The years between World War II and 1970 witnessed, first, enactment of maximum legal sanctions against narcotic drug use, and then a strong reaction that gave considerable responsibility for control to physicians and psychotherapists. Under an onslaught of increased drug abuse and addiction, rising crime against property, and a renewed faith in medicine and psychological treatment, federal drug-abuse statutes retreated from death penalties and mandatory minimum sentences to more reliance on treatment, flexible sentences, and even addiction maintenance, not only with methadone but perhaps even with heroin itself. During the same period the reputation of marihuana, which some considered as dangerous as heroin, changed significantly: in 1972 a Presidential Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse recommended elimination of criminal penalties for private use of marihuana.1 Advocates of severe punishment for addicts found themselves unheeded.

World War II minimized the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' problems with smuggling and domestic addiction. Enforcement of the Marihuana Tax Act did not present much difficulty except for illicit use secondary to licensed hemp production to compensate for unavailable Far Eastern imports. In 1942 one more domestic loophole was plugged: legal cultivation of opium poppies in the United States for commercial purposes was regulated by the Opium Poppy Act.2 Yet the FBN feared the war's ending, for recollections of what was thought to have happened after World War I were still vivid—when trade was reestablished, so was smuggling,3 and returning soldiers might again be habituated through the devious methods of the enemy. A major deterrent favored by Anslinger, but not yet enacted, was imposition of mandatory minimum sentences on the first drug conviction.

Modification of the Uniform [state] Narcotic Drug Act by adding mandatory sentences was therefore sought when a reported rise in addiction between 1947 and 1950, particularly in black and Puerto Rican ghettos of northern cities, confirmed the FBN's fears.4 The federal statute was dramatically strengthened in 1951 by making first convictions carry a mandatory minimum penalty of two years, and by omitting provision for either suspension of sentences or probation on second and subsequent convictions.5

Congress decreed mandatory minimum sentences for narcotic offenders in an emotional atmosphere similar to the years of the first Red Scare. Hale Boggs's bill, which contained mandatory sentences, was passed in 1951 at the beginning of the McCarthy era and fears of Soviet aggression, the "betrayal" of China to the Communists, and suspicion of domestic groups and persons who seemed to threaten overthrow of the government. Narcotics were later associated directly with the Communist conspiracy: the Federal Bureau of Narcotics linked Red China's attempts to get hard cash, as well as to destroy Western society, to the clandestine sale of large amounts of heroin to drug pushers in the United States.6 This fear was similar to Hobson's more general allegations against foreign nations in the 1920s.

Senate investigations led by Senator Estes Kefauver drew attention to narcotic traffic as an element in organized crime. The FBN also strongly suspected the circumstances under which some federal district judges only mildly reprimanded narcotic dealers. Representative Boggs enthusiastically supported mandatory sentencing as an effective and appropriate weapon against narcotic addiction and was pleased to have his name attached to the act which partially removed judicial discretion in sentencing narcotic offenders.

Before and after this signal victory, the bureau attempted to show that mandatory sentencing worked in those states where it had been tried and that the new federal law was a boon to enforcement. Opposition from within the American Bar Association, however, led to reexamination. A resolution calling for a congressional investigation of narcotics passed the ABA House of Delegates.7 Unlike the disinterest shown Representative Coffee's similar request in 1938, Senate authorization for a subcommittee to evaluate the narcotic problem came only a month after the ABA resolution. The subcommittee, headed by Senator Price Daniel of Texas, did not question current policy, as apparently the Bar Association had hoped, but recommended penalties even more severe than those of 1951.8 Sentences for some offenses were raised to five years on the first conviction, while a jury could impose the death penalty on anyone over age 18 who sold heroin to an individual under 18.9 These two federal statutes of 1951 and 1956 represent the high point of federal punitive action against narcotics. Although some states had even more severe sentences for some offenses, no state law had the breadth of jurisdiction or the unified enforcement service of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

There is a noticeable parallel between the association of internal subversion in the postwar periods of both 1919-20 and 1951-55; both led to extremely punitive sanctions against addicts and those who catered to addicts. Toleration of addiction was attacked as a dangerous weakness of soft-hearted or ill-informed persons; at least some of them must harbor evil intentions. Public sympathy was up against a social fear of addiction that had almost no connection with physiology or pharmacology.

