18
Changes of Scene

If Dr Anstie or Sir Arthur Pease, De Quincey or some nameless back-street seller of laudanum, or some others of the great range of relevant nineteenth-century actors were today to return to earth and inspect the current production of the play in which they had once performed, how strange , or familiar to their expectations would they find the present scene? For a start, they would certainly be chagrined to discover how little most people even in specialist circles read or remembered the writings, the debates and the campaigns, or the back-street shops. Only De Quincey could expect a familiar greeting. Here and there some of them would uncover pleasing little reminders that they had indeed once trodden the same ground - the Society for the Study of Addiction still exists as monument, and the British Journal of Addiction, which under an earlier name reported their scientific deliberations, moves forward towards its hundredth year of publication. The phrase `Chinese Heroin' would catch attention, and a previously distrusting view of the Oriental would be reinforced by the news that the Triad gangs had moved into the heroin import and distribution business - a small but poetic vengeance for the opium wars. The growing of British opium is forgotten, although the keen home cultivator may produce his few plants of cannabis at risk of prosecution, while the market stalls in the Fenlands are innocent of any memory of opium pills. The question of `infant doping' in the meaning familiar to the nineteenth-century reformers might not appear to be completely dead when they discovered the vast prescribing in America (and to a lesser extent in Britain) of amphetamines to the `overactive child'. They would, of course, be fascinated by the progress of science, and particularly by the astonishing recent discovery that the body produces its own opiate-like substances.
But beyond the little assurances of sameness and the many little evidences of change, there would soon dawn on these visitors the large and central fact that a concern with drugs and with addiction was still enormously with us. The market stalls or the chandler may no longer be selling opium, but tranquillizers are multinational business. Concern over how we are to co-exist with drugs, far from having faded away, has become a continuing and major source of societal anxiety. The definition of drug taking as a problem - the whole `problem framework' which began hesitantly to emerge in the nineteenth century - remains now as a dominant and usually unquestioned legacy.
So far as the prevalence of addiction is concerned, what would most surprise the nineteenth-century actors would be that a matter which had seemed for decades to be under control in this country - a success story for their reforming endeavours and the control system whose foundations they laid - had broken through again in the 1 960s. Behind the actual upsurge in numbers would, on closer inspection, be seen the emergence of a prevalent type of ._ addict which the nineteenth century had not envisaged. The drug problem has become dominantly a problem of young people: roughly twice as many men as women are now affected, and prevalence has in recent years shown an even social class spread. Heroin and cocaine were the drugs of choice at the start of the new epidemic, although a wide variety of other substances were soon in use too. Multiple drug use is now the order of the day: drugs are being injected intravenously. The source of supply for heroin and cocaine may initially have been the over-prescribing of a handful of doctors, but soon a situation arose where drugs were obtained from many sources - lax prescription, pharmacy breaking, thefts from warehouses, illicit manufacture of amphetamines and so on - and then circulated through a system of large or petty blackmarket dealings. Drug users were drawn together for supply and mutual support: they began to use the same jargon, to assume a sub-cultural identity. The ugly and denigrating American word `junkie' began to be heard. Drug use and crime inevitably became associated because illegal possession of drugs, and their `supply', were crimes by definition; because pharmacy breaking and forged prescriptions became common; and because the prior petty criminal involvement of many of the adolescents drawn into this drug world came to be mixed with their drug taking. In America the young `street addict' came to be seen as at the very centre of the problem of law and order, and as he stole and robbed to support his habit, he re-cycled the wealth of New York or Chicago. Some intimations of the potential for drug-taking to stimulate the formation of sub-cultures had been seen in the nineteenth century. But cannabis-taking among British artistic circles of that period had, for instance, never even faintly become a centrally cohesive activity in the way that the seeking and use of heroin became an organizing activity for groups of young city dwellers in the twentieth century.
Looking at our contemporary drug scene, the nineteenth-century visitor might therefore at first conclude that, although drug misuse was still with us, the nature of the phenomenon was so different in social terms that we were not now talking about the same happening. The stereotype of the middle-class woman injecting the morphia which her doctor has unwisely given her is replaced by the image of the addict as the drop-out, the delinquent adolescent, the fringe member of society. However, on close inspection, the junkie himself might be seen as the fullest incarnation of nineteenth-century fears of the `stimulant' use of opium - here indeed is the stereotype of addiction for fun and indulgence, for what the nineteenth century feared in the rumoured uses of opium in the mill towns. There is a parallel between our fear of the pleasure-seeking rebellion of youth and the previous century's terror of the working classes getting out of hand.
Important strands in the total nineteenth-century story of opium use of course included, besides addiction, the fundamental themes of opium as self-medication and opium in medical practice, that is, the place of the drug in therapeutics. In looking at the ways in which nineteenth-century themes carry through to the present, it is important therefore to stress that the totality of the story is not encompassed simply by addiction and drug problems. What current manifestations of therapeutics are the heirs of opium as medicine?
Under that heading, it would soon be evident to the inquiring visitor that Britain still has a vast and rich tradition of self-medication, which is not today a matter of opium but of many other substances. And even as medical prescribing and folk traditions of self-medication merged in the nineteenth century and the use of opium for symptomatic treatment of illness shaded off with no clear demarcation into drug-taking for pleasure, or relief of anomie, so today there are similar mergings affecting the drugs which are employed in place of opium. As regards present rates of self-prescribing, Karen Dunnell and Ann Cartwright1 found in a community survey that over a two-week period the ratio among adults of self-prescribed to prescribed medicines was roughly two to one. Two-thirds of adults had in fact taken a selfprescribed medicine over the previous two-week period, while about 41 per cent of the sample had taken `aspirin or other pain killers' during that time. Nineteen per cent of babies had been given `an indigestion remedy or gripe water'. All the reasons which formerly made opium so popular for symptomatic medication are still society's common pains and tribulations, but with a variety of drugs now taking a role in different areas - analgesics in particular in place of opium for pain relief or ill-defined malaise, varieties of cough medicine where opium was previously the sovereign remedy, and tranquillizers and anti-depressants as present-day substitutes on a huge scale for opium's role as a psycho-active drug for the relief of nervous tribulations and the stress of life. In 1968 a piece of research showed that diazepam (Valium), a minor tranquillizer, is now the most frequently prescribed of any single drug in Britain .2 One may well suspect that diazepam is taken as much for relief of anomie as for any diagnosable medical condition, and for the young mother living in the tower block its role is closely similar to that of opium in the nineteenth-century slums. Other work has shown that 8.6 per cent of adults in the U.K. will, during a twelve-month period, have taken anxiety-relieving drugs continuously for four weeks at a stretch. The multiple heirs to opium are self-prescribed, sometimes on the doctor's advice, obtained on medical prescription, swapped around the family, or given as a free sample by a drug firm and generously passed on by the doctor to his patient.
What might then cause surprise to ghostly visitors would be the discovery that in our contemporary and drug-laden society the most vocal manifestation of reforming public concern over drugs has been directed not at bringing substances under stricter control, but at the legalization of cannabis. A remarkable reversal in the attachments of liberal sentiment in one sense has come about. In the nineteenth century, men and women of good conscience and middle-class self-assurance were worrying about the opium use of the working classes and the quietening syrups which the mother in the industrial town gave to her baby: the contemporary middleclass reform movement has argued that cannabis use should be left to personal choice and claims that drug laws are applied with discrimination against working-class black youths in Brixton. Without discussing the factual basis for concern, there is some reminder here of the arbitrariness of what counts as a liberal cause, although it could be argued that closer analysis might show less of a paradox than surface inspection suggests. Today's reform movements have a philosophy which borrows much from nineteenth-century liberalism and J. S. Mill's emphasis on the individual's right of choice. The surface causes may suggest a turnabout, but the philosophy is continuous.
Evidence of the seriousness with which drug misuse is viewed today and the status which the problem has achieved might then be picked up in terms of the scope of government responses, the institutes and the international meetings and proliferation of learned journals, the committees and reports, the ramifications of the United Nations' control apparatus and the international treaties, the flow of Western money towards eradication, of opiumgrowing or crop-substitution programmes in the East. 3, ° The listing (and the costing) of this range of happenings, and comparison with nineteenth-century equivalents, could be seen as the real measure of the growth and institutionalization of social action. Nineteenth-century concern with the opium trade between India and China was basically an unofficial and uninstitutionalized response made by moral reformers, who sought the leverage to move governments and forced their anxieties on to parliament; their activities are now the formal business of the United Nations. It is an analysis of the pounds and dollars spent, the offices given over to these activities, the number of policemen, bureaucrats and customs officers directed to such ends, which gives the true picture of change. Governments now operate where previously only the amateurish societies for Improvement were at work. The small but generous benefactions of good Quaker bankers are replaced by the multi-million dollar U.N. Special Fund on Drug Abuse Control (U.N.F.D.A.C.).
Opiates still have particular symbolic meaning for national activity and for international crusade, but the concerns and activities of control now spread much more widely, and there were already hints of this in the nineteenth century, with cocaine, cannabis and chloral entering the arena. The U.N. Single Convention of 1961 dealt essentially with opiates, cocaine and cannabis, but the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 aims to spread the net far more widely, and at the international level reflects the anxieties which many countries are experiencing over the misuse of synthetic stimulants such as the amphetamines, and depressants such as the barbiturates and other sedatives, and the minor tranquillizers. Many of the nineteenth-century activists were concerned with the problems of alcohol as well as opiates, but the extent to which the two movements have come together has been limited, despite the promulgation by the World Health Organization of the `Combined Approach'. And cigarette smoking, although an aspect of the addiction problem which is increasingly acknowledged as constituting in most countries a far greater threat to health than the traditional substances of concern, tends to be dealt with through social mechanisms separate from either drugs or alcohol. There can be no doubt that the historian of the future will find fascinating material in our present fumbling toward policies to deal with smoking, our ability so sanguinely to accept smoking as a drug habit which in this country perhaps kills 100,000 people each year, and the contrast with the massive concern over opiates, which evidently do so much less harm.
To look at the present in terms of how it might be perceived by any of the key figures from the nineteenth century's opium debates is not just a device for stringing together a series of images. Unless one is reading history for history's sake, the account of the previous century's engagement with drugs given in earlier chapters inevitably invites introspective and self-regarding concern as to the continuities and the contrasts which can be detected, and the insights which may be gained into our own predicament. We look at the past not simply for the fun of it, but with the hope that we may better understand the present.
Superficial attempts to read `lessons from history' can only mislead. Britain is dealing now with many of the same drugs as a century ago, but the society within which drugs are used and controlled, and related problems defined, has radically changed.
The analytical approach which guides this chapter rests on the belief that the very facts of changing social context which make nonsense of the attempt to write history as homily are also exactly the difficulties which, if met rather than ignored, render this process of extrapolation meaningful. By taking due note of the changing nature of context one can then see more clearly the continuing themes, with their true underlying continuity in no way diminished by the fact that their expression will be very much shaped and altered by the context of changing times. For instance, one theme which can be traced is that of society's image of the heavy drug user: `bad habit' is replaced by `addiction', and in different contexts the word addiction itself has then certainly changed in meaning and implication. The complex theme of social control is also very important, and given that concept as an organizing idea, it is possible to relate the many different strategies of informal and formal control which society has employed over the decades.
The ways in which society thinks about and handles drugs could indeed be read as a set of markers which when properly comprehended offer important ways into understanding the nature and processes of the particular society which thinks and handles.
For the professional historian, the question of how and to what extent history is to be taken as addressing the present is a familiar debate. Parallel arguments also concern the anthropologist, who must be immensely aware of the dangers of the type of over-simple reading of anthropological material which seeks in Westernoriented ways to slant and demean the interpretation of primitive cultures toward instructive fables and pretty analogies for our own times.
This introductory section to the present chapter has attempted to set out in brief form some of the wide range of issues on which comparison could be made between past and present - a catchup note for the nineteenth-century visitor, or in reality a checklist for ourselves. The potential themes are many and others could certainly be identified beyond those which will be touched on here.
Having thus set the scene, we shall select a few of the themes and attempt to go rather deeper.

