There is scientific, practical, professional, and ideological importance in what legislators say and do. The behavior and opinions of lawmakers are in themselves fascinating areas for psychological inquiry. What they think of a profession and its practitioners affects the development and well-being of that profession and bears on legislative support for the institutions and endeavors in which such professionals are involved. And, ideologically, what legislators do matters. Their attempts to influence human conduct can have immense effects and those effects—as well as the intent of the acts—will be judged by moral and social standards. For these reasons we believe that psychologists will be interested in the results of interviews which we have had with key men in the California legislature. The subject of the interviews was legislation on mind-altering drugs and on drug users. The implications of the results extend, we believe, much beyond the interesting question of where legislators stand with respect to problems of drug use and abuse.

The value and feasibility of psychological studies of political behavior are by now well known. Spranger (1928 ) and Lasswell (1930) —if not Plutarch and Suetonius—led the way. Our own interest in the views of legislators arose from some previous work on the use of mind-altering drugs (Blum and Associates, 1964; Blum and Blum, 1963 ) and on personality and political and social outlook (Blum, 1958) . It had become clear to us that the social issues surrounding the use and abuse of drugs are important ones which illuminate a number of social problems and value conflicts within our society. We had also concluded that positions on drug issues are part of a larger fabric of a person's outlook—one in which moral values, psychological characteristics, and social and cultural surroundings play a determining role. We were not in a position to conduct any careful test of hypotheses among legislators; they could not be expected to give us the time necessary to participate in formal testing or experiments. On the other hand, we would be able to assess their views on crucial questions and to relate these to the available data on political stance and party affiliation.

In order to conduct the study, we approached the fifty-two California legislators who in 1964 held appointments to one or more committees which processed bills dealing with drugs or with the handling of drug users. These men had the greatest interest and knowledge in and real power controlling drug legislation in the state. Fifty legislators (42 per cent of the 120 in the California legislature) were kind enough to cooperate in the study. There were twelve senators and thirty-eight assemblymen, thirty-three Democrats and seventeen Republicans in our sample. All were men; most were Protestant. More than half, thirty-one, were lawyers; over a fifth, twelve, were businessmen. There were two high school teachers, one medical and one veterinary doctor, two ministers, a pharmacist, an economist, and a former customs officer. The assemblymen had an average tenure of six years in office; the senators, nine years.

THE INTERVIEWS
The interviews were conducted according to a schedule. The core of each question on that schedule is presented in the following sections in the order in which the questions were asked. Tangential discussion was encouraged for as much time as the lawmaker had available. Following the interviews, the respondents were rated as liberal, moderate, or conservative and as expressing views which we classify as those of moral absolutists or of pragmatic men. We shall present the substance of the views of the sample in each inquiry area and will discuss the relationship of the several positions taken to political stance when the latter appears relevant.

Is drug abuse a serious social problem? We began by asking whether California is faced with a problem in the abuse of mind-altering drugs. Most of the legislators thought it is-88 per cent of the Republicans and 81 per cent of the Democrats answering in the affirmative. If we separate the "convinced" from the "perfunctory" affirmations, we find the political differences much more marked in the perception of a drug threat. Three quarters of the Republicans but only half of the Democrats seemed convinced that there is a clear and present menace to the social order arising from drug abuse. Although many were worried about drugs, what they were specifically worried about varied considerably. About a fifth spoke of their concern about crimes committed by narcotics users, mentioning murder and theft as examples. Fewer numbers spoke rather broadly of dangers to youth and of costs to the community and to users. A few legislators defined the problem in terms of the inhumanity of the present approach to the offender addict.

The discussions moved from what the problem is to what ought to be done about it. Two major positions and one minor one emerged, exclusive of that third of the lawmakers who volunteered no general solutions. One major position, representing the largest single group, emphasized punishment and control. This group of men wanted present laws more stringently enforced and/or wanted new laws imposing harsher penalties and tighter restrictions. The second position excluded coercive restraint or punishment; those proposing it called for new efforts at public education, the treatment of drug users, further research, and the alleviation of social conditions which are presumably at the root of the abuse. A minor position, never advocated as a sole approach, was taken by three lawmakers. They separated punishment from control—the latter in the form of the confinement or isolation of the offender for the purpose of reducing his dependency on drugs and preventing his contact with the community; they advocated nonpunitive restraint and isolation in combination with rehabilitation or with rehabilitation and punishment. A number of men called for diversified efforts; most often rehabilitation and punishment-control were recommended.

An examination of the distribution of these proposed solutions by party affiliation showed that the majority of those exclusively advocating more emphasis on punishment-control were Republicans (eight as compared with three Democrats). Six Democrats and three Republicans called for education-rehabilitation-research, while the suggestions for movement in several directions at once came from nine Democrats and four Republicans.

What does the voter want done? In our conversations with the legislators, we differentiated among three major classes of drugs: alcohol, the dangerous drugs (legally defined to include stimulants, sedatives, tranquilizers, and so on), and narcotic drugs (the legal definition of which in California includes the nonnarcotic and intoxicating marijuana and hallucinogen peyote). With reference to narcotics users, the most frequently expressed view of the legislators was that the public wants harsher penalties imposed as a means of controlling drug abuse and exacting retribution from wrongdoers. The public was said to prefer to see users of dangerous drugs handled just as if they were narcotics offenders (again more punitively than at present). The public was most often seen as having no interest in alcoholics. No legislator was of the opinion that the public desires a rehabilitative rather than a law-enforcement approach to narcotics addicts; but some did believe that the public would favor treatment rather than arrest (as is presently the case in public drunkenness) for alcoholics.