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

The ABA responded to sanctions like the Boggs Act by declaring that in their opinion a harsh approach was unjust and ineffective, that the answer must lie elsewhere. This professional reaction was reminiscent of the AMA and the Public Health Service which, just after World War I, remonstrated that medical treatment for addiction was much less effective than laymen believed it to be.

In 1951 the ABA House of Delegates condemned the imposition of mandatory first sentences in narcotics convictions and two years later established a Standing Committee on Narcotics and Alcohol in its Section of Criminal Law.10 A trend toward more sociological and psychiatric analyses of crime and its treatment helped tha ABA toward a serious reevaluation of the narcotics problem and laws. By 1955 the ABA was ready to join with the AMA in a study of narcotics, and the Joint Committee of the ABA and the AMA on Narcotic Drugs was appointed.

Now that respectable institutions of medicine and law were beginning to question the trend of narcotic control, the liberal medical wing, based principally in New York City, began to assert itself again. Rigid enforcement of the Harrison Act had caused more physicians to become disaffected with FBN policies, and eventually in 1955 the Academy of Medicine of New York, which had taken a more restrained view of addiction control in 1918, adopted a policy not dissimilar to that of the Medical Economic League in 1917: it supported maintenance clinics and suggested that the decision to undertake cure be voluntary. 11 This pronouncement represented an important but nevertheless peripheral group within organized medicine. The AMA's cooperation, and especially the ABA's questioning of increasingly severe legal penalties, were more significant with regard to eventual change in narcotic control.

The direction of the Joint Committee's Interim Report (1958), although carefully phrased and tentative, seemed clear enough to the FBN. It was another move to soften penalties and, worse, open the door to clinics. Restrictions on private physicians would become relaxed, and narcotics would be prescribed more widely and easily. The Interim Report was cautious about clinics, but did not preclude dispensing narcotics in an outpatient experimental clinic for the treatment of drug addicts.12

The report, however, had two appendixes of a different tone. One, by the chairman of the Joint Committee, praised the British method of dealing with addicts.13 The other, by the Director of the Narcotics Control Study, described the narcotic laws, criticized federal agents who intimidated physicians, expressed the hope that clinical errors of the past could be rectified, and suggested that crime might be prevented by providing addicts with their drugs.14

The bureau's shrill counterattack, an ad hoc Advisory Committee report entitled Comments on Narcotic Drugs: Interim Report of the Joint Committee of the ABA and AMA on Narcotic Drugs (1959), characteristic of a passing era and style, was the high-water mark of its public expression. It placed the Joint Committee in the same category as Doctors Bishop and Volk, the White Cross, and a few "crackpot" doctors and sociologists. Already chafing under restrictions placed on its enforcement activities and various Supreme Court decisions that seemed to favor the criminal element in the United States, the bureau had to contend with members of the legal and health establishments. The FBN discerned a much more direct threat from the Interim Report of the Joint Committee of the ABA and the AMA, because the prestige of the two associations gave the clinic idea respectability, in spite of the AMA's previous disapproval of clinics (1957), the widely reported Daniel's hearings, which had resulted in the extremely severe penalties of the law enacted in 1956, and a heavily biased brochure against clinics published by the FBN in 1955.15

The brochure's description of the old narcotic clinics is important for the kinds of errors and truths it contained. It can be divided into two parts: a description of respectable medical opinion in 1920 and an analysis of the clinics' operations. The bureau correctly portrayed the opposition of medical and scientific opinion to treatment of addiction by private physicians on an outpatient basis or by narcotic-dispensing clinics and its own support of law enforcement and drying up of the narcotic supply as the best "cure" for addiction. But the FBN presented only the worst aspects of the clinics and must have ignored the available evidence to the contrary.

Maintenance clinics would threaten the delicate legal authority that enabled the FBN to check up on doctors and other registrants. By the 1950s few of the original clinic opponents were still alive. Anslinger, who had not been in the old Narcotics Division then, accepted as true the prevailing opposition to the federal clinic experiment.

