative for dealing with the nation's marijuana problem."7

The best example of de facto decriminalization is Amsterdam. There, "soft" drugs remain illegal, but are treated by the authorities as if they were legal. Cannabis is readily available for purchase in more than three hundred coffee shops and bars, and the police look the other way.8

Veterans of the American sixties and early seventies recall a time when you had to practically try to get arrested for pot. A fair number of the 39 states that did not officially "decriminalize marijuana" in the 70s did not attempt to enforce the marijuana laws with great assiduity. A modicum of discretion was sufficient to remain in possession of one's liberty. Police and the public were tolerant, if not approving, of personal marijuana use. That era, perhaps, could be described as one of de facto decriminalization.

Decriminalization, whether de jure or de facto, would appear to offer an attractive alternative to the drug war in states where the courts are clogged with drug prosecutions. In Massachusetts, for example, a recent report of the Boston Bar Association reported that the "flood of drug cases" has brought the Massachusetts judicial system "to the brink of extinction."9 The task force considering the "crisis" apparently did not consider any alternatives to continued war, such as a transfer of some or all drug cases to the federal courts, through a simple device like the 1923 Curvillier bill.

Curiously, a shot has recently been heard in the war for shifting drug cases from the federal courts to the state courts. The report, from the Federal Courts Study Committee, calls it "reallocation."10 It is not clear if the committee proposed the repeal of federal prohibition laws in order to achieve the shift.

Among avenues of law reform, de facto decriminalization has the distinct advantage of not requiring the complicity of the legislature. Police officers, one recalls from junior high civics, work for the executive branch of government, whose job it is to execute the laws. If police don't arrest, people don't get arrested. All it takes to institute such a policy is the will of a single executive — a mayor, governor or president — and the political moxie to carry it out.

There are two principal drawbacks to decriminalization. One is that because the drug market remains illegal, underground networks of illegal producers and distributors will continue to supply the public demand for drugs. With no legal commerce, there could be no taxes paid or collected, no FDA-like controls over drug purity and dosage, no legal and peaceful remedies for settling industry disputes when things go sour. Criminal organizations remain in control of the drug traffic, except in the case of cannabis, where backyard gardens may well supply most consumers and their friends.

The other problem with decriminalization is that it does nothing to curb drug abuse, ignoring the problem of why people abuse drugs in the first place.

Hence a number of legalization advocates have urged schemes to protect people from drugs by limiting the drugs to which they would have legal access.

B. Limitation Models

The idea behind limitation models is that limiting availability of drugs will help to protect drug users, and the public, from adverse consequences of drug use. Although prohibition could perhaps be called the ultimate limitation scheme, a better example is the control of medical drugs through prescriptions signed by doctors.

To a slight extent, today's alcohol laws employ limitation approaches, by restricting alcohol sales to certain places (licensed premises) at certain times (legal operating hours, closed Sundays and holidays) to certain people (unintoxicated adults).

A variety of limitation schemes has been proposed for drugs, though none has been put into statutory form.

Mayor Kurt Schmoke of Baltimore, who has valiantly promoted consideration of drug legalization, says that the drug problem should be treated as a public health problem, not a law enforcement problem.11 He has not gone into much detail, but his Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. Maxie T. Collier, has called for the "medicalization" of drug use. In a recent speech, Dr. Collier called for the "machinery within our society to allow the medical profession to deal with the problem of addiction,"12 suggesting that doctors should be controlling the keys to the nonmedical drug cabinet.

The same term, "medicalization," has been proffered by Tod Mikuriya, M.D., for a plan "based on a concept that responsibility and accountability would be achieved through producers and users paying the costs of the drug's side effects."13

Dr. Mikuriya would make drugs available to adults who have passed written tests and medical examinations through "pharmacy-based voluntary drug users' cooperatives?'"14 Personal home cultivation" of marijuana would be "legal."15 "Product-liability exemptions" for alcohol and tobacco would be rescinded, and alcohol and tobacco taxes would be earmarked for drug prevention and treatment."16

Without dismissing medicalization, it is not clear to what extent doctors would consider controlling access to non-medical drugs within their professional calling to heal the sick. Nor is it clear to what extent they would want to take on the responsibility of deciding who gets legal access to legal drugs and who continues to rely on his cousin in Jersey.

Lawyers are frequently heard to complain that the nation's failure to come to terms with drugs has been dumped into the lap of the criminal justice system. Medicalization would appear to transfer it to the lap of doctors. That may especially please the civil trial lawyers, who would delight in the prospect of pinning responsibility on doctors for the stupid things people do on drugs.