If the position of the legislators is compared in terms of their own proposals for what might be done to correct drug abuse with their views of what the public desires, the Republicans reflect a greater correspondence between the legislator's own position and his view of the will of the public. Only two Republicans saw any discrepancy between what they proposed and what the public wants, and in both cases what they proposed was harsh penalties and what they thought the public wants was even harsher penalties. Democrats, on the other hand, were much more likely to see a discrepancy between what they thought should be done and what the public wants; half of the Democrats espoused treatment but said the public still thinks in terms of punishment; a fourth of the Democrats said that there is no public opinion, that a variety of publics exist, each with a different viewpoint, and that, for the most part, people are apathetic and no public "opinion" as such exists on drug control.

It is clear that most legislators believed the public to be "out for blood" on the drug-control issue. It is also clear that there was a much greater perception of, and presumably tolerance for, difference among the Democrats between the legislator's own views and those he ascribed to the public.

What can laws accomplish? Fundamental to any proposals for legislation arc beliefs about what laws can accomplish in influencing human conduct. In our discussion on these beliefs, the most frequent expectation voiced by lawmakers was that through the passing and enforcement of drug laws the amount of drug abuse could be reduced by limiting the supply of drugs—a matter of practical controls —and by placing a stigma on us—the stigma serving as a moral proclamation to deter citizens from drug experimentation and, at the same time, presenting drug abusers with the threat and fact of punishment. Men who held this view did not believe that any legal effort could eliminate drug abuse entirely. A smaller number of legislators said the laws functioned, presumably successfully, to protect society from the criminal menace posed by users and to provide morally necessary retribution, "an eye for an eye" for wrongdoing. A few legislators expressed the conviction that legislation could ameliorate the problems of society and the individual drug user by providing the user with treatment facilities. Three lawmakers saw no hope for any laws to control drug taking through any presently available methods, but they expressed the hope that laws which authorized research might lead_ to eventual solutions. Three Democrats and no Republicans expressed the latter view.

Of what use is social science research? About half of the lawmakers, in discussing the possible contribution to legislative planning of studies by social scientists, psychologists, and psychiatrists, took the position that social science is a good thing but that, at present, it has not developed enough information to be of much help. Some lawmakers nodded politely in the direction of research but discounted the importance of any findings, present or future. "I know it already" was the feeling or, as one man said, "The answers are so simple we don't need a psychiatrist to tell us." Over a fifth of the legislators rejected social-science research outright, their position being that it is useless, biased, dangerous, or otherwise nonsensical.

What would you expect from a social scientist? When the discussion shifted from the consideration of the value of research on human behavior to the more immediate question of what a social scientist or psychiatrist might tell legislators to aid them in drafting laws designed to influence human behavior, we were able to distinguish several different themes among the attitudes toward these professionals. That some lawmakers offered several different themes accounts for the fact that the percentages in the table below add up to more than 100 per cent. Table 20 presents the several views and illustrative quotations.

Obviously, the majority of legislators were critical of the knowledge, orientation, sense of responsibility, practical sense, honesty, or communication skill of social scientists and psychiatrists. Only a minority of lawmakers gave weight or priority to what these professionals might say and certainly few legislators, if any, would seek them out for information or advice. Even those lawmakers who were interested in what social scientists might tell them expected the scientist to take the initiative and come to them.'

Information needs for decisions on hypothetical drug legislation. In order to learn more about where legislators would get information on proposed drug legislation and to learn more about their stands on the punishment-isolation-rehabilitation continuum (for a continuum we believe it to be), we discussed with each man three hypothetical bills. One bill would make the hallucinogenic drug LSD more widely available by classifying it as a dangerous drug (it is now restricted to use in approved research only) and thus enable physicians to prescribe it. The second bill, following contemporary proposals in Great Britain, would make the use of marijuana legal, subject only to the same controls that govern alcohol sales. The third bill would remove public drunks from the concern of criminal law and would transfer the handling of alcoholics to public-health and medical authorities, who would be responsible for alcoholic-treatment programs. The police function would be limited to twenty-four-hour protective custody prior to mandatory medical disposition. In order to decide on the LSD bill, two fifths of the legislators said they would need information dealing with the dangers of the drug to society should LSD be made more easily available. Their request presumes that society is endangered by any increased access to mind-altering drugs. A third of the lawmakers stressed the danger to individuals rather than to the community and said that they would want to know what the drug does to those who take it. These legislators would also want information on the benefits to be gained by LSD—the basic argument for changing the law—as well as information assuring them that any changes in the law would still provide careful controls and safeguards over access, and information on the motives and characteristics of those who propose that LSD be made more available. A fifth of the legislators said they had no need for any information, for their minds were already made up; to a man they would not make LSD more available and would maintain the present tight controls.