The belief that neither a clinic nor a physician could be "licensed" to prescribe narcotics—that if one person were legally permitted to maintain addiction anyone else could do the same—resulted from narrow Supreme Court decisions that had raised this question in the Harrison Act. Anslinger apparently prided himself on rarely asking for higher appropriations, and so as late as 1967 the FBN had only three hundred agents. A clinic system would make surveillance much more difficult; increased appropriations would have to be requested or the entire national control system might collapse, causing a situation that could not be helped by any number of agents. The ABA-AMA report had not advocated a network of clinics, but an experimental clinic, and not hecessarily one that!gave out narcotics. The appendixes, however, did give a warm approval to the maintenance policies ascribed to the "British system."

The Joint Committee's Interim Report and appendixes, although repeating antibureau views, was not harsh or melodramatic. But the bureau's vituperative attack on the Joint Committee can be seen as a desperate response to the belief that, regardless of congressional support and official bureau statements, its control of narcotic enforcement in America was beginning to slip. In fact, the bureau's opponents had been rapidly gaining national power since the end of World War II.

RISE OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS

After the war the government began to pour money into mental health training and research. By 1969, when the FBN annual budget was about $6 million—only twice the appropriation for 1932—the NIMH budget exceeded $250 million 16

Psychological and psychiatric studies, and therapies of various kinds, were to be President Kennedy's contribution to the mentally ill and retarded.17 In spite of the most vigorous opposition of the AMA, which feared that the precedent of federally funded mental health centers might lead to enactment of some form of general health insurance, a gigantic program for mental health centers throughout the nation was adopted in 1963. This concrete expression of faith in the newer modality of deviance control and correction foreshadowed a decline in support for old-time law enforcement.

The leaders of the mental health establishment had an attitude toward addiction vastly different from that of the FBN, arguing anew that addiction was a psychological or physical disease and that the medical profession should therefore treat addicts. Their power and persuasiveness, now extensively funded and supported by congress, suggested that mandatory sentences and rigid control would be modified.

The directors of the Mental Hygiene Division ( after 1946, the National Institute of Mental Health) had been either directors or trainees at the federal narcotic "farms." These psychiatrist—administrators had lost faith in policies that in effect turned the treatment centers into prisons; they had reluctantly done the bureau's dirty work since 1935. One of the NIMH's most symbolic actions in the late 1960s was to remove the steel bars from the cells at Lexington and to turn the facility into a recognizable hospital. Since Anslinger's retirement in 1962, support for the control in which he believed had gradually become less adamant and powerful. The NIMH attitude toward social dysfunction and individual behavior gradually replaced the bureau's approach, which on the New Frontier seemed crude.

Faith in the "British System" characterized the anti-FBN forces in the 1950s and 1960s. If in the United States the willing physician and addict were not kept apart by arbitrary rulings of the FBN and intimidation, America could, like Great Britain, solve the addiction problem.18

Although rival theories of deviance control were gaining credibility in the postwar period, the enforcement of narcotic laws did not become widely questioned and condemned until surveillance and penalties failed, even with mandatory minimum penalties and the death threat, to prevent a rapid rise in various forms of drug abuse in the 1960s. If the use of marihuana, which was more feared in the early 1960s because of a general lack of accurate medical information, was rapidly increasing among young people, and if heroin use was moving from the ghettos to the suburbs, then a new approach must be undertaken. If prohibitive enforcement had failed, perhaps the opposite would succeed. Commissions and public figures turned to answers consistent with current social science thinking: lesser penalties, medical treatment, and perhaps maintenance supplies to addicts at low cost.

In Great Britain, meanwhile, a similar rapid increase in drug use occurred in the 1960s. Heroin replaced morphine as the preferred drug; the number of addicts rose from a few hundred to several thousand. A black market developed, and youth seemed attracted to drugs regardless of the medical practitioners' availability and understanding. In Great Britain, also, the old form of control was criticized as inadequate. The Interdepartmental Commission on Drug Addiction recommended in 1965 more severe restrictions on physicians—limiting to a few the right to prescribe for addicts, setting penalties for prescribing too readily, and improving customs searches to prevent drug smuggling.19 Eventually, addicts' clinics were established and operated under strict controls. The British were reacting to what they considered a new situation, never having had so large a narcotic problem in the twentieth century.20

Marihuana's increasing popularity in the U.S. created a gap between those who used it without becoming maniacs and the society that believed it had vicious effects. Youth, especially, grew doubtful that drug warnings had any credibility, since marihuana was being exposed after a quarter of a century as less than "the most dangerous habit-forming drug of them all." Perhaps as a result, more accurate information on other drugs, such as the amphetamines, was ignored. Long sentences for marihuana possession became examples to youth of an ignorant establishment's show of force. Confidence in the courts and fear as a deterrent to drug use declined. Sentiment began to favor a general reevaluation of drug laws to reflect both current medical and sociological information and beliefs.