Taking the Mikuriya approach a step further, Richard S. Wilmot, Ph.D., and Timothy M. Ryan, M.A., have recommended a "drug license," like a driver's license.17 To become eligible to use drugs legally, one must, as in the Mikuriya proposal, take classes and pass an examination, but Wilmot and Ryan would have the user prove to only the satisfaction of the state authorities, that you can handle drugs. Once you pass the examination, you'd get a plastic card with your personal identity code, which, when placed into an ATM-like machine, would deliver the requested drugs (assuming you haven't exceeded your quota) and, presumably, charge the purchase to your VISA account.18

Eric E. Sterling, director of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, has described a limitation plan whereby pharmacists would control drug distribution, without the necessity of doctors' prescriptions. Pharmacists would be licensed to sell drugs and would be under "strict legal and ethical responsibilities not to sell drugs inappropriate to a given purchaser?"'19 The "consulting pharmacist" would "intervene ... to protect both the naive first-time experimenter as well as the person who already may have substance abuse problems?"20

Sterling is the first to caution against great expectations for such a plan. He asks, "[I]f we walked into a bar and ordered a drink, would we stick around if the bartender asked us, 'Why do you want a drink? How many drinks have you had in the past weekr 21 Several legalization advocates have proposed that drugs be available legally only within the confines of "clinics" or "treatment centers." The Hartford Mayor Carrie Saxon Perry, suggests "government distribution of drugs through neighborhood-based drug treatment clinics, the way recovering heroin addicts now get methadone. No legalized corporate pushing. Low prices. And a requirement that users receive a lecture and/or counselling along with their fix.22

Ronald Dworkin, M.D., urges "institutionalization!"23 He would set up addiction-maintenance programs operating out of deliberately-drab government clinics.

"Addicts" would go "to obtain their 'fix'," and stay until the drugs wore off.24 Legalization schemes that grant or withhold legal rights or benefits based on whether one is an "addict" run up against the reality that the preponderance of drug users are not drug addicts. Addiction maintenance holds promise for reducing predatory street crimes carried on to maintain expensive habits but does nothing to reduce or eliminate the huge illicit economy supplying part-time ("casual") users. Some casual users who would prefer to avoid the illicit market might thereby take it as an incentive to increase their drug use so as to qualify as an "addict," knowing that they would then have legal access to their drug of choice.

None of the limitation schemes mentioned above have been put into statute form, hence important questions remain unanswered. Chief among them is — What will happen to the black market? If there is anything we should have learned in the fifty year experience with prohibition, it is that people who want drugs will get drugs, whatever the government says. Any attempt by the government to rope drugs off to just the "right" people in the just the "right" circumstances must encounter that reality. The "wrong" people will continue to rely on the illicit market. Illegal drug production and distribution will regularly be prosecuted. Little will have changed. Since unlimited supplies of drugs will remain available illegally, what is the point of imposing legal limits?

C. Regulation and Taxation

It is the absence of such limits that characterizes regulation and taxation schemes, of which the familiar alcohol model stands as an unfortunate example. The principal function of regulation and taxation models is to drive out the illegal market by creating a legal market with which the illegal market cannot compete.

The first "drug" regulation and taxation schemes applied only to marijuana. In 1971, a bill was introduced in the New York senate by Senator Leichter,25 which would-set up a Marijuana Control Authority to license and control commerce in cannabis, as commerce in alcohol is presently licensed and regulated. A notable difference from alcohol regulation laws, however, is that the bill specifically prohibits advertising. This feature has been repeated in nearly all the subsequent regulation and taxation proposals.

The Leichter bill was introduced regularly during the seventies, and by 1979 had attracted a number of cosponsors, including Senator Joseph L. Galiber, who later proffered a bill of his own. In 1979, state senators Jack D. Gordon and Dempsey J. Barron of Florida introduced a measure that would give each of Florida's sixty-seven counties the local option to permit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis, subject to local regulation.26 A 10 percent sales tax was imposed, earmarked for local tax reduction. The bill is especially notable for its brevity, which stems largely from the fact that regulatory details are delegated to the Boards of County Commissioners. Thus if the option were exercised by each county, Florida could wind up with sixty-seven different cannabis regulation and taxation schemes. Some would see that as not necessarily a problem.

