What is rhetoric? We have probably all heard the media and politicians make use of phrases such as "empty rhetoric" and "mere rhetoric." Such usage has distorted the definition of the word rhetoric to the point where people think of rhetoric as something underhanded, sneaky, suspect, and outright dishonest. With this in mind, I recently began a rhetoric course by asking the students, "What is rhetoric?" One student enthusiastically waved his hand and confidently responded, "Lies!" It is not.

Rhetoric is the art of persuasion. It is a powerful tool by which speakers and writers persuade listeners and readers to believe and to act in accordance with what they say and write. Effective rhetoricians — those who succeed in persuading their audiences — can bring about either harm or good. Abraham Lincoln, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Harriet Tubman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Adolph Hitler, Winston Churchill, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela are examples of effective rhetoricians; they persuade their audiences to think, to respond, and to act in specific ways.

Recent presidential administrations have attempted to persuade us that they are serious about correcting the problems associated with drug use. They have maintained the "war" metaphor, a rhetorical tactic with origins in the 1930s. They have begun campaigns with catchy slogans like "Just Say No." They have allocated money for advertisements that show us a frying egg. In 1989, President George Bush attempted to persuade us that he is the most concerned president to date on the drug issue by appointing William J. Bennett Director of the newly created Office of National Drug Control Policy — the Drug Czar.

When Bennett accepted the directorship, he also accepted the responsibility of being the administration's spokesperson on the subject of drugs. At first glance, given the newness of the office, Bennett appears to be in a ground-breaking position. He seemingly has an opportunity that no other individual United States citizen has had before: Bennett's drug rhetoric can shape our thinking, change our attitudes and perceptions, and persuade us to support government drug policy.

Thus far, we can say that Bennett is a successful rhetorician; recent polls show that most Americans believe that drugs are our nation's number one problem. However, if Bennett's rhetoric is persuasive, why isn't it solving the drug problem? Why is the problem continually worsening?

To answer this, we have to look back six decades to Bennett's predecessor. While Bennett refers to himself as "the first 'drug czar'" and while his is the instrumental rhetoric, in actuality, Bennett is not the first drug czar, nor is his rhetoric new, nor is it likely to work.1 Bennett's rhetorical approach to drug issues — the persuasive arguments he uses — is at least six decades old and closely mirrors that of the first drug czar, Harry J. Anslinger.

In an article in the 20 February 1960 issue of The Nation, entitled "Federal Narcotics Czar: Zeal Without Insight," Stanley Meisler unofficially bestows the title of drug czar on Harry J. Anslinger, who was the Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) for more than three decades, from its inception in 1930 until his retirement in 1962.

Discussing Anslinger in both complementary and derogatory terms, Meisler juxtaposes Anslinger's zealous and generally honest approach to drug traffic control with a discussion of some observers' distress at Anslinger's Draconian police methods. In painting this dual picture of Anslinger, Meisler attributes Amslinger's longevity to the Commissioner's "persuasive manner."2 Anslinger was, in fact, so persuasive during his frequent Capitol Hill testimonies that, with seeming ease, he effected passage of drug laws carrying incredibly stiff penalties. For example, in 1956, Congress passed the Narcotics Control Act with provisions "so stringent that they set a two- to ten-year sentence for persons convicted of possessing narcotics for the first time, refused to allow suspended sentences and probation in many cases, and permitted the death penalty for any adult, addicted or not, who sold narcotics [including marijuana] to anyone under eighteen."3 Although this occurred toward the end of Anslinger's official career, it is indicative of his thirty-two-year reign during which he also effected passage of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 and the Boggs Act of 1951, both acts severely increasing fines and prison sentences.

Meisler goes on to caution his contemporary readers (Anslinger was still FBN Commissioner at the time) that "while guiding Congress to one point of view, Anslinger also helped generate an atmosphere which inhibits objective thinking on the subject."4 This is precisely the danger we face today with the rhetoric of William J. Bennett — loss of objectivity. This loss occurs when speakers do not present factual data, but rely instead on emotional appeals, scare tactics, unsubstantiated figures, and unnamed authorities.

