Drug Abuse

THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL SYSTEM

by Adolph Lande*

* Attorney, New York, New York

CONTENTS
The National Interest in International Control of Dangerous Drugs

The Gradual Evolution of the International Drug Treaty System

The Situation at the End of World War II

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

Evaluation of International Drug Control

A Summary Appraisal of the Protocol of 1972 Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

A Summary Appraisal of the Vienna Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances

Further Desirable Amendments of Drug Treaties

Questions of Treaty Provisions Preventing Some Policy Options on Certain Controversial Questions

Measures Which Would Be Possible Without Treaty Amendment and Which Might be Desirable

 

THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

It was largely due to the initiative of President Theodore Roosevelt that the International Opium Commission met in Shanghai in 1909 and thus set in motion international efforts which led to the gradual establishment of the present international narcotics regime. Since then the United States of America has undoubtedly been the most important protagonist of international action for the control of "narcotic" drugs 1 and has generally favoured the strictest control measures,' including often some pro-visions which proved to be unacceptable to many other States. For the purpose of determining whether this attitude was justified in the past and what policies our country should adopt in the future in regard to problems of international drug control it may first be appropriate to establish the interest which the United States has in the international drug treaty system, this is to say what advantages it has obtained from this system and what additional benefits it could expect from a more effective functioning of the inter-national drug regime in the future.

Probably the most important factor which induced governments to establish a system of international control of narcotic drugs is the ease by which these substances can be smuggled over international bor-ders. This can be illustrated by the fact that one can make from one kilogram 3 of morphine one hundred thousand therapeutic dosages and from one kilogram of heroin two hundred thousand therapeutic dosages.4 An illicit trafficker who succeeds in smuggling only one kilogram of opium containing about ten percent of morphine is thus able to manufacture nearly ten thousand dosages of morphine and even much more dosages of heroin 5 by a relatively simple process, "which can be carried out even within the resources of a domestic kitchen or bath-room".6 It follows from this situation that a country, which by effective domestic control measures succeeds in preventing the diversion of narcotic drugs from its legal trade into the illicit traffic supplying its addicts, cannot entirely prevent the illegal importation of such drugs. Its task to prevent such an illicit inflow becomes particularly difficult and virtually impossible if other countries by their lack of or defective control facilitate the diversion of narcotics into illicit channels. The situa-tion of the United States which undoubtedly has a very effective domestic system of control of all phases of its legal narcotics trade is in a particularly difficult position since its thousands of miles of land frontier and maritime coast render it very difficult indeed and even impossible to prevent some smuggling.

If one examines the narcotics treaties one will in fact find that their provisions are actually only in-tended to prevent or at least to reduce, to the greatest extent possible, the availability of drugs for abuse. This aim has to some extent been achieved with respect to manufactured narcotic drugs whether ob-tained from opium or by fully synthetic processes. However, this picture of partial success of the inter-national narcotics treaties has been obscured by the epidemic-like spread of the abuse of drugs in a num-ber of countries in recent years. It might be useful to recall in this connection that this frightening ex-pansion of drug abuse relates in a large measure to substances other than the internationally controlled manufactured narcotic drugs, although addiction to some of the latter has without any doubt also grown greatly.

Availability or the ease of availability of drugs for abuse is still very widely considered to be an im-portant factor responsible for this social evil; but other causative factors are now generally recognized, including: environmental conditions of an economic and social character, which may be responsible for psychological defects, particularly personality weak-nesses which lead to antisocial behavior; the effects of quick social change entailing in some countries the dissolution of ancient social ties, such as tribal organization, in the course of rapid urbanization and in some other more developed countries the move-ment of masses of people from relatively primitive agricultural activities to technologically advanced urban societies; and the possibly favorable attitude of some cultures or subcultures to the drugs which are abused. The international drug regime does not deal with these other factors responsible for drug abuse. Apart from requiring administrative and penal measures affecting the availability of drugs for abuse —to keep the dangerous substances from actual or potential abusers—the international treaties do not impose any obligation on governments as to par-ticular methods which they should employ in combatting the causes of drug abuse or in treating the persons abusing drugs. It may in particular be pointed out that contrary to a rather widely held but er-roneous view, the treaty provisions in force regarding limitation of the use of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes and regarding possession of drugs do not prevent a government from adopting any methods of dealing with its abusers of drugs, as long as it acts in accordance with sound principles of medical science and with the requirements of its particular society:

The fact that the drug treaties deal only with the problem of availability of drugs for abuse and not with the other factors responsible for this social evil and do not prescribe specific methods for the treat-ment of drug abusers is by no means due to lack of knowledge of these factors and of the need for treat-ing addicts. It is probably true that in the first years of the evolution of the international drug regime there was very little understanding of the causes of drug abuse nor a comprehension of the problem of treatment of drug addicts; but this changed very early as seen by treaty provisions adopted in 1925 and 1931 8 and from a recommendation passed by an international drug conference in 1931.9

In any event some provisions of the recent treaty instruments, i.e. of the Single Convention on Nar-cotic Drugs, 1961," of the Vienna Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances n and of the Geneva Protocol of 1972 amending the Single Con-vention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 12 clearly show that their authors were very well aware of the various elements involved in the etiology of drug abuse as a social problem as well as of the need for early iden-tification, treatment and after-care (rehabilitation and social integration) of abusers of drugs. These early and recent provisions are however rather gen-eral and vague and point only to the need for treat-ment and for knowledge of the dangers of'drugs by drug abusers, as well as of a comprehension of the complexity of the problem by persons dealing with drug abusers in their respective professional or voca-tional capacities. They refer also to the need for training of these persons to enable them to acquire the necessary specialized skills. They are, however, mostly phrased in such a way as to constitute little more than recommendations rather than definite legal obligations. In any case they do not stipulate which medical, social, economic or other measures govern-ments must undertake in dealing with their particular drug abuse problem. They limit themselves to pre-scribing measures to control the legal drug trade and to fight against the illicit traffic. This omission of the drug treaties is due to the fact that the causes of drug abuse very often differ in different countries and not unfrequently in various groups of the pop-ulation of the same country. In view of these varying conditions, it would hardly be possible to include in a multilateral treaty, particularly in one which aims at universal acceptance, provisions requiring the adoption of the manifold medical, social or economic measures which would be needed in the campaign against drug abuse in a particular country. These measures may vary from country to country and some of those which would be adequate in one coun-try might be unsuitable and even harmful in another country."

Moreover, seen solely from the viewpoint of combatting drug abuse, the existence of such abuse and the particular medical, social or other approach which a particular country's government chooses with regard to this problem is often of little inter-national interest as long as that government succeeds, by exercising effective control, in preventing the illicit movement of drugs from its territory to other countries. Such abuse becomes, however, an impor-tant international problem, if it exists—as it gen-erally does—in locations in which uncontrolled or illicit production of opium or coca leaves takes place. The existence of such abuse significantly increases the obstacles to implementation of the economic and social reforms which are required for eliminating production. Any plan to abolish the cultivation of the opium poppy or the coca bush should also in-clude adequate measures for combatting drug abuse —opium smoking, opium eating or coca leaf chew-ing—which exists in the poppy or coca bush growing districts. But once again the specific measures, which must be taken for the implementation of the needed economic and social measures as well as those which are required for the treatment of drug abusers, may and generally will differ from one country to another country. Therefore, they can hardly be included in the multilateral drug treaties which impose detailed obligations on the countries concerned.14

The existence of drug abuse in a country which is not the source of illicit drugs flowing into our coun-try nevertheless may be an important American con-cern if looked upon in the light of more general political considerations. Such abuse may be an im-portant obstacle in the way of economic and social progress and political stability in a particular country in whose welfare we might have an important national interest. More generally one may maintain that the elimination of drug abuse in all countries is our concern insofar as we must be morally interested in the welfare of all nations:

It may therefore be concluded that the only important advantage which our country can expect from an effective functioning of the international drug control system is the prevention or reduction of the illicit flow of dangerous drugs into our territory. To state it in different words. The drug treaties could to a considerable extent assure that the effec-tiveness of our administrative and penal measures taken to fight the illicit traffic is not impeded by lack of control or of effective control in other coun-tries. Our drug abuse problem cannot be solved by resort to international treaties alone.

But even this advantage cannot be obtained in a satisfactory measure as long as a number of countries cannot implement the drug treaties by their own unaided efforts. It is in our national interest that such countries request and obtain the required for-eign assistance either from individual states, includ-ing the United States, or under the multilateral aid programmes of the international organizations. The importance of such assistance has found some recog-nition in a recent treaty provision.15

Reference may also be made in this context to article 4, paragraph (b) and article 35, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Single Convention which require parties to co-operate with other states in the execu-tion of the provisions of this Convention and more specifically to assist each other and to co-operate closely with each other and with the competent inter-national organizations of which they are members in the campaign against the illicit traffic. While these provisions can hardly be interpreted so as to estab-lish a legal obligation of a party to render technical or financial assistance or both to another state need-ing and requesting it for the purpose of improving its drug control system, it may be held that under the present conditions it is certainly within the spirit of provisions requiring such co-operation and mutual assistance, to grant, within reasonable limits, such aid if requested.

Here again it may be submitted that it would hardly be feasible to include in a multilateral drug treaty provisions specifying in detail the extent and forms of aid which governments would have to ren-der to other governments needing and requesting it. The type and quantity of aid which different coun-tries may need will differ from country to country, depending on the particular reasons for its weak-nesses of administration and on the particular politi-cal, economic and social conditions responsible for the unsatisfactory drug control situation in the coun-try involved. However, a general obligation to render technical assistance in the field of drug control could theoretically be included in a multilateral drug treaty; but it is suggested that in the present circum-stances it would not be in the interest of our country to undertake such a formal legal obligation, which would be accepted by few if any other countries capable of granting such help.

It may also be pointed out that it is very important to see to it that aid granted by intergovernmental organizations in the sphere of drug control, to which we are and probably will remain the largest financial contributors, should in a great measure be guided by the needs of our country in this field, since we are the principal victims of the international drug traffic.

Attention may finally be drawn to another consideration which cannot be overlooked: an examina-tion of the role of an effective control of availability of drugs in combatting drug abuse. The view is widely held that many addicts, who are unable to obtain their particular drug, as a result of effective control, will resort to other drugs, which are not controlled or less strictly controlled, including alcohol.16 It is suggested, however, that it would be of great ad-vantage to us if, as a result of a more effective operation of the narcotics treaties, the flow of heroin into the United States were reduced to a minimum, even though a part of our heroin addicts would shift to the consumption of other addictive or otherwise harmful drugs.

But what has been just said should not lead to an inclination to underrate the great importance of the multilateral drug treaties for the United States. Any program of dealing with the social problem of drug abuse requires control of the availability of drugs. This applies also to those programs which inctude temporary or permanent drug maintenance of ad-dicts.17 No domestic control of the availability of drugs and of the fight against the illicit traffic can be successful without an effective operation of the multilateral drug treaty system.

It may also be mentioned that the United States has an interest in the measures which other govern-ments take in combatting drug abuse. Information on those measures, which are designed to control the availability of drugs and to fight the illicit traffic, are made available to the United States and to other countries under the terms of the narcotics treaties, particularly the Single Convention. Data on the particular methods which governments choose for the treatment of their addicts may also be learned in the course of the implementation of the international reporting system 18 or in the course of discussions of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.° The information received on such treatment in this way is, however, often not complete and any-way not sufficient. The relevant data which we can obtain on this point by bilateral relations with other concerned governments are generally much more comprehensive. A reasonably complete and accurate knowledge of methods employed by other govern-ments, especially of advanced industrial countries, in the treatment of drug abusers and in fighting the underlying social causes of drug addiction may be of considerable aid in formulating our own policies. The special character of our society, which is different from that of other industrial countries, must of course be taken into consideration in judging the applicability of foreign methods to our own problems.

THE GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TREATY SYSTEM

The basic motives of President Theodore RooseveIt's initiative in convening the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 was not only a serious domestic narcotics problem 20 and the opium problem in the Philippines, which the United States had acquired as a result of the Spanish-American war; but also the pressures of American missionaries in the Far East, who were concerned about the opium smoking situation in China and in European possessions.There cannot be any doubt that the European powers were not very anxious to institute effective measures of control or prohibition, because they were under the influence of their local colonial administrators, who were under pressure from local groups with vested interests in continuation of opium smoking. This resistance to reform is reflected in the Agreement of 1925 concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in and Use of Prepared Opium 21 and in the Agreement of 1931 for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East,22 whose provisions were very weak and completely inadequate for abolishing opium smoking within a reasonable period of time. This resistance is also mirrored in the weak provisions of the International Opium Convention of 1925 23 concerning "prepared" or smoking opium. The refusal of the Second Opium Conference of 1924/1925 to adopt stronger provisions was one of the reasons why the American delegation withdrew from the Conference and why the United States never became a party to the Convention.24 It may be noted in this place that it was one of the important features of American drug policy in the inter-war period to bring pressure to bear on the European powers having Far Eastern possessions to make more rapid progress in abolish-ing opium smoking in these territories. It was the result of the pressure of the U.S. Government that in 1943 the British and Dutch Governments finally undertook to prohibit opium smoking in their Far Eastern possessions, which were then under Japanese occupation.25 It was also due to the same influence particularly strong during World War II that the French Committee of National Liberation decided at the same time to adopt the principle of total prohi-bition of opium smoking in its Japanese occupied territories and undertook to carry out to this effect a program of action after liberation of these possessions.25

It may however be mentioned in this context that the prohibition of opium smoking adopted in several territories and countries after the war did not turn out to be a great success everywhere. While opium smoking greatly decreased, heroin addiction became an important social problem in several places where opium smoking previously had been legal. 27

The present institutions of international drug con-trol evolved gradually. Their history shows that the first international measures were taken only after it had been demonstrated that domestic control had to be supplemented by international action to be effec-tive. It points to the difficulties in the way of a com-prehensive international regime which could not immediately be overcome but had to be solved step by step. These difficulties did not consist only of the resistance of vested interests, which undoubtedly represented a serious obstacle. There were certainly powerful groups which were interested in the con-tinuation of opium smoking and coca leaf chewing and which opposed reform by arguing that these cen-turies old habits could not be abolished within a definite period of dine. It is also characteristic that misguided by their selfish interests they denied or belittled the harmful nature of these abuses. It must also be admitted that a system of comprehensive con-trol of agricultural activities is much more difficult to implement than one over industrial enterprises; but such control over the cultivation of the poppy for the production of opium, of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis drugs, and of the coca bush is indispensable. The gradualism of international narcotics control and drug control is also to some extent explained by the need to respond to scientific progress in the field of chemistry such as the de-velopment of new narcotic drugs, the evolution of completely synthetic processes of making narcotic drugs and, in recent years, the growing use of "psy-chotropic" substances.28 Finally, it may also be men-tioned that the nature of international co-operation in the campaign against drug abuse, although not included in the provisions of the multilateral drug treaties, has undergone a gradual change in conse-quence of better understanding of the causes of human behavior of the economic, social and cultural factors involved in the phenomenon of drug abuse and of the incapacity of a number of countries to make, without foreign aid, a full contribution to the international efforts. The various stages in the evolu-tion of international drug control law prior to World War II follows:

The International Opium Convention of 1912.29

For the first time, narcotics control was made a matter of multilateral treaty law.3° The 1 9 1 2 Con-vention introduced:

•    a system of licenses or permits of the making ("manufacture") of and trade in medicinal opium and those manufactured narcotics which it covered. Governments were, however, en-titled to require instead only that these manufac-turers and traders make to the competent authorities an official declaration that they engage in such manufacture or trade as the case may be;

•    a system of licensing of the establishments and premises in which the manufacture of these drugs takes place. Governments were, how-ever, authorized to limit themselves to obtain-ing information on these establishments and premises and to keep a register of them, instead of requiring the licensing;

•    the requirement of keeping records of the quantities of these drugs which were manufac-tured and of the various transactions of trade in them. This requirement needed not be ap-plied to the retail sale by authorized pharma-cists;

•    the prohibition, as regards the internal trade, of the delivery of these drugs to unauthorized persons;

•    the limitation of the manufacture, sale and use of these drugs to medical and legitimate purposes ;31

•    a system of international reporting by govern-ments consisting of mutual communication, through the intermediary of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the laws and regulations enacted in implementation of the Convention, and of statistical information on trade."

Governments were also required to "use their best endeavours" to exercise some control over the import and export of the narcotics in (a) above.33
It may finally be mentioned that governments were bound to examine the possibility of making the illegal possession qf raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, cocaine *and their respective salts a penal offense." As can be seen, the 1912 Convention con-tained many of the basic principles of control which are still valid, although its provisions on these mat-ters were not always binding and in several instances formulated in more general and vague terms than in the later narcotics treaties. It may also be men-tioned that none of its provisions referred to coca leaves or cannabis drugs.35 The Convention's weak provisions on the control of raw opium and prepared opium are not discussed because they are of no importance for the purposes of the present paper.3° It may only be recalled that the production of raw opium, the manufacture of prepared (smoking) opium and the trade in and use of these two kinds of opium were not limited to medical and legitimate purposes.

The Covenant of the League of Nations

The covenant, which entered into force on 10 January 1920, provides in its article 23, paragraph
(c) that, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions, the Mem-bers of the League will entrust this Organization with the general supervision over execution of agree-ments dealing with traffic in opium and other dan-gerous drugs. This provision was very broadly inter-preted in the League's practice. It represents a very important step in the evolution of international co-operation in the field of drug control because it entrusted an international worldwide organization of general competence with this function. An organiza-tion of this kind is able to deal with many aspects of the drug problem falling within the scope of many different disciplines as an organization having spe-cialized functions would not be able to do. This consideration is probably the reason why after World War II the family of nations entrusted the United Nations with the principal role of drug control and not a specialized organization, such as the World Health Organization, despite its importance in the drug field. The Charter of the United Nations does not expressly refer to drug control. It was, however, made quite clear at the San 'Francisco Conference which adopted the Charter that the phrase "inter-national economic, social, health and related prob-lems", for which the United Nations was made com-tent," also covered international co-operation in the suppression of the traffic in, and of the abuse of, opium, other narcotics and other dangerous drugs.38 The parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, moreover, have expressly recognized the competence of the United Nations with respect to the international control of drugs." It is also im-portant that this kind of organizational arrangement made it possible that not only organs charged exclu-sively with drug functions could deal with problems of drug abuse but that also such important bodies as the past Assembly and Council of the League and the General Assembly, Economic and Social Coun-cil and Trusteeship Council could be called upon to include questions of drug abuse in their agenda.

The League's Assembly, by a resolution adopted at its first session on 15 December 1920, established the League's "Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs", a body com-
posed of government representatives.4° The Assembly thus created the first international organ of drug control. The Committee is the predecessor of the present United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

The International Opium Convention of 1925

This convention strengthened some of the control rules established by the Convention of 1912. It re-quired Parties to /imit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, export and use of medicinal opium and manufactured narcotic drugs (but not of raw opium, prepared opium, cannabis, cannabis resin and coca leaves) .41

The system of permits and licenses governing manufacture and all phrases of trade in manufactured narcotics and the requirement of licensing the estab-lishments and premises in which the manufacture takes place was made mandatory. The requirement of keeping records was extended to retail traders (or distributors), who were permitted, however, to file and preserve the medical prescriptions instead.42
Parties were not only bound to prohibit, as regards their internal trade, the delivery of the controlled manufactured drugs to unauthorized persons but also the possession of these substances by such persons.'"
The obligation of governments to furnish statisti-cal information was defined in detail. The data re-quired 44 were basically very similar to those required under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. They also included information on the production of opium and coca leaves (but nat of cannabis or can-nabis resin), on the confiscation of illicit import and export of all substances to which any of the Con-vention's provisions applied, including raw opium, prepared opium, cannabis, cannabis resin and coca leaves, and on the import and export of all these substances.45

The Convention of 1925 introduced as a legal obligation the application of the import certificate and export authorization system" which is nearly the same as that incorporated in the Single Conven-tion.47 Provision was made for authority of an international organ 48 to place under international control additional drugs, which were "liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill-effects"4° as the manufactured drugs already controlled by the Con-vention. These decisions were binding only on those parties which expressly accepted them.
The same organ could also exempt from the con-trol of the Convention preparations of controlled manufactured narcotics which "cannot give rise to the drug habit" because of the medicaments with which the narcotic drugs are compounded and which preclude the recovery of these drugs.50

The Convention also established the Permanent Central Board," an organ which was charged with some semi-judicial functions and was composed of irulependent experts.51 The Board was authorized not only to scrutinize the statistical information which it received from governments 52 but also to examine any matter which was drawn to its attention by a party to the Convention and which appeared to re-quire investigation.53 It was charged with watching continuously the international trade in narcotics.54

The Convention also introduced a system of sanc-tions. If information at its disposal led the Board to conclude that excessive quantities of any substances " covered by the Convention were accumulating in any country or that there was danger of that country becoming a centre of the illicit traffic, the Board was authorized to ask for an explanation from that coun-try. If no explanation were given within a reasonable period or time if it were unsatisfactory, the Board was granted the right to call to the attention of the Parties to the 1925 Convention and of the Council of the League of Nations that matter and to recom-mend that no further exports of all or some of the substances covered by the Convention should be made to the offending country until the Board reports its satisfaction with the situation.56 The sanc-tion provisions of the Single Convention 57 follow in part the rules of the sanction system of the 1925 Convention, particularly by granting the present International Narcotics Control Board the right to recommend inter alia the discontinuation of the ex-port of narcotic drugs to an offending country or tenitory. For the purpose of evaluating such a pro-vision, it may be mentioned that in the 1920's the illicit traffic was supplied largely with drugs diverted from the legal trade while at present there is no significant diversion of manufactured narcotic drugs from the legal trade into illicit channels. Even opium, after it has been controlled by the national opium agency, is not diverted in important amounts from the licensed legal trade into the illicit traffic; but rather from the cultivator of the poppy." Therefore, in the 1920's, discontinuation of legal export of narcotic drugs to a country could be an effective means of curbing the illicit traffic.