Medicalization as organizing idea

The account given in this book of a progressive medical dominance in society's ways of thinking about and responding to drugs identifies a theme which runs through to the present day and to modern sociological debate. The nineteenth century was a period during which the basis was laid for a disease theory of addiction. The social consequences were seen in the addict being defined as patient, the design of treatment methods and treatment facilities _which would now deal with this illness, and the emergence of medical specialists who had the continuing right to define the realities. The medical profession certainly at times became an instrument of control as well as of treatment. Opiates were literally taken away from the people and became in large measure the property of the doctors. Both practically and conceptually (and in the broadest sense politically), drugs became medicalized. Later. in this chapter, aspects of medicalization will be taken up under a number of headings. The influences of medical thinking in this field have gradually become so protean that it is indeed difficult to find a theme which is not in some way related to this idea. While leaving detailed consideration of medical influence within particular themes till later, it is useful here to look briefly at some general questions relating to medicalization.
Conspiracy theory is a simple-minded approach which seemingly offers instant answers to all these questions. The basic thesis was many years ago economically stated by Bernard Shaw - `Every profession is a conspiracy against the laity'. It is this idea which finds its elaboration in the writings of Szasz5 or Laing,6 or in the polemics of Illich.7 It is also an idea which at times influences formal sociological studies of professionalism, studies which despite their claimed objectivity reveal a paranoid tinge. Medicine is portrayed as out to grab as many monopoly rights as possible, and arbitrarily but with value-laden judgements. to delineate which deviations from accepted behaviour are to be called sick. Witch-hunting and case-finding are deemed then to be synonymous activities. The profession claims the right to control the stigmatized individual in the name of treatment, and supports or engages in widespread repressive social action in the name of public health. The essential device which is supposed to legitimize this whole packet of medical interference is the doctor's claim that the behaviour in question is illness or disease. With drug-taking behaviour, this analysis therefore suggests that the essential piece of legerdemain was the medical promulgation of addiction as a disease - the discovery of a circumscribed and diagnosable medical condition where previously there had only been `bad habit'.
To what extent though is the medical profession ever usefully to be seen as an autonomous social organization, an entity moved entirely by its own intent and volition?' This is certainly not the argument of the historical chapters of this book; but the influence of the conspiracy theory interpretation is certainly important in contemporary polemics which surround drug issues, especially in the United States. In conspiracy theory, medicine is a foreign power lodged dangerously within the body of the state, and potentially subversive of the state's true interests. Opium is taken into medical ownership because the doctors are expansionist - the doctors are not of society but against society. A very different view is that medicine is the .product of society, and is in fact often no more than its agent or mere catspaw. Furthermore, the profession is not a once-and-for-all product, but an organization continually reflecting and influenced by the society without which it has no meaning or existence. If this is correct, then far from society having to guard against the medical conspiracy, medicine will have to be wary of the risk of society's conspiracy to turn the profession into its too obedient servant - the danger is that doctors will agree to incarcerate addicts or otherwise act as agents of control, because society wants addicts incarcerated or otherwise controlled and will subvert the profession. It must, however, be remembered that the word `society' is only shorthand for a vastly complex organization which is very far from being unitary, while the medical profession also has many different groupings and attitudes within it. The analysis might of course be taken much further by considering what part of the profession has at which time held what sort of two-way relationship with which other segments and interest groups within the larger society. Perhaps the story of drugs suggests that neither extreme - medicine as the autonomous conspirator, or as society's poodle - is accurate. Medicine in certain .contexts and at certain stages of history may, on occasion (for better or for worse), generate its own initiatives - it may make a grab at opium control in the interests of its own prestige, but even then society as a whole is evolving in a manner which leads to this and other professionalisms. In different contexts and in other stages of development medicine appears to have done little more than passively connive: doctors were not in general particularly keen to set up the drug clinics of the 1 960s but were in effect ordered to do so by the government. Most often the roots of action on any drug issue appear to be mixed, with influences which interact and mutually amplify.
We are here of course doing no more than touch on the surface of the type of analysis which drug problems require if we are to understand fully the role and function of a profession within a society. Enough has though been said on this issue to suggest that historical interpretation within the simple framework of conspiracy theory is likely to betray the real subtleties. Medicine is no more a conspiracy against the laity than society is a conspiracy against an otherwise altruistic and disinterested profession. Their relationship is symbiotic.