The sources that the legislators considered most reliable and trustworthy for those among them who would want information are shown in Table 21 below. Physicians—especially representatives of organized medicine—would most often receive a respectful hearing, while law-enforcement representatives were ranked second in order of mention as a source of reliable drug facts. Significantly, behavioral scientists were spontaneously mentioned as reliable information sources by only four legislators.


Asked what stand they would take on the LSD bill if they were to vote today, half said they did not know, that they could not decide without further information. More than a third did know how they would vote, but however they voted would be in the direction of maintaining or increasing the present tight controls over LSD use.3 Six legislators (13 per cent of the forty-five discussing their stand) would be willing to make LSD more available by making it a prescription drug, provided information gave them assurance of its claimed benefits.

Making marijuana legal. Should a bill be introduced to make marijuana use legal, what information would the legislators need in order to decide how to vote? Half of them were not interested in further information; they already knew how they would vote—and that would be against its legality. The reasons for that decisive opposition varied; some were convinced the drug is evil or that it leads to evil. Some, for example, said, "We've enough problems now, no use starting other evils," or "It makes people lose their moral responsibility by promoting irrationality." Others were sure of the information they already had, that marijuana is the first step toward hard drugs. Two assemblymen gave statements that were politically wise, albeit cynical. One said, "I'd make campaign speeches against it and be a hero"; the other said, "Because public opinion is definite, I'd vote against marijuana."

The remainder of the legislators were nearly all interested in learning what the effects of marijuana were, how it might be beneficial or harmful. "Why is it desirable?" "Does it have clinical uses?" "Does it really lead to addicting drugs?" "What are the consequences on crime and traffic accidents?" Two legislators asked whether legislation making marijuana legal was feasible in view of current public opinion. "Can we remake our society so that people here view marijuana as they do in Mexico?"

Only five legislators—their minds not yet made up—could specify the preferred sources of information they would need; three mentioned physicians, while two mentioned law-enforcement personnel. They also wanted to hear the views of interested parties, those for and against such legislation. One legislator thought of university people as an information source.

In terms of a vote today, only five of the fifty lawmakers felt unable to commit themselves. Two thirds would vote against the bill out of conviction; another 8 per cent would vote against it because of the political danger of voting for such an unpopular measure, even though they themselves might favor it. Six legislators said that, realistically, the bill could never come to a vote for no one would be so courageous—or so foolish—as to introduce such legislation. "It would take twenty-five years of public education before anyone would dare."

Making alcoholism a rehabilitation rather than a police problem. In discussing a bill which would remove alcoholics who are public drunks from criminal prosecution, the legislators showed much greater willingness to consider a change from present practice and to be open to new information about proposals. Their decisions would be influenced by: information about the mechanics of the program—facilities, authority, needed changes in the law, and the protection of civil liberties in the commitment process (mentioned by a fourth) ; information on the costs and sources of funds for an alcoholic-treatment program (mentioned by a fifth of the legislators) ; evidence for the advantages of a new program—proof of benefits to be gained through treatment; information about alcoholics themselves—"What are they like?" "Is it really a disease?" "Is it really an addiction?" "Why is it a health problem?" "How many are public nuisances now?"; data from other states or nations where such programs are in effect showing how the legislation has worked, assurance that individuals who are drunk and commit other offenses would still be responsible for their criminal violations, and assurance that the public would accept the new approach (one legislator).

In discussing information sources, a number of legislators brought up an important point. To our inquiry as to where they would go for information, they replied that they would not go anywhere, that the people with information would come to them. Things would not be changed unless there was pressure for change. Such pressure occurs when individuals or groups come to the capitol to propose a bill. In presenting their proposals, interest groups are responsible for providing the evidence of need for new legislation and its benefits. When a legislator has listened to the interested parties and still needs more data, he relies on such standard procedures as interim-committee hearings and the reports of the research staff which committees employ. But if he is to seek something more, it will usually take the form of turning to an easily accessible source already known to him—for example, in drug controversies, to his own personal doctor, the familiar personnel of state health or law-enforcement agencies in the capitol, the ever hovering representatives of the state medical association, and so forth. Only a few legislators spontaneously think of specialists or experts in terms of professional disciplines or individual reputations. However, three lawmakers in our study did say they would turn to social scientists and psychiatrists for alcohol information, and one would ask the prohibitionists. This latter legislator had in mind one of the best-known lobbyists in the capitol, a fondly regarded minister who persistently advocated prohibition.

We asked what pressures from interest groups would be exerted should an alcoholism-treatment bill be proposed. Eleven legislators believed that some of the state's best-known police chiefs and district attorneys would oppose the bill because of their "lack of faith in rehabilitation." They also agreed that churches and temperance people would oppose it should there be any suggestion that the nonpunitive handling of alcoholics would "threaten to remove the stigma from drinking." The legislators' point was that the temperance people hold that drinking is evil and must be publicly stigmatized through arrest and conviction; if medical treatment were to imply acceptance of alcoholism as a disease rather than as an evil, temperance people would be afraid that drinking would be encouraged. In addition, they might argue that evil must be condemned and that rehabilitation is not condemnation.