To demonstrate this point, I will compare and contrast the rhetoric of Harry Anslinger and William Bennett, using speeches from each individual before similar audiences: on 5 June 1966, Anslinger spoke at St. Francis College in Loretto, Pennsylvania, and, on 11 December 1989, Bennett spoke at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Anslinger's target drug was LSD, and Bennett's was cocaine, each a popular drug of its time.5 Although the speakers' tones are quite different — Anslinger's is positive and congratulatory while Bennett's is negative and accusing — the similarities in the speeches are striking and almost seem to establish a genre of drug czar rhetoric: both speakers roughly follow a problem-cause-solution arrangement, citing an identical cause and attributing blame to similar groups.

While the speakers do share a number of similar approaches to solving drug-related problems, the major contrast appears in the solution sections of their speeches. Bennett has almost wholly assumed Anslinger's solutions of decades ago; however, there is one exception in the speakers' solutions, and that exception is critical in explaining why the drug problem in our country has worsened since Anslinger's reign as drug czar and will continue to worsen during Bennett's.

In introducing and establishing the problem, both speakers make a reference to the institution and to morals. Bennett reflects on having been a law student and a proctor at Harvard, calling the experience "morally formative," establishing his credibility by complimenting the institution's responsibility for shaping his moral character.6 He reminds his Harvard audience that in a previous appearance, as Secretary of Education, he found it necessary to admonish the institution and that it responded favorably and acted on his criticisms. Bennett then explains that he hopes that his appearance as drug czar will reap similar results.7

Anslinger makes a much stronger moral statement but does not chastise the institution, St. Francis College. He begins his speech saying, "This is the first time in American history that so many students have declared their independence of moral values and proclaimed a new standard, 'is it right for me, not is it good for the world community?"8 Unlike Bennett, Anslinger does not point an accusing finger at his audience; rather, he says, "Let me qualify; this has not happened here at St. Francis College" (p. 1). Anslinger's is obviously the more politic move in that in hearing praise of their moral character, his audience will be more disposed to keep listening.

Once the speakers establish the premise that the illicit drug problem is a product of moral decline, both Anslinger and Bennett point to the group responsible for the cause — the rhetorical tlheory of Kenneth Burke would call this group the scapegoat. Both speakers point, at least in part, to the American academic community. They do not, however, agree on which of its members is the real culprit — the active liberals for Anslinger, or the passive intellectuals for Bennett. At any rate, they lambaste the university community (Bennett much more so than Anslinger), for perpetrating and condoning the use of illicit drugs.

Anslinger lays responsibility for the problem on three groups, two of which are within the university community: first, "weak willed administrators who somehow confuse academic freedom with anarchy" and upon whom "a very great deal of the unrest and trouble being generated on the campuses of United States colleges today can be blamed directly"; second, "ultra-liberal professors" who in the space of five years caused drug abuse to "spread like wildfire" (p. 1). The third group Anslinger blames, and who suits the times quite well, is what he calls the "'God is dead' crowd" who are "worse [than) Communists."9 He accuses these "fakers" of seeking "cheap publicity" in order to, like drug addicts, "lead you into the paths of darkness" (pp. 3 & 4).

While Anslinger sees the faculty and Communist perpetrators of the drug problem as actively pursuing their prey in the form of innocent college students, Bennett accuses the academic community of lethargy. According to Bennett, in dealing with the illicit drug problem, "the country's major idea factories have not just shut down, they've hardly even tooled up" (p. 2). He describes them as "intellectuals" who "seem complacent and incurious," who "don't want to be bothered," and who have "little to contribute, and little of that has been genuinely useful or for that matter mentally distinguished" (p. 2).

Bennett invites intellectuals to do "serious research and serious thinking on both the theoretical and the practical levels," and he names two current and one former Harvard scholars as "exceptions" to the lackadaisical attitude in academia. This is one of the few noninsulting remarks contained in his speech, obviously an attempt to ingratiate himself to these particular listeners.

Both Anslinger and Bennett agree that the illicit drug problem is the result of moral decline perpetrated at least in part by the academic community; however, they differ somewhat in their use of proofs in substantiating their arguments. As in most of his public discourse, Anslinger relies on examples and numbers. For this occasion, he chose a brief and, quite uncharacteristic for the lover of gore that he was, non-horrific example, but one to which his audience could relate because it involves a college student.10 Referring to drugs on college campuses, he says, `The first real shock came at Oxford where the grandson of former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan died from an overdose of heroin and cocaine. From that time on it appeared all over the world" (p. 1). He then brings the problem closer to his audience, using numbers: "This has happened (the abuse of drugs) at 16 colleges and universities in this State [PA] and 100 throughout the nation" (p. 1).11

