FOREWORD

Since the 1970s, the cross-border trade in drugs and guns has brought both immense profits and terrible destruction to the United States and Mexico. Some estimates place the annual profits of Mexico’s drug trade at 3 percent to 4 percent of the country’s GDP—on the order of $30 billion per year—and around half a million people are said to earn a substantial portion of their income through the narcotics business. The business, however, is not without its risks and costs. Since Mexico’s president, Felipe Calderón, effectively declared war on the drug cartels in 2006, more than 30,000 people have died in drug-related violence in Mexico.

Nor is the United States immune from the effects of the drug trade. The ruthlessness of drug trafficking organizations is well-known in this country already, particularly, though not exclusively, in the inner cities, and the violence of Mexico’s drug war is now beginning to spill over the border. Border patrols are already costing the country more than $3 billion per year while obstructing billions more in legitimate trade. Yet the United States is hardly an innocent victim. Nearly half of adult Americans admit to having tried drugs in the past, and the United States remains the world’s largest consumer of illegal drugs. It is also the world’s largest supplier of weapons, which fuel the drug war in a more direct way. Fully 10 percent of America’s gun dealers line the Mexican border, and the country’s permissive gun laws make it an inexpensive and convenient source of powerful guns, ammunition, and explosives.

In this Council Special Report, David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego, analyzes the steps that the United States and Mexico can take to more effectively combat drug violence. Though Calderón’s military-led effort has splintered the major drug cartels, it has not diminished their strength—or political influence—sufficiently to prosecute them in the courts rather than in the streets. Nor is Mexico’s criminal justice system robust enough to pose a real challenge to cartel leaders. It remains seriously underfunded, riddled with corruption, and deeply mistrusted by the public. And while American efforts to support the military and shore up the justice system have been substantial, efforts to address the economic and social conditions that encourage people to join the drug trade are, as yet, insufficient.

To address these challenges, the author outlines a series of recommendations. In addition to improving cooperation between U.S., Mexican, and Central American security authorities, he writes, the United States must expand its aid to nonmilitary fronts in the long-running war on drugs. Washington should, he argues, assist Mexico’s criminal justice system as it pursues a wide-ranging set of organizational, operational, and cultural reforms to improve its effectiveness, efficiency, and professionalism. Moreover, the United States should increase funding for job creation, microfinance, and other economic aid to expand opportunities outside the drug trade. Finally, he recommends that the United States explore alternatives to its current drug laws; while legalization may not be the answer, he says, focusing exclusively on punishing suppliers and users has not proven a successful strategy.

The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat thus provides a fresh look at one of the most important security threats in the Western Hemisphere and suggests recommendations for policy in both Washington and Mexico City. There can be little doubt that the social, economic, and political challenges posed by drug trafficking are grave for both countries. Purposeful and immediate action is warranted, and this report provides thoughtful and thought-provoking guidance for those looking to begin.

Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relations March 2011