The Convention of 1925 also expressly authorizes the application of its sanction provisions to non-parties.59 The application of some provisions to non-parties has become an important feature of the inter-national narcotics regime.

The authors of the Convention also recognized the need for adequate punishment of illicit traffickers and the desirability of punishing acts committed with-in their jurisdiction for the purpose of assisting the illicit traffic abroad.6°

The Convention of 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs.61

This established a system of limiting the amounts of the supplies of manufactured narcotic drugs 62 to the quantities needed for medical and scientific purposes. This system was intended to apply to each country and territory and consequently also to the world as a whole. The limits of narcotics supplies which each country or territory 63 was entitled to obtain by both manufacture and import were com-puted on the basis of estimates of its narcotics re-quirements 64 which it had to furnish for each con-trolled manufactured narcotic drug to the Permanent Central (Opium; Narcotics) Board by 1 August of the year preceding that to which the estimates .re-ferred.65 Each country was entitled to revise its own estimates or those of its territories 63 by supplemen-tary estimates.66

A special organ was created for the international administration of this estimate system: the "Super-visory Body" 67 which consisted of four members who were in this capacity not Government represen-tatives." This organ was required to establish, as far as possible, the estimates for any country or territory whether bound by the 1931 Convention or not, whose government had not furnished them in time 69. Such estimates established by the Supervisory Body had the same legal effect as those sent by governments; but they could be changed if the governments, which had failed to submit estimates, did so.

The Supervisory Body was charged with examining the estimates with a view toward assuring that nar-cotics supplies were limited to medical and scientific purposes.7° It had also to keep in mind that the sup-plies should be sufficient for such needs; this was not expressly stated, but certainly implied, in the Con-vention. The Supervisory Body was also entitled to require governments to furnish further information 7' and explanations and, with a government's consent, to amend any estimate.72 The Supervisory Body was required to send to governments an annual statement containing the estimates for each country or terri-tory, and an account of the explanations given or required and its observations and critical comments. This statement also enabled the governments to ob-serve their manufacturing and import limits. Supple-mentary statements were also issued quarterly by the Supervisory Body to show revisions in the estimates.

The Permanent Central Board was given two func-tions intended to assure that countries or territories 63 do not exceed their narcotics supply limits:

(a) It was bound to order the discontinuation of exports of narcotic drugs to a country or territory, which imported or authorized to import drugs in excess of its import limit.73

(b) It was required to prepare a yearly statement showing each country's estimates, and statistical figures 74 to show whether any supply limits had been exceeded. If the statement indicated that a Party had or might have failed to carry out its obliga-tions, the Board was entitled to ask for explanations from such a Party and supply the sanction provisions of article 24, paragraphs 2 to 7 of the 1925 Con-vention.75

Since governments were the masters of their esti-mates of drug requirements and since they could not be changed without their consent, it follows that the regime of limitation based on estimates, which was introduced by the 1931 Convention, was a system of voluntary co-operation subject to suggestions and criticism by the Supervisory Body. In the great ma-jority of cases, however, governments accepted the Supervisory Body's suggestions.

This summary of the estimate and limitation sys-tem of the 1931 Convention has been rather exten-sive because it is basically the same as that incor-porated in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.76 The latter, however, applies to controlled manufactured narcotic drugs and also opium, cocoa leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin."

The Convention of 1931 advanced the interna-tional reporting system by requiring governments (a) to furnish to the Secretary General of the League of Nations an annual report on the working of the Con-vention in accordance with a form drawn by the League's Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs;78 (b) to communicate to each other, through the Secretary-General of the League, important cases of the illicit traffic;78 and (c) to notify to the Secretary General of the League the names and addresses of persons or firms authorized to manufacture narcotic drugs and whether the Manufacture was permitted for domestic needs only or also for exports.80

Furthermore, governments were required to furnish to the Permanent Central Board statistics on the amounts of drugs used by manufacturers and whole-salers for the compounding of exempted preparations, that is, "preparations for the export of which enport authorizations are not required." 81

The information mentioned under (a) and (b) and that on compounding exempted preparations is also expressly required by the Single Convention.82 The information referred to under (c) is now re-quested by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs under its authority granted by the Single Convention to require Parties to furnish to the Secretary General of the United Nations such information as it may request as being necessary for the performance of its functions."

The Convention of 1931 also required governments to apply the provisions of the 1925 Convention to drugs they manufactured. In so doing, it distinguished between drugs in Group I 84 and Group II." All these provisions applied to Group I, but only some applied to Group 11.86 The retail trade in group II drugs was exempted from the system of licenses and permits, which applied to manufacturers, whole-salers and international traders; but not to retail traders, who also were not bound to keep records" of their acquisitions and sales and could supply or dispense such drugs without medical prescriptions. In fact, such retail trade was exempted from the sys-tem of international narcotics control 88 and—as far as the 1931 Convention was concerned—anybody could freely engage in the retail sale of Group II drugs. It may however be mentioned that governments applied to these drugs a much more strict regime than was prescribed by their treaty obliga-tions. Many Governments exempted them, however, from the requirement of a medical prescription as they also may do under the Single Convention.89 To some extent, it may be due to this practice that Group Il drugs did not appear in important quan-tities in the international illict traffic, although weak international control continued until the Single Con-vention introduced a more strict regime for Group II drugs and substances of a similar degree of harmful-ness, listing them in Schedule 11.9°

In accordance with a generally accepted interpretation of the relevant provision of the 1931 Convention,91 preparations 'of Group II drugs "adopted to a normal therapeutic use" were exempted from the 1925 Convention, that is, from all its administrative controls, including the import certificate and export authorization system.92

The 1931 Convention represented another ad-vance in our field, since contrary to earlier narcotics treaties, it applied control measures not only to drugs which were dangerous 93 by themselves, but also to substances which were "convertible" 94 into such drugs. Drugs "capable of producing addiction" were placed in Group I, sub-group (a), while drugs not "capable of producing addiction," but convertible into such drugs, were placed in Group I, sub-group (b) if they were of no or only of limited medical use, and in Group II if they were widely used in medi-cine.95 Drugs in sub-group (b) of Group I were sub-jected to the same strict regime as drugs in sub-group (a). In providing for a lenient regime for drugs in Group II the authors of the 193 1 Convention were guided by consideration of the fact that availability of widely employed useful drugs of relatively little abuse liability should not be made too difficult, and that in establishing controls both the need for pre-vention of abuse and for facilitating legitimate use should be taken into account.

In order to exercise control over the narcotics trade, governments must require participants in this trade to make periodic reports to their domestic con-trol offices. This obligation was already implied in the statistical provisions of the 1912 96 and 1925 97 Conventions because governments would otherwise have not been able to obtain the information. which they needed for their international statistical reports. This applies also to the obligation of governments, introduced by the 1931 Convention, to make annual reports on the working of this treaty.98 The Convention of 1931 also extended this domestic reporting system by imposing upon governments the obli-gation to require manufacturers of narcotic drugs to submit domestic quarterly reports on the movement and stocks of raw materials " and drugs in their factories.100

A very important step forward was taken by the authors of the 1931 Convention when they author-ized an international organ '9' to place, with binding effect on parties to the treaty, additional drugs under international control. This authority was however limited to two chemical groups, namely to products obtained from any of the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or from the ecognine alkaloids of the coca leaf. Such an international authority has since remained a permanent feature of the international drug regime. The Paris Protocol of 1948 '92 extended the right of an international organ, the World Health Organization, to place under international control, with obligatory effect upon governments, additional drugs or substances to any chemical structure which were "liable to the same kind of abuse and produc-tive of the same kind of harmful effects as the drugs specified in article 1, paragraph 2" of the 1931 Convention."' In other words, the Protocol authorized the World Health Organization to place under the regime of the 1931 Convention and thus under pro-visions of the 1925 Convention applicable to manufactured drugs,104 any substance which had morphine-like or cocaine-like effects or which was "conver-tible"' into such a substance. This authority did not apply, however, to raw opium, medicinal opium, coca leaf, cannabis or cannabis like drugs.'106

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 'transferred the authority of placing additional drugs under international control from the World Health Organization to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which in this capacity, however, must either accept or reject, but not modify, the recommendation of the World Health Organization. In placing a drug under international control, modifying the regime of a controlled Arug or decontrolling a drug, the Commission must either act "in accordance with the recommen-dation of the World Health Organization" or not act at all.107 The authority of the Commission to place under international control additional substances applies to any substance of any chemical structure. The Commission may apply this right, however, only to a substance which the World Health Organization has found to be "liable to similar abuse and produc-tive of similar ill effects as the drugs in Schedule I or II" or to be "convertible" 94 into an already con-trolled drug.'" Since cannabis and cannabis resin are included in Schedule I,'" the Commission, contrary to the World Health Organization's authority under the 1948 Protocol, may also place under international control cannabis-like drugs of any chemical structure. As understood by the participants of the Plenipotentiary Conference of 1961, which adopted the Single Convention, this treaty did not grant authority to place under its regime amphetamines, barbiturates and tranquilizers. There appears, however, to be no obstacle to placing under the Single Convention hallucinogens, such as LSD, mescaline, tetrahydro cannabinols or psilocybine."°

The Vienna Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances "1 would when in force also provide for authority of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to place additional "psychotropic" substances under its control. This authority would not be limited to par-ticular chemical groups, but would extend to sub-stances of any chemical structure. It would apply to any substance which the World Health Organization finds to be capable of producing dependence and certain types of mind alteration "2 or finds capable of similar abuse and similar ill effects as a substance already controlled by the Vienna Convention. The authority to extend that Convention's control would not apply to a substance already under international control, that is, a substance already controlled by the Single Convention."3 The Commission would have to take into account the findings and views of the World Health Organization; but in contradistinction to the provisions of the Single Convention, its actions would not be limited to acting in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization or of not acting at all. Although the World Health Organization's assessment would be determinative as to medical and scientific matters, the Commission, bearing in mind economic, social, legal, administra-tive and other factors, could place the substance under a regime which might be different from that recommended by the World Health Organization.114

The Commission's decision to place an additional "psychotropic" substance under international control or under a more onerous regime would also have a more limited binding effect on parties than the corresponding decisions of the competent international organs have under the 1931 Convention, the 1948 Protocol or the Single Convention. Parties to the Vienna Convention, by a written notice to the Sec-retary General, would be able to free themselves from some of the control provisions.'"

The Convention of 1931 is also the first of the narcotics treaties which provided for provisional con-trol of a drug pending the final decision on its con-trol status. It was found that drugs, particularly those which produced physical dependence,"6 were sometimes widely abused prior to their international control and that such a situation was very difficult to correct once it existed. Therefore, the authors of the 1931 Convention subjected automatically to mea-sures of prohibition "7 or of strict control "8 all products obtained from any of the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or from the ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf which had not yet been included in Group I (sub-group (a) or (b) ) "9 or in Group II. Provisional control applied only to substances of two limited chemical groups, which could possess the dangerous properties which the 1931 Convention sought to control. It was later found that the chem-ical structure of possibly dangerous drugs could not be foreseen and it was recognized automatic pro-visional control on the pattern of the 1931 Conven-tion was infeasible. It is superfluous, therefore, to discuss its details in the present paper."2°

The protocol of 1948 authorized the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to place, with binding effect on governments, provisionally under the regime ap-plicable to drugs in Group I, a substance whose international control status was pending before the World Health Organization."21 Similarly, the Com-mission on Narcotic Drugs, under the Single Con-vention, may decide that the parties must apply provisionally to a substance, which has not yet been subjected to the Convention's control, all control measures applicable to drugs in Schedule I pending its decision on the international control status of that substance,122 that is, pending the World Health Organization's finding on the properties of the sub-stance and its recommendation, which the Commis-sion requires for its final decision.'23 Moreover, the Single Convention obligates parties to examine in the light of all available information the possibility of the provisional application of all control measures governing drugs in Schedule I to a substance whose possible control is the subject of a procedure under article 3 of the Single Convention.'24

The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances, on the other hand, would not provide for a decision of an international organ which would require parties provisionally control a substance. How-ever, parties would have to examine, in the light of all information available to them, the possibility of provisional application of the control regime govern-ing substances in Schedule I or II, pending the procedure determining whether a substance should be controlled or if controlled, under which regime it should be placed. The parties would have this obligation of examining the possibility of applying such provisional control if the information transmitted would indicate that the properties of a substance justify its subjection to one of the two more strict regimes 125 of the four control systems which would be introduced by the Convention.126 It is also important to note that the Convention of 1931 required governments for the first time to create and maintain a "special administration" for the purpose of applying its provisions, for regulating, supervising and controlling the trade in the controlled drugs, for organizing the campaign against drug addiction by taking all useful steps to prevent its development and to suppress the illicit traffic.127 It was understood by the participants of the Conference which adopted die Convention that the term "special administration" does not necessarily mean a "single authority".128 'The constitutional, legal and administrative systems of many countries would not allow the establishment of a single authority for the implementation of all the provisions of the international narcotics regime. The Conference recommended, however, that governments consider the desirability of establishing a single authority.129 In implementing their obligations regarding the maintenance of a "special administration", governments—as they still must under the corresponding provision of the Single Convention 130"—had to make some special administrative arrangements to provide for liaison among their various domestic agencies charged with functions of narcotics control to coordinate the work of these agencies, nationally, and internationally.

The Single Convention also requires governments to maintain a "special administration" for the purpose of implementing its provisions.130 When including this provision in the Convention the delegates to the Conference made it quite clear that they used the term "special administration" in the same sense as the phrase was used in the 1931 Convention.131

The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs would not make it mandatory to maintain a "special administration" for the implementation of its provisions. It declares it only to be desirable to establish and maintain such an administration. It states that this administration may be the same as or work closely with the special administration.132 The Conference which adopted the Convention of 1931 was also fully aware of the particularly dangerous character of diacetylmorphine (heroin). The Convention placed the international trade in heroin under particular restrictions 133 which were not taken over, however, by the Single Convention. The Conference also recommended that each government should examine in conjunction with the medical profession the possibility of abolishing or restricting the use of heroin.134 The principle of discouraging the medical use of drugs, which are held to be very dangerous and of little if any medical value, is found in the Single Convention. This Convention includes such drugs in Schedule IV. It requires parties: 135

To adopt any special measures which in their opinion are necessary in view of the particularly dangerous properties of the drugs in this Schedule.

If in their opinion the prevailing conditions in their prespective countries render such a measure the most appropriate means of protecting public health and welfare to prohibit the production,136 manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of drugs in Schedule IV except for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific research only.137

The authors of the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs accepted a similar principle. It would prohibit all use of substances in its Schedule I, such as LSD, mescaline or tetrahydro cannabinols except for scientific and very limited medical purpurposes.138 Two other provisions of the Convention of 1931 may still be mentioned because they were modified and adopted by the Single Convention: the requirement that the narcotic drug content be shown on the label under which that drug or any of its preparations is offered for sale 139 and the obligation to prevent the accumulation of quantities of raw material, such as opium, coca leaves and poppy straw, in the possession of manufacturers in excess of those required for the economic conduct of business.140 The Single Convention obligates governments to prevent such an excessive accumulation of narcotic drugs 141 and poppy straw by drug manufacturers, state enterprises engaged in the drug trade and other drug traders or distributors. This obligation however does not cover the accumulation of excessive quantities of drugs in Schedule II by retail traders or distributors.142

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs does not impose specific restrictions on the disposal of seized drugs as article 18 of the 1931 Convention does.143

The 1936 Convention and the Evolution of Penal Law in the Field of International Drug Law.144

The illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is often international and carried on by internationally organized groups. This is particularly true in our country where the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, other than "marihuana", is nearly exclusively supplied from abroad.

In order to make penal law an effective weapon in the fight against the illicit traffic, several principles must be adopted:

The penalties meted out to illicit traffickers must be adequate 145 sufficiently severe 146 to have the desired deterrent effect; but a penalty which may be adequate in one country may be either too severe or too lenient in another country. However, it is suggested that punishment by imposition of fines would alone never be an adequate punishment for serious crimes of illicit 'trafficking because the profit which can be derived from it is too great to deter a possible offender by the threat of a fine. Therefore, punishment by imprisonment is prescribed by the Convention of 1936 for the offenses of the illicit traffic.146 This type of punishment is also required by the Single Convention for serious crimes of the illicit traffic."147 The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances would also obligate parties to so punish serious illicit traffickers, except if they were abusers of psychotropic substances, who could be required to undergo measures of treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation and social reintegration, instead of punishment. The Protocol of 1972, amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, would also authorize governments to replace punishment by such measures as treatment and rehabilitation for abusers of narcotic drugs.148

It is also desirable that all forms of participation in the illicit traffic,. including accessory acts, con-spiracy, preparatory acts and attempts, should be subject to penal sanctions. The 1936 Convention requires the punishment of certain acts of the illicit traffic, including conspiracy and attempts, but it leaves the obligation to punish preparatory acts to national law.149 The Single Convention is however weaker on this point. It requires each party, subject to constitutional limitations, to punish intentional participation in any of the acts of the illicit traffic, conspiracy and attempts to commit them and preparatory acts. The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs follows the Single Convention. Both of these treaties mention, however, as a form of participation financial operations in connection with the offenses of the illicit traffic. The Parties to the Vienna Convention would however be entitled to substitute measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social integration for punishment of intentional participation, conspiracy, attempts or preparatory acts if the offenders would be abusers of psychotropic substances.150

It will be noted that illicit "cultivation" and "production" are not included by the 1936 Convention as punishable offenses, while the Single Convention expressly provides that governments should punish them. This is due to the fact that the narcotics treaties in force in 1936 did not yet provide for international control of cultivation and production while the Single Convention does.151 Article 5 of the 1936 Convention stipulates, however, that governments whose national law regulates cultivation and "production" with a view to obtaining narcotic drugs should severely punish contraventions of such law. The Vienna Convention does not enumerate the various acts which should be made punishable, but uses instead a general formula: "any action contrary to a law or regulation adopted in pursuance of its (i.e. the party's) obligations under this Convention." The Convention also does not control cultivation of plants for the production of psychotropic substances. It also does not regulate specifically "production". Such "production" (the separation of controlled psychotropic substances from the plants from which they are obtained) would be "manufacture" according to the Vienna Convention and if illicit, would be a punishable offense under the general formula referred to above.

In contradistinction to the 1936 Convention, the Single Convention supplements its list of acts which a party is required to punish by the following general formula: "and any other action which in the opinion of such Party may be contrary to the provisions of this Convention."

It is also important that heavy crimes of the illicit traffic do not escape prosecution or punishment or both on the technical ground of lack of local jurisdiction in the country in which offenders are found. It is necessary, therefore, that serious crimes of illicit traffic should be extraditable and, although com-mitted abroad should be prosecutable in the country in which the offender were found, if extradition could not be accomplished.

The 1936 Convention requires countries which do not extradite their citizens, to prosecute and punish their nationals who have committed offenses of illicit traffic abroad. It also requires countries to prosecute and punish a foreign illicit trafficker, who has committed his offense abroad and whom they find in their territory, provided that his extradition has been requested and could not be granted for a reason independent of the offense itself and that the law of the country of refuge considers prosecution for offenses committed abroad by foreigners admissible as a general rule.152 The 1936 Convention also stipulates that the offenses of the illicit traffic shall be deemed to be included as extradition crimes in any existing or future extradition treaty between parties to that Convention.153 It requires, in addition, that parties, who do not make extradition conditional on ihe existence of a treaty or on reciprocity, shall recognize these offenses as extradition crimes.154

These provisions concerning prosecution and punishment of crimes committed abroad and the inclusion of the offenses of illicit traffic as extradition crimes in past and future extradition treaties are probably among the principal reasons why the 1936 Convention has been accepted only by a relatively small number of countries. Some countries are not willing and possibly constitutionally unable to limit in this way their treaty making authorities. More-over a number of states, as a general principle, limit their jurisdiction to crimes committed on their own territories. They are guided by the consideration that the trial of crimes committed abroad would often not be conducive to good administration of justice because it might prevent defendants, for financial or other reasons, from obtaining witnesses or other evidence needed for their exculpation. These considerations explain why the provisions of the Single Convention on prosecution of crimes committed abroad and also on extradition are weaker than those of the 1936 Convention.