Bennett attempts to use testimony as proof, referring to his unnamed "experts" who are capable of refuting, what he claims is, the consensus of the intellectual community. That consensus, Bennett says but does not substantiate, is two-fold: intellectuals believe either "(a) that the drug problem in America is absurdly simple, and easily solved; [or] (b) that the drug problem in America is a lost cause" (p. 3). He continues, claiming that "both [of these propositions] are disputed by the real experts on drugs in the United States — and there are many such experts"; however, he does not name any of them, nor tell his audience how or with what evidence they do, in fact, dispute these claims. Perhaps because these experts are "not the kind the media like to focus on," Bennett sees futility in naming them. However, later in this speech, we find the following passage with two more such references:

For I believe, along with those I have named as the real experts on drugs, and along with most Americans, that the drug problem is not easy but difficult — very difficult in some respects. But at the same time, and again along with those same experts and with the American people, I believe it is not a lost cause but a soluble one. (p. 4)

Here, in addition to espousing the wisdom of "real [unnamed] experts," Bennett also lays claim to having access to the thoughts of "most Americans?"12 While Bennett refers to the grounds for intellectual thinking as "very thin gruel indeed" (p. 2), his own gruel is far from thick.

To enhance their persuasive techniques, both speakers use patterns of argument from consequence, Anslinger in relation to the projected increased use of illegal drugs and Bennett in reference to the increase that he projects would occur with legalization. They both foresee an increase in violence, particularly in urban crime. In addition, they both discuss the health of the American population. Anslinger, discussing LSD, again uses numbers: "The user winds up in the asylum, in prison or in the grave, or the chances are 99 to 1 he will have permanent damage to the mind with only one dose" (p. 2). Discussing cocaine, Bennett says, "More pregnant women would buy legal cocaine, and then deliver tiny, premature infants. . Ies a horrid form of child abuse" (p. 8).13

Further, Bennett and Anslinger refer to illicit drugs' deleterious effects on the human spirit. Using strong negative diction, Bennett says, "Drug use — especially heavy drug use — destroys human constitution. It destroys dignity and autonomy, it burns away the sense of responsibility, it subverts productivity, it makes a mockery of virtue" (p. 9). Using religious imagery and an overall positive, rather than negative, approach Anslinger says, "Mankind has still escaped the crack of doom. ... You have going for you that volatile but resurgent and possibly indomitable instrument: the human spirit. It is the persisting echo of an ancient aspiration and just possibly it could prevail" (p. 4).

A further consequence Bennett cites (and Anslinger alludes to) is that of "a citizenry that is perpetually in a drug-induced haze." This potential condition, he says, "doesn't bode well for the future of self-government" (p. 9).14 Considering the fact that Bennett directs the national office that is attempting to destroy our most basic right of privacy with mandatory and random drug testing, the issues of freedom and self-government are becoming more and more mythical. He goes on to say, again without substantiation, that American intellectuals have "a general hostility to law enforcement and criminal justice," and seems to believe that the proof for such an accusation lies in the fact that "whenever discussion turns to the need for more police and stronger penalties, they [intellectuals] cry that our constitutional liberties are in jeopardy" (p. 10). Bennett says that drugs, not drug policy, are jeopardizing constitutional liberties, a statement that is difficult to support, given current drug policy.

Bennett's feelings here closely mirror those of Anslinger who says to his student listeners, "We beg of you, we beseech you to find some way to destroy the intellectual sanctions which promote free drugs, free love, and other dangerous freedoms" (p. 3). Apparently because the students of the 1960s did not move to destroy those freedoms, the offices of the FBN, now the Drug Enforcement Administration, are doing it for us, by advocating random and mandatory drug testing of people in America.

Finally, the speakers offer solutions. While they espouse four identical solutions, Anslinger's fifth solution, which Bennett jettisons for contradictory reasons, is the one that could begin to provide a real solution to our illicit drug problem. For thirty-six years before delivering this speech (thirty-two as Narcotics Bureau Commissioner), Anslinger vehemently advocated two solutions: higher fines and longer jail sentences. He eventually added treatment and parent-teacher (and later youth) education. Most curiously, in this speech, he proposes a new solution: "Our nation must move rapidly to solve its social problems and eliminate conditions that breed anger, frustration, and blind rebellion" (p. 3). Perhaps with all of his experience, Anslinger was finally aware that Draconian measures simply were not working.