A comprehensive cannabis regulation and taxation bill was introduced in Massachusetts in 1981.27 The Cannabis Revenue and Education Act regulated commercial production and distribution of cannabis, and imposed a tax based on THC content. Half of the net tax proceeds collected went to a Cannabis Education Trust, which carries on an active public education campaign against marijuana abuse. As with the Leichter bill, advertising is prohibited.

The Massachusetts bill codified to a large extent the 1974 recommendations of the Committee for a Sane Drug Policy, a membership association based in Boston, and affiliated with NORML.28 Its proposal would create a legal market in cannabis, subject to the usual controls over purity, labeling, and the other mechanics of a regulated market. Interestingly, no excise tax would be imposed on cannabis — only the regular state sales tax would apply. That feature, combined with floating prices, would effectively preclude the emergence of an illegal market. If the legal product is barely more expensive that the illegal market, it is unlikely that a substantial fraction of consumers would rely on the illegal market. Under the CSDP/ NORML plan, retail sales would be limited to licensed pharmacies.

The first comprehensive "turn-key" federal statute for the legalization (regulation and taxation) of cannabis was the Cannabis Revenue Act,29 drafted in 1982 by a group of lawyers and economists called the National Task Force on Cannabis Regulation, also a NORML affiliate, but independent of the CSDP. The Cannabis Revenue Act might best be called federal "umbrella" legislation, because it gives states a variety of options, and sets ground rules for their interaction with the new federal law.

Option A was for a state to retain its prohibition laws, as many states and counties remained "dry" after the repeal of national (alcohol) prohibition.

Option B was to repeal local prohibition laws, and pass laws dealing only with distribution of marijuana to minors and driving under the influence. Without further regulation, the state could plug into (and thus qualify for revenue from) the new federal scheme, which imposes the usual regulation on all levels of commerce in cannabis, from production to consumption: it licenses people to engage in the business, it collects the tax, it protects consumers from fraud and adulterated cannabis, it prohibits advertising, and imposes penalties on people who violate the new laws. And it sends money to state capitols.

Under Option B, this picture of legal cannabis emerges: it would be sold by licensed retailers in one-ounce packages, packed loose like pipe tobacco or herbal tea. "The package would bear a tax stamp, and the label would reveal the origin of the cannabis, the identity of the contents by species and variety, the net quantity, potency and a cautionary label."30

Option C for the states, under the Cannabis Revenue Act, was for the state to impose its own regulatory or taxation scheme, or both, in addition to the CRA. This is what happens today with alcohol and tobacco regulation laws. For example, states could impose license quotas, prohibit public use, or earmark revenue for a particular use. However, states would not be eligible for revenue sharing if they legislated in conflict with federal law.

In the year following publication of the Cannabis Revenue Act, regulation and taxation bills were introduced in the state legislatures of Oregon and Pennsylvania. The Oregon bill 31 restricted retail sales to state-operated stores and earmarked all the revenue to local school districts and local law enforcement. The Pennsylvania bill removed all sanctions from personal cultivation and possession (up to 2.2 lbs.) and subjected the commercial cannabis industry to regulation by the Department of Agriculture, restricting retail sales to state-owned liquor outlets.32

Following a six-year hiatus in which talk of legalization as a solution to the drug problem took a back seat to slogans and fried eggs, three new legalization models appeared. The proposals were distinguishable from prior ones in that they regulated and taxed cocaine, opiates, and other currently illegal drugs as well as marijuana.

In a paper presented to the 1989 Third International Conference on Drug Policy Reform, Nancy Lord, M.D., proposed a comprehensive federal statute called the Drug Crime Elimination Act. The bill, drafted for introduction in the U.S. House of Representatives, repeals current federal prohibition laws and allows states to develop their own regulatory schemes, withholding all federal funds from any state that flatly prohibits the drug trade. Short of prohibition, states are given very wide latitude to restrain drug use and commerce, including time and place restrictions, sanctions for driving under the influence, drug-testing programs for public and private employees (authorizing termination of "employees who are using drugs")33, denying entitlement programs on the basis of drug use,34 providing for "drug use as grounds for divorce or as a factor in determining child visitation or custody rights, or as evidence of child neglect 35 and making "such other restrictions and regulations necessary to preserve the public order ..."36

A serious question arises as to whether such broad authority on the part of states to "regulate" the drug trade would not replace one form of tyranny for another. If the government gives up the right to prohibit adults from using drugs, but gains the right to exercise even greater control over people's personal lives, a leap may have been made from the drug war pan to the fire.