The Single Convention requires each party, subject to constitutional limitations and domestic law, to prosecute serious offenses committed abroad if the offender, whether a national or a foreigner, is found in its territory and if his extradition is not acceptable to a country which would have jurisdiction because the offense was committed within its borders or because the offender is its national. The party, in whose territory the offender is found, is also not bound to prosecute if the offender has already been prosecuted and judged in another country.155 It is suggested, however, that it would be incompatible with the spirit of the Single Convention if a party gives refuge to a trafficker who has been convicted abroad but has not yet served his sentence. A party, subject to constitutional limita-tions and domestic law, would have to adopt such measures as it could take to prevent such a situation, either by extraditing the fugitive, by trying him or by expelling him. The Vienna Convention contains the same provision as the Single Convention with respect to the prosecution of serious offenses committed abroad.156

The provisions of the 1936 Convention regarding extradition were taken over by the Single Convention, but deprived of their obligatory character. The Single Convention only declares it to be desirable that the offenses whose punishment it requires be included as extradition crimes in existing and future extradition treaties between its parties, and also that these offenses be recognized as extradition crimes between parties, which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty or on reciprocity.157 The Vienna Convention contains the same non-obligatory provision.158

The Protocol of 1972, amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, would correct this weakness with respect to extradition of illicit traffickers. 159 The Protocol 160 would replace the extradition rules of the Single Convention by stipulating:

•    that each of the offenses which are punishable under the terms of the Single Convention shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty existing between parties and that parties undertake to include these offenses as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them;

•    that a party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty may, at its option consider the Single Convention as amended as legal basis for extradition in respect of the above mentioned offenses if it receives a request for extradition from another party with which it has no extradition treaty; and

•    that parties which do not make extradition con-ditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize those offenses as extraditable offenses among themselves.161

The Protocol would authorize a party to refuse extradition if it would consider that the offense in question is not sufficiently serious. The 1936 Convention has the same provision.162

It is certainly also of greatest importance that countries make the necessary administrative arrangements to coordinate the activities of their various agencies engaged in the fight against the illicit traffic and to facilitate close cooperation and expeditious communications with foreign enforcement authorities. The Convention of 1936 required each party, "within the framework of its domestic law," to establish a "central office" for domestic coordination and international cooperation.163 A country whose government was federal in character, or where the executive authority of the government was distributed between central and local governments, was expressly authorized to carry out, in conformity with its constitutional or administrative systems, the task of supervising and coordinating the work of its different agencies charged with the campaign against illicit traffic.164

Correspondingly, the Single Convention does not specifically require the establishment of a "central office." It requires parties, having due regard to their constitutional, legal and administrative systems, to make arrangements at the national level for coordination of preventive and repressive action against illicit traffic, to assist each other and to co-operate with each other and with the competent international organizations, in the campaign against the illicit drug trade, to assure an expeditious conduct of cooperation with the enforcement agencies of other countries and to provide for an expeditious international transmission of legal papers required for the prosecution of traffickers in other countries.165 The Single Con-vention also states that parties "may" usefully designate an appropriate agency responsible for co-ordination of preventive and repressive action at the national level.166 One may conclude that the organizational provisions of the Single Convention con-cerning the fight against illicit traffic are much more vague and considerably weaker than those of the Convention of 1936. The provisions of the Vienna Convention are similar to those of the Single Con-vention.167

The Convention of 1936,168 the Single Conven-tion 169 and the Vienna Convention 170 contain very similar provisions requiring the seizure and confiscation of the drugs, (psychotropic substances), substances and equipment (instruments) intended for the Commission of the punishable offenses concerned.171

The United States of America refused to become a party to the 1936 Convention. In a statement 172 of the U.S. delegation to the Conference explaining the American refusal to sign the Convention, reference was made to the failure of the 1936 Convention to provide for the punishment of "illegal cultivation and gathering of cannabis" 173 and to the fact that the Convention was "inadequate as far as cannabis was concerned" 174

It follows from the preceding comparison of the penal provisions of the 1936 Convention and of the Single Convention that the penal provisions of the former treaty are considerably stronger than the provisions of the Single Convention. This is the reason why the 1936 Convention is the only drug treaty preceding the Single Convention which is not replaced by the latter as between parties thereto.175

THE SITUATION AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II

The evolution of international drug control prior to World War II had led to the establishment of a comprehensive international regime governing manu-factured narcotic drugs with the result that illicit traffic in such drugs could not obtain its supplies in significant quantities from legal sources. Clandestine factories, which could acquire opium or coca leaves with relative ease, had taken the place of legal manufacturers as suppliers of the illicit traffic.

While the international control of manufactured drugs as it existed on the eve of World War II is basically the same as it is today, the international efforts prior to the War had not yet been completed and had not yet resulted in the conclusion of a treaty.176 The control of the production of coca leaves and of cannabis and cannabis resin 177 was considered unrealistic prior to World War II. However, it was generally recognized—as the League's efforts to elaborate a comprehensive system of international control of the production of opium show—that a successful fight against the illicit traffic in opiates, such as morphine and heroin, required an effective control of the production of opium. After World War II the need for the international control of the cultivation of the coca bush and of the production of cannabis and cannabis resin was also accepted by the family of nations.

Moreover, in the years immediately preceding World War II, scientific progress in the field of chemistry had created a new problem with which the international society had to deal. Chemists succeeded by a fully synthetic process to manufacture a drug (pethidine) which was capable of producing addiction, that is, physical as well as psychological dependence, and which was not obtained from agricultural raw materials, such as, opium, poppy straw, coca leaves, cannabis or cannabis resin. Since the late 1930's, a great number of "synthetic" drugs have been developed which are either addiction-producing themselves or readily convertible" into addiction-producing drugs. Prior to World War II, no treaty provisions existed by which such "synthetic" drugs could be placed under the full international narcotics regime in the Conventions of 1925 and 1931.178

The treaties concluded prior to World War II had also not prohibited opium smoking, opium eating, coca leaf chewing and the non-medical use of cannabis and cannabis resin.

The disappearance of the League of Nations whose organs exercised the international functions of narcotic control created another problem.179

Six narcotics treaties had been concluded befor World War II. A codification of the treaty law the field of narcotics control and a simplification I the international control machinery appeared to be a desirable aim.

It seems, however, that the weakness of contro of drugs in Group II of the 1931 Convention w. not considered to represent an important problem probably because governments applied a more strie regime to those drugs than would have been r-quired by their treaty obligations and because thes drugs did not appear in the international illicit traffi in significant quantities.

This situation as it existed at the end of World War II explains the basic features of the program of work which the United Nations, either through its organs or through plenipotentiary conferences meeting under its auspices, carried out from 1946 to 1961, the year in which the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted.180

Some of the tasks which resulted from the post-war situation appeared to be urgent and capable of immediate implementation, others appeared to be less urgent or in any case to require more time to carry them out.

The Urgent Tasks Considered Capable of Immediate Implementation:

Transfer of the international functions of narcotics control from the organs of the League of Nations to the organs of the United Nations and to the World Health Organization

This was accomplished by the Protocol signed at Lake Success on 11 December 1946, amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and on 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at Geneva on 26 June 1936.181' In particular, the League's Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs was replaced by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The functions of the Health Committee of the League of Nations and of the Office international d'hygiene publique 179 were transferred to the World Health Organization.182 The Permanent Central Board 183 and Supervisory Body 184 of the League continued to function until March 2, 1968 when both were replaced by the present International Narcotics Control Board in accordance with ct:'.,cle 45, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention and the resolution 1106 (XL) of the Economic and Social Council. Their appointive bodies were replaced by United Nations organs and the World Health Organization.

Extension to "Synthetic Drugs" of the International Control Regime of the 1931 Convention and thus of Provisions of the 1925 Convention governing manufactured narcotic' drugs

This was done by the Protocol 195 signed at Paris on 19 November 1948 bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the Convention of 13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success on 11 December 1946.

Establishment of a Comprehensive System of Control of the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy for the Production of Opium and of the Production of Opium.

The effective control of the production of opium was considered to be extremely urgent in the early years of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Moreover, in the years preceding the out-break of World War II, the League's Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs had done a considerable amount of preparatory work. A "Draft of the Principal Articles Which Might be Embodied in a Convention for Limiting and Controlling the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy and the Production of Raw Opium and Controlling Other Raw Materials Used in the Manufacture of Opium Alkaloids" had been prepared.186 It was decided therefore not to wait to establish control of opium production until it could be incorporated in the planned codification treaty, which would include all drug treaty law and would fill the gaps in the existing drug control system. It was resolved to conclude an interim agreement for the purpose of introducing this urgent control."187

The Commission first considered the creation of an international opium monopoly which was found to be unacceptable to most countries. This plan was ill-conceived because it would have imposed heavy bureaucratic burdens on the international legal trade, which no longer supplied illicit channels significant amounts of opium while it could not have prevented diversion by the cultivators of part of their opium crops. The efforts of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to introduce, as an interim measure, an effective system of international control of opium produc-tion finally led to the United Nations Conference of 1953 which was called by the Economic and Social Council 188 and which adopted the Protocol of 23 June 1953 for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of,
international and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of opium.189

This Protocol, whose preparation was carried out in great haste, contains a number of very useful provisions, some whose value is controversial, and some omissions,190 which can be due only to oversight. The following provisions of the Protocol require mentioning either because they constituted progress in the field of drug control, which in the same or in a very similar form were taken over by the Single Convention, or because their critical appraisal might be useful in order to determine whether they should be taken up again in future attempts to improve the international drug treaty system.

The Protocol limited the use of opium'190A exclusively to medical and scientific purposes.191 Parties could by reservation 192 free themselves from implementation of this provision for a limited period of time to permit opium smoking or non-medical opium-eating 193 which was.."traditional" in their territories. The Single Convention took over the substance of this provision by outlawing the use of any "narcotic" drugs, including opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin. The Convention contains exceptions in favor of countries which make the required reservation, permitting them to continue the non-medical use of opium, coca leaves, cannabis or cannabis resin for a limited period of time. These transitional provisions of the Convention are very similar to those of the 1953 Protocol regarding the temporary continuation of the non-medical use of opium.194

The 1953 Protocol, as the Single Convention, does not prevent any party from producing opium for its domestic requirements.195

The Protocol, as well as the Convention, require parties, which permit the cultivation of the poppy for the production of opium, to establish a particular agency 196 for the implementation of their treaty obligations regarding such cultivation and production.

The Protocol obligated such parties

•    not to permit the cultivation of the poppy for the production of opium except in areas which it authorized for this purpose. The purpose of this provision was the concentration of opium produc-tion in some geographic areas in order to facilitate control.197
•    to permit the production of opium only to licensed cultivators, each license specifying the ex-tent of the area on which the cultivation of the poppy was permitted.198
•    to require the cultivators to deliver their total opium crops to the Agency which was to be held to purchase and take physical possession of these crops as soon as possible.199'
•    to confer upon the Agency a monopoly of the international and wholesale trade in opium and of holding opium stocks other than those held by manufacturers licensed to manufacture alkaloids from opium.200

The Single Convention imposes the same obligations on opium producing countries with the minor modifications.

Opium becomes available for illicit purposes principally from three basic sources:

•    From poppies cultivated in areas which are not under effective Government control, 201 no matter whether their cultivation is theoretically "illegal" or whether no legislation concerning them exists at all.
•    From poppies legally or illicitly cultivated in areas which are under the control of conniving government authorities. The role of official corruption, even in high places, and the complicity of government officials should in this connection not be underrated.202 In appraising such a situation we must understand that this attitude of government officials which according to our ideas we must refer to as "official corruption" does not necessarily have the same moral connotation, under the different social and cultural conditions of the areas in question, as in our country.
•    From diversion by the legal cultivator of part of his opium crop into illicit channels. Such a cultivator does not deliver his whole crop to the national opium agency as he would legally be bound to do, but conceals a part which he sells as a higher than the official price to an illicit trader.

Opium is produced by incising the capsules of poppies while still standing in the field and by collecting the latex exuding from the incisions. Opium production therefore cannot be hidden from neigh-bors or authorities and illicit opium production is consequently impossible in areas which are under effective government control and whose government authorities are willing to suppress it. An unwilling-ness to do so may of course be motivated by the desire not to deprive the cultivators of their sole or principal cash crop and thus to create possibly serious political, economic and social problems.

On the other hand it is hardly possible for even the most competent national opium agency to estab-lish the exact amount of the opium harvest which an individual cultivator has legally collected and is bound to deliver to the agency. It is only too natural that such a private cultivator who is often very poor is frequently tempted by the higher prices offered by illicit traffickers. It is inevitable that even in countries, where opium production is governed by a national monopoly system as required by the 1953 Protocol and the Single Convention, some diversion of legally produced opium into illicit channels is bound to occur as long as private individuals are permitted to cultivate the poppy for the production of opium. This diversion can be prevented only if licen.ses to produce opium are granted only to rela-tively large corporations, co-operatives or state farms. Both the 1953 Protocol and the Single Convention contain the basic weakness that they permit the granting of licenses to produce opium to private individuals. Whether and when a generally acceptable treaty could be concluded, which would exclude individual private farmers from producing opium, is difficult to estimate, particularly after the intensive treaty making activities in the field of drugs in recent years. The elimination of illicit opium supplies from the sources mentioned above is of course not a mat-ter which can be accomplished by the instrumentality of the international drug treaties alone.

The Protocol does not contain any provision which would require a party to prohibit the cultivation of the opium poppy whenever the prevailing conditions in its territory would render such an action the most suitable measure, in its opinion, for protecting the public health and welfare and for preventing the diversion of drugs into the illicit traffic. The Single Convention has included such a provision not only with respect to the cultivation of the opium poppy but also in respect to that of the coca bush and the cannabis plant.203 Such a provision must of course be implemented in good faith as all treaty provisions. A country which has an efficient administration and which despite adoption of strict controls would be unable to prevent the diversion into the illicit traffic of important quantities of its legally produced opium would hardly act in good faith if it would declare that, in its opinion, the prohibition of poppy cultivation would not be the most suitable measure for preventing the diversion of drugs into the illicit traffic. The production of opium cannot be concealed from the authorities in areas under effective government control nor can the cultivation of the poppy be hidden. Turkey is undoubtedly a country which is capable of exercising effective government control over its territory and which, despite its control measures, could not prevent large-scale diversions from its legal opium production. It is therefore suggested that the Turkish governments acted in accordance with its obligations under the Single Convention to which it is a party when it recently prohibited the cultivation of the opium poppy with effect from the 1972 crop year.

The 1953 Protocol does not permit parties to import or export opium other than opium produced in any of the following seven countries which would be parties to the Protocol:204 Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia.

The Single Convention admits to the international trade in opium:

•    opium produced in any of the following countries which are parties to the Convention: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burma, India, Iran, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia.205
•    opium produced by any country which produced and exported that drug during ten years prior to 1 January 1961 if that country has established and maintains a national control agency as required by article 23 of the Single Convention and has in force an effective means of ensuring that the opium which is produces is not diverted into the illicit traffic.206
•    an annual maximum amount of five tons of opium produced in the territory of any party 207 which has notified to the Economic and Social Board its desire to export this opium and furnishes to that organ information regarding the controls which it has in force in respect of the opium to be produced and exported as well as regarding the name of the country or countries to which it expects to export the opium.208
•    opium produced in the territory of any party 207 which has notified to the Economical and Social Council its desire to produce opium for export in amounts exceeding five tons annually, the estimated amounts to be produced for export, the controls existing or proposed regarding the opium to be produced and the name of the country or countries to which it expects to export the opium and which has obtained the Council's approval of its intended production for export.209 and
•    opium seized from the illicit traffic which is exported by one party to another party.210

The failure of the authors of the Single Conven-tion to incorporate the provision of the 1953 Pro-tocol limiting the international opium trade to opium produced in the territory of those of the seven named countries which became parties to the Protocol 204 and the Single Convention's enlargement of potential sources of opium has been widely criticized, particularly in the United States of America. This restrictive provision of the 1953 Protocol has on the other hand been one of the reasons for which several countries refused to become parties to that treaty. In appraising the criticism of the Single Convention on this point, it must be realized that it is based on considerations which had more validity under the different conditions of the past than they have at present. It was held in the past that legal over production of opium is one of the principal caus of diversion. Due to the controls required by 1953 Protocol and by the Single Convention introduced by the countries now engaged in th legal production of opium, the only stage of lega trade at which opium is presently diverted into illicit channels, occurs with the licensed individual farmer who cultivates the poppy for the production of opium. It is safe to state that opium, once it has been taken over by the national opium agency, is not diverted into the illicit traffic either by such .211 agency or in significant quantities from the subse-quent trade in the opium sold by the agency. It is very difficult to see how the restrictive provisions of the 1953 Protocol limiting the legal international opium trade to opium produced in seven named countries or even the more liberal provisions in question of the Single Convention can contribute to the prevention of diversion of opium by a licensed in-dividual farmer or to the suppression of the il/icit or uncontrolled production of opium. Moreover, less opium is sometimes legally produced than is needed for medicinal purposes.212 There seems at present to be a greater danger of legal underproduction than of legal over-production. One must also not overlook that harvesting of a quantity of opium often requires many more man-hours than that of an amount of many other agricultural products of the same or even greater value on the legal market. The past Permanent Central Board 16 found that in one opium-producing country the collection of 7 kg. of opium required about 1280 man-hours.2i2 It follows that even at the present increased world market prices of opium 213 legal production of opium can be eco-nomically profitable only in countries with a very low wage leve1.214 While it cannot be predicted which additional country with a low wage level may become capable of exercising effective control and of enter-ing the world market with needed additional legal supplies of opium without becoming an important source of the illicit traffic, the danger of future shortages of opium required for medical purposes should not be underrated. It is to be expected that the wage level will rise not only in the countries which presently legally produce opium, but also in countries which at their present level could take their place. Legal opium production may become less and less profitable and finally entirely uneco-nomical in both kinds of countries. Such a possible shortage of opium might of course be obviated by an increasing substitution of synthetic narcotics for drugs obtained from opium or by an increasing price of opium which might not only have the effect of increasing legal opium production, but also on the other hand stimulate the development of fully ade-quate synthetic substitutes 215 and thus in turn reduce the medical need for opium. It may finally be pointed out that poppy straw could not fully replace opium as raw material for the manufacture of morphine.

This would require a tremendous increase in the cultivation of the poppy for its seeds. However, with-out such an increase there would not be enough poppy straw for the complete replacement of opium. Even in the recent past, an increase in the produc-tion of morphine from poppy straw seems to have been prevented by the fact that not enough straw was available for this purpose. The cultivation of the poppy for the straw alone is entirely uneconomical.

It may also be noted that no country commenced opium production for export under the more liberal provisions of the Single Convention. Iran which had prohibited the production of opium and recently resumed it for domestic purposes, but not for ex-port 216 would under the provisions of the Protocol be authorized to produce opium for export. One 'may hold that contrary to the past, the present international campaign against the illicit traffic in opium does not need additional measures for the limitation of the quantities of legally produced opium, but prevention of the diversion of opium by licensed individual cultivators and the suppression of illicit or uncontrolled production of opium in the areas in which they occur. The best means of preventing diversion by licensed individual farmers would be the prohibition of the production of opium by such farmers. Refusal to renew the license of a farmer 'whose alleged opium yield from a unit of land is considerably lower than the amount of opium harvested by other farmers from such a unit of land would also be a useful measure.

Prohibition and prevention of poppy cultivation in all countries which are incapable of exercising ef-fective control must be one of the principal aims of further international action in this connection.
In conclusion, of the Single Convention's control of sources of opium supplies, which in the past might have been of great value, may have to be revalued and may be found to have lost their usefulness in the light of changed circumstances brought about par-ticularly by the international narcotics regime.

The 1953 Protocol provided for a system of sanc-tions 217 which inter alia authorized the Permanent Central Board to recommend to the parties an em-bargo on the import of opium, the export of opium, or both, from or to the offending country or territory.218 The Board was also authorized to make such an embargo "mandatory".219

Such an embargo if implemented would have the effect of cessation of the legal imports of opium into the offending country or territory or of the legal exports of opium from such a country or territory. A cessation of legal imports might endanger the sup-ply of needed medicines but would have no effect on the illicit traffic which is not any more fed by legal imports as was the case in 1925. The sanction system, which was then established by the 1925 Convention and which inter alio authorized the Per-manent Central Board to recommend the cessation of the exports of drugs to an offending country, was based on conditions as they existed at that time, but which no longer exist.

The cessation of legal exports of opium from an offending country might cause some economic dis-advantages to that country and might therefore make some sense as sanction, but it could also increase an already existing shortage of opium for medical purposes in other countries. It is however not asserted that the authority of the Permanent Central Board to recommend or make mandatory the embargo provided for in the 1953 Protocol is without any value. Its authority to take such action might have strengthened the Board's position in negotiations with governments which failed to implement their treaty obli-gations. It must however be emphasized that the embargo system of the 1953 Protocol is based on conditions as they existed in 1925. Sanction pro-visions which would take into account the changes which have since then taken place in the drug field might usefully have to be different.220

The 1953 Protocol authorized the Permanent Central Board to apply its sanction provisions also to non-parties.221

The "sanction" rules of the 1953 Protocol contains another provision which is worthwhile discussing because it proved to be unacceptable to a number of countries and because a similar provision proposed by the United States in recent diplomatic negotiations leading to the adoption of the Protocol of 1972, amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, was also opposed by many States. Under the 1953 Protoco1,222 the Permanent Central Board could submit to a government an inquiry which would contribute to the elucidation of the opium situation under the jurisdiction of that government. The Board could propose that this inquiry should be carried out by a person or a committee of inquiry. The inquiry would require the express consent of the government concerned. A failure of the government to reply to the Board's proposal within four months should be considered to be a refusal to consent. The inquiry would have to be carried out in collaboration with officials designated by the government. The American efforts led to an inclusion in the Protocol of 1972 of a provision 2" which would expressly forsee the possibility of a government studying possible defects in its narcotics regime, at the proposal of the Inter-national Narcotics Control Board. If the Board, on the basis of information which it could use for this purpose, would have objective reasons to believe that the aims of the Single Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any party, country or territory to carry out provisions of this Convention, it would be authorized to propose to a government that a study of the matter should be carried out in its territory by such means as the gov-ernment would deem appropriate. The Board would also be entitled to propose such a study to a country, which, without any failure in implementing the Single Convention, had become or might become an important center of illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of, or traffic in or consumption of drugs.224 The Board would be entitled to propose this study if it thinks such action necessary for the purpose of assessing the possibly defective control situation. If the government would decide to under-take the proposed study, it could request the Board to make available its expertise and the services. The modalities of the study and the time limit for the completion of the study would have to be determined by consultation between the government and the Board. The government would be required to com-municate the results of the study to the Board and to indicate the remedial measures which it considers necessary.