Addiction

The supplanting of the simple idea of bad habit by addiction during the latter part of the nineteenth century has been described in Chapter 13. Here is an apparently straightforward example of the medicalization of society's perceptions.
The concept of addiction is not just still very much with us, but permeates society's ideas on drug use. Addiction is written into legislation and it is the person addicted to designated drugs who must be notified to the Home Office.
National Health Service treatment of drug misuse focuses on treatment of addicts. The word suffuses official documents, the treatment world, the research literature both nationally and internationally, media discussion and ordinary conversation on these topics.
The scientific world to some extent agrees to use the term drug dependence as a latter-day replacement for addiction, but one often has the feeling that the speaker at the scientific meeting is likely to stumble and correct himself as the new word is rather uneasily substituted for the old, with 'drug-dependent person' a desperate circumlocution for `addict'. The concept of dependence was introduced by the World Health Organization" in 1964. The term was defined thus:

a state, psychic and sometimes also physical, resulting from the interaction between a living organism and a drug, characterised by behavioural and other responses that always include a compulsion to take the drug on a continuous or periodic basis in order to experience its psychic effects, and sometimes to avoid the discomfort of its absence. Tolerance may or may not be present. A person may be dependent on more than one drug.

The purpose of this exercise in redefinition appears largely to have been to get away from the stereotyped view of addiction in teams 'of the opiate picture alone, and to substitute varieties of dependence pictures, each related to a group of drugs. Between these pictures there would be commonalities as well as dissimilarities. In so far as the aim was to produce a nomenclature more in accord with what is actually to be seen, the move achieved a useful purpose - for instance, it invited people to look closely at the alcohol picture rather than simply to ask whether alcoholism was or was not a `real addiction', with its reality tested only by the extent to which it accorded with the morphine picture. More covertly the influence may have been to spread the net of medicalization even further - the seriousness with which heavy use of barbiturates, non-barbiturate hypnotics, amphetamines and of course alcohol would be viewed could in some way be enhanced. From drug use of these types being seen as giving rise to rather uncertain or second-class varieties of addiction - habituation was a shadowy and intermediate concept - they now each had their own dependence syndrome. Although no one seems to have realized it at the time the promulgation of dependence was in many ways the rediscovery of inebriety, with its drug-specific sub-types. Inebriety had been an idea which held a wide group of substance concerns together, and dependence could meet the same purpose.
For the sake of simplicity we shall continue this discussion in terms of the meanings which are today given to addiction, with due awareness that in scientific circles it is sometimes the word dependence which is being used instead, and that a fine-grained analysis would have to look at the shades of difference between the meanings given these two words. The terms drug misuse and drug abuse are also in circulation, often with no very precise definition except the latent meanings of social disapproval. But it is undoubtedly addiction rather than dependence or any other rephrasing which is the word still to be heard in conversation at the bus stop, the person uttering it having no thought of its origin in nineteenth-century medicalization of the popular vocabulary.
What meanings in our present twentieth-century context are attached to addiction, and what are the influences and consequences of this word? One approach to that question is to look at statements which can be culled from medical and scientific writing. The attempt to delineate professional views on addiction by picking out a particular series of quotations could, though be misleading - the process is inevitably selective and even with the best endeavours selection may be biased. No one view or brief selection of views can accurately characterize the position of a whole profession. But to tap what we are searching for it is reasonable to look both at a few texts written for specialists and at books written by drug experts who seek to inform a general audience. It would indeed be difficult to find many relevant major texts of recent years which have not felt compelled to tackle this question of whether addiction is a disease, the nature of this putative disease, and the social implications of giving addiction this disease status.
One might wonder whether the repetitiveness with which authors return to this issue and the lack of any finality itself speaks to some fundamental unease and uncertainty whether medicine has become lumbered with a metaphysical debate rather than a scientific discussion capable of closure.
Is addiction in current thinking still seen as a disease and, if so, in what precise terms? Here is a quotation which shows that at least in some quarters the disease theory in its most primitive and somatic guise is still very much alive

When biochemical abnormalities are discovered in addicts (as I am sure they will be someday), a new era of clinical research will open. Will these abnormalities appear in all persons exposed to narcotics, or only in some? Can they be replicated in animals? Can treatment restore the change to normal? Can addiction be considered a metabolic disorder, like diabetes, and its progress followed with a chemical index? These are exciting questions, and are the ones that investigators will be asking in the future.9

That passage, written in 1978, comes from Dr Vincent Dole, one of the most distinguished American authorities on drug addiction.
If Dole's Position can be seen as a direct lineal descendant of the more organic nineteenth-century views of addiction, the `moral insanity' view, or addiction as impairment of will, finds equally direct recent expression in the same volume of conference proceedings

An obvious advantage with the disease concept of addiction is that it may be of assistance in persuading patients to submit to a sensible treatment programme. When we speak of illness, they realize that we are not moralizing over their situation but understand that they happen to have fallen into a situation in which they have lost normal voluntary control.10

Loss of `normal voluntary control' is easily recognizable as the descendant of Dr Thomas Clouston's `diseased cravings and paralysed control'. And as was the case a century ago, the disease formulation directly legitimizes the `sensible treatment programme'.
Here next is a passage from a popular book on drug addiction by Dr James Willis, a British psychiatrist specializing in treatment of addicts

Thus to regard dependence on alcohol and on drugs as a kind of disease does constitute a humane and a practical approach in our efforts to understand a very complex area of human behaviour ... Drug addicts and alcoholics are, after all, continuously damaging themselves with toxic substances, and to act in this way is, to say the least, an abnormal way of carrying on.11

The disease concept is again seen both as humane and as `practical' or pragmatic. And there is in addition the appeal to common sense - surely people who behave in this wrong-headed way just can't be normal? The postulate that we may as well look upon odd behaviour as ill behaviour is tentatively and almost apologetically put forward.
Ambivalence as to whether drug taking is disease or moral delinquency, the attempt to wrap the two ideas into one package as addiction, the legitimization of treatment by the concept of addiction - quotations from contemporary twentieth-century sources suggest the continuation of a debate which has been in the same state of confusion for many decades.
Another important theme can be picked up in an extract from a book published in 1975 by an American psychiatrist:

The failure to recognize that drug abuse and addiction are symptomatic of an underlying psychiatric disorder and psychological conflict ... has the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy... Parents, for example, should take firm stands and insist on medical treatment when they discover drug abuse behaviour in their children.12