In the 1989-90 session of the New York legislature, Sen. Joseph L. Galiber (who had ten years earlier cosponsored the Leichter proposal)37 introduced an alcohol-clone bill, 38 which he succinctly described in the title of an explanatory memorandum as "A Bill to Make All Illegal Drugs as Illegal as Alcohol."39 The bill would set up a State Controlled Substances Authority to license the manufacture and sale of controlled substances (currently illicit drugs). Sales would be made by registered pharmacists.

The newest drug legalization proposal to be introduced as legislation comes from Missouri, It was introduced in the 1990 session of the House of Representatives by Rep. Walton.40 The bill licenses the production, distribution and sale of all drugs. The sales tax is set at 25 percent of retail.

Unlike the other regulation and taxation models, the Missouri bill imposes strict limits on where drugs may be used, prohibiting the use of "controlled substances" (the term takes on new meaning) "... in the presence of a minor under the age of eighteen years or outside the confines of a private residence or in a place of public accommodation or conveyance."41 Meaning, no legal drug use in bars, restaurants, offices or cars, and not even at home if the kids are around.

A novel feature of the Missouri plan is that it expands the conventional definition of cannabis, giving statutory recognition, for the first time, to the species cannabis Americana. Such recognition represents a tribute to the many American botanists who have developed this species over the past decade, as the crackdown on importation, and paraquat spraying, brought about the explosion of domestic marijuana production. At the beginning of this survey, it was said that most legalization plans fall into one of the three categories: decriminalization (tolerance, de jure or de facto), limitation models (prescriptions, pharmacies, clinics, quotas, etc.) and regulation and taxation (legal, open market to adults, alcohol without advertising). But there is a notable Other, especially because far more so than any legalization measure that has been discussed above, it is closer to becoming law.

It is the Oregon Marijuana Initiative's "Drug Abuse Program Funding Act of 1990."42 If OMI obtains the requisite signatures of registered voters, the measure will be on the ballot November 6, 1990.

If adopted by the voters,43 the new law would carve out an exception to current cannabis prohibition laws, allowing personal use and cultivation, with a certificate from the county health department, available for $50 each with the revenue going to county drug and health programs.

The OMI measure combines features of all three approaches to legalization. It is typical of decriminalization approaches in that it represents a relaxation of laws, de jure, a pulling-back not all that dissimilar to what Al Smith did in 1923. People with a small pot patch out back will now have to be prosecuted by the federal authorities, because cultivation would no longer be a state offense.

The measure is like a limitation scheme in that it "licenses" cannabis growers and users, by issuance of a certificate (but falling far short of issuing ATM cards). It also authorizes physicians to prescribe cannabis, which is what the "medicalization" advocates like Dr. Collier have called for.

And, warming the heart of any regulation and taxation advocate, the measure raises revenue.

The OMI people have put forth a creative legal measure which can be called legalization because it implements a non-belligerent approach to cannabis use and cultivation. In a sense, however, the measure cannot legalize cannabis, because cannabis remains illegal under federal prohibition laws. To its credit, the measure defies categorization.

Chief Petitioners for the OMI are John Sajo and Laird Funk. They, along with an indefatigable grass roots organization, have done more to make legalization a reality than any author of any other plan mentioned in this paper.

How to evaluate?

As legalization plans come along, they can be scrutinized from many angles. But there are three simple questions for which any plan should offer clear, unequivocal answers.

1. What drugs, exactly, would be legalized? It's easy to say that marijuana should be treated like alcohol or tobacco, but does that mean high-potency THC-spiked drinks,in cola machines, or hashish-laced Winstons? Legal LSD? Crack? Ecstasy? Where, exactly, is the pharmacological line to be drawn between legal and illegal drugs?

2. Who will get rich? Will the profits from a legal drug market go to private industry, as they do today from alcohol and tobacco, or will they go to the government, like profits from state lotteries? There are billions of potential dollars out there, and a legalization proposal must be punctilious about directing this revenue windfall.

3. This question is the hardest. How will the proposed legalization scheme impose an acute sense of responsibility on drug users for the consequences of their own drug use? The government cannot police people's sumptuary practices, but it can provide sanctions for violating the rights of others. A good legalization plan must promote and enforce individual responsibility in drug use. Just how it does that must be examined closely.

Conclusion
To believe in legalization is to believe that a democratic society can more peacefully, more economically, more efficaciously, more morally, and more Constitutionally come to grips with drugs, thereby halting the crime and violence associated with the drug trade, the economic drain, the burden on police and the courts, and the pernicious erosion of individual liberties that the drug war has wrought.