This new provision of the Single Convention would be very helpful in improving the drug situation in a country. However, nothing in the unamended Single Convention would prevent the Board from recom-mending such a study,225 although without reference to article 14,226 and a government from carrying out such a recommendation.227

The 1953 Protocol also introduced provisions by which the amounts of opium supplies which a country or territory could obtain annually by imports would be limited. The maximum amounts of opium imports which would be permitted would be calculated on the basis of the estimates of opium requirements which the government would furnish to the Permanent Central Board; or if it fails to do so, would be established by the Supervisory Body.°7 The Supervisory Body could amend the estimates of a govern-ment only with the governments consent. The Board is also required to order the discontinuation of further exports of opium to a country or territory which has exceeded its import limits. In short, the Protocol subjected opium to the estimate and limitation system which the 1931 Convention applied to the manu-factured narcotic drugs.228 The Single Convention subjects opium, as well as coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin and extracts and tinctures of cannabis—the drugs which the 1931 Convention excluded from its provisions-to its estimate and limitation system.229

The Protocol also required each opium producing country to furnish to the Permanent Central Board an annual estimate of the extent of the area in which it proposed poppy cultivation and an annual estimate of the amount of opium to be harvested.230 It did not confer a binding character on these estimates.231 These provisions regarding estimates of area and harvest were not adopted by the Single Convention.232 The Protocol of 1972 would introduce into the Single Convention provisions which would require parties to furnish annual estimates of the area to be used for the cultivation of the poppy for any purpose (and not only for opium), as well as estimates of the approximate quantity of opium to be produced. It would require that these estimates of the area should not be exceeded. Parties would have to organize and control opium production in such a manner as to ensure that, as far as possible, the quantity produced in any year should not exceed their estimates of opium production.233 In determining whether production has exceeded the estimates, certain deductions would have to be made from the amount of opium which would have been pro-duced.224 These provisions of the Protocol may have to be appraised in the light of the following considerations:

•    Whether additional restrictions limiting the quantities of legally produced opium collected by the national opium agencies can reduce the amounts of opium diverted into illicit channels by licensed in-' dividual farmers, and whether they can have any effect on the other important sources of illicit opium, namely the cultivation of the poppy for opium in areas which are not under effective government control or in areas under the control of conniving government authorities.

•    Whether a government can make a reasonably accurate estimate of the approximate quantity of opium which it may harvest from a unit of area of land in regions whose weather conditions are unstable.

The question may also be raised whether the considerable number of European countries, which cultivate the poppy for the seeds or do not permit the production of opium, are fully capable of preventing and actually prevent such production and have no diversion of opium would be willing to accept an obligation to furnish to the International Narcotics Control Board an annual estimate of the area and of the geographic location of the land to be used for the cultivation of the poppy as well as annual statistical figures with respect to the "ascertainable area of cultivation of the poppy".235

Attention is also drawn in this connection to a provision of the Single Convention which would not be affected by the Protocol of 1972 and according to which any state may furnish supplementary estimates during the year. The Protocol of 1972 would not exclude the estimates of opium production from the right of governments to change their esti-mates by supplementary estimates. Neither the earlier estimates nor the supplementary estimates can under the unamended Convention or under the Protocol be amended without the consent of the government concerned. The Protocol would provide that in case of disagreement between the government and the Board, the latter would have the right to establish, communicate and publish its own figures. Only the estimates or supplementary estimates of the Governments would have the legal efiect of determining the limits of narcotics supplies to be obtained by manu-facture or import or both or the legal effect of establishing the limits which the amount of opium production would not be permitted to exceed; the figures established and published by the Board in the case of the above mentioned disagreement could only have a moral effect. An opium producing country could by its estimates and supplementary estimates always establish the amounts of opium which it would be permitted to produce. It could also, by sup-plementary estimates, assure that its opium produc-tion would not exceed the limits which would be prescribed by the Single Convention as amended by the Protoco1.235

In the case of estimates and supplementary esti-mate,s determining the limits of the supply of drugs to be obtained by manufacture and import, govern-ments can follow suggestions of the Board by re-ducing manufacturing or import plans or by reducing or discontinuing additional manufacture or imports. Once the poppy is sown, an opium producing country could, in the case of supplementary estimates, carry out suggestions of the Board to reduce its estimates and its planned opium crop, either by uprooting or otherwise destroying some of the plants in the field or by prohibiting its farmers from c,ollecting opium from a part of the poppies which they would have grown. Finally, in reviewing the opium production estimates the Board would have at its disposal only estimates of the area to be used for cultivation of the poppy for any purpose and not for the area on which it would be planned to grow the poppy for the production opium.238

The provisions of article 5 of the 1953 Protocol regarding the limitation of opium stocks which governments may hold have proved in practice to be of no value, have not been included in the Single Convention and have not been proposed for consideration in any future revision of the inter-national drug treaty system.237

The Tasks Resulting From the Post War Situation Which Appeared To Be Less Urgent Or In Any Case Would Require Some Time To Carry Them Out.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs was of the opinion that provisions dealing with these tasks should be included in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs which it intended to prepare. These tasks were:

•    Codification of the law contained in all existing multilateral narcotics treaties which numbered six in 1946, but whose number had grown to nine in 1953 .238

•    Simplification of the international control machinery by substituting a single organ for the Per-manent Central Board 18 and Supervisory Body 87 and by reforming the secretarial arrangements serving the international control organs.
•    Closing the gaps which were held still to exist in the international narcotics regime.

The latter would be accomplished by (1) establishing a comprehensive system of control of the cultivation of the coca bush, of the production of coca leaves, of the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis and cannabis resin and of the production of these cannabis drugs and (2) by prohibiting the non-medical use of coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin which was still permitted under the existing narcotics treaties. The 1953 Pro-tocol, which was considered to be only an interim measure, already provided for a comprehensive inter-national regime of the cultivation of the poppy for the production of opium and of such production and for the prohibition of the non-medical use of all kinds of opium. Such a regime had not yet existed under the pre-war treaties, which had not yet prohibited the non-medical use of raw opium and prepared (smoking) opium.239 Since the Single Convention was intended to replace all preceding multilateral narcotics treaties, including the 1953 Protocol,240 it had also to provide for control of the cultivation of the poppy for the production of opium and of such production and for the continued prohibition of the non-medical use of all kinds of opium.

THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961

It may be recalled that the work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on the Single Convention was initiated by the United States representative on the Commission.241 The work was carried on under the authority of resolutions of the Economic and Social Council 159 (VII) II D of August 3, 1948 and 246 (IX)D of July 6, 1949, both of which were adopted on the recommendation of the Commission.242 The Commission devoted its efforts to this task from its third session in 1948 to its thirteenth session in 1958.243 The Economic and Social Council, by its Resolution 689 (XXVI) J of July 28, 1958,244 requested the Secretary General, to call a plenipotentiary conference for the adoption of the Convention.

This Conference met in New York from January 24 to March 25, 1961, and adopted the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 on March 25, 1961.

The Convention was opened for signature ("done") a March 30, 1961.

The Commission considered three drafts of the Single Convention, of which the first and second drafts 245 were prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with principles adopted by the Commission, and the Third Draft 249 was prepared by the Commision itself. The Third Draft was used by the plenipotentiary conference as working document in eleborating the final text of the Single Convention.

Some of the Controversial Problems Which arose in the Course of the Preparatory Work on the Single Convention

Estimates and Statistics

Contrary to the earlier and later narcotics treaties, obligations of parties were frequently described in very general terms, leaving it to international organs to fill in details. For example, parties would have been ,bound to furnish such statistical and other information as the "International Drug Commission" 247 would request as being necessary for the performance of the functions of the international control organs.248 They would also have been required to supply such estimates of their drug requirements as the "International Drug Board" 249 would determine 250 No list of estimates which parties would specifically be bound to furnish was included in the draft treaty. The Second and third drafts of the Single Convention, as its final text, returned to the method of describing in some detail the treaty obligations of Parties; and

Extension of Control to New Drugs

The International Drug Commission 247 was authorized to place under international control any (dangerous) drug, and to apply the appropriate con-trol measures. It would have been irrelevant whether the drug in question had properties similar to those already under international control 251 or what its chemical formula was. Parties would however have had the right, within a stated period, to reject onerous decisions of the Commission,252 and thus would not have been bound by them.252 This proposed extensive authority of the Commission to adopt decisions bind-ing upon those parties which do not reject them is somewhat similar, although less far-reaching, than article 2 of Draft B of the Protocol on the Control of Drugs Outside the Scope of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.253 The proponents of such a pro-vision hold that it is highly improbable that a govern-ment would want to expose itself to international opprobrium by expressly rejecting the control of a really dangerous drug.2" Anyway, the Second and Third Draft and the final text of the Single Conven-tion returned to the method, employed by the 1931 Convention and the 1948 Protocol, of defining more or less closely the type of drugs which may be placed under international control by a binding decision of an international organ, a decision which cannot be rejected by the parties.255

The International Clearing House

The First Draft of the Single Convention contained provisions regarding an "International Clearing House" which would have required parties not to authorize an export of a controlled drug to any country or territory until it would have obtained confirmation from the International Drug Board 249 that the export would not exceed the estimates of that country or territory.257 These provisions were rejected by the Commission and do not appear any more in the subsequent drafts and in the final text of the Single Convention. They would have imposed an unnecessary burden on the legal international trade in controlled drugs, from which, due to the import certificate and export authorization system, only very insignificant amounts are diverted into illicit channels. Such a system of an "international clearing house" would also have delayed the shipment of urgently needed medicines. It could not have prevented the theft of drugs which are being shipped from one country to another country. Unfortunately, such thefts continue to occur occasionally.

Mandatory Prohibition of Dangerous Drugs

The Draft provided for the possibility of the mandatory prohibition of the production 258 or manufacture of, trade in and use of particularly dangerous drugs, except for small amounts for scientific purposes.259 A provision of this kind was included in the Second Draft, but only as an alternative to an-other text which only would have required Parties "to consider sympathetically" such a prohibition.260 The Third Draft provided for a regime of mandatory prohibition of drugs in Schedule IV 261 without any alternative as that foreseen in the Second Draft. The Plenipotentiary Conference rejected the idea of a mandatory prohibition of dangerous drugs. It included instead in the Single Convention a provision which amounts only to a recommendation to prohibit drugs in Schedule IV.262 Opponents to mandatory prohibition agreed that it would be useful if international organs would have authority to discourage the medical use of particularly dangerous drugs which in their opinion have no medical value or whose advantages could be obtained equally as well from other less dangerous drugs. They also thought it useful if an international organ could recommend the prohibition of dangerous drugs of this kind. They held, however, that no person or group of persons at an international center could be sure that a particular drug did not have some important therapeutic value of which they were not aware. Moreover, admission of dangerous drugs to medical treatment, if effectively controlled, did not constitute a danger to the control regimes of other countries and in this sense did not represent the type of international problem, which multilateral narcotics treaties sought to solve.263 A mandatory prohibition of the trade in and use of dangerous drugs should only be ordered by the national authorities and not by international organs.

The provision of article 7, paragraph (a) of the Vienna Convention of 1971, which would prohibit all use of substances in Schedule I of that Convention (such as LSD or mescaline), except for scientific and very limited medical purposes, is also influenced by the ideas of those who consider international mandatory prohibitions or restrictions of the therapeutical use of very dangerous medicines to be useful.264

Sanctions

The sanction provisions of the First Draft of the Single Convention included the right of the International Drug Board 249 to require parties to discontinue the export to, or import from, an offending country or territory, of any or all controlled drugs. The Draft did not provide for the less severe measure of recommendation of such an embargo, but only for the imposition of obligatory embargo.265 The discontinuation of legal exports of drugs was an appropriate punitive measure capable of reducing the illicit traffic under the conditions as they existed in 1925, but not under present circumstances. Such a discontinuation might be a questionable measure because it might endanger the treatment of innocent sick people. The cessation of the import of drugs (and particularly the threat of such cessation) from an offending country or territory has retained some value as an enforcement measure, since it could cause economic disadvantages to a country or territory.266 However, it may cause considerable inconveniences to other countries which faithfully carry out their treaty obligations, but whose normal sources of drug supplies could be cut off by such a measure. These considerations may have to be taken into account in future revisions of the international narcotics regime and may lead to the adoption of provisions regarding sanctions which are more in accord with present conditions than the punitive cessation of the import or export of medicines.

As the first Draft, the Second and Third Draft of the Single Convention provided for a mandatory embargo of the import or export of drugs, but the latter two also contained provisions under which ithat embargo would not be obligatory, but would have the character of a recommendation.267 The Singgle Convention does not provide for a mandatory embargo. Its sanction provisions (article 14, paragraph 2) authorize the International Narcotics ControI Board only to recommend to parties that they top the import of controlled drugs, the export of such drugs, or both, from or to the offending country or territory.

The Protocol of 1972 would amend the Single Convention (article 14 bis) to authorize International Narcotics Control Board either in addition to, or as an alternative to, the recommendation of an embargo,268 to recommend, in agreement with the Government concerned, to the competent United Nations organs and to the specialized agencies, that technical or financial assistance, or both, be provided to the government in support of its efforts to carry out its treaty obligations. The authors of the Protocol obviously recognized that the threat and even the imposition of punitive measures might not help in improving the drug situation in countries, which are not fully capable of carrying out their treaty obligations without foreign assistance. However, even under the unamended text of the Single Convention the Board would be entitled to recommend, in agreement with the government concerned, the granting of assistance by international organizations or by other governments, either in addition to, or as alternative of, the enforcement measures provided for in article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2 269. The Board is not bound to take these measures, but is only entitled to adopt them.

As in the case of the 1925 Convention and of the 1953 Protocol, the applicability of the sanction pro-visions of the three drafts of the final text of the Single Convention to non-Parties may be noted. This applies also to most of the sanction provisions of the Vienna Convention of 1971 which are nearly the same as those of the Single Convention.270

Amendment of Estimates

One provision of the First Draft of the Single Convention requires particular mention not only because it was a subject of controversy in the preparatory work of the Single Convention but also because the introduction of a similar provision was proposed in the recent negotiations leading to the adoption of the Protocol of 1972, amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The First Draft would have authorized the International Drug Board 248 to amend, after consultation with the Government concerned, the estimates of drug requirements, furnished by that government.2" This Board would thus have had the final say on the quantities of drug supplies which a country would have been authorized to obtain.272 The authors of the Second Draft limited the right of the International Narcotics Control Board 273 to change the estimates without the consent of the government. The Second Draft would have established as a general rule that the Board could change the estimates only with the consent of the government;274 but it would still have authorized the Board to establish the estimates of any state 275 under the following condi-tions: The estimates furnished by the government would, in the opinion of the Board, have to be "unsatisfactory"; the Board would without undue delay have to request explanations from the state and, not having received the requested explanations after an appropriate interval, would have to reiterate its request. Only if the state concerned would fail to reply within a reasonable period to this second re-quest could the Board substitute its own estimates for the unsatisfactory estimates furnished by the government.276 The Third Draft 277 and final text 278 of the Single Convention merely authorize the International Narcotics Control Board to amend estimates only with the consent of the government which has furnished them. They do not provide for any exception from this requirement. They follow in this the precedents of the 1931 Convention 279 and of the 1953 Protoco1.280

At the Twenty-Fourth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, it was suggested to amend article 12, paragraph 5 in a way which would have authorized the International Narcotics Control Board to modify estimates without consent of the government.281 The Protocol of 1972 did not incorporate such an amendment of the Single Convention. Its revision of article 12, paragraph 5 would still maintain the requirement of the consent of the government to amendments of its estimates by the Board. The new version of this paragraph would add, however, that in case of a disagreement between the Board and a government concerning that government's estimates or supplementary estimates, the Board should have the right to establish, communicate and publish its own estimates, including supplementary estimates.282 It is suggested that the correct view would be that a country's legally binding limits of drug supplies (to be obtained by manufacture or import or both) would in such a case have to be calculated on the basis of the estimates of the government and not on the basis of those established by the Board without that government's consent.

A few of the views held by those who are opposed to conferring upon the International Narcotics Control Board the right to amend estimates without consent of the government and to determine, with binding effect, the quantities of narcotic drugs supplies which each of the nearly 190 countries and territories may annually obtain, are:

The conditions which determine the drug needs of different countries vary from country to country. This applies even to countries of similar economic and social conditions and of a similar level of health services. It is impossible even for a group of international experts to determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy the quantities of each drug which each of such numerous countries and territories need. Even an occasional under-estimation by the Board could lead to a shortage of medicines in a particular country or territory and, thus, endanger the proper treatment of sick people. Such a situation would undoubtedly discredit the international drug regime and create considerable doubts about the value of a control system, which may produce such a deplorable situation. Moreover, there is presently no significant diversion of manufactured drugs from legal trade into illicit channels nor is there any such diversion of opium once it has come into the possession of the national opium agency. An unilateral right of an international organ to limit further the quantities of drugs which may be legally produced, manufactured or imported could have no effect whatsoever on the diversion of opium by licensed cultivators, or contribute to the suppression of the uncontrolled or illicit production of opium. The value of estimates of production 283 is questionable even with opium be-cause it is hardly possible, by appropriate control arrangements, to assure 284 that actual production 285 is reasonably close to the estimate,s 286 in the majority of years. This is even truer in the case of the production of cannabis and coca leaves 287 which is hardly controlled anywhere as would be required under the Single Convention. It will be recalled, moreover, that the provisions of this Protocol, as well as those of the Single Convention, concerning the control of the production of opium contain an important weakness. 'The provisions of the Single Convention concerning the production of coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin are even more in-adequate. Anyway one can hardly see how binding production estimates of an international organ can substitute for measures intended to remove these weaknesses of control.

Single Organ and Single Secretariat

The First Draft of the Single Convention would not only have replaced the Permanent Central Board and Supervisory Body by a single organ, it would also have provided for a single secretariat 2", to be furnished by the Secretary General, to serve both the International Drug Commission 247 (the political organ) and the International Drug Board 249 (the independent, semi-judicial organ). Under the pro-visions of the drug treaties preceding the Single Con-vention, the Secretariat of the Permanent Central Board was appointed first by the Secretary General of the League of Nations and then by the Secretary General of the United Nations, following nomination by the Board and approval first by the League's Council and later by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.289 The Secretariat of the Supervisory Body was provided first by the Secretary General of the League of Nations and in the post-war period by the Secretary General of the United Nations 290. The secretariat services of the League's Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Dangerous Drugs were supplied by the League's Secretary General 291 and those of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs have been, and are being furnished, by the Secretary General of the United Nations.292 In 1946, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Permanent Central Board and Supervisory Body agreed 293 to establish a Joint Secretariat of this Board and the Supervisory Body to serve these two organs, until they were replaced in 1968 by the present International Narcotics Control Board.

The restrictions surrounding the secretariat of the Permanent Central Board, particularly that its secretariat members could be appointed only on the nomination of the Board, had reduced the importance of political influence and the relevance of geographic distribution in the selection of staff members. Moreover, there was no duplication 264 between the work of the Joint Secretariat of the Board and Supervisory Body and of the Division of Narcotic Drugs, serving inter alia the Commission on Narcotic Drug.295

The Second 266 and Third Drafts 267 of the Single Convention returned to the 1925 Convention's method of staff appointment for the independent (semi-judicial) control organ. Both would have provided that the secretary and staff of the International Narcotics Control Board should be appointed by the Secretary General on the nomination of the Board and subject to the approval of the Economic and Social Council.

Although the majority of the delegates was in favor of establishing a single secretariat for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board, the Plenipotentiary Conference provided in the Single Convention that the Secretary General should furnish the secretariat services of the Commission and the Board, thus leaving it up to him to make such arrangements as he considers appropriate.298 The secretariat services supplied by the Secretary General, however, must be in accord with the arrangements which the Economic and Social Council is required to make, in consultation with the Board, to assist the Board in carrying out its functions.299 Under the arrangements in force at the time of this writing,300 provision is made for a separate secretariat of the Board, which is an integral part of the Secretariat of the United Nations and under the full administrative control of the Secretary General. This secretariat, however, is bound to carry out the Board's decisions. Its chief is appointed or assigned by the Secretary General in consultation with the Board. Provision also is made for administrative measures to protect the confidential nature of the Board's correspondence and other papers. The need for such measures arises from provisions of the Single Convention.301

It is submitted that the Board needs a separate secretariat in order to carry out its functions free from the political pressures which contrary to the Charter of the United Nations 302 members of the United Nations Secretariat are sometimes subjected to by some governments.

The Protocol of 1972 would retain the provision of the Single Convention requiring the Secretary General of the United Nations to furnish the secretariat services of the Commission and the Boaret. However, it would add to that provision that in particular, the Secretary of the Board shall be appointed by the Secretary General in consultation with the Board." 303 'This addition implies the obligation of the Secretary General to maintain a separate secretariat of the Board.

Control of Poppy Straw

In the course preparing the Single Convention, very strict provisions were also proposed for the control of poppy straw.304 The Second Draft, which incorporated the provisions of the 1953 Protocol regarding the control of the cultivation of the poppy, opium production, trade in opium in producing countries, and the limitation of the international trade in opium to that produced in seven countries extended these provisions to poppy straw.305 The Third Draft did the same, adding Afghanistan to the list of privileged countries whose opium and poppy straw would be admitted to the international market.306 Moreover, it placed poppy straw in Schedule I, extending to it all control provisions ap-plicable to drugs, such as morphine.307 The Convention, however, did not take over the provisions of the Second and Third Draft concerning poppy straw.308 It provides only that the international trade in poppy straw shall be subject to the import certificate and export authorization system and that parties shall furnish quarterly statistics on the import and export of poppy straw and annual statistical figures on the amount of straw utilized for the manufacture of narcotic drugs.309 Parties are also required to prevent the accumulation of poppy straw in the possession of drug manufacturers, traders and distributors (including State enterprises engaged in such manufacture, trade or distribution), in excess of those quantities required for the normal conduct of business.310 The Convention also contains the very general provision that parties, which permit the cultivation of the poppy for purposes other than the production of opium, should take all measures necessary to assure that opium is not produced from such poppies and that the manufacture of drugs from poppy straw is adequately controlled.311

Some of the views of the opponents of strict control of poppy straw, which prevailed at the Pleni-potentiary Conference that adopted the Single Convention were:

The morphine content of different varieties of poppy straw differs; it is greater in the upper parts of the stem and capsules rather than in the lower parts. Notwithstanding the advanced methods of ex-tion now used by morphine manufacturers, the rage yield of morphine was 0.18 percent in 1970 and 0.20 percent in 1969 of the quantity of the straw used.312 It follows that an average quantity of 500 kilograms of poppy straw is required for the manufacture of one kilogram of morphine while 10 kilograms or even less of opium yield the same amount of morphine. Furthermore, relatively voluminous means of transportation and large storage facilities are needed for the straw. The process of manufacturing morphine from straw is difficult. A complicated and expensive apparatus, and access to water and energy is needed. The manufacture of one kilogram of morphine would require an apparatus including vessels with a total capacity of approximately 10,000 litres. A plant of the size needed for such an activity could hardly be hidden from the authorities 313 In fact, although the process of extracting morphine from poppy straw has been known since the 1920's, no clandestine manufacture of morphine from the straw has been discovered.