Among other pressure groups interested in alcohol, the legislators mentioned the liquor industry—which would oppose a bill if its members had to pay any part of the costs of the new program or if it threatened sales. Taxpayers' organizations and civic organizations would also be interested—and opposed—if taxes were to be increased or if any menace to the community were perceived. Civil-liberties "extremists" would also be heard from should there be any danger of the alcoholic's being institutionalized against his will by health personnel without his having an opportunity for a trial or some other judicial review of his status. "Welfare bills may actually take people's rights away from them. It's better to be arrested as a drunk than as an alcoholic."

As for their present position on a bill to shift the burden of alcoholism to public health rather than law-enforcement people, a third of the legislators were uncertain, saying they would be favorably inclined if they were sure there would be no abuse of the law by the alcoholics themselves. Their fear was that alcoholics would be less motivated to recover if "indulged" through rehabilitation than if prodded by the knowledge of their being criminal offenders. "Punishment works to make us good; remove punishment and you remove the reasons for doing good." Another third of the lawmakers favored such a bill provided its administrative program could be worked out without increased taxes. The final third of the legislators said they would vote against the bill at the present time, although many of them offered reasons which suggested their opinions might change if convincing information were in their hands.

In reviewing the negative reactions on the bill, we think it curious that both liberals and conservatives were against it. The same liberals were critical of public-health proceedings and involuntary hospitalization because civil liberties were denied and the individual is socially harmed by being stigmatized as an "alcoholic" without due process of law to protect him from erroneous labeling. Some conservatives felt that "weak" as they are, alcoholics must be held responsible for their actions and punished if they "overindulge" themselves; furthermore, they felt that any transfer of social-control efforts from police to health personnel would threaten a breakdown in law enforcement and subsequent community safety. The latter position is not unrelated to that ascribed to temperance groups: evil exists and must be punished, while rehabilitation implies acceptance or neutrality and that is in itself amoral and conducive of immorality in others.

Voting in disagreement with constituents. "Under what circumstances would you go against your constituents' wishes in voting on any bill to control or change human behavior?" About a fourth of the lawmakers expressed clear unwillingness to vote contrary to the wishes of their constituents or—sometimes more specifically—their important supporters. Some of this group argued that such circumstances do not arise, that discrepancies can never be since they are so close in heart and mind to their constituents that they are as one with them on all matters. A larger group said they would be reluctant to oppose their constituents but would do so under certain circumstances—for example, on moral issues or if the electorate was uninformed. The remaining third stated that they would readily vote against their constituents, that their own special knowledge, judgment, and responsibility require that they act on behalf of, rather than merely under, the direction of the electorate. There were no major differences in the distribution of these three positions by party affiliation.

How to handle the drug offender. Early in our exchange with the legislators, we had encouraged them to offer solutions to the problem of drug abuse. About two thirds of the lawmakers volunteered suggestions; three positions and permutations of those positions emerged: punitive control, education-treatment, and isolation-confinement (nonpunitive) . Later in the interview, we mentioned each of these three positions as a commonly advocated alternative and asked each legislator to express and elaborate his preferences. By providing a structured choice, as opposed to the earlier encouragement of spontaneous proposals, we found that all the lawmakers were willing to commit themselves to an approach. Table 22 below shows that more favored a combination of approaches than otherwise.

That the majority stated their opposition to the treatment approach with no penalty is consistent with legislative history. Punishment, confinement, and within-institutional treatment is the legislative program for handling addicts in the state. Furthermore, some five years ago, a bill with provisions for no-penalty, noninstitutional treatment was proposed but was defeated. Among those opposing the bill were some leading police officials—an event in keeping with the comments of lawmakers to the effect that interest groups now opposing any "liberal" drug bills were law-enforcement people, conservative civic groups (PTA, mothers' clubs, fraternal societies), the liquor industry, and church and temperance groups. Legislators saw as supporters of the treatment-no-penalty approach the Friends (Quakers), American Civil Liberties Union, NAACP, California Democratic Council, and the social-welfare people ("those do-gooders"). Wryly noting that "the addict has no friends," some observed that not only were the antitreatment forces much stronger than the protreatment ones but that the latter—for example, the civil-liberties groups—were themselves under fire for their "subversive" activities or were decried for their attempts to "break down law enforcement in the state."

Lest it rashly be thought that stated opinions are excellent predictors to positions on all related issues, we find it necessary to note that even the most punitive legislators approved of the Synanon4 approach. They reasoned that Synanon forces the individual to take responsibility for his actions, that it does not coddle addicts but forces them to be withdrawn "cold turkey" from opiates, and that the entire effort is done without any cost to the taxpayer. Clearly, Synanon appeals to the economy-minded lawmaker and can be approved for its harshness to addicts by punitive legislators, while treatment-oriented men approve of its nonpenal rehabilitative aspects. We suspect that the legislator who observed that Synanon had a first-class, public-relations program in the capitol was by no means in error. The diverse appeal of Synanon should emphasize the possibility of obtaining agreement on the handling of drug-dependent people, even though stated positions would make it appear impossible that such agreement among lawmakers would ever be reached.