Moral insanity is here re-interpreted as underlying psychiatric disorder, but there is the same axiomatic implication that treatment is needed, that the doctor is the man immediately to be called in. Here is medicine directly caught in the act of attempting to influence popular images.
A further variant on the theme of underlying disorder, with the same treatment implications, is that of personality deviancy. Here is a fairly typical formulation of this type, given by a British doctor, Dr George Birdwood, in 1969:

Voluntary treatment puts the responsibility for his care on the addict himself, thus imposing a strain that he is ill-fitted to bear. It ignores the widely accepted fact that he is an immature and inadequate person... To expect such a person to summon-up sufficient will-power to break his habit permanently is patently absurd. 13

`Disease of the will' is clearly a formulation which still thrives, but with the idea subtly translated into underlying `immaturity and inadequacy', which then predicate the need for compulsion. A personal view unsupported by review of evidence is given the status of `widely accepted fact'. An absolute explanation of addiction is offered that then speaks very directly in support of an absolutist solution. The doctor is not only again telling the people what to think, but in this instance is also telling the government what it ought to do.    4
Searching the contemporary drug literature offers rather the same pleasures and excitements as browsing in an antique shop where there is the chance of picking up a good piece of Victoriana. As this series of quotations indicates, many of the nineteenth-century ideas on addiction as disease are undoubtedly still in currency,' often in mint condition. As a further source, we may take the twovolume handbook, Drug Addiction, which has a German publisher but an American editor and largely American contributors. It was published in 1977. The following quotation comes from the scenesetting opening chapter, written by Dr W. R. Martin, a distinguished and widely respected medical scientist with a lifetime's experience of work on opiates. He writes

Although it is argued by some that drug abuse is caused by social deprivation and assimilation into deviant sub-cultures, an alternative hypothesis is that drug abusers share with other social deviants a disorder in their thinking processes characterized by impulsivity, immaturity, egocentricity, hypophoric and increased need states. It is proposed that this disorder may have a hereditary basis or be a consequence of or exacerbated by drug abuse and may be biologically transmitted... Although psychopathy is probably the most prevalent and most costly of all mental illnesses, it has received only modest attention from the psychiatric and medical community... Although the United States government is making a large commitment to drug abuse, only a small portion of the funds are committed to basic research whose purpose is to understand the disease and treat it. In order to develop psychotherapeutic agents for the treatment of psychopathy, a concerted effort must be made to synthesize and test new agents for their efficacy. There is every reason to be optimistic about the development of drugs for the treatment of psychopathy.14

Not so much a statement as a manifesto. Psychopathy, described in intensely moralistic terms, is an `illness', or indeed in a later passage a `disease'. Social explanations of drug addiction are discounted, and psychopathy (as biological condition) is seen as the underlying disorder. These postulates legitimize drug treatment of drug addiction. Furthermore, a platform is created from which to call for priority funding of a particular type of biological medical research: in a cost-conscious society the way to build the climate for research backing is firstly to introduce a panic factor and underline the costliness of psychopathy - `the most costly of all mental illnesses'. The expectation is then held out to government agencies that research money can deliver exciting goods - `there is every reason to be optimistic'.
Here perhaps is a particularly revealing example of how the same process runs through time, identical in its fundamentals but with different manifestations in different social and temporal contexts : medicalization in the twentieth century, goes _ on to become a vital strategy for the winning of ,research funds _,as long ago as 1972 the total annual U.S. federal budget for addiction research ran at $42,218,o00.15 The social implications of the need to sell your particular image of drug addiction and thus to foster your own institution's research budget may go beyond the immediate influence on the research world and budgetary allocations. For the process inevitably means the lobbying of government. Successfully winning round a government agency such as Washington's _ National Institute of Drug Abuse to a particular view for the sake of research gain may then leave behind a mark on that agency of much more pervasive influence. Research within a particular mould has ripples of influence as it becomes the training ground for the best young scientists, attracted to the prestigious and wellfunded laboratory. The government agency has to justify both to the public and its political masters the type of research which it has backed, and the implicit definitions of what should be society's priority concerns are thus further reinforced. The distinguished researcher in his white coat is also often the man whom the media interview, so that his image of addiction further influences the public's awareness.
Images of addiction are in fact consistently and relentlessly marketed - in the nineteenth century to make opium the property of the medical profession, in the twentieth century to justify the position of enforcement agencies or the international control apparatus, or to win tomorrow's research budget Images compete, and in the process the marketing becomes even more aggressive. The medical and scientific images feed and change the public, administrative and political view, and in return these perceptions give the doctors and scientists the needed support. Processes become circular and reinforcing. The most far-reaching consequences of the medicalization of images are not what happens within the strictly medical sphere - the hospitals and research laboratories - but the wider influences on societal perceptions and national and international policies.
But far more subtle and socially sensitive images of addiction are to be found in some scientific writing than is conveyed by the selection of quotations given above. A recent American research monograph on heroin16 reviews a range of models and the objective evidence supporting particular views, showing, for instance, the scientific difficulties which still beset efforts to determine whether the seeming prevalence of personality disorder among addicts is cause or consequence of drug-taking. The research reported in that monograph was itself conducted and interpreted within a learning theory model, and it is interesting to see how the latterday psychologist's view of addiction as learnt behaviour is in a way the rediscovering of `bad habit'. Indeed, the psychologist in this regard brings the word habit, used now in a strict technical sense, back into circulation.
It would be a major research undertaking to determine precisely which images of addiction - addiction as biological disorder, as `disease of will', as evidence of underlying mental illness or personality disorder, or as aberrant learning - have in different countries and at different times been the most influential on different sectors of society. We are not talking about just one type of model, or about potential influence on a society in undifferentiated terms - the real interest would come when one could document in detail which models influenced this or that committee, what assumptions lay behind a named piece of legislation, what was the idea at large in a particular suburb when the residents opposed the placing of a drug rehabilitation hostel in their midst." It seems possible that it is the sophisticated and carefully qualified view of things that often remains in the monographs, while it is the scientist who entertains no doubt whose views most readily generate the wider influence. What views the drug user himself entertains of his condition have seldom been thought worth investigation - certain drug sub-cultures might even be the last repository of the folk belief in bad habit, unforgiving and strangely unmedicalized.