It may be mentioned in this connection that in 1970, 27.9 percent of the world's morphine was made from poppy straw, 5.5 percent from "concentrate of poppy straw" and 66.3 percent from opium.312 "Concentrate of poppy straw" is listed in Schedule I and thus subject to the same regime as morphine.

Control of Opium, Coca Leaves

The Second and Third Draft of the Single Convention applied the regime governing the cultivation of the poppy and production of opium to the cultivation of the coca bush and the production of coca leaves.314 The final text of the Single Convention does the same.315 It may be worthwhile mentioning that all three drafts and the final text of the Single Convention contain provision intended to ensure the right to use coca leaves for the preparation of a flavoring agent of beverages.316.

The Second Draft also provided for limiting the international trade in coca leaves and in crude cocaine to coca leaves produced and crude cocaine manufactured in any of those countries, which would be named in the Convention and which would become parties to the Convention. Crude cocaine made from leaves produced in one of the privileged countries would also have been admitted to the international market wherever it might have been manufactured.317 The Third Draft contained the same provision, naming Bolivia, Indonesia and Peru as the countries which would have been privileged by the Convention.318 The Single Convention does not con-tain the international trade restriction on coca leaves or crude cocaine, however, both drugs are subject to the import certificate and export authorization system.319

It may finally be noted that in the course of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Protocol of 1972 Peru proposed to amend the Single Convention for the purpose of requiring a party, which imports coca leaves for the preparation of a flavoring agent, to use alkaloids which it would extract from such leaves, only to meet its domestic requirements.320 The Protocol of 1972 does not contain any provision which would subject the international trade in coca leaves to restrictions other than those applicable to drugs in Schedule I of the Single Convention.

Provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

The purpose of the Single Convention is twofold:

• Limitation of all phrases of the narcotic drugs economy and of the use of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes.
• Limitation of the narcotics supplies of each country or territory and of the world as a whole to the quantities needed for medical and scientific purposes.

Limitation of Narcotic Drugs to Medical and Scientific Purposes

The relevant provision requiring this limitation is article 4 paragraph (c) which reads as follows:

"The Parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary•
(c) Subject to the provisions of this Conven-tion, to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, im-port, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs."

The exceptions referred to by the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Convention" are those of article 2, para. 9,321 of article 27322 and article 49. Article 49 permits those parties which make the required reservation to continue to allow, for definite periods of time, existing legal opium smoking, opium eating, coca leaf chewing and non-medical use of cannabis, cannabis resin and extracts and tinctures of cannabis, provided that the non-medical consump-tion concerned has been "traditional" in the territory in which it is permitted to continue. Article 49 does not free from the obligation to apply the controls required for production,'322 manufacture, international and domestic trade, other distribution and possession. After the expiration of the time limits foreseen in article 49, there will be no exception from the prohibition of the non-medical consumption of drugs covered by the Single Convention.323 The term "medical and scientific purposes" appears in the field of the multilateral narctorics treaties for the first time in the 1925 Convention.324

The phrase "medical purposes" has not been uniformly interpreted by governments when applying narcotics treaties. Some have prohibited the use of the controlled drugs by all addicts,325 making exceptions only when necessary to mitigate suffering during a withdrawal treatment. Some other countries have permitted consumption by addicts of minimum quantities of drugs required to prevent painful withdrawal symptoms and to enable them to lead a "normal" life. There have also been a few cases in which all consumption of narcotic drugs by addicts was interdicted even in the case of withdrawal treatment.326 These different interpretations by governments of the term "medical purposes" have also, continued under the regime of the Single Convention and no party has protested against the use of the controlled drugs for the purpose of maintenance programs such as in the United Kingdom, It must be concluded that governments have a very wide discretion in interpreting the term "medical purposes" in accordance with their own conditions.327

Moreover, the term "medical purposes" can not have exactly the same meaning at all times and under all circumstances. Its interpretation must also depend on the stage of medical science at the particular time in question. There may also be a legitimate difference of view among medical experts as to what is proper medical use in a particular case. It is suggested that the meaning of the phrase "medical purposes" must in all cases be determined by medical considerations, which include the desire to help the addicts or other abusers of controlled drugs.

The term "medical purposes" includes veterinary and dental purposes.328

The basic aim of the Vienna Convention is also to limit all phrases of the economic activities dealing with psychotropic substances and the use of such substances to medical and scientific purposes. The Convention would require each Party to limit, by such measures as it would consider appropriate, the manufacture, export, import, distribution and stocks of, trade in and use and possession of, substances in Schedules II, III and IV to medical and scientific purposes."9 It is submitted that the term "medical purposes" in the Vienna Convention has the same meaning in the Single Convention.

As regards substances in Schedule I, the Conven-tion would prohibit their use except for scientific and very limited medical purposes under very strict controls. It would also place the manufacture of, trade in, distribution, possession, export and import of these substances under a very severe regime.

Substances Subject to the Single Convention

•    Plants: the opium poppy for the production of opium, the coca bush grown for any purpose whatsoever and the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis or cannabis resin.330
•    Drugs: 331 substances which are included either in Schedule I or II as revised by operation of article 3 of Single Convention. All drugs in-cluded in Schedule IV, which may also be modified in accordance with the provisions of article 3, are also listed in Schedule I. Their inclusion in Schedule IV has only the effect that they are subject to. the controls of article 2, paragraph 5, in addition to all the controls which govern drugs in Schedule 1.332
•    Preparations: 333 mixtures containing a drug are generally subject to the same control measures as the drugs which they contain. They are normally exempted only from very few controls. Preparations, which are included in Schedule III as revised by the operation of article 3, are exempted from important control measures, such as the application of the import certificate and export authorization system.334

Mention may also be made of two general and vague provisions which relate to substances which do not fall under the narcotics regime established by the Single Convention.

Article 2, paragraph 8 requires parties to use their best endeavors to apply to substances which do not fall under the Single Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of supervision as may be practicable; and article 28, paragraph 3 which obligates parties to adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant. The authors of article 2, paragraph 8 thought of such substances as acetic anhydride, which is used in the conversion of morphine into heroin. It is also very widely used in the chemical industry for other legitimate purposes. Countries which do not have a chemical industry, but in whose territory the clandestine manufacture of heroin takes place, may find it practicable in implementation of article 2, paragraph 8, to prohibit the importation and possession of acetic anhydride.

The Vienna Convention contains a similar vague provision which is nearly literally the same. Article 2, paragraph 9 requires parties to use their best endeavors to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of psychotrophic substances, such measures of supervision as may be practicable.

Control of Plants

Opium Poppy.—The controls which are required by the Single Convention are similar to those of the 1953 Protocol.

Countries which have an effective administration and effectively control their national territory particularly the regions in which the poppy is cultivated.

The provisions of the Single Convention governing the cultivation of the opium poppy and the produc-tion of opium can have a beneficial effect only in such countries. But even these states cannot prevent the diversion by licensed cultivators of a part of the opium crop into the illicit traffic. The rate of such diversion in some countries has been estimated to be between 10 to 25 percent of the crop.335 Even in India, which is reputed to have a good system of con-trol of opium production, but which permits culti-vation by licensed individual farmers, there appears to be a significant diversion of legally produced opium into illicit channels. India reports to have seized from the illicit traffic 4270 kg. of opium in 1969 and 3338 kg. in 1970. The amount actually diverted was certainly a multiple of the seized quan-tities. It has been estimated that generally not more than five to 10 percent of drugs in the hands of illicit traffickers are seized by the authorities. Even the amount of opium diverted in India into the illicit market would suffice to manufacture all the heroin which the illicit traffickers need for the American market.

On the other hand, no diversion of opium from legal production appears to occur in countries, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria.336

It would be advisable, from the view point of control, to prohibit the cultivation by individual farmers of the poppy for opium production. It would also be useful if the Single Convention could be amended to introduce a provision which would re-quire governments to grant licenses to cultivate the opium poppy only to corporations, cooperatives or state farms. The corporations or co-operatives would have to be relatively large to prevent collusion. It is also probable that a provision limiting the right to produce opium to licensed state farms and co-operatives might have a greater chance of being generally accepted than one which would give this right to private corporations. As long as such an amendment is not adopted, it appears particularly important to rely on the provisions of Article 22 of the Single Convention which requires a party to prohibit the culti-vation of the poppy if, acting in good faith, it is of the opinion that such prohibition is the most suitable measure for protecting the public health and wel-fare and for preventing the diversion of significant amounts of opium into the illicit traffic. It would not matter if a party, not acting in good faith, would in such a case allege that, in its opinion, this prohibition was not the most suitable measure for the purposes in question. In requesting such a prohibition one must of course weigh the advantages to be obtained from preventing the diversion of opium against the possibility that such a measure may cause or increase a shortage of opium needed in other countries for medicinal purposes. An efficient administration, which is in effective control of the poppy growing region, can suppress the cultivation of the poppy as well as the production of opium, two activities which cannot be hidden from the authorities. At the same time, it cannot, prevent the diversion of opium which has been harvested by the individual farmer and whose exact amount very often cannot be known to the control officials.

Possible improvements of the treaty provisions regarding opium production are:
•    a world-wide prohibition of opium production, accompanied by a substitution of poppy straw for opium in the manufacture of morphine.
•    a world-wide prohibition of poppy cultivation and the replacement of the drugs obtained from opium by synthetic products.

There is not enough straw available for the manufacture of the required quantities of morphine, the largest amount of which is converted into codeine, a very useful and relatively non-dangerous drug. It also cannot be expected that the amount of straw needed for this purpose can be sufficiently increased. Moreover, such a world-wide prohibition of the pro-duction of opium would have no effect on the uncon-trolled or illicit production of opium which, as a long-range problem, is much more serious than the diversion of opium by licensed cultivators.

As regards the replacement of opium derivatives by synthetic substances, a recent Report of a World Health Organization Scientific Group, entitled "Opiates and their Alternatives for Pain and Cough Relief" reached the following conclusions:
•    Synthetic alternatives are available that are equivalent to and may, in some respects, be superior to the opiates for the relief of moderate to severe pain.
•    Synthetic alternates are available that may be equivalent, though none is clearly superior, to the opiates (codeine) for the relief of mild to moderate pain.
•    Synthetic alternates are available that can be and to some extent are being, used for the relief of cough, and on substantial evidence a few of them rate as equivalent to codeine in effective-ness. Lack of well-controlled clinical trials in most instances prevents a definitive judgement on their relative merits.

At the present stage of research the replacement of codeine by snythetic drugs would not yet be med-ically justified. Furthermore, a large part of the medical profession would be opposed to the dis-continuation of codeine in therapy. Codeine is the most important drug obtained from opium and the largest part of the legally produced opium is used for the manufacture of morphine which is converted into codeine.

The world-wide prohibition of the cultivation of the opium poppy will also have little, if any, effect on illicit and uncontrolled cultivation and it will be very difficult for political and economic reasons to carry out the prohibition in most of the regions in which ffiicit and uncontrolled cultivation takes place at present. Those countries which cultivate the poppy for its seeds, do not permit the production of opium, effectively prevent such production and, in fact, do not have any problem of illicit production of opium whatsoever would not accept a treaty provision requiring a world-wide prohibition of the cultivation of the opium poppy.

Countries which do not have an effective administrative system and in particular are not able to exercise full governmental control over their poppy growing regions

Some of these countries are Afghanistan, Laos, Thailand, Burma, some States to the North of the Indian-Pakistani Sub-Continent, such as Nepal, and Pakistan in the tribal borderland near the Khyber pass. The opium grown without legal control in these countries offers clandestine manufacturers many sub-stitute sources of opium supplies. The problem posed by this widespread uncontrolled or illicit opium pro-duction is also complicated by the fact that it generally takes place in regions which have an archaic political, economic and social structure and whose population often depends to a greater or larger extent on the sale of opium for their livelihood. Opium is frequently the only cash crop. Furthermore, these areas do not have the required skilled personnel capable of exercising effective administrative controls and their population generally lacks the understanding of the opium problem and as a result the willingness to co-operate in its solution. Not only a program of crop substitution or of replacement of opium production by other ways of earning a livelihood might be required in some of the regions con-concerned; but also radical modernization of their archaic political, economic and social structure in or-der to create the conditions which would make effective control possible. Otherwise, illicit production of opium might continue.                 

It is obvious that problems of this kind cannot be solved by treaty provisions nor by national laws con-trolling or prohibiting opium production. In fact, some of the countries from which large quantities of opium flow into the international illicit traffic are even parties to the Single Convention, namely Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan and Thailand. It is particularly gratifying that the problem of illicit opium is approached in some countries by measures of economic and social reforms rather than solely by legal and administrative steps. An example is the pilot project undertaken by the Thai Government, with the assistance of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

Efforts of individual countries, either by their own means or with the help of international organizations or friendly governments, to introduce the required economic and social reforms in areas in which iUicit or uncontrolled opium production occurs are certainly valuable and should be encouraged and strengthened; but it would be wrong to rely solely on the isolated efforts of individual countries. The suppression of illicit and uncontrolled production is an international problem not only because its solution is in the interest of the entire world; but also because such production takes place in a number of different countries, so that even if successful efforts in a particular country actually leads to its suppression of poppy cultivation, clandestine manufacturers will be able to obtain the opium which they need from other countries in which illicit or uncontrolled cultivation takes place.338

Not all districts in which illicit or uncontrolled production of opium occurs necessarily represent the same problems. In some, the issue may be only a legal and police matter, capable of being handled by improved laws and law enforcement; but in the majority, attempts to enforce a prohibition of poppy cultivation may lead to violent resistance and diffi-cult political problems.       

Even where basic reforms of political, economic and social conditions are required to establish an effective government administration to enforce con-trol measures and to obtain the needed willing co-operation of a large part of the local population, circumstances vary from country to country; so must the methods employed.

The past Permanent Central Board suggested that a world plan be adopted for the economic and social modernization of these areas.339 If it is accepted that such a world wide approach would be needed and worth the great efforts required, it would be necessary to create an international diplomatic atmosphere in which the opium problem would be accepted by the family of nations as a whole. Any observer at inter-national Conferences on drug problems realizes that many countries were not interested in the opium issue and did not show a willingness to co-operate in its solution. In view of the recent spread of large scale addiction to many countries, which did not believe they had such a problem, the creation of the appropriate international atmosphere may be easier today than yesterday. A major diplomatic effort would be useful. All means should be used to arouse na-tional and international opinion in favor of a radical world-wide approach towards the opium problem.

In preparing the proposed world plan, the following measures would be useful. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs should first request the Secretariat of the United Nations to indicate and to describe all locations of illicit or uncontrolled opium production. The Laboratory of the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations Secretariat has a very extensive knowledge of these locations. All governments should be asked whether they have areas in which illicit or non-controlled production of opium exists..

Each country which would be found to have illicit or uncontrolled opium production should be invited by the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly to prepare a detailed plan of action for the suppression of this production. The government should be requested to include in its plan all meas-ures, including necessary economic and social ones, and state which measures it could carry out by its own unaided efforts and for which foreign assistance would be needed and requested. The governments should be advised that they could obtain the services of experts for the preparation of these plans. Such services, if requested, should be furnished by the United Nations Development Program and the Technical Cooperation Departments of the United Nations. These organizations should be invited by the Eco-nomic and Social Council or the General Assembly to render this aid in preparing the national plans. An expert body should be appointed by the Council or the General Assembly or the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program to analyse individual national plans in the light of the programs of other countries. This body should have the right to propose modifications of the plans and to recommend a consolidated plan on a world scale.

A world opium conference of all states and of all international organizations should be called by the Economic and Social Council or the General As-sembly for the adoption of such a plan, determining which of the proposed national measures would re-quire international aid. Each Government and organ-ization participating in the Conference should pledge their financial and other assistance.

The conference would focus the world's attention on the opium question as an important international problem. The international narcotics control organs would be encouraged to take more courageous and forceful action than they could otherwise do in this world of sovereign, nationalistic states. The willing-ness of states to act must be strengthened. While foreign aid is essential for the solution of the world's opium problem, continuous pressure must be brought to bear on the governments to act.

The Coca Bush.—Coca leaves are used for three purposes:
•    chewing which is considered to be an abuse of the drug and which were tolerated under the terms of article 49 of the Single Convention must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of that Convention.34°
•    the preparation of a flavoring agent.341
•    the manufacture of cocaine.

According to the statistical figures reported to the International Narcotics Control Board, the world's total production of coca leaves was more than 14,000 metric tons in 1969 and more than 13,000 metric tons in 1970. Real production was undoubtedly much greater. The greatest part of this production is used for chewing. The amount needed for the manufacture of cocaine, whose medical use has become very limited, is very small. The world's total manufacture of cocaine was 1241 kilograms in 1969 and 1939 kilograms in 1970.342 In 1970, only 353 metric tons of coca leaves were used to manufacture cocaine and to make flavoring agents.343

The cultivation of the coca bush and the product. ion of coca leaves are not effectively controlled any-where. Clandestine manufacturers of cocaine have no difficulty in obtaining coca leaves. Cultivation and production are not subjected to the full regime re-quired by article 26 of the Single Convention. This treaty stipulates that the rules applicable to the culti-vation of the opium poppy and production of opium should also be applied to the cultivation of the coca bush and to the production of coca leaves. However, the opium regime is inadequate for the control of the cultivation of the coca bush which grows and is cultivated under conditions which are very different from those of the poppy. In fact, neither the Commis-sion on Narcotic Drugs nor the Plenipotentiary Con-ference devoted any real efforts to finding control measures which would be suitable for the coca bush.'344

The present writer has no expert knowledge of the differences between the botanical properties and agricultural conditions of the coca bush and of the poppy; but such differences must be considered in developing adequate control schemes. The poppy is an annual plant 345 while the coca bush has an average life time of fifteen to twenty years. The opium is collected by incising the capsules of the poppies while still standing in the field while the leaves of the coca bush are picked individually by hand. The coca bush yields normally three or four crops each year. The size of these crops fluctuate greatly,346 but so does that of the opium harvest, although the reasons appear to be different in the case of the two plants. A considerable quantity of coca bushes appears to grow wild.347

A number of delegates to the Plenipotentiary Con-ference which adopted the Single Convention was well aware of the fact that the poppy regime was not suitable for the coca bush. The United States repre-sentative pointed out this weakness of the Third Draft 348 which provided for the application of the provisions controlling the poppy to the coca bush. The United States proposed an amendment 349 which would have required the parties to control the culti-vation of the coca bush and the production of coca leaves exclusively for medical, scientific and other legitimate 35° purposes. The amendment also stipu-lated that the General Assembly, after consultation with Bolivia, Columbia, Indonesia and Peru, may adopt control regulations. These regulations should be binding upon each party which would not reject them by a notification to the Secretary General within a year from the date of their adoption by the General Assembly. The American amendment was adopted by the Ad hoc Committee charged with elaborating the regime of the coca bush.3" The Plenary rejected the proposed revision of the coca bush,352 with the final result that the Single Convention applies the same regime to the bush as it applies to the poppy.

In order to amend the regime provided by the Single Convention for the control of the coca bush and the production of coca leaves, it would be neces-sary to obtain the agreement of those countries who would be affected by the amended rules of control. The United States should initiate the required nego-tiations with those countries. Such rules as would be accepted by these countries would most probably be adopted by the Economic and Social Council in accordance with article 47, paragraph 1, sub-para-graph (b) of the gingle Convention. It is expected that no party would reject such an amendment. The amendment would thus come into force without the need for a new Plenipotentiary Conference. Adoption by this procedure would also have the additional advantage of being binding upon all parties to the Single Convention, while an amendment by a treaty (Protocol) adopted by a new diplomatic conference would bind only those parties to the Single Conven-tion which accept it.

Effective control of the cultivation of the coca bush and of the production of the coca leaves would also require the suppression of coca leaf chewing. This suppression, obligatory under the terms of the Single Convention (article 49, paragraph 2 (e) can be accomplished only by long overdue economic and social reforms in the Andean region of South Amer-ica. Bolivia, contrary to Peru, is not even a party to the Single Convention and has been particularly reluctant to take measures necessary to abolish coca leaf chewing and to replace the coca bush by other crops. In two written agreements with the past Permanent Central Board, Bolivia has inter alio ex-pressly undertaken to carry out a gradual suppression of coca leaf chewing and of the cultivation of the coca bush.353

After suppression of coca leaf chewing, only a very tiny fraction of the present coca leaf production will be required for medical purposes (cocaine) and for the preparation of a widely used flavoring agent. In view of the small quantities involved, which would be of little monetary value, it may be possible to obtain agreement that each coca leaf producing country should establish a state enterprise which would have a monopoly of the cultivation of the coca bush and of the harvesting of, and all trade in the leaves. Each country could also be authorized to grant this monopoly to a single cooperative or cor-poration working under close state supervision. That country should moreover be required to abolish all coca bush cultivation and coca leaf trade not con-ducted by the monopoly. Since it would be impossible to prevent diversion by licensed individual farmers of a part of their coca leaf crop, cultivation by them should be prohibited under the proposed monopoly regime. Furthermore, economic and social reforms would have to be adopted to carry out a program of abolishing coca leaf chewing and of reducing coca leaf production to the small quantities which would still be needed for medical and aromatic purposes. Extensive foreign aid, although not on the scale of that needed for the world-wide suppression of uncon-trolled or illicit opium production, would also be needed. The reforms might have to include crop sub-stitution and the creation of other livelihoods to replace coca bush cultivation; development of com-munity services, educational measures including nutri-tional education; and some transfer of population. Foreign aid should ais'.) be made available for the preparation of the required national plans or for the modification of already existing programs.

The administrative services of the governments which control the coca leaf producing areas are much more advanced than those of some governments which are the nominal sovereigns of territories in which uncontrolled or illicit opium production occurs. The coca leaf problem also has much smaller geo-graphic dimensions than the opium problem. Viewing the matter from a world-wide angle, the coca leaf question is certainly much less important than the opium question. This is not meant to suggest that the solution of the coca leaf problem should be delayed; but the international action required for this purpose should not divert our attention from the need of devoting the main efforts of the family of nations to the solution of the much more important opium problem.