Unfortunately, Bennett learned only the first four solutions from his predecessor as evidenced by his speech in which he stresses the need for tougher laws, treatment, education, and "a bigger criminal justice system" (p. 11).

On the subject of alleviating social problems that cause urban blight and perpetuat,e the dissatisfaction that leads to drug abuse, Bennett appears to take two contradictory stands. Early in his speech, he refers to the "whole cadres of social scientists, abetted by whole armies of social workers, who seem to take it as catechism that the problem facing us isn't drugs at all, it's poverty, or racism, or some other equally large and intractable social phenomenon" (p. 3). Bennett sees the possibility of addressing urban blight, the cause of much of the drug problem, as "a hopelessly datulting task" (p. 4). He adds that those who advocate such an approach "also happen to make their living" implementing social programs (p. 4).

Almost at the end of his speech, however, Bennett attempts to praise the social programs he refused to consider as solutions only moments previous by lambasting "America's intellectuals — and here I think particularly of liberal intellectuals — [who] have spent much of the last nine years decrying the social programs of two Republican administrations in the name of the defenseless poor" (p. 12). He does not mention the fact that such "decrying" comes about because of cuts — not advances — in social programs such as housing, education, and health care.15 Bennett continues with this argument, saying that now that the intellectuals could, in fact, contribute to the poor, they can be found only "on the editorial and op-ed pages, and in magazines like this month's Harper's telling us with an ignorant sneer that our drug policy won't work" (p. 12).

Both of Bennett's above remarks — accusing social agencies of grandstanding and calling editorial writers names — hardly ingratiates him to either group and almost ensures that he will not persuade listeners who belong to, agree with, or support either group. These two groups could be influential in beginning to address the problem, and they are rhetorically powerful in their own rights, yet Bennett chooses to alienate them — not a rhetorically sound move when his goal would be better served by garnering support and bringing such groups together to address the problem cumulatively.

Unfortunately, a relatively small audience heard Anslinger's fifth solution and related suggestion as to how to begin to effect it: he suggests that people begin to live with "a fluid mind which is open to new theories, fresh opinions, changing impressions and in the willingness to make new beginnings." Most people who remember Anslinger's addresses recall the hardline, merciless czar-like statements for which he became infamous.

It is sadly ironic that this is the only one of Anslinger's solutions that Bennett has not inherited. If he had, the situation might not be as desperate and as costly as it is today. We can put all the money we want into Bennett's "larger criminal justice system," but until we curb urban blight and give people a reason not to use drugs, no criminal justice system will be large enough to hold the victims of narcotics abuse. Bennett's rhetoric is persuasive; however, as we have seen, success in persuasive technique does not necessarily lead to success in alleviating the problem. Unfortunately, Harry Anslinger learned this too late. It took Anslinger thirty-four years to suggest something other than Draconian solutions to drug-related problems. Do we have to wait that long for Bennett?

Rebecca Carroll is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pittsburgh and an instructor at Carnegie Mellon University. Her address is 3955 Bigelow Blvd., #205, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213. (412) 682-7138.

Footnotes

1 William J. Bennett, "The Role of Treatment in a War on Drugs: Some Preliminaiy Thoughts," Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Task Force Conference, San Diego, 6 June 1989.

2 Stanley Meisler, "Federal Narcotics Czar: Zeal Without Insight," The Nation, 20 February 1960, p. 161.

3 Meisler, p. 161.

4 Meisler, p. 161.

5 Although Anslinger retired from the FBN four years prior to delivering this address, he remained active in and spoke frequently on behalf of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

6 William J. Bennett, 'Drug Policy And The Intellectuals," Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 11 December 1989, p. 1. Subsequent references will appear parenthetically in the text by page number.

7 refers to himself as drug czar in the statement, "I didn't have to become drug czar to be opposed to legalized marijuana" (p. 6).

8 Harry J. Anslinger, "Address," St. Francis College, Loretto, 5 June 1966, p. 1. Subsequent references will appear parenthetically within the text by page number.