Among the new insights gradually accepted by the informed public was an idea that the identification of crime and drug abuse with some ethnic minorities, such as blacks and Puerto Ricans, might have resulted from repressive and racist policies. Police collusion with drug suppliers in communities like Harlem, where such deals are common knowledge, gradually became known to the public. As this information spread, so did the suspicion that addiction was not necessarily associated with either crime or subgroups, at least not in any simple way.

The concept of "deviance" as a category, created by the majority in society to describe certain minorities on criteria perhaps unrelated to "justice," made perception of unusual or atypical behavior more relativistic. A deviant was not necessarily the product of a dangerous group nor attributable to the evil attraction of vicious activities. Thus the notion of addiction as a simple punishable vice increasingly shifted to a conviction that those who profited from addiction—corrupt police, the Mafia—were the criminals.

The evolution of this ameliorated view of the addict can be followed in court decisions. In 1962 the Supreme Court declared addiction to be a disease and not a crime. Courts became more critical of tracking down petty dealers who were also addicts. Mandatory penalties elicited opposition from judges, prosecutors, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons as well as the American Psychiatric Association. The rise in funds for research within and without the NIMH reflected a desire to find out what was the truth in a .conflict of strong statements for and against drug use, particularly psychedelic drugs.

METHADONE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR HEROIN

The example of institutions and outpatient clinics established in the mid-196os for methadone maintenance helped create favor for "medical,treatment" of heroin addiction. From the care with which it is dispensed, the public appears to believe that methadone is a medicine like an antibiotic rather than what it is—a synthetic and addictive morphine substitute discovered by German scientists in World War II. In the methadone maintenance program, various mental health services are also supplied. The knowledge that methadone substitutes one addiction for another and that only a minority of heroin addicts, very few under twenty-one, want to make the switch is rarely publicized.21 Dr. Vincent Dole and Dr. Marie Nyswander, who established methadone maintenance as a result of their research at Rockefeller University, expressed the belief that opiate addiction creates a permanent biochemical change in physiology so that methadone maintenance might well be necessary for the life of the addict. In their view, therefore, it is not an abstinence cure, but it can be used to stabilize the life styles of those who will cooperate in a treatment program.22

For a few enthusiasts methadone has become a panacea that will solve the American addiction problem. It is, of course, diametrically opposed to the earlier federal policy of keeping supplies of all addicting drugs as scarce as possible. Every step toward respectability and public financing for methadone maintenance has frayed the traditional view of opiate addiction as inherently perilous.

Property theft to obtain funds for opiates is claimed to cause much property crime, estimated at more than 50 percent of all reported crimes in New York City. Therefore, if property crime is a chief menace, and if addicts steal to pay for their supply, the argument goes, methadone maintenance—perhaps even heroin maintenance—is justified because it might cut the crime rate. Widening acceptance of maintenance also indicates that certain medical facts have filtered down to the public: the addict might steal to pay for his habit but not because the drug stimulates him to steal—a notion Richmond Hobson and his colleagues had sold to readily believing audiences.

The election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency set in bolder relief the decline of Anslinger's influence after thirty years of political and popular support. As Anslinger's retirement drew near, demands for a reevaluation of the drug policies increased. The final ABA–AMA report was published in 1961. Then an outgrowth of the ABA's study of narcotics, W. G. Eldridge's Narcotics and the Law (1962), appeared; Anslinger retired; and the White House Conference on Drug Abuse met in September 1962.23

Anslinger's successor, Harry Giordano, a pharmacist, was considered much more reasonable. Perhaps Giordano lacked Anslinger's drive and aggressiveness. In any case, during his tenure (1962-68) groups like the NIMH made more effective challenges to older control styles.