The Cannabis Plant.—The control of the production of cannabis and cannabis resin offers great difficulties because many varieties of the cannabis plant grow in numerous countries. There is wide-spread wild growth in many parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mexico, many African countries and some districts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Cannabis and cannabis resin are also distributed by illicit traffickers in much greater quantities and in many more countries than any other drug. According to the statistical data published by the International Narcotics Control Board, only five of 63 countries and territories, which furnished figures on seizures of drugs, did not report cannabis seizures in 1970. The total amount of cannabis seized in 1970 was more than 340 metric tons. In addition, more than 2300 metric tons of cannabis plant material were seized in South Africa.354 A large part of the cannabis drubs in the illicit traffic is obtained from illegal cultivation; but much comes from wild growth. The role of uncontrolled culti-vation in some countries also plays an important part in the illicit supply.

It appears that the potency of drugs obtained from different varieties of the plant varies. The tops of the female plants, especially of those which have not been fertilized, are particularly rich in the potent resin. The potency of the drug is also said to depend on the climatic conditions of the location in which the plant is grown.

The Board's Statistical Report indicates only two countries as having produced cannabis in recent years: India and Pakistan; but there are certainly a few more countries, such as Nepal, which permitted or at least tolerated the production of this drug.

- Varieties of the cannabis plant are also grown for their fiber and oil seeds. The governments concerned have generally found it to be superfluous to apply Control measures to this kind of cultivation. How widespread is the cultivation of the plant for its fiber can be seen from the statistical data published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations."' According to this information, a number of European countries grew the plant on 94,000 hectares yielding 82,800 metric tons of fiber in 1970; India used 165,000 hectares with an estimated yield of 75,000 metric tons of fiber. The World's total area in which cannabis was grown for fiber was 626,000 hectares with a yield of 298,100 metric tons of fiber. l'he United States of America which grew the plant tfor the fiber on a very small area from 1948 to 1952, has since then entirely discontinued the legal cultivation of the cannabis plant.

The Plenipotentiary Conference opined that the cu8ltivation of the cannabis plant for its fiber and seeds alone did not represent any significant risk of becoming a source of itlicit supplies of cannabis drugs. Therefore, it included in the Single Convention a vision that this Convention should not apply to cultivation of the cannabis plant grown exclusively for industrial purposes (fiber and seed) or horticultural purposes.356

VVhether illicit traffickers would try to obtain cannabis drugs from plants, which are grown for such purposes and which very often can yield only very weak drugs, assuming effective controls would make it impossible for them to acquire their supplies from plants yielding more potent cannabis and ampler amounts of the resin, is difficult to determine. An investigation undertaken in the United States in 1937 357 came to the conclusion that only the pith, lower stalks and roots of the plant fail to contain the active ingredient during the growth of the plant. It was also concluded that the active ingredient disap-pears from the upper stalks after the fruits are mature, and that the seeds do not contain it at all or only minor quantities so as to exclude the possibility of misuse. Whether or not these results were born out by later research, it cannot be excluded that illicit traffickers could obtain some cannabis drugs from plants grown for their fiber and seeds.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs in the 1950's considered two possibilities for solving abuse of can-nabis plants grown for industrial purposes:358 breeding a drug-poor or drug-free strain of the cannabis plant, or replacement by other fiber yielding plants. While such breeding was possible, it was too costly and replacement by other plants was not justified by the risk of diversion of drugs from cannabis plants grown for industrial purposes, under the conditions as they existed in the 1950's.333

Some of the difficulties in the way of an effective control of production of cannabis and cannabis resin are: widespread wild growth of plants capable of yielding potent drugs; illicit or uncontrolled culti-vation of the cannabis plant for the drugs in some countries in which the illicit traffic originates, and toleration of the production of cannabis drugs even by some countries which have laws prohibiting such production or the cultivation.

While opium must be collected by incision of the capsules while the poppies are still standing in the field and therefore cannot be concealed from neigh-bors and authorities, substances can be obtained from the cannabis plant after its harvesting for the fiber and its seeds, that is, after removal of the plant from the field.'360 The production of drugs from can-nabis plants grown for industrial purposes can be hidden with relative ease. Countries which have an effective administration are capable of making opium production from poppies grown for the seeds impos-sible, but would not be able to prevent some pro-duction of cannabis drugs from plants grown for industrial purposes. While uncontrolled cultivation of the poppy for the seeds in such countries is there-fore compatible with an effective international poppy regime, it appears that uncontrolled cultivation of cannabis plants for industrial purposes would become a source of the illicit traffic in cannabis and cannabis resin as soon as better sources are taken away from the traffickers by effective international control measures.

The Single Convention applies to the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis or cannabis resin and to such production, the same regime as it provides for the poppy. This poppy regime is even more inadequate for the cannabis plant than it is for the coca bush. If the cannabis plant grown for the production of the drugs were controlled only by the provisions prescribed by the Single Convention, it would hardly be possible to prevent large diversions by the licensed individual cultivators. Moreover the regime of the Single Con-vention could have no effect on obtaining cannabis drugs from plants grown for industrial purposes, which the Convention expressly excludes from its controls.

It would be unduly optimistic to assume that in the foreseeable future the illicit traffic will be suppressed by a universally accepted and applied international regime. In the immediate future, countries will have to rely on domestic enforcement measures and on inducing other countries, which are the source of cannabis drugs, to prohibit the cultivation of any variety of cannabis for any purpose, to enforce energetically such a prohibition, to improve their enforcement services and to co-operate closely with other nation's authorities. Where the prohibition of cannabis cultivation would require economic meas-ures or the improvement of local enforcement ser-vices, foreign aid on a bilateral or multilateral basis should be favored.

More effective treaty provisions might include an international regime which would cover the cultivation of all cannabis plants for whatever purposes.'" The cultivation of cannabis plants by individual farmers should not be permitted. Governments which would permit the cultivation of the cannabis plant 362 for any purpose would have to establish a monopoly of such cultivation, of the production, if any, of can-nabis drugs and of the trade in all parts of the plant. Such a monopoly should be entrusted to a state enterprise, a cooperative or a corporation.

Some significant production of cannabis and Cannabis resin would have to be continued as long as the non-medical use of these drugs 363 is permitted under the transitional provisions of article 49 of the Single Convention.'" In 1970 more than 94 metric tons of cannabis were still used in India for non-medical purposes and in 1969 more than 12 metric tons were so used in Pakistan under these provisions of the Single Convention. Even after expiration of the period during which countries may permit the non-medical use of cannabis drugs, some production will have to be carried on. In the years 1966 to 1970, 17 countries have used quantities of cannabis of one kilogram or more for medical purposes or research. In 1970, 1,639 kilograms were employed for these needs, 1,521 kilograms in India alone. While the World Health Organization has found that the use of cannabis is obsolete for therapeutic purposes, the value of cannabis drugs still is recognized in the indigenous (Unani, Tibbi and Ayurvedic) systems of medicine on the Indian-Pakistani subcontinent. Fur-thermore, it may be that therapeutic uses for cannabis will be discovered in the future.

Even the adoption of such a radical international regime, for the control of the cannabis plant and for the production of cannabis and cannabis resin would not be sufficient for the suppression of the illicit traffic in cannabis. It would have to be supported by very extensive measures of foreign aid to enable some governments to implement such treaty provisions. Considerable political pressure would also be re-quired to induce a number of reluctant governments to accept and implement such a far-reaching regime. But it seems to be superfluous to discuss these supportive measures, since it cannot be expected that -the suggested control measures have a chance of being generally accepted in the foreseeable future.

International juridical aspects of legalization of the non-medical use of cannabis and cannabis resin.

It must be emphasized that such legalization is not advocated. Moreover, the admission of the use of dangerous substances depends on a number of considerations, which are outside the scope of this paper, 'eluding medical (research on the deg,ree of harm-fulness); political (acceptance by the population) ; administrative (possibilities of enforcement) ; social (effects on society of enforcement of laws opposed by a large part of the population) ; and philosophical (how far society should limit the freedom of individuals to harm themselves) factors. The fact that a prohibited substance is less harmful than substances whose consumption is legal is not a valid argument. A number of considerations may make it advisable , to outlaw the use of a less harmful drug while auth-orizing the non-medical consumption of more harm-ful ones. Equality of treatment of chemical substances is not required.

The non-medical use of cannabis and cannabis resin and of extracts and tinctures of cannabis is not kvermitted under the Single Convention, except under ,article 49, which does not apply to the United States. fteveral legal considerations which may have a bearing on this issue are:

•    Deletion of cannabis and cannabis resin from Schedules I and IV and their inclusion in one of the Schedules of the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs. This could be accomplished by decisions of the Commission under article 3 of the Single Convention and under article 2 of the Vienna Convention. This would have no effect on the prohibition of the non-medical use of the cannabis drugs and on the requirement of a medical prescription for their acquisition by individuals.386 It is also doubtful whether these drugs could be included in Schedules of the Vienna Convention because in view of article 28 of - the Single Convention, concerning the control of the cannabis plant grown for their production and concerning the control of such production, they might be considered to be already "under international control" and only substances "not yet under international control" can be included in these Schedules.366
•    Deletion of cannabis and cannabis resin from the schedules of the Single Convention without including them in a schedule of the Vienna Convention. This would appear to free these substances from all provisions concerning control of drugs and to auth-orize their sale and use for non-medical purposes. The provisions of article 28, paragraph 1 concerning the control of the production of cannabis and can-nabis resin, of article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (t), including in the definition of "production" the separation of cannabis and cannabis resin from the cannabis plant, and of article 4, paragraph (c), re-quiring parties to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production of "drugs", would remain in force.367 But since cannabis and cannabis resin would no longer be listed in any of the Schedules of the Single Convention, they would no longer be drugs in the meaning of the Single Convention.368 Thus their production would not be limited to medical and scientific purposes. A somewhat anomalous legal situation would be created. Production of cannabis and cannabis resin would continue to be controlled by the same strict regime as the production of opium, but would be authorized for any purpose. Anyway, the non-medical use of cannabis and cannabis resin would be legalized.
•    Amendment of the Single Convention to legalize the non-medical use of cannabis and cannabis resin and avoid the anomaly of strict control of its pro-duction.3" An amendment by a new treaty (Proto-col), however, could free cannabis producing coun-tries from their obligation to apply the strict control measures of the Single Convention, but only with regard to those parties which would accept the new treaty. The cannabis producing countries would re-main bound to apply the present regime until all parties to the unamended text would have accepted the amendment.

An amendment, by the simplified procedure of article 47, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) and para-graph 2 of the Single Convention, would only enter into force if no party objects within the eighteen months mentioned in paragraph 2. It can hardly be expected that some countries would not make such an objection, since it cannot be assumed that an American decision to legalize the non-medical use of cannabis would cause all other parties to come to the same conclusion. Those that wish to continue the prohibition of non-medical use of cannabis certainly would desire that the international cannabis produc-tion regime remains in force.

A removal of cannabis, by treaty amendment, from the schedules of the Single Convention would, lead to the same difficulties; but this would not be necessary since it could be accomplished by the operation of article 3 of the Single Convention.

•    Transferral to Schedule II of cannabis and can-nabis resin from Schedule I and IV and extracts and tinctures of cannabis from Schedule I. This would have the effect of permitting these drugs to be sold by licensed retailers (druggists) without medical pre-scription.3" This would have the effect of permitting non-medical use of cannabis drugs. Such a transfer, if done for the purpose of facilitating the non-medical consumption of cannabis, would be a violation of the provisions of the Single Convention, which requires parties to limit the use of all drugs, including those in Schedule II, to medical and scientific purposes.37' This transfer could be accomplished by a decision of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs acting on the recommendation of the World Health Organization under article 3 of the Single Convention. It would be a subterfuge, however.

•    Denunciation of the Single Convention,372 which has been suggested by an advocate of the legalization of cannabis.373 Such a denunciation would make it possible for the United States to carry out such a legislation because no preceding treaty prohibits the non-medical use of cannabis or cannabis resin.374 But cannabis drugs could be deleted from the schedules of the Single Convention and included in a schedule of the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs. If the United States becomes a party to that Convention and it enters into force, we would still be bound to prohibit the non-medical consumption of cannabis drugs.'375

Moreover, an American denunciation of the Single Convention would have very undesirable conse-quences. It would deprive this treaty of much of its strength. Furthermore, if the American example would be followed by many other countries—as it probably would—it could reduce the number of parties to less than forty and, as a consequence, the Single Convention would cease to exist.3" This would deprive the international society of the advantages brought about by this treaty. There would be no international control of the cultivation of the coca bush. International control of opium production would, have to reply on the 1953 Protocol, which is unacceptable to many states and which could remain in force only if three of the following four states continued to adhere to it: Greece, India, Iran and Turkey.377

Finally, a denunciation of the Single Convention would not be necessary for legalization would be possible by the operation of article 3 of the Single Convention.

The leaves of the cannabis plant

The leaves of the cannabis plant, when not accom-panied by the tops of the plant, are not "cannabis" in the sense of the Single Convention,373 and, there-fore, are not "drugs" whose use is limited to medical and scientific purposes.'" Such leaves are therefore not subject to the narcotics regime. Only a single provision of the Single Convention applies to them. This requires that parties adopt measures necessary to prevent the misuse of, and "illicit traffic" in, the le ayes .380

Parties may permit the non-medical use of the leaves while preventing their misuse. This may in-volve an obligation to prevent the consumption of very potent leaves, or to prohibit the sale of excessive quantities of them. Prohibition of sale to persons below a certain age also may be required. These are only examples of what parties may have to do under the very vague prbvision of the Convention concern-ing the leaves. In order to prevent the "illicit traffic" in the leaves, governments may be required to limit the trade in the leaves to businesses licensed to engage in this activity or to authorize state enter-wises. Export of the leaves without governmental authorization may also have to be prohibited. Gen-erally speaking, such control laws as are enacted in many countries to prevent excessive consumption of, and illegal trade in, alcohol may be sufficient to implement the obligation of parties to the Single Convention regarding the leaves of the cannabis plant. These are merely considerations regarding the legal aspects of the use of cannabis leaves under the Single Convention and should not be considered to imply any proposal to legalize their non-medical use.

Control of Drugs

The Single Convention applies its provisions re-garding drugs not only to manufactured drugs (in-cluding extracts and tinctures of cannabis), but also to drugs which are agricultural products (all kinds of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin) and to the preparations of the drugs. All drugs are listed either in Schedule I or II, the latter being exempted from a few measures of control. Preparations are, with minor modifications, subject to the same control as the drugs which they contain, except if they are in Schedule III in which case they are exempted from some important control provisions. Drugs in Schedule I which are also included in Schedule IV are also subject to article 2, paragraph 5, in addition to all control measures governing drugs in Schedule I."'

The control system governing "narcotic" drugs may be summarized under the following headings:

•    System of authorizations (drug businesses, establishments and premises, permits, import certificate and export authorization system, pro-hibitions and restrictions of export and import, possession of narcotic drugs, and consumption of narcotic drugs).
•    Record keeping and Reporting to and Control by domestic authorities.
•    Organs of Domestic Control ("Special Adminis-tration").
•    Penal laws to be applied to violations of laws enacted to implement the Single Convention.
•    Limitation of narcotics supplies.
•    Reports to international control organs.
•    Changes in the Schedules of the Single Con-vention.
•    The Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
•    The International Narcotics Control Board.

The System of Authorizations.—There are two kinds of licenses: those authorizing the participation in a particular phase of the drug economy and those authorizing the use of establishments and premises. The notion of license requires the exercise of dis-cretion by the authorities to grant or refuse the license. It is submitted that for a person, who has certain educational qualifications, to have a right to obtain a license to engage in a particular phase of the drug economy would be incompatible with the provisions of the Single Convention regarding licensing of production,382 manufacture and trade.

Licensing of drug businesses

The system of licensing of drug businesses is in-tended to enable the national authorities inter alio:

•    to assure high technical and moral standards of the leadership of drug enterprises."3
•    to restrict the number of drug enterprises to facilitate control.
•    to prescribe in the license such conditions as the authorities may find necessary or useful regarding the quantities to be manufactured or to be held in stock, the kind of records to be maintained or other details of business manage-ment or control.
•    to make possible, by the revocation of the licenses, the elimination of drug businesses when required for the purposes of effective contro1.384
•    Each manufacturer 38' of, trader "5 in or distri-butor 385 of drugs requires a license.388 In contradis-tinction to the preceding drug treaties, the licensing requirement of the Single Convention applies also to the retail trade in drugs in Schedule II and to the trade in preparations in Schedule III. Under the earlier treaties the retail trade in drugs in Group III, corresponding to the drugs now in Schedule II such as codeine, and any trade in "preparations for the export of which export authorizations are not required," preparations corresponding to those now in Schedule 111,387 could be carried on without license.

This licensing requirement does not apply to state enterprises.388 This does not mean that any state enterprise can engage freely in any drug business activity it wishes. Only those State enterprises, which are charged by their government, may engage in the drug business.

The licensing requirement for drug businesses applies also to preparations.388 A license to carry on a retail trade in drugs also authorizes the licensee to compound ("manufacture") preparations for sale to individuals.

While it is useful, from the view point of narcotics control, to reduce the number of all businesses en-gaged in the narcotics trade, it is essential to limit the number of manufacturers of basic drugs and of im-porters of drugs and preparations to a small number, which would still be compatible with competition and with maintaining favorable conditions for research. The need for a restrictive system is conditioned by the requirement of limiting the narcotics supplies through the manufacturing and import quota system of the Single Convention.3"

The need for restricting the number of manufac-turers of basic drugs was also recognized by the League's Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, by the Council of the League and by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.'"

It is particularly important that countries, which are not capable of exercising effective control, should not issue licenses for the manufacture of basic drugs and their sales. The League's Advisory Committee was particularly concerned about this danger."' The national sensitivity of countries, which have a defi-cient administration, must be realized. The situation is very different from that in the 1930's when the Advisory Committee expressed its concern. Never-theless, everything must be done to induce govern-ments not to issue drug manufacturing licenses, in order to prevent a return to the conditions of the late 1920's and early 1930's when licensed drug manufacturers sold hundreds and even thousands of kilograms of morphine and heroin on the illicit market.'" In the future, it may be possible to obtain general acceptance of a treaty provision by which governments would undertake to prohibit the manu-facture of narcotic drugs if the conditions prevailing in their territory would render such action the most suitable measure, in their opinion, for preventing the diversion of drugs into the illicit traffic. Such a pro-vision would be patterned after article 22 of the Single Convention regarding the prohibition of the cultivation of the opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant. It would offer a diplomatic instrumen-tality to induce countries not to engage in drug manufacture. While there is now no significant diver-sion of manufactured narcotic drugs into the illicit traffic,383 this provision would be helpful in meeting future dangers.

The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Sub-stances would also require a license "or other similar control measure" for engaging in any phase of the economy of such substances; 394 with regards to sub-stances in Schedule I such as LSD or mescaline, "a special license" or special "prior authorization" would be prescribed.'" This Convention does not control the cultivation of plants from which psycho-tropic substances can be obtained. The separation of such substances from the plants from which they are obtained would be "manufacture" (Article 1, para-graph (i) ) and would be subject to the controls of the Convention. The Convention does not employ the term "production."

Licensing of Establishments and Premises

The term "establishment" as is used in articles 29 and 30 of the Single Convention means any place of the drug business concerned with fixtures and or-ganized staff. A drug business may have one or more "establishments." "Premises" are whole buildings or parts of buildings used for the drug business.

The Single Convention requires Parties to "control under license" the establishment and premises in . which manufacture of narcotic drugs or their prepara-tions may take place or in which the trade in or dis-' tribution of, such drugs may be carried on. This re-quirement does not apply to places of trade in preparations nor to places of retail trade in which ; preparations are compounded ("manufactured") for sale to individuals.396

This license requirement also applies to state en-terprises. It is primarily intended to assure that the establishments and premises in which the manufac-ture or trade takes place should facilitate control and prevent theft or other types of diversion.

The narcotics regime preceding the Single Convention prescribed the licensing of "establishments and premises" that manufactured397 drugs, not those dealing with preparations.398

The requirement of licensing trade and distribution, and establishments and premises in which trade ' or distribution takes place, does not apply to "per-sons duly authorized to perform and while perform-ing therapeutic or scientific functions".399

With regards to psychotropic substances in Schedule II, III and IV, the Vienna Convention would stipulate that the parties should control under license or other similar control measures the establishments and premises in which the manufacture of, trade in or distribution of these substances or their preparations would take place. The parties would also be expressly required to provide that security measures ,-be provided for such establishments and premises to prevent theft or other types of diversion."° With regard to substances in Schedule I, the Vienna Convention would prohibit their use, except for scientific and very limited medical purposes by duly author-ized persons, in medical or scientific establishments which are directly under the control of their govern-ments or specifically approved by them."' Parties would have to require that manufacture of, trade in, and distribution and possession of psychotropic sub-stances in Schedule I should be under a specia/ license or prior authorization.'" and to provide _for close supervision of these activities and for limited use of these substances."3 These strict control provisions imply that parties would also have to require that establishments and premises, in which the manu-facture of, trade in or distribution of substances in Schedule I would take place, to maintain strict con-trols, similar to those applicable to substances in other Schedules.