It is ambitious, if not naive, to assert that this coming to grips can be achieved by replacing one set of laws with another. If we cannot control drugs with arrest and prosecution, how can we be expected to control them with licenses and certificates?

Changes in the drug laws will mean nothing — and are not likely to occur — without significant changes in public and private values and attitudes toward drugs.

That change is happening. That is why it is important to say what, exactly, legalization means.

"The bogus ideal," wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "dwells in generalities, and shirks the details."44

Richard M. Evans is an attorney with offices at 56 Main St., Northampton, Mass. 01060. (413) 586-1348.

Footnotes
1 E.g., Nadelmann, Ethan A., "Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives," Science, September 1989
2 Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon
3 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska, 1975)
4 Kyvig, David E., Repealing National Prohibition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1979, p. 23
5 New York Times, June 2, 1923, p. 1
6 The Columbia Encyclopedia, Second Edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 1950
7 Kleiman, Mark A.R., Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control, Greenwood Press, New York, 1989, p. 182
8 Altman, Howard, "If Drugs Were Legal," Fairfield County (Conn.) Journal, February 28, 1990, p. 27
9 Drugs in the Community: A Scourge Beyond the System, Final Report of the Boston Bar Association Task Force on Drugs and the Courts, March 15, 1990, Boston, p. 2
10 "Court Study Calls for More Judges, Greater State Role," USA Today, March 30, 1990, p. 4
11 Schmoke, Kurt, "It's Worth A Try," The New York Daily News, March 11, 1990, p. 2
12 Speech before the 1989 Biennial Conference of the American Civil Liberties Union, Madison, Wisconsin
13 Mikuriya, Tod, M.D., "A Comprehensive Proposal To Legalize Drugs," California Physician, December 1989, p. 19. See also, "Medicalization of Drug Abuse Control," Drug Policy 1989-1990, A Reformer's Catalogue, The Drug Policy Foundation, Washington, D.C., p. 239
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Wilmot, Richard S., and Ryan, Timothy M., "The Drug License," Drug Policy 1989-90, A Reformer's Catalogue, The Drug Policy Foundation, Washington, D.C., p. 146
18 Ibid.
19 Sterling, Eric E., "A Model for a Regulated Market in Drugs: Advantages and Drawbacks," paper for The Third International Conference on Drug Policy Reform, Washington, D.C., November 2-5, 1989
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 3
22 Bass, Paul, "If Drugs Were Legal," Fairfield (Conn.) County Advocate, February 19, 1990, p. 24
23 Dworkin, Ronald, "Drugs and the Principle of Utility," Baltimore Evening Sun, May 30, 1990
24 Ibid.
25 Senate No. 4944, February 16, 1971, 1971-72 Session; Senate No. 3980, Assembly No. 6025, March 15, 1979, 1979-80 Session
26 Senate No. —, April 11, 1979, 1979-80 Session
27 House No. 1737, 1981 Session. (The author was the principal draftsman of this legislation.)
28 "A Massachusetts Proposal For Making Marijuana Legally Available,' Committee for a Sane Drug Policy/National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, March, 1974
29 "The Regulation and Taxation of Cannabis Commerce," Report of the National Task Force on Cannabis Regulation, December 1982. The author was chairman of the Task Force.
30 Ibid., p. 8
31 Senate No. 497, 1983 Regular Session
32 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania Marijuana Cultivation Control Act of 1983, introduced by Sen. T. Milton Street
33 Lord, Nancy, Drug Crime Elimination Act, Sections 6(e) and 6(f), 1989
34 Ibid., Section 5(i)
35 Ibid., Section 5(j)
36 Ibid., Section 5(m)
37 Supra, p. 7
38 State of New York, 1989-90 Regular Session, S. 1918, Controlled Substances Bill, Sen. Joseph L. Caliber
39 "A Bill to Make All Illegal Drugs as Legal as Alcohol," Explanatory Memorandum to S. 1918, Drug Policy 1989-90, A Reformer's Catalogue, The Drug Policy Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1989, p. 400
40 State of Missouri, House Bill No. 1820, 85th General Assembly
41 Ibid., Section 195.237
42 "Drug Abuse Program Funding Act of 1990," "An Act Relating to Marijuana and Drug Abuse Prevention," as published on back of Signature Sheet for Initiative Petition
43 As of July 1990, it appeared that insufficient signatures were obtained to put the measure on the ballot.
44 Letter to Harry Drinker, quoted in Family Portrait, by Catherine Drinker Bowen, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1970