To conclude what had started at the White House Conference, the Presidential Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse was established. In 1963 the commission issued its report, recommending relaxation of mandatory minimum sentences, increased appropriations for research into "all aspects of narcotic and drug abuse," and the dismantling of the FBN and allocation of its functions to the Justice and Health, Education and Welfare departments. The HEW would assume responsibility for legitimate distribution and research; the Justice Department would be responsible for investigating illicit traffic. The medical profession would have the ultimate voice in saying what constitutes legitimate medical treatment and use of narcotic drugs. The Lexington and Fort Worth hospitals, rather than continuing as routine treatment facilities, would become centers of research operating with voluntary patients only. Localities would receive aid for establishing treatment centers. In accord with evidence that the best results in addiction treatment come from detention of a year or more in an institution, a federal civil commitment law was advocated as an alternative to prison for the federally convicted offender who was a "confirmed narcotic or marihuana abuser." 24

The 1963 Commission report continued the policy of lumping together marihuana and narcotic offenders but suggested a policy that would shift the criteria for regulatory decisions regarding addicts and other drug users away from enforcement agencies to the health professions. The Drug Abuse Control amendments of 1965 established the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control within HEW and attempted to regulate hypnotics and stimulants such as barbiturates and amphetamines. In the 1965 Act, the constitutional basis for drug control shifted from taxing power to interstate and commerce powers, another recommendation of the 1963 Advisory Commission.25 In 1966, the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act ( NARA) provided for civil commitment of some addicted federal prisoners and some categories of addicts before trial or before sentencing.26 The faith in civil commitment, however, gradually faded as evidence of its success was less impressive than anticipated. Also, the estimated number of addicts was so large that adequate housing and care became problematical.

The NIMH, which in 1963 had succeeded in obtaining congressional approval for a program aimed at creating mental health centers throughout the nation, wished to set up in them the local treatment centers recommended by the 1963 Commission. The NIMH further wished to model addiction treatment along the lines of what was considered the latest and best in psychiatric therapy, the multimodality mental health center, and established several centers that were not committed to any one approach but to any combination of approaches that would process large numbers of drug abusers.

In 1967 the narcotic problem was examined again, this time by the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The FBN still existed intact, but the Drug Abuse Control Amendments had presaged a new federal antinarcotic formula. Marihuana use was rapidly increasing, and the heroin epidemic had become a common issue in political campaigns and among enforcement personnel. Methadone therapy was now accepted in major centers of addiction. Drawing attention to the minuscule amount of narcotics seized annually compared to the minimum that had to be smuggled in to sustain addiction, the 1967 Commission recommended greatly increasing enforcement staffs of the Bureau of Customs and the FBN. The FBN's agents, spread over the nation and ten foreign countries, numbered about three hundred, not much higher than in the 1930s. The commission especially requested the FBN to institute long-range programs to attack "upper echelons of the drug traffic," and asked the states to cooperate, beginning with enactment of legislation complementary to the Drug Abuse Control Amendment Act.

By 1967 marihuana was clearly marked for attention as both medical information and use of the substance increased. Questioning its association with crime and its role as a prelude to addictive drugs, the Presidential Commission asked the NIMH to look into "all aspects of marihuana use." The commission commented impartially on various treatment programs for drug abuse, including methadone maintenance and drugless institutions like Daytop and Synanon. The strong recommendation for civil commitment by the 1963 Commission was not supported a few years later, by which time California and New York had had a fair amount of experience with it. Indeed, the 1967 Commission criticized civil commitment as denying freedom to an individual who was convicted of no crime but was merely suffering a diseased state—addiction. Its study found the California experience between 1961 and 1965 to be discouraging, with more than five thousand civilly committed addicts. Even if the objection to confinement for no crime could be answered by comparing addiction commitment to that for mental illness, the procedure would still have little chance of achieving the desired result, a "cure" for addiction.27

In 1968 the FBN was transferred to the Justice Department, joined with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control of HEW, and became the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Increased appropriations, training of more agents, and the institution of a long-range program of enforcement and regulation including revived attempts to convince Turkey to stop growing opium poppies, fulfilled the expectations of past commissions. After lively controversies with health agencies and scientists, the Justice Department succeeded in framing the Drug Abuse Act of 1970.28 In it the myriad regulations advanced during the Harrison Act's long evolution were brought into one statute, tempered now by a desire to have flexible penalties and to separate marihuana from addicting drugs. For both the 1965 Drug Abuse Control Amendments and the 1979 Act, jurisdiction was based on the interstate commerce powers of the Constitution, now greatly extended and strengthened by sixty years of constitutional development since Representative Mann and Dr. Wiley had attempted to use those powers in the first decade of the century.