The meaning of treatment

The nineteenth-century discovery that the addict is a suitable case for treatment is today an entrenched and unquestioned premise, with society unaware of the arbitrariness of this come-lately assumption. People may debate the future direction of the National Health Service's Drug Treatment Clinics, but any suggestion that the current model is fundamentally mistaken in its assumption, that the treatment enterprise should be closed down and people with bad habits left to their own devices, would be dismissed only as outrageous and bizarre.
But although there are a number of reasons for believing that the basic postulate that addiction is a condition to be treated is the direct descendant of the last century's evolution in thinking, much else in regard to the meaning of treatment has changed.
In essence, the nineteenth century evolved the treatment of addiction as a method of dealing with the individual who in some way offended society's idea of what was decent and orderly. It was not as if anyone could put forward evidence that the condition was particularly life-threatening or damaging to the health of the individual himself, nor was there much evidence that the social demand for treatment was generated in any large measure by the belief that the addict caused great trouble to family and friends, or to other members of society. In the late nineteenth century the leading image of the addict was of the middle-class patient (often a woman) indulging in a self-regarding act which was mildly damaging to health and perhaps a little bit of a nuisance. The historical evidence given in Chapter 12 suggests that this image of the class and sex characteristics of the addict was badly out of focus, while even at the height of concern about morphine addiction, remarkably few addicts were actually being admitted to hospitals or nursing homes. The extent of learned debates on therapeutic methods which were conducted in the medical journals was out of balance with the actual treatment demands.
In so far as treatment had a manifest clinical purpose it was therefore to save the individual from his own behaviour, although the latent social purpose of correcting unacceptable deviance must have been of equal or greater importance. If opiates had produced compulsive drug-seeking without physical withdrawal symptoms, the medical profession might not have had such a ready opening for promulgation of disease theories, while if alcoholism treatment had not provided a contemporary parallel and a base for medicalization, treatment of opiate addiction might not have become such a socially accepted idea. Without alcoholism, there would certainly have been no Society for the Study of Inebriety.
For the twentieth century up to the mid 1 960s, the British medical view on the worth and necessity of treatment for opiate addiction settled down to something more tempered than in the t 890s. The professional attitude was now in the main that addicts were best left on their drugs unless they wanted assistance to do otherwise, in which eventuality nursing-home help would be arranged and a regime put into operation not unlike the medico-moral treatment of former days. There was still a lingering debate on the virtue of abrupt versus gradual withdrawal and every now and then a resurgence of interest in introduction of compulsory care. But behind the seeming sameness, two new elements had during these years been added to the social meaning of treatment.
There was firstly the birth of the belief that treatment was an :: alternative to criminal handling of the addict. This, of course, came about only after 192o, when the first Dangerous Drug Act made illegal possession of opiates a criminal offence. From then onward, treatment could award itself the accolade of being not only benign in itself, but much more benign than the alternative model of response which might otherwise have been chosen in Britain, and which was to be established as the dominant response to addiction over many decades in the U.S.A. Indeed, Britain only narrowly averted treading the American path when in 1926 the Rolleston Committee18 ruled that it was acceptable practice for a doctor to maintain an addict on his drugs if the patient could not otherwise function healthily, or for the practitioner to prescribe diminishing doses to other patients in a process of weaning. The Committee accepted the illness model. Any absolutist intentions that the Home Office may earlier have entertained were defeated, and the doctors won the day. They were able to do so with authority because they could still count on the doctor's right to define the nature of addiction, which had been secured in the nineteenth century. Not only opium but the addict was to remain medical property. It may, though, be an inadequate reading of the significance of Rolleston to make an interpretation simply in terms of a battle between the profession as the force of righteousness, and the Home Office. Also to be taken into account is that this committee marked the beginning in Britain of an alliance in the drug area between `experts' and the bureaucracy of control which goes forward to today's Home Office Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. The profession's championship of the illness model might certainly in this instance be seen as being as much rooted, in a determination to protect the doctor's right to prescribe and his freedom from bureaucratic interference as in any desire to protect the freedom of the drug user.
The second assumption which became attached to treatment during this period was what might be called the doctrine of competitive prescribing.18 British doctors did not themselves initially promulgate this view of the function of treatment, but the idea came from American commentators .20 These commentators drew inferences from the fact that America prohibited opiate prescribing to addicts and had a large-scale and intractable drug problem sustained by a criminally organized black-market, and a problem unresolved by an expensive and punitive enforcement programme. They pointed out that Britain, with a largely medical response, appeared on the other hand to contain the problem at a vastly lower prevalence level and to have no significant blackmarket. The inference was that prescribing undercut the blackmarket and hence, as well as its being a measure for dealing with the individual, it also constituted a magically effective public health measure.
The degree to which these two evolutions in the perceived function of treatment were justified by the facts deserves scrutiny, again for the moment taking the question as bearing only on the period from Rolleston up to the mid- 1960s, when the heroin drug epidemic marked a general shake-up in balances. As regards the idea that treatment was operating as a benign alternative to punitive response, this contention was in principle well founded: addicts who in America would have been prosecuted were in England free of penal entanglement. The British addict who forged a prescription or stole drugs might on occasion come before the courts and likewise there may have been some exceptions to the national approach in America, but the contrast between the two national modes of response holds good. It must though be remembered that the British had the advantage of having to deal with a much lower addiction prevalence. As regards the contention that competitive prescribing was responsible for there being only negligible black-market activity, this question has been discussed at length elsewhere21 and the conclusion must be drawn that this postulate was based on faulty inferences and a flattering American mis-reading of the British scene. The reasons why Britain had, over this period, a lesser drug problem than America related most importantly to enormously different social conditions in the cities of the two countries - different patterns of poverty, urban decay, ethnic underprivilege and entrenched criminal organization. The relaxed and gentlemanly British way of responding to drugs waswitness to the small scale of the problem rather than the cause of that scale.
But the idea that prescribing was an effective prevention policy was put into circulation, and when the 196b heroin epidemic exploded in Britain it was an idea which loomed large in importance for policy makers. The pervasive fear was that the British epidemic would lead to a situation where our cities might, before long, be faced with problems so sadly familiar to America - endemic and intractable illegal narcotic use particularly among young people, a drug sub-culture and a criminal black-market. The debates and documents of the time amply chronicle the acute official and public anxiety in this regard, and the determination to avoid any move which by driving the addict into the hands of the criminal dealer would `invite in the Mafia'. The nineteenth century had seen addiction treatment as person-directed : the Second Brain Committee report22 of 1965, the Dangerous Drug Act of 1967 and the system of Drug Treatment Centres which went into operation in 196823 may seemingly still have been about treating the individual, but they marked a shift in emphasis towards official belief in the social function of treatment as preventive strategy. What was to happen to the individual even became in some ways now of secondary importance. The Drug Unit in Cambridge had the courage of its convictions, and named itself a Containment rather' than a Treatment Unit. Giving a patient injectable heroin in the name of treatment might be in the patient's best interests, or it might not. There was a tricky and highly responsible decision to be made every time a patient came to a clinic demanding to be `registered'. It would be wrong to suggest cynicism or any betrayal of medical ethics on the part of the doctors concerned, but the fact is that the treatment system as it had evolved in 1968 subtly pressurized doctors into a position of conflict. They were running a prescribing system probably for the good of their patients, but they were now also operating as agents of a system designed not only for individual good but aiming also to avert the spread of a criminal black-market. What had previously been the speculative American interpretation now became the root of British policy. This development in the inner meaning of treatment and the consequent role accepted by the medical profession provide an illustration of the imperfections of explanations which see the profession as autonomous, and for ever generating its own motivations as the independent state within a state. Here was the control system covertly making the profession its instrument of policy. That the doctors concerned now worked for a National Health Service may in some ways have made the profession more amenable to being cajoled, if not directed.
In the 1960s the social meaning of treatment also evolved two other new implications. One of these was the idea that giving a prescription would in a certain sense control the individual :E4 he would be brought out from under cover, be in contact with an agency of society, counted, discouraged from criminality, got into gainful employment, and generally cleaned up. Again, such aspects of treatment could be seen as in the patient's best interests, and for that very reason the profession would be easily moved into this role. The other new element in the treatment was that for the first time cogent reasons existed for believing that opiate addiction, in the pattern of injected drug use which had evolved, was profoundly dangerous to life and health. Addicts were dissolving their heroin tablets in any dirty water that came to hand and injecting themselves without regard for sterile precaution. The common result was varieties of septicaemia, and the sharing of syringes led to the spread of virus hepatitis. Deaths from injection complications or overdose were frequently being reported, and such tragedies were all the more horrifying because of the youth of the population involved. It was a long way from a little quiet tippling of laudanum: the longevity debate was supplanted by studies of coroners' courts, which showed about 3 per cent of young drug addicts dying in any one year .25 Whatever the other and more covert elements in the meaning of treatment, traditional concern for preservation of life and prevention of illness seemed therefore to demand energetic medical commitment. Whether in the event the treatment offered achieved those traditional goals remained an unanswered question. We do not know whether prescribing drugs to this new wave of addicts, a group so different from the patients known to Rolleston, averted or even heightened the long-term likelihood of tragedy.
Thus the fundamental conclusion to be drawn here is that in different contexts there has remained within society's repertoire of concepts something called treatment of addiction. Study of the nineteenth century offers insights into the origins of this treatment movement, and a preliminary view of the inner complexity of themeanings and social motivations. As that theme is followed forward, so the meanings shift and the complexities multiply.
Has anything other than the word itself remained the same in treatment? In fact, rather like finding a few fossil animals remarkably alive and well and even capering, it is possible to find some aspects of nineteenth-century ideas of treatment still very much with us and infecting our perceptions and policies. Such a direct follow-through is evident in the ambiguous perception of addiction as both moral defect and disease. The moral view forms the basis for the therapeutic community movement. The disease concept, in traditional medical terms, then continues to call for a therapeutic attack on the `physical illness' itself. This latter aspect of perception might be seen as contributing to faith in methadone maintenance treatment programmes.
To substantiate those contentions, let us look first at some of the evidence on therapeutic communities. In America there has been enormous investment in establishment of such facilities for treatment of addicts. Quoting again the available but rather outdated figures, there were in 1970 about 4,000-5,000 addicts in the U.S.A. resident in these houses.25 Britain, with a smaller drug problem, has never moulted a therapeutic community programme on that scale, but since the 1960s a number of communities have been active and have received government, local government and charitable support. And the direct flow from underlying concept of addiction to the actualities of treatment can be seen in the following description of the Phoenix House programme in New York by Dr Mitchell Rosenthal:

What Boorstein has stated for the offender in general, I would re-emphasize for the addict population. At the present time, the only approach to the problem which can deal with the numbers involved and the ego defects present is the Therapeutic Community ... To take it one step further, I believe the therapeutic community to be the treatment of choice in the vast majority of cases of addicts, regardless. of the availability of other methods.

Dr Rosenthal then continued:

Addictive or character disorders suffer from a lack of identity, which can be considered a deficiency syndrome ... Moral values are taught ... In a Phoenix House the teaching of socialization and its consequent morality is made both explicit and emphatic ... We regard antisocial, anti-military, amoral and acting-out behaviour as `stupid'.28

In considerable degree, the American concepts have been the ideas with which the British houses have operated. In 1970, Phoenix House was established in London. The idea of self-responsibility has been emphasized by Mr David Warren-Holland, a previous director of Phoenix, London:

The concept of self-help is vitally important to this process. We believe it is essential the ex-addict be given ample opportunity to help himself in his own recovery and to assume responsibility for his life. Treatment of the ex-addict as helpless and incapable deprives him of this opportunity and panders to his manipulative and irresponsible behaviour .27 

So far as the therapeutic community is concerned, one may therefore wonder whether nineteenth-century concepts have in this instance been transformed, or whether in this movement they still find their original expression in unaltered and pristine form. Jennings, with his The Re-education of Self-Control in the Treatment of the Morphia Habit, sounds entirely modern. But there can be no doubt that in both the U.S.A. and the U.K. controlled opiate prescribing is quantitatively the much larger treatment investment than therapeutic communities or any other approach. The roots of maintenance clearly go back to the nineteenth century, and Dr Anstie's writings of 1871 on controlled morphine addiction at low dosage provide a ready text for today's drug clinics - `Granting that we have ... a fully formed morphia-habit, difficult or impossible to abandon, it does not appear that this is any evil, under the circumstances' (see p. 142).
We have already argued in this chapter that the prescribing of drugs to the addict in today's context has multiple meanings, but the more biological views of the nature of addiction may be expected to have their follow-through in the justification of drug treatment of drug addiction. And such a connection has been given very direct expression by champions of maintenance. Methadone is seen as correcting some sort of defect state, and a protagonist such as Dr Vincent Dole will argue that psychopathological theories of addiction are ill-founded: for him the seeming psychopathology is consequence rather than cause of addiction, as witnessed by the psychopathic behaviour fading away once his patients are maintained on methadone. By the same token, Dole would not see psychiatric treatment for addicts as commonly needed. He specifically rejects the view of the `moralists', and seeks to establish a view of addiction as illness, in terms of a disease model which would have been in accord with much nineteenthcentury thinking.9