Opposing the lobbyists. Given the fact of powerful interests groups which lobby for and against pending drug bills, what happens to the legislator who decides to buck the pressure groups, voting against their persuasion and threats? Nothing much, according to the lawmakers, at least nothing disastrous as long as there are pressure groups on the other side, too. "No one is defeated [at the polls] on the basis of [his vote on] one issue." On the other hand, the legislator who opposes a powerful lobby will "have to explain things back home" and to accept the alienation of a few former supporters. Only one lawmaker saw potential catastrophe in opposing the strong antirehabilitation lobbies on drug bills. He explained that drug issues are particularly newsworthy, "Narcotics . . . have been made a political football," he said. Another said, on this same point, "Some legislators use rabble rousing [on drug issues] to gain votes," and a third commented, "We are pushed and pressured . . . by overexaggeration. Some people discuss it [drugs] as though every other person were addicted." In any event, it was foreseen that newspapers and law-enforcement people could whip up a storm over a vote for a lenient drug measure, which could, in turn, arouse the electorate to reject the legislator.

Legislator's personal experience. Half of the legislators who were willing to discuss their own personal experiences regarding the abuse of drugs or alcohol indicated that they had had bad experiences; most of these experiences had been with clients, employees, or relatives who had been alcoholics. Half of those who had had bad experiences denied that these had influenced their interests, thoughts, or convictions in any fashion. Among the remainder, several claimed they had come, one way or another, to an understanding of alcoholism as a disease. One legislator had himself given up drinking; another had come to the conclusion that drug abuse was a psychological and social problem; another had decided that penalties would have to be increased for drug peddlers. One legislator with an alcoholic kinsman realized—in contrast, he said, to what he had believed before—that an alcoholic might not be responsible (in the free-will and self-control sense) for his continued drinking. Nevertheless, this same legislator said he would shy away from legislation for the handling of drunks as a civil rather than criminal problem because he would not want to "dignify self-induced drunkenness." Furthermore, regardless of the plight of the individual alcoholic, he felt his legislative obligation was to protect the welfare of society. He believed he could best accomplish this through stigmatizing drunkenness and applying penalties as a moral deterrent to others even if these would not help the alcoholics themselves.

Political stance and attitudes on drug issues. We compared the stance of legislators with reference to other social issues and the views expressed during our interviews with them. First, we classified each as liberal, moderate, or conservative based on his key voting record prepared by the California Democratic Council. That politically liberal group scored votes they approved of with "plus" and ones they disapproved of with "minus." Typical pluses would be for a vote for a bill outlawing discrimination in housing, for a moratorium on the death penalty, for elimination of loyalty oaths, for withholding tax on wages, against exempting real-estate operations from antimonopoly laws, and so forth. There were seventeen CDC conservatives, nineteen CDC moderates, and fourteen CDC liberals in our sample.

After each interview we had rated each man as liberal, moderate, or conservative on the basis of his comments. This rating was done without knowledge of his voting record or the CDC score card. Ratings were done by one person, the interviewer, whose only prior information about the legislator was his party affiliation. Men who appeared open to new information, willing to change the status quo, and willing to consider a greater rehabilitative approach with a reduced punitive or controlling emphasis in handling drug-dependent persons were classed as liberals; moderates were those who showed less of each of the above qualifications; and conservatives were those who were least interested in new information to guide legislative decisions on new bills—that is, men who emphasized the need for retribution and deterrence in controlling the menace of drug abuse, as well as favoring the maintenance of the status quo. Comparing relative positions on these two measures, the CDC liberal-conservative continuum and our rating of drug liberality-conservatism, we obtained by using the Spearman rho a correlation of .91. Our conclusion was that a legislator's position on drug issues and his interest in new information and new ways to influence human conduct were predictable from his stands on other social issues. Drug views are part of the constellation of views which are generally spoken of as "liberal" or "conservative."

Being a conservative or a liberal on the basis of the CDC voting record was almost perfectly predictable from party affiliation: fifteen out of seventeen conservatives were Republicans; seventeen out of nineteen moderates were Democrats; and all fourteen liberals were Democrats. A similar trend held for those rated as liberals and conservatives on drug issues. Among sixteen conservatives on drug issues, twelve were Republicans; among fourteen moderates on drug issues, nine were Democrats and five were Republicans; and among the twenty liberals on drug issues, all were Democrats.

For all their differences, we suspected that the liberals and conservatives shared at least one thing in common, a commitment to a "harder" position on issues. The moderates, we thought, would be more willing to conform to what they saw to be the will of the electorate. We tested our expectation by comparing the degrees of stated willingness to "go it alone" among liberals and conservatives. Assigning scores of increasing value to the degrees of independence expressed and using the "t" test, we found that t = 5.98 (df = 30) which is significant beyond the .01 point. We concluded that the "extremists" were more "independent" in that they were more likely to state that they would oppose their own constituents on important issues.

PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES   

From our earlier studies of issues involved in the use of mind-altering drugs, we have found it useful to be alert to two philosophical positions. One is a form of idealism and is moral absolutism; the other is relative and pragmatic. According to our definition, absolutists have a moral sense derived from faith in traditional values, which are based on authoritative sources. With reference to drugs, their views typically reflect the ascetic antipleasure sentiments of St. Paul and the spirit of wrathful vengeance found in the Old Testament. The absolutist position has much in common with that second stage of -moral development described by Piaget (1948) in which laws are regarded as sacred and derived from unchallengeable sources. Suggestions for change in such laws are met with hostility, and the whole orientation involves a sense of (religious) respect for what is and what has been handed down as the proper order of things. In the absolutist view good and bad exist, and may be inherent in acts, without reference to the effects of those acts. Drug abuse, because it does involve—in the user and in the observer—strong feelings about pleasure, impulse control, spontaneity and constraint, and authority relations is one of the acts requiring moral evaluation and is, in that framework, sinful and wrong. The abuser, having made his responsible choice between good and evil, must be punished. Legislation which would fail to affirm the stigma of innate evil is in itself immoral regardless of its effects. Convinced of this much, the moral absolutist will approach the legislation of pleasure and pain with a very strong precommitment.

The pragmatist, by our definition, is very much an empirical and utilitarian man. In our society he is ordinarily also sustained by an idealism which has its roots in the same cultural traditions as the absolutist. But his moral position usually evolves through an evaluation of the effects of acts, and his criteria ordinarily are humanistic ones. Rejecting faith in traditional authority as a route to an ethical system, the pragmatist is not hostile to innovation and takes a relativistic position about good and bad.

Given these two philosophical positions (not to be found in this classical form, of course, in the real world of men), we undertook to rate the legislators for their adherence to or leaning toward one or another position. Ratings were made, in each case, by the interviewer and were based on the foregoing definitions applied to the interview remarks of the legislators. At the time these ratings were made immediately after the discussion, the interviewer was aware of party affiliation. We rated eighteen men as moral absolutists and twenty-six as pragmatists; six men were not rated because we felt unsure or felt they did not fit the typology. Expecting considerable overlap between these ratings and political stance, we found that fifteen absolutists were drug conservatives and three were drug moderates, while seventeen pragmatists were drug liberals, eight were moderates, and one was a conservative. A very similar distribution resulted for political stance as derived from the CDC scorecard. Here, again, we expected overlap between philosophical position and party affiliation as such, and found it. Twenty-three pragmatists were Democrats and three were Republican; eleven moral absolutists were Republicans and seven were Democrats.

As we have said, the overlap between political and philosophical positions was hardly surprising. In part, we were describing the same components but using different words and, in part, the ratings themselves were colored by uncertain reliability and more certain contamination. We grant all this readily and would not attempt to disprove it. But we do suggest that it remains useful to think in philosophical, as well as political or psychodynamic, terms when evaluating legislative, moral, or policy behavior and trying to understand why such a gulf exists between psychologists and lawmakers. We shall also try to illustrate that there can be predictive power derived from the identification of these positions as an aspect of personality.

Social science is pragmatic and social scientists are likely to be empirical, relativistic, and humanistic. As a result, a psychologist (or psychiatrist, pharmacologist, and so on) may confidently testify on the basis of available evidence that marijuana is not ordinarily harmful to the user and that the user does not become dangerous to those about him. Consequently, their testimony concludes that it is only reasonable that marijuana be removed from the list of illicit narcotic substances. In the same empirical vein, Chein, Gerard, Lee, and Rosenfeld (1964) state, "We started with the common belief that prolonged use of narcotic drugs is intrinsically devastating to the human being, physically and psychically, and it was not until we set to work . . . that it was brought home to us how completely without any scientific foundation and contrary to fact such a belief is" (p. 6). Or, again, ". . . by far the most horrible consequences [of opiate use], personally and socially, are directly traceable to its de facto illegality, . . . the incontinent use of opiates is far less dangerous . . . than that of alcohol" (p. 327).

The scientists' soul mate in the capitol, the pragmatic politician, is willing to listen and, if the evidence is persuasive, to agree. But to the moral absolutist the foregoing conclusions are blasphemy and apostasy. And because that is the case, the world view and morality of the social scientist are unacceptable to the absolutist. If he lacks an opportunity to learn how scientific findings might be of value or to find through acquaintance that pragmatists can also have an idealistic bent, the absolutist will reject social science and its practitioners outright.' Indeed, a frequent comment was that the social scientists' position was so different from that of many legislators that they were hearing-room outcasts.

If our speculations are correct, the moral absolutists will more often reject social scientists as information sources than will the pragmatic lawmakers. To test that premise and simultaneously to demonstrate that philosophical predilections once identified can be more powerful predictors than, for example, party affiliation, we returned to the interview data regarding "trustworthy and reliable" sources of information on the three hypothetical drug bills. On the basis of party affiliation, we found that expressed interest in the opinions of university people (including medical-school faculty), sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists was not predictable—that is, there was no significant relationship between reliance on social scientists as trustworthy information sources and the legislator's party label. On the other hand, there was an association (P is greater than .05) between philosophical bent and spontaneously mentioned interest in social-science and academic-information sources. Table 23 presents the distribution employed in the two 7c2 tests.