THE CONTROL OF DEVIANCE BY LAW

Law enforcers and the mental health professions have at least one objective in common—effective and knowledgeable control of deviant behavior. Both may effect this control through custodial restraint (imprisonment in a penal institution or care in a mental hospital) or through relative nonrestraint ( outpatient therapy or parole). Before World War I, physicians had the responsibility for treating addiction. Treatment, however, did not cure, and not all physicians used good judgment in prescribing and dispensing narcotics. The arrangement, therefore, did not work—it did not eliminate narcotic addiction.

By World War I the American addict was identified as a social menace and equated with the IWWs, Bolsheviks, anarchists, and other feared subgroups like the cocaine-using blacks and the opium-smoking Chinese. But these deviant subgroups that threatened the social fabric could still be considered subjects for psychotherapy or medical treatment.

In the post-World War I hysteria, however, attitudes changed. If outpatient treatment could not control deviance, if medical institutions like hospitals could not cure it, then police and jails were the last option.

That addiction rose spectacularly between 1915 and 1919—an assumption drawn to justify the repression of addicts after 1919-- is not supported by evidence. On the other hand, any contention that this fact was deliberately constructed in order to permit the government to take dramatic action against a minimal threat is not supported by evidence either. Commissioner Roper, among others, seems to have honestly believed the drug problem was out of hand, and he was prepared for a serious national problem when the Supreme Court ruling and the Harrison Act Amendments of early 1919 were enforced.

Passage and enforcement of the 18th Amendment supported repression of addiction and dangerous drugs. Here again quarantine was adopted as the best solution for a social problem. The Harrison Act's interpretation in 1919 was aligned with social acceptance of repression, quarantine, prison, or fines for social danger whether political, bacteriological, or chemical. Congress continued to pass laws more severe until the ultimate in severity, the 1956 Narcotic Control Act, combined the threat of death with mandatory minimum sentences on the first conviction.

THE MEDICAL CONTROL OF DEVIANCE

Medical treatment for deviance is not an intentional penalty, although it may result in more "punishment" as measured by the kind and length of restraint than a sentence for a crime. Underlying medical therapy is the belief that behavior can be corrected through scientific treatment and that ascription of guilt and criminal sanctions are often inappropriate. Although the perfectibility of man is an old American belief, faith in treatment became extensively implemented only after World War II, with the entry of the federal government into national health and welfare areas. As elements in the medical quest for perfectibility, psychological and sociological insights strongly influenced sophisticated Americans, beginning with World War I.

The mental health center concept is a striking example of the acceptance by Congress of an attitude that had been accepted and promoted by mental health professionals for several decades. The mental health center program in 1963 envisioned a network of rather small community-based hospitals, about one for every two hundred thousand persons. These centers were proposed by President Kennedy in order to reduce the number of citizens under restraint in state mental hospitals by allowing them to be treated in their local communities. Presumably, admissions to state hospitals would also decline because the incipient mentally ill would be treated quickly and efficiently by the mental health center staff. If custodial care was necessary, even that could be accomplished through brief confinement in a mental health center rather than long stays in a far-off hospital. Hope existed also that the mental health centers scattered across the nation would treat sick communities as well as sick persons, and thereby lessen social disruption caused by the unhappy and maladjusted.

The development of a federal health establishment, phenomenal growth of the Public Health Service and its research body ( the National Institutes of Health), and the rise of HEW provided Congress with new sources of help in social and health problems. Medical and scientific methods for the control of drug abuse are now under evaluation. The possibility exists that failure of such approaches to eliminate drug abuse may be interpreted, as in the period after World War I, to mean that they are worthless and should be abandoned.

NOTES

1 National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, First Report, Marihuana: a Signal of Misunderstanding ( GPO, 1972), chapter five, "Marihuana and Social Policy," pp. 127-67.

2 Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942, Public Law 797, 77th Cong., approved 11 Dec. 1942.

3 G. Piel, "Narcotics: War Has Brought Illicit Traffic to All-time Low but U.S. Treasury Fears Rising Post-war Addiction," Life, 19 July 1943, pp. 82-94. See also H. J. Anslinger and W. F. Tompkins, Traffic in Narcotics ( New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953), p. 166.

4 H. J. Anslinger, "The Federal Narcotic Laws," Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law Journal 6 : 743-48 (1951).