9 The strength of this statement lies in Anslinger's publicly vehement charges that Communist China was seeking to destroy America through illicit drugs. Anslinger's personal papers (hereafter referred to as AP), housed in the Labor Archives of Pattee Library at The Pennsylvania State University, contain numerous articles on the subject. See AP, Box 5, File 5 for articles with such titles as "China Reds Pour Opium on World, Hearing is Told," "Opium Smuggled to World Gives Huge Profit to China," "Red China's Drug Profit $70 Million!" "China Under Communists Multiplies Deadly Drugs," and "Communist China's International Drug Traffic" to cite a few; each of these articles quotes Commissioner Anslinger. See AP, Box 1, File 8 for Anslinger's testimony before the April 1953 United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, entitled "The Illicit Narcotic Traffic in the Far East" and his June 1962 testimony entitled "The Smuggling of Narcotic Drugs from Communist China." In addition, the Drug Enforcement Administration Library in Washington, D.C. houses some files on Anslinger; one file contains portions of the Congressional Record from 19 April 1961 in which Representative Thomas J. Lane of Massachusetts moves to include in the Record a report by Anslinger entitled 'We're Winning the War Against Drugs" in which he discusses "Dope from Red China."

10 Anslinger relied heavily on appealing to audiences through the use of gore stories. His personal papers contain numerous files of them. Further evidence of Anslinger's penchant for gore appears in the transcript of a meeting of the Conference on Cannabis Sativa L., held in the Treasury Building, Washington, D.C., 14 January 1937. (AP Box 9, File 21).

11 Also notorious for his use of numbers, Anslinger quoted statistics before almost every audience — legislative, public, or private. Some of his detractors argue that Anslinger fabricated numbers to suit the needs of his arguments depending on the audience. For example, on an NBC radio talk show, "Monitor," in 1959, Anslinger stated that the number of addicts in the U.S. was 60,000. Other guests on the "Monitor" program strongly refute that number. The author acknowledges the generosity of Rufus King for making the "Monitor" tape available.
In addition, a case can be made for misinformation in Bennett's speeches. For example, in this speech he refers to the "myth" that "prohibition caused big increases in crime" (pp. 8-9). An 18,January 1990 article in The Pittsburgh Press by David Morris documents the fact that, although "Prohibition worked," it had other effects: "Arrests soared. Gangland slayings increased. Police corruption became endemic. By 1929, "the legal system appeared overwhelmed by national prohibition,' observes historian David E. Kyvig."

12 Bennett does not say which Americans have given him that impression. Interestingly, after a pro-legalization op-ed piece entitled "The Worthless Crusade" by Rufus King, a Washington attorney and author, appeared in the 11 January 1990 issue of Newsweek, Mr. King received dozens of telephone calls and letters from people who commended him and said that they support drug legalization. The point here is that the people who seek us out to talk with us are generally those who agree with our position, and it is unfair of Bennett to make a sweeping statement about the sentiment of most Americans. Interview with Rufus King, 11 January 1990, Washington, D.C.

13 It is interesting that this is one of very few speeches in which Anslinger does not use effects on children and youth as an argument. Those of us who teach public speaking know that our in-class audience analyses continually reflect concern for and love of children as a priority of American audiences. Any speaker wishing to ingratiate herself or himself to an audience in many cases needs simply to discuss effects on children in order to win over an audience. Anslinger was a master at this, and after the publication of his article, "Marijuana: Assassin of Youth," many other youth-oriented articles appeared, such as 'Youth Gone Loco," "One More Peril for Youth," and "'Danger." His articles and his public speeches were rife with stories of innocent "children homeward bound from school" being approached by marijuana dealers saying, "Do you want to be happy? Hey kid! Do you want to be happy?" (Harry J. Anslinger, "Marijuana,"National Parent-Teacher, May 1938, p. 16). Bennett, too, is astute in this area. In this speech alone, he makes nine references to children who, if currently illicit drugs become legal, will be able to purchase them with ease.

14 In a 21 December 1989 op-ed column, historian John C. McWilliams points out that "ours has never been a drug-free society, and it is unrealistic to expect that it will be. Use of marijuana dates back to Jamestown, alcohol was in widespread use during the first half of the 19th century, morphine and heroin were commonly used after the Civil War, and opium could easily be purchased in the form of pain-killers and cough mixtures into the 20th century." ("Fantasies Won't Solve The Drug Problem," Centre Daily Times, 21 December 1989).

15 According to Historical Tables, the percentage of outlays of the national budget for human resources (education, training, employment, social services, health, Medicare, income security, social security, and veterans benefits and services) was 53.0 percent. In 1988 (the most recent actual figures available), that percentage dropped to 50.1 percent, a reduction of 2.9 percent. For that same period, the percentage of outlays for national defense rose from 22.7 percent to 27.3 percent, an increase of 4.6 percent. (Historical Tables, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1990, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989).