              
The demonstration of a relationship between moral absolutism and the tendency to reject (or at best overlook) academic- and social-science information sources when considering drug bills must not lead to an oversimplification of the reasons for the low status of these pragmatists in the state's capitol. Remember that the majority of legislators in this sample—men in key posts in the legislature of the largest and most "progressive" state in the Union (defined by its welfare programs and government support for health, education, police service, consumer protection, and the like)—were reluctant to accept social-science, psychiatric, and university opinion. All of the reasons for this do not lie in the bosoms of the lawmakers. These professionals have not, as the lawmakers noted, put themselves forward. Their capitol contacts are usually limited to matters of direct interest to their professional organizations: certification and licensing, personnel posts, salaries, and so on. There have been no "unselfish" lobbies to further the scientific view of man or to assure the presence of these professions at hearings on bills designed to modify human behavior. Nor are they a visible group compared with the commercial or law-enforcement interests or the well-financed and smoothly run lobbies of organized medicine, labor, farmers, and the like. Furthermore, on those rare occasions when they do appear to testify, they do not wear well. The legislators spoke convincingly of the inability of some professionals to speak clearly and avoid jargon; they noted how the scientist, casting doubt or raising questions, may produce anxiety and discomfort in the listening lawmaker, who must vote "yes" or "no" regardless of the scientists' own uncertainty. It seems clear that the testifying experts have not realized the need to cast their knowledge in ways that can be useful to men who make laws, nor have they—unlike shrewder lobbyists—tried to guide legislators to the uses of the information that they present.

The fact that moderate and conservative legislators are unlikely to accept the value of scientific data about human behavior should not make us overlook what we nevertheless take to be the trend of the times, notwithstanding the recent upsurge of the reactionary right. The content of the interviews makes it clear that even the punishment-oriented, the most absolutist legislator cannot avoid some token acceptance of "liberal" ideas. A legislator can no longer safely be against "rehabilitation" or "humanitarian treatment" and still count on being re-elected. To give way to the impulse to "throw the key away," said one legislator, proves either that one is ignorant and unaware that "addiction is now a disease" or else that one is inhumane himself. Why—and to what extent—the punitive impulse is interwoven with the absolutist position—at least among the legislators we interviewed—remains an important question in political and religious psychodynamics. (In one study [Blum and Associates, 1964] of policemen working in narcotics, we found a product-moment correlation of only r = .28 between dogmatism and punitiveness.) In any event, the consequence of being an absolutist who is forced by the times to accept a more enlightened doctrine leads the legislator to be of two minds—that is, he compartmentalizes. "Of course we should try to rehabilitate but, after all, a man is responsible and should be punished for his irresponsibility." Or to use another illustration from a conservative trapped in a liberal net: "We should have (free) drug clinics for the user, but we should have the death penalty for the pusher." (In reality users and peddlers are often the same people.) One conservative put it this way: "I think psychology is the answer to all problems —one must use education and insight to reduce the abuse of dangerous drugs"; he went on to say that the solution to the use of narcotic drugs was to be found in heavy penalties and stricter law enforcement.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Drug abuse was considered to be a major social threat by the majority of California legislators in our sample. Holding key positions of knowledge and power on drug issues, they have reacted to this threat—as reflected in present law and practice—by trying to influence human conduct through punishment and confinement; such measures, of course, are thought to contain the problem rather than solve it. They have considered treatment, but, for the most part, it has been limited to within-institution programs. In our interviews many lawmakers felt that the present approach is inadequate, and a few thought it inhumane. Although many proposals for new legislation call for "more of the same"—that is, for harsher laws and stronger controls—a minority of those legislators interviewed were actively interested in new approaches. Their willingness to explore and innovate has not been reflected, according to the reports of all the legislators, in the opinions of the electorate. The public was generally said to be strongly in favor of punishment and confinement. In their own eyes, a good many legislators are more "liberal" than the people they represent.

Present positions on legislative alternatives in the handling of drugs and users varied according to the drug under discussion. About LSD, for example, many in our sample had no present convictions and were quite open to informed proposals. A hard core of a third of the legislators would stand by the present tight-control laws. With marijuana—a far milder drug than LSD but one about which public opinion is strong (and incorrect) —present punitive positions remained firm, and for reasohs of conviction or political savvy, most legislators would oppose any effort to make its use legal. Their attitude toward alcohol was the reverse; they believed the public either to be willing to rehabilitate alcoholics or to be just uninterested in them. Concommitantly, most lawmakers were quite ready to remove the drunk from police purview, provided they were convinced that a treatment program would work and would not be too costly.

For those considering new approaches, the choice of sources for information was a matter of real importance. We found that in matters of drugs it was to the medical man—especially to organized medicine—and to the various law-enforcement associations and bureaus that the legislators would turn. Only a few spontaneously considered academic people: psychologists, sociologists, and psychiatrists. Nevertheless, about half of the legislators in our sample showed respect for the potential value of research in human behavior.

As for the relationships between these positions and other variables, we interested ourselves in our study in the conventional liberal-conservative continuum and in party affiliations. Men in our sample who were liberal on drug issues—seeking information, willing to change, and interested in rehabilitation as well as punishment—were also liberal when voting on other social issues; conservatives in the drug area were conservative in their other votes. Party affiliation and a legislator's stance as a liberal or conservative were related. Most of the conservatives were Republicans; all of the liberals were Democrats. While the conservatives and liberals had little in common politically, they did share that strength of conviction which makes them appear more willing than moderates to go it alone against the will of their own constituents.