Permits (Quotas)

Under the Single Convention, parties must require that licensed manufacturers of drugs obtain periodical permits specifying the kinds and amounts of drugs which they shall be entitled to manufacture. This requirement need not apply to preparations."4 Manufacturing quotas are such permits."' Since the supply limits are calculated on an annual basis, these "periodic" permits should be granted at least an-nually. Countries which import drugs might apply such a system of permits to importers, although this is not expressly required by the Single Convention. This would be one of the ways to assure that limits of the drug supplies would not be exceeded.4°5 They could also achieve this objective by proper adminis-tration of the import certificate and export authoriza-tion system.4°6

The Vienna Convention, contrary to the Single Convention, would not require permits. The reason is that this treaty does not have a system of limiting the supplies of psychotropic substances to certain quantities to be computed in accordance with rules which it would prescribe, while the narcotics regime does.407

The Import Certificate and Export Authorization System 406

The basic features of this system are: each import (or export) whether it consists of one or more drugs requires a separate authorization by the government of the importing (or exporting) country. No export may be authorized unless previously permitted by the government of the importing country or terri-tory. This permission must be proven by the ex-porter by producing to the authorities of the expOrt-ing country a copy of the import authorization or "import certificate", in which the government of the importing country certifies that it has approved the import concerned. By a system of communications, it is assured that the governments of the importing country and the exporting country are informed of the quantities of drugs which were shipped and ac-tually arrived at their destination. This information is given on copies of the export authorizations which are sent by the government of the exporter to the government of the importer and returned by the lat-ter government to the former with an endorsement indicating the required information. Moreover, W copy of the export authorization must accompany each consignment.

Each authorization must also give the data in-dicating the drugs, their amounts, importer and the exporter.

The import certificate and export authorization system of the Single Convention applies to all narcotic drugs and their preparations except those included in Schedule III. This follows the narcotics regime which preceded the Single Convention and which exempted preparations referred to as "preparations for the export of which export authoriza-tions are not required" or "exempted preparations", a group of preparations 408 which corresponds to the category of preparations presently included in Schedule III.

The Vienna Convention would apply to Schedule I and II psychotropic substances an import certificate and export authorization system similar to the Single Convention's. It would be expressly required that the non-proprietary name or, lacking such a name, the designation of the substance concerned in the Schedule should be given. An indication of the phar-maceutical form of the substances to the consigned would also have to be shown and, if the substance to be shipped would be in the form of a preparation, the name of the preparation would also have to be furnished.409

International shipments of substances in Schedule I would be subject to additional control measures. Their export or import would be prohibited except when both the exporter and importer would be the competent authorities or agencies of the exporting and importing country or region,4" respectively, or other persons or enterprises which would be spe-cifically authorized by the competent authorities of their country or region.

International shipments of substances in Schedule II would also be subject to additional controls, name-ly to a system of "prohibition and restrictions."

Individual exports and imports of psychotropic substances in Schedule III would not require a gov-ernmental authorization. The exporter, however, would be bound to draw up a declaration in tripli-cate giving information identifying the consignment, the exporter and the importer. The exporter would have to furnish two copies of this declaration to the competent authorities of his country or region and would have to attach the third copy to the consignment. The government of the exporter would have to send, by registered mail with return of receipt re-quested, a copy of the declaration to the competent authorities of the importing country or region. It would also be stipulated that the parties "may" re-quire that on receipt of the consignment, the importer should transmit to the competent authorities of his country or region the copy of the declaration which accompanied the shipment, with an endorsement stating the quantities received.411

It is obvious that this system, which appears to have been drawn up to impose no obligatory administrative burdens on the authorities of the importing countries, might rather often have the result that the authorities of the exporting country would not know whether the shipment arrived at its destina-tion or whether the whole or part of it was lost, stolen or diverted into illicit channels. The government of the importing country would also lack this knowledge unless it would choose to obtain from the im-porter the copy of the declaration which accompanied the consignment with endorsement. Unless govern-ments, under the general rules 412 requiring them to control the trade in psychotropic substances in Schedule III, would choose to apply to the international trade in these substances additional effective control measures, the regime of the Vienna Convention concerning individual international consignments of sub-stances in Schedule III might not make it very difficult to obtain from foreign countries such substances for illicit purposes. Whether a stricter regime would be generally acceptable or even desirable is another matter which might have to be judged in the light of such factors as the extent to which illicit traffickers actually obtain substances in Schedule III from foreign sources. It might also be important to consider whether in view of the easy availability from domestic legal sources of some of the barbiturates listed in that Schedule, it is probable that a significant international illicit traffic in those substances would develop and whether and how far one could curtail the freedom of medical practitioners to prescribe them without making difficult their availability for legitimate therapeutic purposes.

Substances in Schedule III would also be subject to the system of "prohibition and restrictions." Neither the import certificate and export authoriza-tion system nor the provisions regarding declara-tions would apply to psychotropic substances in Schedule IV, although they would be subject to the same system of "prohibition and restrictions" as that which would govern international trade in Schedule II and III substances.

Prohibitions and restrictions of export and import

The Vienna Convention provides that countries or regions could require all other parties not to export to them Schedule II, III or IV substances. They would indicate this by a notification addressed to all other parties through the Secretary General. Certain quantities of such substances, however, could be excepted from this prohibition by the importing country or region to meet specific needs.

The effect would be that parties could prevent the free (unauthorized) import into their national ter-ritory of substances in Schedule III and IV. They could also prevent the import of substances in Sched-ule III and IV, which the exporting countries would not admit for domestic use on account of their harmful side effects, but would nevertheless export to other countries. Representatives of developing coun-tries have asserted at international conferences that exports of this kind have taken place. These pro-visions would also govern substances in Schedule II, which would be subject to the import certificate and export authorization system. The importing coun-tries, by their administration of this system, could achieve, with respect to Schedule II substances, aims similar to those achieved by special provisions re-garding the prohibition or restrictions of imports. The authors of the Vienna Convention did not find it necessary to apply these provisions to substances in Schedule I, whose exports and imports would not only be subject to the import certificate and export authorization but also to the strict control provisions of article 7, paragraph (f).

The parties would have to take "measures" to assure that none of the substances indicated in the notifications are exported to the country or region 408 of the notifying party with the exception of those amounts which would be specially authorized by that party in particular cases. The "measures" which would have to be taken need not necessarily be of a legislative nature, as long as they would be effective. In exporting countries, which have only a small number of exporting manufactures or other drug exporters, an instruction to such exporters or agree-ment with them might be sufficient.

Finally, it may be mentioned that the Vienna Convention would provide that parties may permit international travellers to carry small quantities of preparations of substances in Schedule II, III or IV (but not of those in Schedule I) for personal use. Each party would however be entitled to satisfy itself that these preparations have been lawfully ob-tained.414 This means that parties would not have to require an export and import authorization with regard to such preparations if they contain a sub-stance in Schedule II, nor to require the traveller, with respect to preparations of substances in Sched-ule III, to make a declaration, which exporters of these preparations would otherwise have to make.415

Neither the Single Convention nor any other nar-cotics treaty contains a provision of this kind. It may be noted that the Vienna Convention would free exempted preparations,416 which contain substances in Schedules II or III, from the application of the import certificate and export authorization system or from the requirement of making an export dec-laration, respectively, but neither these preparations nor those of substances in Schedule IV from the rules regarding "Prohibition and resttictions on ex-port and import."

If the Commission on Narcotic Drugs would de-cide to add a noncontrolled substance to any of the schedules of the Vienna Convention, a party would be entitled to notify the Secretary General that in view of exceptional circumstances, it would not be in a position to give effect to all the provisions ap-plicable to the substance in a particular schedule. This would free the notifying party from the obliga-tion to apply certain control measures; but the notifying party would not be exempted from the import certificate and export authorization system for Schedule I or II substances, except in relation to another party which would also have given such notice for the same substance. The notifying party would also be bound by the export declaration, which exporters of Schedule III substances would be ob-ligated to make. It would not be required to make such a declaration regarding the substance if it would be exported to another party which would also have sent to the Secretary General similar notification regarding that substance (Article 12, paragraph 1 and 2).

Notifying parties would not be freed from apply-ing the rules regarding "Prohibition of and restric-tions on export and import" (Article 13). They also would have to apply these rules to a substance placed in Schedule I. They would not be required to apply the strict control regime of article 7, paragraph (f).

The notifying parties, which would be authorized to apply the less severe regime for Schedule I 'sub-stance allowed to them as result of their notification, would be required to "take into account, as far as possible, the special control measures" applicable to substances in Schedule I (Article 7). Moreover, parties which would have given a notice with respect to a substance transferred from one schedule to an-other governed by stricter controls and obligations, would have to apply as a minimum all of the control provisions applicable to the ichedule from which it would have been transferred (Article 2, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7).

In general terms the right of parties to reject decisions of the Commission would not free them from the obligation to apply the provisions govern-ing international transactions, except (1) that they would not be bound to apply the import certificate and export authorization system or to make the export declaration with respect to a substance a party would have given the required notice; and (2) they would in respect of substances placed in Sched-ule I have to substitute the rules of article 13 for those of article 7, paragraph (f).

Authorization of Possession of Narcotic Drugs

Three provisions of the Single Convention relating to the possession of drugs are of interest for the purposes of this paper and may usefully be considered together: 417
•    Article 4, paragraph (c) requires the parties to take such legislative and administrative mea-sures as may be necessary to limit possession of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific pur-poses.
•    Article 33 stipulates that the parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority.
•    Article 36, paragraph 1 requires each Party, subject to its constitutional limitations, to treat as punishable offense the possession of drugs, contrary to the provisions of the Single Convention, as well as any other action which in the opinion of the party concerned would violate these provisions, provided in both cases that the acts were committed intentionally. If the offense is serious it shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty. The paragraph lists a number of other acts which under the same conditions must be so treated including the distribution, purchase, sale and delivery on any terms whatsoever of drugs, but does not list acquisition and use of drugs.

The three provisions just mentioned apply to all gs whether in Schedule I or II, and to their preparations, including preparations in Schedule 111.418

Possession of drugs by persons, corporate bodies or state enterprises which are engaged in any phase of the drug economy is legally authorized under article 33 if it serves the business purpose.

The supply or dispensation of drugs in Schedule I and their preparations other than preparations in Schedule III to persons not engaged in the drug economy, requires a medical prescription. This re-quirement need not apply to such drugs and their preparations as individuals may lawfully obtain, use, dispense or administer in connection with their duly authorized therapeutic functions. The supply or dispensation, to individuals, of drugs in Schedule II and their preparations and of all preparations in Schedule - III need not require a medical prescription.419

With a few exceptions,420 no possession of any drug or of any preparation of any drug may be per-mitted for other than medical and scientific purposes. ' Drugs in Schedule II and their preparations and the preparations in Schedule III, which under the terms of the Single Convention may be acquired by individ-uals without medical prescription, are not excepted. Governments which do not require a prescription . for the purchase of these drugs and preparations should therefore obligate their licensed retail traders not to sell them to an individual who obviously in-tends to abuse them, and not to sell excessive amounts of them to a single person. They would also be bound to confiscate these drugs and prep-arations if found in the possession of a person who intends to abuse them. Unless stricter controls are required by national law than prescribed by the Single Convention, the prevention of the unauthor-ized possession Schedule II drugs and their prepara-tions and of preparations in Schedule III will generally be very difficult if not impractical or im-possible.

The obligation of parties to limit the possession of drugs to medical and scientific purposes 421 and 422 not to permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority applies whether the drugs are held for distribution or for personal consumption; and this obligation must be implemented by all governments bound by the Single Convention. They are bound to confiscate drugs in Schedule II and their prepara-tions and preparations in Schedule III and drugs in Schedule I and their preparations possessed by per-sons not legally authorized to have them.

Does the penal provision of article 36, paragraph 1 apply not only to possession of drugs for distri-bution, but also to possession of drugs for personal use? "Possession" is not intended to apply to pos-session for personal use, but only to possession for sale or other distribution. This view is based on the provisions of article 36, which seek to fight the illicit traffic and not to require the punishment of those not participating in that traffic. Moreover, article 45 of the Third Draft of the Single Conven-tion, which served as working document of the Plenipotentary Conference which adopted this treaty, enumerated in its paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) "possession" among the acts for which punishment would be required. This sub-paragraph is identical with the first part of paragraph 1 of article 36 of the Single Convention dealing with "possession" as one of the punishable offenses. Article 45 of the Third Draft is included in Chapter IX of the Draft headed "Measures against Illicit Traffickers". This would seem to support the view that only possession for distribution, not for personal consumption, is a punishable offense under article 36 of the Single Convention. The Draft's division into chapters was not taken over by the Single Convention and this is the reason why the above chapter heading was deleted; but article 36 still is in that part of the Convention devoted to the illicit traffic. This article is preceded by article 35, entitled "Action against the Illicit Traffic", and followed by article 37, en-titled "Seizure and Confiscation". Article 36, paragraph 1 does not list "use"—consumption of drugs contrary to the provisions of the Convention—as a punishable offense. "Use" certainly presupposes "possession" of the drug to be consumed. This paragraph also does not refer to "acquisition" of drugs, but only to "purchase". If it intended to require the punishment of persons not participating in the illicit traffic, it would have used the more general term "acquisition". The illicit trafficker purchases the drugs which he intends to sell, while the user may occasionally acquire drugs without con-sideration. The term "purchase" as used in article 36, paragraph 1 means "purchase" for distribution and not "purchase" for personal consumption.

Possession is not "action" and for this reason cannot be covered by the requirement that, subject to the conditions mentioned in article 36, paragraph 1, each party should treat as a punishable offense "any other action which in the opinion of such party may be contrary to the provisions of this Conven-tion".

But parties which hold, that the pob—sion in article 36, paragraph 1 covers possession for per-sonal consumption may decide that it is not a "serious offense" and need not be punished by imprisonment. Parties may punish the unauthorized possession of drugs exclusively for personal consumption by fines, by censure or by confiscation of the drugs which they would have to do anyway, even if they would not consider the unauthorized possession of drugs for personal consumption to be a punishable offense. Moreover, if a party considers such possession to be such an offense it would have to confiscate the drugs involved under article 37 which renders liable to seizure and confiscation any drugs, substances and equipment used in or intended for the commission of any of the offenses, referred to in article 36.

Governments could also consider illegal possession of drugs for distribution and illegal distribution not to be serious offenses to be punished by penalties of deprivation of liberty in certain cases, such as, where the drug concerned is not very dangerous and the intended or actual distribution for non-medical pur-poses would be delivery to a friend without any consideration.

No provision of the Singte Convention would pre-vent a government from inflicting such severe punish-ment as it may see fit on a person who illegally possesses drugs for any purpose whatsoever.

The Protocol of 1972 amending the Single Con-vention would allow parties to treat and rehabilitate any illicit trafficker, who abuses drugs, in addi-tion to his conviction or punishment; and would also allow them to substitute such measures for con-viction or punishment. This amendment is patterned after article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (13) of the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This far-reaching provision, which could also be applied to major illicit traffickers, could seriously impede the campaign against the illicit traffic. Such traffickers may have very good relations with the authorities of the country in which they reside and such a provision could offer corrupt authorities a pretext not to try or punish the traffickers, alleging that these criminals are abusers of drugs.

The amendment of the Protocol of 1972 which wouid authorize the Parties to substitute measures of treatment and rehabilitation for conviction or punishment moreover would remain ineffective for many of the states which would accept the amend-ment according or would become parties to the amended Single Convention, would also be parties to the unamended Single Convention. This applies to all those numerous States which are already par-ties to the unamended Single Convention and would accept the Protocol, as well as to those which would become parties to the Single Convention after the coming into force of the Protocol, and would, failing an expression of a different intention by the states concerned, be considered parties to both the amended and the unamended Single Convention. Parties to the unamended Sing,le Convention, which would also be parties to the amended text, would remain bound to those parties to the unamended Convention which would not accept the amendment and they could not choose to substitute treatment and rehabilitation for conviction or punishment. Treatment and rehabilita-tion not more severe than punishment, therefore, un-der article 39 of the Single Convention, they cannot replace the obligation to punish unless all parties have agreed to the right of substitution. This means that, although they would accept the amendment, parties to the unamended text of the Single Conven-tion would be bound to continue to punish the of-fenses enumerated in article 36, paragraph 1, as long as they are obligated to states which are parties to the unamended treaty only.

The Vienna Convention has no provision which would require parties not to permit the possession of psychotropic substances in Schedule II, III and IV except under legal authority. It declares how-ever that it would be desirable that Parties do not permit the unauthorized possession of these sub-stances.423 The Convention, on the other hand, would prescribe that the possession of substances in Sched-ule I should be "under a special license or prior authorization.” 424

This treaty enumerates punishable offenses as the 1936 Convention 425 and the Single Convention did. 426 It WOUld provide, subject to its constitutional limitations, that each party should treat as a punish-.able offense any action intentionally committed con-trary to a law or regulation adopted pursuant to this 'tonvention. Serious offenses should be liable to ade-quate punishment, particularly by imprisonment or other penalty of deprivation of liberty."' In view of the lack of an obligation by parties not to permit the possession of substances in Schedule II, III or IV, except under legal authority, possession for any purposes cannot be covered by the term "punishable offenses.II 428

Apart from defining punishable offenses in general terms and from permitting the substitution of treatment and rehabilitation for conviction or punishment, the penal provisions of the Vienna Convention are nearly the same as those of the Single Convention.
The penal provisions of the Vienna Convention are intended to apply to illicit traffickers, not to users, who do not participate in the illicit traffic. Article 22 of the Vienna Convention—"penal provisions"—isin the Convention's part devoted to illicit traffic. Article 21, which precedes the "penal provisions", is titled "Action against the illicit traffic".

The definition of punishable offenses in article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) not only does not cover possession of substances in Schedule II, III and IV, but also does not include possession of substances in Schedule I for personal consumption and the purchase or other acquisition of all psychotropic substances for personal consumption. "Possession" may not be an "action", which is a punishable offense under article 22, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a). Regarding consumption of psychotropic substances, including those in Schedule I, neither the 1936 Convention 429 nor the Single Convention 430 include illicit "use" of drugs among the offenses which Parties are required to punish. This may strengthen the view that the penal law of article 22 of the Vienna Convention, whose provisions are patterned after those of the 1936 Convention and the Single Convention, was not intended to apply to the consumption of any psychotropic substance in Schedule I or any other Schedule

Governments which consider illicit acquisition and purchase of psychotropic substances for personal use or possession of substances in Schedule I for such consumption to be punishable offenses covered by article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) may if they wish take the position that acts of this nature are not "serious offenses liable to adequate punish-ment, particularly by imprisonment or other penalty of deprivation of liberty." They may therefore penal-ize these acts only by such sanctions as fines, censure or confiscation of the substances, would be obligatory under article 22, paragraph 3.43' Those governments may even adopt the same attitude with respect to offenses, such as illicit delivery of a small quantity of psychotropic substances to a friend without con-sideration.

The question whether illicit acquisition, including purchase, and possession for personal consumption are punishable offenses is of much less importance under the Vienna Convention than under the un-amended text of the Single Convention, since the former would authorize the substitution of treatment and rehabilitation for the conviction or punishment of any offender, who also is user of psychotropic substances. Major traffickers would not be excluded.

Since parties to the Vienna Convention would not be required to prohibit the possession of substances in Schedules II, III and IV except under legal author-ity,'" they would not necessarily have a treaty ob-ligation to confiscate such substances found in the possession of unauthorized persons, except where these substances would be used or would be in-tended for the commission of the penal offenses covered by article 22.431 Parties to the Convention, on the other hand, would have an obligation to limit the possession of these substances to medical and scientific purposes by implementing all the control provisions required by the Convention. They would particularly have to assure that these substances should not be supplied or dispensed for individual use except pursuant to a medical prescription.4" Where parties would not be able to prevent the supply of such substances to persons who intend to use them for non-medical purposes, they might consider it to be "appropriate" to confiscate them.

It is regrettable that the right of parties under the Vienna Convention to permit the possession of substances in Schedules II, III and IV without legal authority was not restricted to possession for personal use.

Since the possession of the substances in Schedule I would require a special license or prior authorization,'" there can be no doubt that parties to the Vienna Convention would be bound to confiscate these substances if found in possession of an unauthorized person.

Persons who would have the special license or prior authorization to manufacture, trade in or dis-tribute psychotropic substances in Schedule I or the specific authorization to export or import them,435 would also be authorized to possess quantities of these substances required for their authorized busi-ness. They would not need, in addition, a special license or prior authorization for this possession. This would also apply to persons "duly authorized" to use substances in Schedule 1 for "scientific and very limited medical purposes," in respect of the amounts which would be required for such use. The quantities which they would be permitted to have might be determined by rules or special instructions to individual businesses or users which governments might have to issue in implementation of their obligation to provide for close supervision of such businesses 436 and use and to restrict the 'amount supplied to a duly authorized person to the quantity required for his authorized purpose.437

Nothing in the Vienna Convention would prevent a party from imposing an appropriate penalty on persons who would possess, without authorization, any psychotropic substances with the intent to abuse them. Governments would be entitled to do this even though they might consider possession not to be a punishable offense under the terms of the Vienna Convention.

Authorization of Consumption of Narcotic Drugs

The word "consumption" is employed here in its ordinary meaning. It may be recalled that the words "consumption" and "consumed" are used by the Single Convention to indicate the transfer from the manufacturing or wholesale level of the drug economy to its retail leve1.438 The Convention sometimes applies the term "use" for "consumption" in its com-mon meaning 439, and on other occasions for "employment" of drugs for other purposes, such as, the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Sched-ule III and substances not controlled by the Convention:440

Apart from the exceptions of article 49, which do not apply to the United States, consumption of nar-cotic drugs, under the terms of the Single Conven-tion, can be authorized only for medical and scientific purposes."' The Vienna Convention has the same provision with respect to psychotropic substances in Schedules II, III and IV 442 while in respect of substances ia Schedule I it would prohibit all use (in-cluding consumption) except for scientific and very limited medical purposes under very strict controls."3

The normal method by which governments au-thorize the consumption of drugs is the "medical prescription". From an ideal viewpoint, consumption of all drugs should be authorized only on a phy-sician's orders—medical prescription. The expenses which would be incurred by individual patients or by public or publicly subsidized health insurance sys-tems; the shortage of doctors; and the increased bur-dens which would be imposed upon medical practi-tioners and pharmacists prevent achievement of the ideal.