5 Public Law No. 255, 82nd Cong., approved 2 Nov. 1951, known as the Boggs Act.

6 Anslinger's warnings were accepted by the Daniel's Subcommittee which investigated narcotics traffic in 1955. The Committee's final report, The Illicit Narcotics Traffic (Senate Rept. no. 1440, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956) stated that "subversion through drug addiction is an established aim of Communist China" and that American civilians and military were prime targets. See also H. J. Anslinger and J. D. Gregory, The Protectors ( New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1961 ), p. 223; H. J. Anslinger and W. F. Tompkins, Traffic in Narcotics, pp. 69-116.

7 "Proceedings of the House of Delegates," Annual Report of the American Bar Association 8o : 408-09 ( 1955).

8 See above, ch. 10, n. 6 for the subcommittee's report.

9 Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Public Law 728, 84th Cong., approved 18 July 1956.

10 "Report of the ABA Commission on Organized Crime," Annual Report of the ABA 76 : 411-13 ( 1951).

11 "Report on Drug Addiction by the New York Academy of Medicine," Bull, of the N.Y . Academy of Medicine 31 : 592-607 (Aug. 1955). An interesting comparison can be made with the Academy's recommendations of 1918 (Med. Record 73 : 468, 16 March 1918).

12 ABA and AMA Joint Committee on Narcotic Drugs, Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease ( Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1961), introduction by A. R. Lindesmith, p.

13 Ibid., Appendix B, Rufus King, "An Appraisal of International, British, and Selected European Narcotic Drug Laws, Regulations, and Policies," pp. 121-55.

14 Ibid., Appendix A, Morris Ploscowe, "Some Basic Problems in Drug Addiction and Suggestions for Research," pp. 15-119.

15 Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Narcotic Clinics in the United States (GPO, 1955). A similar one-sided report is contained in Anslinger and Tompkins, Traffic in Narcotics, pp. 195-206.

16 U.S. Bureau of the Budget, The Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1969, Appendix (GPO, 1968), PP. 445, 820.

17 Message from the President: Mental Illness and Retardation, House Doc. no. 58, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 February 1963. President Kennedy relied on "the new knowledge and new drugs acquired in recent years which make it possible for most of the mentally ill to be successfully and quickly treated in their own communities and returned to a useful place in society" (p. 3).

18 For example, this comment by A. R. Lindesmith in 1947: "At first glance it might seem that [the British system] would make opiates more available than they are now and lead to a spread of the habit. Further consideration reveals, however, that the opposite would be the case" (Opiate Addiction [Bloomington, Ind.: Principia Press, 1947], p. 205). By 1965 the implication that addiction maintenance through physicians would reduce the number of addicts is less clearly stated: "It is characteristic of Britain and apparently of virtually all countries with this type of Program that the number of addicts is relatively low, that there are very few youthful users, and that addiction contributes little to the crime problem in proportion to the number of addicts. If a program of this sort contributes to creating these effects, it deserves more serious consideration than it has yet been given" (The Addict and the Law [New York: Vintage Books, 1965], p. 170).

19 "Drug Addiction" (London: H.M.S.O., 1965).

20 For a recent optimistic review on the rapidly changing British experience see Edgar May, "Narcotics Addiction and Control in Great Britain," in Drug Abuse Survey Project, Dealing with Drug Abuse, A Report to the Ford Foundation (New York: Praeger, 1972), chapter 7, pp. 345-94.

21 J. V. DeLong, "Treatment and Rehabilitation," Dealing with Drug Abuse . . . , pp. 173-254.

22 "Methadone Maintenance and Its Implication for Theories of Narcotic Addiction," in A. Wikler, ed., The Addictive States (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1968 ), p. 359.

23 Proceedings of the White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, Final Report, Washington, D.C. (GPO, 1962).

24 President's Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Final Report, Washington, D.C. (GPO, 1963).

25 Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Public Law 89-74, 89th Cong., approved 15 July 1965.

26 Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 2966, Public Law 89-273, 89th Cong. approved 8 Nov. 1966.

27 Dennis A. Aronowitz, "Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts and Sentencing for Narcotic Drug Offenses," Appendix D of The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Annotations and Consultants' Papers, Washington, D.C., ( GPO, 1967), pp. 148-58.

28 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Public Law 91-513, 91st Cong., approved 27 Oct. 1970.