Although both political stance and party label were consistent with approaches to drug issues, we found it useful to designate related philosophical positions: one, moral absolutism and the other, pragmatism. The assumptions implied in these two positions helped us to understand the extent of the differences between the poles of belief as to how to legislate so as to influence conduct. In addition, these philosophical positions, or personality predilections if one prefers, may prove to be useful variables in research. To illustrate, we learned from our sample that they bore a significant association with the willingness to entertain psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and academic people in general as respected sources of information; absolutists tended to reject and pragmatists tended to accept what behavioral scientists might have to say.

From the practical standpoint of the profession of psychology, the candid views of these legislators provided a test of political reality against which to measure the profession's social importance, as well as its place in the capitol pecking order. The criticisms that they made about social scientists led us to the question of whether or not psychologists, as one of the professions criticized, should commit themselves to positions on social issues and enter the fray either as a pressure group or as a lobby—not in the way that a conventional lobby presses for bills affecting the welfare of the professional and vocational interests of its membership, but on behalf of the human beings whom the individual psychologists study and treat as the object of their vocations. In other words, should they do as some legislators recommend and lobby for the implementation of their findings as scientists or for the application of their reasoned inferences from their data in legislative programs? Or should they avoid a professional commitment to lobbying' (for example, of the sort done by the scientific committees of the medical associations) and limit their political participation to their partisan, private-citizen domain, while keeping the professional self out of the rough and tumble of capitol cities? Certainly there is a potentially receptive audience for the information that psychologists might provide, but should the profession itself move in that direction, it would take a while for it to earn its spurs of respect in the hearing rooms and capitol offices.

We would raise one more issue. Because it is the general one which we asked the legislators to face, it would be less than fair to dodge it ourselves. It is substantive and ideological and is the issue of drug abuse. How is it to be viewed, how should society respond? The need for facts in order to reply is compelling enough, but the questions go beyond that to challenge us to consider our own personal views about what constitutes a social menace, what pleasure sources are part of individual freedom, and under what conditions and how society should intervene to influence drug use. It may be the nature of the scientist, derived from his work precautions, to wish to avoid a commitment until all the facts are in. But others will act while he waits and their actions will have effects—effects which must be judged according to some value hierarchy. Some of the most important actions that others will take will be to pass laws—laws to punish and laws to rehabilitate, laws to restrict drugs and laws to make them available, and laws to treat the symptoms and, much less often, laws to remove presumed causes. We ask our elected representatives to decide on these issues on our behalf, and they do. But is it right that professionals in the field of human behavior show less interest than their representatives in the effects of legislation, not only in regard to drug abuse but on other matters which affect human conduct and feelings and the course of our society? We think interest and involvement are to be preferred and, with it, an effort on the part of professionals to assist in the work of the legislature.

1 Along this line it is worth noting that a number of legislators seemed quite pleased that we had taken the initiative—as they saw it—in coming to see them. As a result of this step on our part, one offered to commission us to conduct research for his committee; another asked us to set up a conference between his committee and scholars in the university; another offered to introduce the hypothetical alcohol bill which we discussed with him, if we so desired. This response confirms the opinion that the social-science "Mahomet" had better be prepared to come to the legislative "hill" and also demonstrates that some lawmakers will be ready to offer warm and cooperative greetings.

2 Confirmation of the distance between the two groups attributable to points of view came from the observations of seven Democrats, none of whom was himself rejecting the academic or scientific position. Typical remarks were, "The average legislator isn't concerned with what the 'do-gooders' say but with what the D.A.'s and sheriffs say." "Because of my background—my wife is a social worker—I'm oriented to listening to social scientists, but the others up here aren't." "There is disdain for the book 'lamed' by those who've made it the hard way."

3 The following year, LSD possession was made a felony in California. Lobbyists for the increased penalties included police and prosecutors.

4 Synanon is a privately sponsored program for the rehabilitation of narcotic-dependent people. Users who have beaten the habit run the program and, in addition, to charismatic leadership, rely on communal living, strong discipline, and very frank and aggressive "interpretations" of addict ploys, weak points, defenses, con games, and alibis. Reportedly highly selective in its admission program, it is claimed to have had excellent results without the use of medical or mental-health professionals, without any government assistance, and often in the face of citizen opposition to Synanon houses in residential neighborhoods.

5 We assume that the absolutist lawmaker perceives a philosophical difference which he cannot tolerate and which leads him to distrust and reject the social scientist. On the other hand, the scientist can also be disdainful of the absolutist and fail to respect the latter's idealism. When this happens, a vicious circle is established, which is a fair guarantee that the two views will remain polarized and that communication will be almost impossible. To assist the scientist in an appreciation of the moral absolutist's position, it may be well to remind the pragmatist that his own utilitarian ethic will be hard put to generate a hierarchy of values or to lend direction either to personal enhancement or social progress unless it is infused with some form of idealism. Without this, the pragmatist remains amoral and might well not only display but eulogize conduct which is conventionally considered to be unprincipled or corrupt. As long as that which works is good and that which does not harm others is not bad, elastic indeed is the standard of conduct. For example, the present emphasis on social adjustment as a mental-health goal is illustrative, for it serves to extol that which is "adaptive" but does do so only at the cost of sacrificing that maladjustment which is for the sake of principle. The administrator who protests against those who would "rock the boat" for any reason or who justifies "cutting corners" becomes Machiavellian.