Strategies for control

Another important theme which must be traced out is the developing story of society's attempt to control drug use and drug users. The story can be seen as a process of continuing shift from reliance on informal controls to belief in the need for varieties of formal controls.
By informal control is meant a subtle and complex apparatus comprising a host of manners, conventions, traditions and folkways, with attendant systems of disapprobation for infringement of these rules and expectations, and approbation for their observation, which together will make known and felt what society expects of the individual in relation to opiate use or anything else. As regards nineteenth-century opium there would have been regional differences and variations in rules according to age and sex and other definitions of social position, rather than a universal norm. The norms which society proposed would be internalized by the individual so that `he believed' that it was right to take opium for his toothache, but wrong to drink laudanum like a De Quincey or a Coleridge. Practices and beliefs in a stable society would be transmitted through the generations - the grandmother would tell the young mother what was the right use of poppy-head tea for the sick child.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century it was informal controls-alone and unaided - which regulated society's use of opium. The control of drug use was embedded in culture and was no more legislated or formally controlled than is at present the eating of peas.
Exactly the same reliance on informal controls can be seen today among, for instance, the opium-growing hill tribes of Northern Thailand, and the anthropological literature is redolent with descriptions of Central American and South American cultures which have unanxiously employed potent hallucinogens such as .peyote and mescaline, within systems of informal control .28 In our own society, aspirin provides a living example of drug use left in the hands of the people, while with alcohol we are betwixt and between - manners and conventions, but also licensing laws.
But so far as opiates were concerned, our society slowly and inexorably moved from reliance on informal controls to a complex, rigid, anxious, punitive and absolute system of formal control - the Dangerous Drugs Acts, imprisonment for illegal possession, the addict notified to the Home Office, opiates the property of the medical profession with the doctors themselves increasingly controlled, and control in many respects internationalized by treaty. The story of the origins of this astonishing shift is what much of this book is about.
What are the reasons for the shift? One explanation might be attempted by looking at the general disruption of society and culture brought about by the Industrial Revolution in nineteenthcentury England. Many aspects of the subtle and informal apparatus which controlled the individual's behaviour by expectation and precept must have been smashed or put into disarray. The existence of an apparatus which is otherwise un-noted and taken for granted only becomes apparent when it is overwhelmed by rapid socio-economic change. The same processes can be seen today in many parts of the Third World, exemplified by breakdown in age-old informal controls over drinking practices in the anomie of the squatter compounds, the shanty towns, the villas miseras.29 Drinking in many primitive cultures has b en closely controlled by custom, and the African village where everyone in all his doings is intimately responsive to cultural behest provides a setting where there is no need for laws to regulate drinking. Go to the slums of Lusaka, and less than a generation onwards people fall down drunk in the road as they spill out of the beer halls. That country will now inevitably move towards formal controls over drinking as a poor but inevitable substitute for the disapprobation of the village elders.
A possible argument here is therefore that what happened in regard to the shift from informal to formal control of opiates in the nineteenth century was witness to fundamental changes in the relationship between individual and society, and it is tempting to stigmatize these changes as the impoverishment of culture. In terms of this argument our stringent contemporary controls bear witness to a profound distrust of the strength and quality of our own culture. It can then be argued that the process becomes circular, and that the more we legislate and the greater the number and the more intense the stringency of formal controls, the more certainly will informal cultural processes wither and fade. The analogy with aspirin can be deployed to carry this point. Make aspirin a dangerous drug tomorrow (the analogy runs), ban it from the supermarket and make it available only on prescription (with due entry of that prescription in the doctor's records on pain of prosecution), and within a generation or two the present traditions of aspirin self-medication would have gone without trace. Moves to put aspirin back in the supermarket would then be certain to give rise to appalled protest.
What has been said here about the weakening of culture, essentially by influences related to industrialization, is in line with a type of analysis that is today's conventional wisdom. To this conventional analysis is then usually added a more or less passionate lament, a yearning for a pre-industrial type of culture such as the townsman's fantasies of the rose-covered cottage in which he has never lived and in which he would in fact be singularly uncomfortable. The `proper lesson from history' is not that we should yearn for the past, but rather that having acknowledged that the balance between informal and formal controls which any society applies to drugs is symptomatic of the cultural state of that society, we should see that the total package of drug controls cannot be dreamed up in terms of some absolute and disembodied ideal - the controls must be congruent with the strengths and resources of the society in question and the moment. 30 It may well be that the way people live and order their relationships in a complex and multiple industrial society will quite inevitably mean a heavier reliance on formal and external controls. On the other hand, one should be willing to question whether the present system of stringencies is indeed truly congruent with society's needs, or whether it is to an extent an anachronism, something which developed in a different context, an apparatus nicely in tune with the past which gave it birth rather than with the present which suffers its excesses.31 Religious tolerance may not have been appropriate when there were fears of a Popish plot, but we have successfully got rid of disenfranchisement on religious grounds. Are our formal controls on drugs partly a lumber of the past? Those who seek a radical solution to the drug problem would certainly so contend, and would see the answer in a return to the right personally to choose one's drugs as freely as to choose one's religious faith.
How could the likely consequence of such a total removal of controls be tested, other than by daringly making the experiment? Inevitably those who would champion such an approach will be tempted to use the historical evidence which has been laid out in previous chapters to bolster their case - they will argue that when opium was freely available not much harm resulted. Even if one believes that temporal differences in social context, and injected drug use, make nonsense of an over-simple attempt to slant nineteenth-century experience of uncontrolled supply towards an argument for decontrolling twentieth-century supply, historical evidence as to what happens to population drug use in uncontrolled conditions must surely have some relevance to general understanding of drug ecology when the equilibrium is allowed to balance itself out without too much tampering. It is worth looking factually at the historical evidence while holding over the question of the relevance of that evidence to the present context until a little later.
What then were the dimensions of population opiate use and related problems with opiates which were experienced during the nineteenth-century equilibrium period? Quantitative evidence of a quality to satisfy the demands of the modern epidemiologist is lacking, but nonetheless there are sufficient clues to allow a number of important conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, the opium import figures suggest that we are indeed justified in using the word `equilibrium'. As noted in Chapter 3 the data show that between 183o and 1869 average home consumption of opium per thousand population varied between two and three pounds of opium per head. Given the imperfections in the way in which the statistics were gathered, some of that variation may be reporting error, although it is equally possible that occasional larger variations may have, been masked. But it is reasonable, despite due qualifications, to take as a conclusion that consumption under conditions offree supply in effect plateaued out - there was certainly no continuing steep escalation of the sort initially seen between 1 820 and 1840 when home consumption had risen from 21,000 lb. to a total of 47,000 lb. annually, even given the rise in base population.
The second conclusion relates to the actual level of the plateau. Three pounds avoirdupois amount approximately to 1.36 kg. The average consumption per person at alb. per 1,000 population would therefore have been 1,360 mg. of opium annually. A recommended single-dose level for opium is today 6o mg. (containing about 6 mg. of morphine). This would imply that between 1830 and 1860 the average user - man, woman and child - was consuming in terms of today's judgements roughly 127 therapeutic doses of opium each year. It is fair to conclude therefore that the plateau represented a very high level of population experience with this drug.
There has recently, as regards population alcohol consumption, been much interest among epidemiologists in how use levels are distributed within the population, with the prediction that the distribution curve will usually be skewed and with a long low upper tail, rather than being represented by the familiar inverted U of the normal distribution curve.32 The data are not available to reconstruct how opium consumption would have been distributed, but obviously the average alone does not tell us all we want to know - many people would have been consuming less than the average, and equally certainly a proportion would here have been consuming much more, and some people very much more.
The third conclusion to be drawn from the historical evidence is that the distribution of drug use was uneven over the country. The Fens provide the obvious example of particularly high usage rates, as borne out both by contemporary impressionistic accounts and the poisoning figures.
What cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed is an absolutely coherent picture of the prevalence of addiction, or of harm resulting from opium use. Poisoning and suicide figures are the only indices to hand, but there is no available way of quantitatively estimating the prevalence of social problems such as secondary poverty from diversion of wages, the influence on work capacity, the impact on family and interpersonal relations, or the number of accidents occurring under the influence of opium. A subtler form of epidemiology would have been required than the sort of social inquiry which was then practised. And it would be equally presumptuous to suppose that such unmeasured problems were either frequent or, because they were not adequately assessed, rare - we do not know with confidence whether `opium sots' were common and commonly a social burden, or whether they were uncommon and untroublesome. The hint is though that incapacity from use of opium was not seen as a problem of such frequency and severity as to be a leading cause for social anxiety. The prime image of the opium user was dissimilar to that of the wastrel and disruptive drunkard. Opium users were not lying about in the streets, or filling the workhouses, or beating their wives. It seems fair to conclude that at the saturation level which the plateau represented, opium was not a vastly malign or problematic drug in terms of its impact on social functioning. But the conclusion must at the same time also be accepted that opium when freely available was, indeed, a drug which could at the population level give rise to certain definite health risks. The impact on infant mortality cannot be quantified, and as has already been argued in Chapter 9 opium would often have interacted with disease and malnutrition to produce an unhappy result, when no single factor could be held solely to blame.
So much then for a tentative set of conclusions. In a particular historical period and in the social context of a particular country, and with opium as a drug available only in oral form, we can begin to see the outline nature of the equilibrium reached between the society and the drug - a plateau at a high general level of usage and with regional variation, no persuasive evidence of large-scale social incapacity, but with associated mortality levels which, though not too disastrous when matched against certain modem drug experiences, were nonetheless cause for concern.
Exactly the same question concerning the nature of the equilibrium between a society and drug use in conditions of uncontrolled availability may be approached by looking at certain recent accounts from special settings. For instance, Dr Charas Suwanwela and his colleagues, writing in 1978,33 provided a view of opium use and addiction among the hill tribes of Northern Thailand. They found that varied and varying patterns of use existed:

It is impractical to separate the occasional users into experimenters, occasional and habitual users as in some reports dealing with urban populations because of the hill tribe situation:

a single person may shift from one to another pattern depending on illness and other factors. The distinction between frequent users and addicts is also not very precise. A person who was not using opium every day, requested to be detoxified. On the other hand, addicts who personally accepted their undesirable status were using variable amounts of opium with variable frequency.

There is the inference here that counting addicts might not have been a logically very satisfactory exercise in nineteenth-century England.
Nonetheless, Dr Suwanwela managed to design an operational definition of addiction for his survey purposes, basing it on daily use and experience of withdrawal symptoms. Within those terms, he found that addiction rates varied greatly from village to village - from 16.8 per cent of population aged ten years and over among the Hmong tribe of Ban Khun Wang, to 6.6 per cent among the Lisu people of Doi Sam Mun. And here in microcosm is a restatement of one of the conclusions which has just been drawn from the historical material - given free availability, use patterns will be a patchwork rather than a uniformity. Social and cultural context as well as supply will influence the plateau which is achieved.
As regards the social effects of addiction, the Tai report is largely dealing with smoked opium rather than eaten opium, although some opium is eaten by these villagers. The following passage conveys the complexity of the situation:

When addicts were asked to recall their ability to work before and after the condition, most stated that they were less productive afterwards. Some, however, could not work at all previously and opium kept them going. For example, a 39-year-old Meo male was addicted for three years because of swelling of both legs and generalized weakness . [after detoxification] he could not work adequately. He decided to go back on opium, and has since been able to earn a living as a farmer and as the village silversmith.

Some addicts are said to be `rather lazy', and they `sleep late and work only periodically'. No one, says this report, would want his daughter to marry an addict. Addiction is disapproved, except among the elderly. But it is also reported that `it is not unusual to see a villager who has been addicted for 30 or 4o years actively working. These are indeed productive members of the household.' The authors sum up the question of opium's impact on social functioning by saying that there are `two extremes with many in-between'.
As ever, there is need to underline the point that different contexts will mean different consequences. But there are inviting twoway analogies to be drawn between endemic smoked opium in Thai villages and endemic British patterns of opium eating in the nineteenth century. The conjecture that nineteenth-century opium use, particularly in rural and agricultural settings, would not have caused widespread social disability is strengthened. One begins more closely to sense the possible texture of the problem, the fine-grained detail of ordinary lives which history cannot by itself reconstruct - multiple and shifting patterns of use rather than absolutes of addicted versus not addicted, a bit of late-lying in the morning, extremes and betweens. How many Fenland labourers may there have been who were able to work only because of their opium?
One might also argue that the nineteenth-century British opium experience has something to say to the contemporary problems and policies of the East. Even with advancing industrialization, with growing cities such as Bangkok, opium is a drug with which a reasonable equilibrium might be expected to be established, even with minimal formal controls. Twentieth-century Bangkok and nineteenth-century Manchester are different contexts, motor traffic and horse trams set different problems, smoked opium and opium pills or laudanum may bring different consequences, but one might at least conclude that endemic opium use in the developing world should not be cause for panic, or for repressive measures which upset the balanced ecology with consequences worse than the original situation. S4 We are back to rediscovering the Royal Commission on Opium of the 1 890s35 - what they told us about India, what history tells us about nineteenth-century Britain, or what the latter-day epidemiologist has to say about Thailand all point to the likelihood that, with opium, a society left to find its natural balances comes to no great harm. If secondary poverty is the problem, this might be met by making opium cheaper rather than by a prohibition which drives up the price.

Unfortunately such a conclusion regarding the possibilities of sustaining a reasonably unworried equilibrium with opium came in many ways too late. Post-war international drug policy has been recklessly insensitive to such considerations, and old patterns of opium use in countries such as Thailand, Burma, Singapore, Hong-Kong, Iran and Turkey have been attacked with crusading zeal. Possession of an opium pipe becomes an offence, and in some countries the drug user has faced the death penalty. Insensitivity has not been an accident, but the order of the day, and it is obvious that policies have often been instigated which are not related to the interest of the countries concerned, but are motivated primarily by the interests of Western states which wish to suppress the opium cultivation which fed the illicit heroin supplies primarily of the United States. So far as large tracts of the East are concerned, suppression of opium use has encouraged its substitution by heroin because lesser bulk means easier surreptitious handling. There is also a logistic attractiveness in heroin because the technique of sniffing this drug is speedy and simple, and it does not require a pipe or the other paraphernalia of opium smoking. It is also sometimes stated that the mere fact that heroin use does not involve the detectable smell of smoked opium makes the drug preferable where there are alert police patrols.
To contend that banning opium in the East has given birth to domestic heroin use in those countries as a direct and simple consequence, and with no other factors involved, would be too simple. But there can be little doubt that the sudden insult to old balances often contributed to bringing about a worse situation than the original. In addition to the effect which post-war policies may have had on actual patterns of indigenous drug use, new images of `the drug problem' have certainly led in some traditional opium-using cultures to damaging criminalization of the user and to some diversion of health care resources. In one or two countries, such as Pakistan and India, special gifts of resistance have allowed the Western pressures in some measure to be withstood, and the opium addict may still, without fuss or bother, collect his drug each day from the licensed vendor.
Let's now though take the discussion back to a consideration of whether the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century evolution of British drug control policies and the movement from informal to formal control is to be seen as careless insult to ecology, aswitness to `impoverishment of culture', or as something to be understood more sympathetically.
Movement in drug control in Britain during the nineteenth century was a slow evolution, much debated, at times much contested - an outcome from manoeuvring between factions as well as the product of larger social movements. The industrial revolution had upset an older ecology but an equilibrium was restored. The movement towards formal control was not an alien and insensitive imposition, but related to society's increasing background concern with health and a willingness to interfere in health matters, together with the availability of a newly confident medical profession which was both self-seeking and the servant of society's behests. Much of our present and more stringent formal control system might be seen in similarly sympathetic terms: unsterile intravenous injections make nonsense of easy comparison with opium eating, young addicts who readily draw others into their -habits demand a control response quite different from the stayat-home morphine addict of the 1890s, the reality as well as the threat of black-market enterprise is with us, and one would be hard put to argue that the dangers to health could be remedied by removing all controls.
But at the same time, it is reasonable to interpret the evidence as also supporting a rather conflicting conclusion. Ecologies can indeed be upset by clumsy interference. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920 was not part of a smooth historical evolution, but a sharp and imposed change, even given that war-time regulations and DORA 4oB may have paved the way for this change. This is not theplace to go into the history of that period in detail, but there-is, -the immediate feeling of contrast with the movement which led, say, to the 1868 Pharmacy Act. Put simply, the Pharmacy Act was the slow outcome of national debates and manoeuvrings, while the 192o Act although having internal elements in its genesis reflected for the first time the influence of international pressures.
Since 192o there must be the uneasy feeling that there are elements within the total system which have not developed in tune with need, or which_ no longer serve the real needs. These remarks are directed particularly to aspects of drug legislation which offer heavy penalties for possession or supply of opiates. The young_ addict found with a supply of heroin on him for personal use, can in theory be liable to a prison sentence of seven years. If he were caught in Piccadilly selling some of his surplus, he could in theory be liable to up to fourteen years' imprisonment. In practice, sentences of this severity are never in these circumstances handed down, and the upper range of sentencing is reserved for largescale and professional dealing. Furthermore, the possibility of a prison sentence for the addict may be benignly used to move him towards probation and social help. The fact is, though, that no _one knows exactly how this penal system is working in practice, and an unknown number of addicts are going to prison to no one's real advantage. The control system is not here responding to con. text, but has in some sense itself gone out of control.
It is easy to forget the extent to which informal controls still operate - for every adolescent who accepts the opportunity to use a drug there are many who refuse. The value and richness of such informal mechanisms is neglected or insulted by `Health Education' which attempts superficially to instruct from outside and from a position of cultural ignorance. Research too very easily neglects these informal processes as too elusive for the habits of thought of investigators (and fund givers) who are willing to persevere with a type of epidemiology which is concerned only with the counting of cases. History itself must not of course be misused as simple-minded Health Education for very different times, but the history of opium use does at the very least repeatedly and remarkably point up the fact that there are different ways of seeing things and doing things, and thus lead to self-questioning. So far as our own times are concerned, our vision of drug control has become too frightened and too mechanistic.

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