The Single Convention requires a medical prescription only for the supply or dispensation, to individ-uals, of drugs in Schedule I and their preparations, excepting preparations in Schedule III. This does not apply to drugs and their preparations which individuals may lawfully obtain use, dispense or administer in connection with their duly authorized therapeutic functions.4" Moreover, drugs in Schedule II and their preparations as well as all preparations in Schedule III are not subject to this prescription requirement. Drugs in Schedule II are not only those which are less dangerous but which in addition are generally more widely used in medicine than drugs in Schedule I."5 Preparations in Schedule III should be those which are not liable to abuse and cannot produce ill-effects because of the substances they contain and because the drugs therein are not readily recoverable.

A number of governments nevertheless requires a medical prescription for Schedule II drugs, for their preparations and even for preparations in Schedule III in order to assure their medical or scientific use. Where they do not require a medical prescription, they are bound by all the control measures of the Single Convention, particularly by prohibiting li-censed retailers of drugs and preparations from sell-ing them to persons who intend to abuse them and from selling excessive quantities to individuals.

The Vienna Convention's medical prescription provisions differ somewhat from the Single Convention's. The prescription requirement would not apply to psychotropic substances in Schedule I. Their use would be prohibited except for scien-tific and very limited medical purposes by duly authorized persons, in medical and scientific estab-lishments 446 which would have to be directly under the control of the government or specifically ap-proved by it.447 Such use as would be authorized would have to be under close supervision;448 the amount supplied to a person duly authorized to use substances in Schedule I would have to be re-stricted 446 and such a person would be required to keep records concerning the acquisition of the sub-stances and the details of their use. Such records would have to be preserved for at least two years after the last use recorded therein.45°

With regard to psychotropic substances in Sched-ule II, III and IV parties to the Vienna Convention would be bound to require that they should be dis-pensed or supplied for use by individuals pursuant to medical prescription only. Similarly, as under the Single Convention, this prescription requirement would not apply to substances which individuals might lawfully obtain, use, dispense or administer in the duly authorized exercise of therapeutic or scientific functions.4" The Single Convention does not give specific details regarding such matters as the number of times prescriptions could be refilled or concerning the duration of their validity. The Vienna Convention however would require that the parties should take measures to ensure that the prescriptions should be issued in accordance with sound medical practice and subject to such regulations, particularly as to the number of times they could be refilled and the duration of their validity, as would protect the public health and welfare.452 However, it is sub-mitted that an obligation similar to this explicit provision of the Vienna Convention is implied in the provisions of the Single Convention. The parties to this latter treaty which must limit the use of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes are of course obligated to see to it that those medical prescriptions which they are bound to require are issued in ac-cordance with sound medical practice and that their refilling and duration of validity is regulated in a manner compatible with the requirement of pro-tecting the public health and welfare.

Psychotropic substances in Schedule I would be excepted from the requirement of a medical prescrip-tion because they would be subjected to control pro-visions which are intended to establish a more strict regime than the control which would be offered by medical prescriptions. Apart from this exception of substances in Schedule I, all psychotropic substances no matter in which Schedule would be subject to the requirement of medical prescriptions. Contrary to the Single Convention, the Vienna Convention nor-mally would not exempt less dangerous drugs which are widely used in medicine from this requirement, that is, some substances in Schedules III and IV. One case in which the Vienna Convention would do this is that of certain preparations which a party could exempt from some controls including in par-ticular the requirement of medical prescription. A party would be able to decide to do this in the case of a preparation which would contain a psychotropic substance other than a substance in Schedule I and which according to that party's findings would be compounded in such a way that it would present no, or a negligible risk of abuse and that the substance could not be recovered by readily applicable means in a quantity liable to abuse, so that the preparation would not give rise to a public health and social problem. Such a decision of a party would be subject to review by the World Health Organization and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs which could terminate all or some of the exemptions which the party would have decreed in respect of the preparation concerned.453

The Vienna Convention contains however two other exceptions from the requirement of a medical prescription which have no counterpart in the Single Convention:

If a party would be of the opinion that local conditions would require this it could, under such conditions as it would prescribe, authorize designated licensed retail distributors of psychotropic drugs to supply, at their discretion and without medical prescription, to individuals small quantities of substances in Schedules III and IV or of preparations containing such substances for their use for medical purposes in exceptional cases. The conditions which parties would have to impose on such an authorized retail distributor should also include the obligation to record each individual sale which should not only indicate the substance and its quantity sold but also the identity of the buyer. The authorities responsible for local public health would have to designate the licensed retail distributors who would have this right to sell without medical prescription. The party would have to determine the maximum amounts of those small quantities which could be so sold. Local circumstances which in the opinion of a party might require such limited sale of psychotropic substances without medical prescriptions would be a year round or temporary absence of a doctor on an island or in an isolated locality. The "exceptional cases" to which the provision refers would include those urgent cases in which a doctor could not easily be reached to write the required prescription.454 The provision in question would not expressly exclude that such a supply of psychotropic substances without medical prescription could under the above mentioned conditions be authorized in a whole country. The reference to "local circumstances" which might require such an action seems however to indicate that it was the intention of the authors of this provision to authorize a party to permit this supply of psycho-tropic substances only in thoqe localities in which such a sale without prescription would be needed; and such localities would normally form only one or several parts of a country and hardly a country as a whole.

A party could under the Vienna Convention give written notice to the Secretary General that in view of exceptional circumstances it would not be in a position to give effect to all the control measures which would have to be applied to a previously uncontrolled substance which would be placed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in any of the Schedules in accordance with the procedure of article 2 paragraph 4 and 5. A party which would give such a notice in respect of a previously uncontrolled substance which would be added to Schedule IV would not have to apply the requirement of a medical prescription to the supply or dispensation of that substance for use by individuals:455

Record keeping and Reporting to and Control by Domestic Authorities.—The Single Convention requires that "governmental authorities, manufacturers, traders, scientists, scientific institutions and hospitals keep such records as will show the quantities of each drug manufactured and of each individual acquisition and disposal of drugs". Such records must be preserved for a period of not less than two years.456

Licensed cultivators of the poppy for the production of opium, of the coca bush and of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis or cannabis resin are not required to keep records. They may sometimes be illiterate farmers.4"

The "government authorities" to which the provisions concerning records refers are state enterprises which are those engaged in the manufacture of and trade in narcotic drugs and also the national opium, coca leaf and cannabis agencies which must be maintained in countries which authorize respectively the cultivation of the poppy for opium, of the coca bush or of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis or cannabis resin. Government authorities charged with functions of drug control need not maintain the above mentioned detailed records. They must however keep such records as would enable them to administer the licensing system, to allocate where necessary manufacturing or import quotas or both, to establish estimates of their drug requirements and the statistical returns which they have to furnish to the International Narcotics Control Board, to see to it that the limits of narcotics supplies which their countries or territories 488 may obtain by manufacture or import or both are not exceeded and more generally to have at their disposal all the data which they might have to supply to international organs under the Single Convention.459

The provision of the Single Convention regarding record keeping do not normally require medical practitioners (physicians, surgeons, veterinarians and dentists) to keep any records. They are not considered to be "traders" within the meaning of this provision.460 Some countries however require them to keep more or less detailed records of the kind of those which the above mentioned provision describes. Medical practitioners who have a hospital or engage in scientific research for which they use narcotics or in the sale of narcotic drugs to other persons than to their own patients must in these capacities keep the records which hospitals, scientists or pharmacists are bound to maintain.

It may in this connection be recalled that the Vienna Convention would require persons using psychotropic substances in Schedule I for the performance of medical functions to keep records concerning the acquisition of these substances and the details of their use, such records to be preserved for at least two years after the last use recorded therein."' Keeping records of the kind of those required by the Single Convention does not impose too heavy a burden on manufacturers and wholesalers who must maintain similar records for commercial reasons. The obligation to record each sale of widely used drugs such as codeine or of widely used preparations may however impose a very heavy burden on pharmacists. It is for this reason that the narcotics regime preceding the Single Convention did not require retail distributors (pharmacists) to keep records concerning drugs in Group II 482 of the 1931 Convention and their preparation or of "preparations for the export of which export authorizations are not required." 483 The text of the Single Convention however does not appear to exempt retail distributor from the obligation to keep records showing each individual acquisition and disposal of drugs in Schedule II and their preparations and of preparations in Schedule III•464 It is suggested that the failure of the Single Convention to exclude from the obligatory records of retail traders the entry of each individual disposal (sale) of these products is probably due to an oversight of the authors of the Convention. In fact, a number of parties to the Single Convention do not require pharmacists to keep records of their retail sales of drugs in Schedule II, of their preparations and of preparations in Schedule III and other parties have not objected to this practice. It may be assumed that a kind of understanding exists that governments need not require pharmacists to record their retail sales of drugs in Schedule II, of their preparations or of preparations in Schedule III. It is however submitted that the sale of a preparation in Schedule III which contains a drug in Schedule I and which the pharmacist did not acquire in a ready-made form, but which he has compounded himself, must be entered in his records as sale of the preparation indicating the amount of drug which it contains, as must be entered each sale of a drug in Schedule I or its preparation.

The Protocol of 1972 amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, would free parties from their obligation to require the recording of each acquisition and of each retail distribution (retail sale) of preparations in Schedule III.465 It is regrettable that the amendment would exempt from the obligatory recording also acquisitions of these preparations. The entry in the records of the acquisitions which are normally much less numerous than the retail sales would not impose a particularly heavy burden on the trader. The individual acquisitions are anyway recorded for commercial reasons. Their recording would be useful from the view point of narcotics control since they could be compared with the corresponding entries in the books of the manufacturers or wholesalers who compounded and sold the preparations. Such a comparison might be helpful in checking the correctness of the entries of these manufacturers or wholesalers who have to account for the drugs which they used in making the preparations in Schedule III.

The provisions of the Vienna Convention regarding the keeping of records by businesses engaged in different phases of the trade in psychotropic substances 466 and by persons using psychotropic substances in Schedule I for the performance of medical or scientific functions 467 are much more extensive and differentiated in relation to the dangerous properties of the substances involved than the provisions of the Single Convention.

The records which manufacturers, traders in and distributors of, psychotropic substances in Schedule I of the Vienna Convention 468 would have to maintain are basically the same as manufacturers of, traders in, and distributors of, drugs in Schedule I and their preparations must keep under the Single Convention.469 The difference in the wording of the two treaties does not affect the validity of this conclusion. The Vienna Convention would require that these records should show the quantities held in stock while the Single Convention does not; but books kept in accordance with the requirements of the Single Convention showing all incoming 47° and outgoing items in respect of each drug and preparation will also indicate the balance and thus the quantities held in stock in regard to each of these products.

The Vienna Convention would also expressly require that the recording of each acquisition and disposal of substances in Schedule I should indicate not only the quantity of the substance involved, but also the date of the transaction as well as the supplier and recipient. The provision of the Single Convention expressed in more general terms 471 does not explicitly state that the date of the transaction, the supplier and recipient should be shown in the records. However, this provision as well as the corresponding provisions of the earlier narcotics treaties 472 have always been understood to require the recording of these data. Without this information the records would lose most of their value for the purpose of control.

There is however one important difference between the provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning the records to be kept in respect of psychotropic substances in Schedule I and those of the Single Convention relating to the records to be maintained. The Single Convention does not require medical practitioners to keep records while the Vienna Convention would require persons performing medical functions to keep records concerning the acquisition of substances in Schedule I and the details of their use.473

The Vienna Convention would also obligate persons performing scientific functions to record the acquisition of substances in Schedule I and the details of their use. The Single Convention prescribes that scientists (and scientific institutions) should keep such records as would show the quantities of each individual acquisition and disposal of drugs.474 Since it is assumed that this provision of the Single Convention would also require in regard to drugs in Schedule I and their preparations an indication of the recipient and of the date and purpose of the scientific use it appears to be difficult to establish in which details the record of scientific use of psycho-tropic substances in Schedule I would differ from the records of scientists required under the Single Convention. Looking however at the intention of the authors of these provisions of the two treaties one must come to the general conclusion that the scientific records regarding psychotropic substances in Schedule I would have to be more detailed than the scientific records required by the Single Convention.475

The records regarding psychotropic substances in Schedule II which parties to the Vienna Convention would have to maintain 4" would be the same as those which are required by the Single Convention for drugs in Schedule I and their preparations. The text of the Vienna Convention does not require in respect of these substances the recording of the quantities held in stock as it does in regard to substances in Schedule I. It stipulates explicitly that the records should also state the date, supplier and recipient in the case of each transaction in substances in Schedule II; but, as has been stated above, the records prescribed by the Single Convention must also give these data in regard to drugs in Schedule I and their preparations. It is also held that medical practitioners would not be bound by the Vienna Convention to record their acquisitions and use of psycho-tropic substances in Schedule II for therapeutic purposes.

The records which manufacturers, wholesale distributors, importers and exporters of psychotropic substances in Schedule III would have to keep under the Vienna Convention 477 would also be the same as manufacturers and such traders in drugs, whether in Schedule I or II, and in their preparations would have to maintain under the Single Convention.

The regulations of the Vienna Convention governing in respect of psychotropic substances in Schedule III the records of retail distributors, institutions for hospitalization and care and scientific institutions 478 are however different from the corresponding provisions of the Single Convention. The latter Convention has for records of scientists, scientific institutions and hospitals the same provisions as for "traders" (including wholesale traders, importers and exporters). As interpreted above it would however relieve retail traders (pharmacists) from the obligation to record individual sales of drugs in Schedule II, of their preparations and of preparations in Schedule III, but not from the requirement to record individual acquisitions of these products. The regulations of the Vienna Convention just mentioned are somewhat vague. They would require parties to this Convention to "ensure, through appropriate methods and taking into account the professional and trade practices in their countries, that information regarding acquisition and disposal of substances in Schedule III by retail distributors, institutions for hospitalization and care and scientific institutions is readily available."

As regards psychotropic substances in Schedule IV only manufacturers, exporters and importers would by the Vienna Convention be obligated to keep records. These records would have to show only the quantities of each such substances manufactured, imported and exported.479

The provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning records to be kept in regard to those preparations of substances in Schedules II, III or IV 4" which a party would exempt under article 3, paragraph 3 of that Convention differ widely from the provisions of the Single Convention concerning records of preparations in its Schedule III. First, of all, the simplified method of record keeping for which the Vienna Convention would provide in regard to "exempted" preparations would be applied only by those countries which have decided under article 3, paragraph 3 to exempt these preparations from all or some of the control measures from which they would be authorized to exempt them. Moreover, these control measures would have to include the requirement provided in article 11 regarding the keeping of records in respect of the Schedule to which those psychotropic substances would belong which the "exempted" preparations would contain. All other countries and particularly also those which would have exempted the preparations, but would not have included among the provisions from which they would have freed these preparations, the normal provisions regarding records of the psychotropic substances which the preparations would contain could not apply the simplified method of recording permitted by article 11, paragraph 6 in respect of "exempted" preparations.481

Only those countries which would make the required relevant decision would be authorized to apply this simplified method of recording to the preparations which it would exempt. Even these countries could be required by a decision of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs pursuant to article 3, paragraph 4 not to apply this simplified method, but to keep in regard to these "exempted preparations" the records which would have to be maintained, under article 11, paragraphs 2-5, in respect of the psychotropic substances which the "exempted" preparations would contain.

Under the "simplified" method of keeping records concerning preparations exempted under article 3, paragraph 3, the party would be entitled to limit itself to requiring manufacturers of such exempted preparations to keep records as to the quantity of each psychotropic substance used in the manufacture of the exempted preparation and as to the nature, total quantity and initial disposal of the exempted preparation made therefrom.

Under the Single Convention, preparations are not placed in Schedule III by a unilateral decision of a party; but insofar as they were not included therein by the Plenipotentiary Conference which adopted the Convention, only by a decision of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in accordance with a recommendation of the World Health Organization. As has been suggested above, the records regarding such preparations must be the same as those concerning the manufacture of and individual acquisitions and disposals of all drugs and their preparations except that retailers need not record the individuals sales of such preparations. This relief from recording may be granted by all parties to the Single Convention. It will be recalled that retailers also need not maintain records of individual sales of drugs in Schedule II and their preparations. The amendment which would be introduced into the Single Convention by the Protocol of 1972 and under which not only the retail distribution of preparations in Schedule III but also all acquisitions of such preparations would be exempted from the requirement of recording has been mentioned above.

The parties to the Vienna Convention would be required to assure that the records and information referred to in article 11 which would be needed for purposes of reports to be furnished to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs or to the International Narcotics Control Board under article 16 should be preserved for at least two years.482

A party which, in respect of a previously uncontrolled substance placed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in any of the four Schedules. of the Vienna Convention, would under article 2, paragraph 7 of that Convention give written notice to the Secretary General that, in view of exceptional circumstances, it would not be in a position to give effect to all the provisions of the Convention applicable to that substance would not be bound to require, in regard to such a substance, the maintenance of the records which would be prescribed by article 11, paragraph 1-5.483 It appears, however, that such a party would nevertheless in respect of a substance placed in Schedule I or II have to require the maintenance of records indicating the quantities manufactured, exported to and imported 484 from each country or region as well as the stocks held by manufacturers since it would need this information for the statistical returns which it would have to furnish to the International Narcotics Control Board.485 For the same reason a party which has given written notice with respect to a substance placed in Schedule II would apparently have to require the keeping of records showing the quantities of that substance used for industrial purposes:488

It may also be assumed that a party winch by a written notice addressed to the Secretary General would under article 2, paragraph 7 reject the full control of a previously uncontrolled substance which would have been placed in Schedules II, III or IV could, in addition, exempt preparations of such a substance under the conditions of article 3, paragraph 2 and 3. Such an exemption may, in particular, offer to the party taking this measure the advantage of freeing the exempted preparations containing a substance in Schedule II from the application of the import certificate and export authorization system 487 and exempted preparations containing a substance in Schedule III from the requirement of making export declarations.488 A party which would under these conditions exempt a preparation which contains a substance in Schedule II would have to require the maintenance of records showing the quantities of the substance used in the manufacture of the preparation,489 since it would have to supply this information to the International Narcotics Control Board. This kind of record would also have to be maintained for the same reason in regard to an exempted preparation containing a substance in Schedule III whose full control would have been rejected under article 2, paragraph 7 by the required written notice of the party.49°

The exemption of a preparation by a party which would have rejected under article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (d) the full control of a substance in Schedule IV which is contained in the preparation would hardly be useful. Such an exemption might impose on the party the application of more severe controls than it would otherwise have to carry out.

It has already been mentioned that if a party by the required written notice would reject the full control of a substance which would be transferred from one Schedule to another Schedule providing stricter controls it would be bound to apply as a minimum the provisions applicable to the Schedule from which the substance would have been transferred. This would also include the requirement of maintaining the records which would be prescribed for this latter Schedule.

The provisions obligating parties to require the maintenance of records do not give a full picture of the situation either in the case of the Vienna Convention or in that of the Single Convention. Govern-. meats must require businesses engaged in any phase of the trade in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances to record all facts which government would have to obtain from them in order to be able to furnish the required data to the international organs.

The maintenance of records as required by the two conventions is a very important factor in the system of drug control. Owners or managers of big businesses will hardly take the risk of making, or arranging for, false entries in their records. Moreover, the authorities are very often able to check the correctness of the records by comparing the entries in the books of both parties to a transaction.

Effective domestic control over the trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances requires that governments obligate the participants in this trade to make periodic reports to their national drug control offices. They need such reports also in order to obtain the data which they must furnish to the international control organs; but neither the Single Convention nor the Vienna Convention expressly provide for such reports of participants in the various phases of the drug trade to the domestic authorities."' An obligation of governments to require such reports is however implied in those provisions which provide for the keeping of records and for reports to international organs.

In addition to their obligation to carry out specific control measures, parties to the Single Convention have an obligation, which is defined in general terms, to control all phases of the drug trade. They are bound to "control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged" in the manufacture of, trade in, distribution, import or export of narcotic drugs.492 The very general meaning of this obligation was recognized by the Plenipotentiary Conference which adopted the Single Convention.493 It is suggested that the "persons" to be controlled are all persons participating in the manufacturing or trading process and not only the owners or managers of the firm, but also office workers, technicians and manual labourers. The "enterprises" which must be controlled, no matter whether they are owned by individuals, partnerships, corporate bodies or the state, are the drug businesses, their buildings and premises, including the appurtenances and equipment used by the businesses.

This general obligation requires parties not to limit their control to those measures which are expressly prescribed by provisions of the Convention. It must of course be interpreted in a reasonable manner e.g. it certainly does not require the physical search of all employees leaving the building or premises of a drug firm or the continuous presence of a Government inspector on the premises. Only such control measures are required as are necessary and practical under the special conditions of the Party concerned. Such measures would be: the exclusion from the drug factory or trading business of persons convicted or justifiably suspected of illicit traffic. It is also submitted that this general obligation to exercise control includes the requirement to carry out more or less frequent government inspections. These inspections should in particular examine the records of the drug firm in question and the quantities of the drugs held in stock in order to establish that no illicit diversion has taken place. The adequacy of the safety measures to prevent theft should also be examined. This obligation of the parties to the Single Convention to carry out inspections is not based on a specific provision requiring it but only on the above mentioned general obligation to exercise "control".

The Vienna Convention has similar general provisions which would require parties not to limit themselves to carrying out the specific measures which would be prescribed by the treaty but also others which could be reasonably expected from a practical view point. These general provisions of the Vienna Convention, however, seem to have a more limited scope than the corresponding provisions of the Single Convention. They would require parties to control "all duly authorized persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged in the manufacture of, trade (including export and import trade) in, or distribution of substances" in Schedules II, III and IV.494 They would also obligate the parties to provide for "close supervision" of the specially licensed for in advance specially authorized manufacture of, trade in, distribution and possession of substances in Schedule 1.495 Such close supervision would also have to be exercised over the prohibition of all use of substances in this Schedule except for scientific and very limited medical purposes by duly authorized persons under the restrictive conditions stipulated by the Convention.496

The reference of these general control provisions of the Vienna Convention to "duly authorized persons" may be interpreted to mean that they would need to be applied only to the enterprises and to persons who would require a due authorization for their participation in the controlled activities and not to such persons as office workers, technicians and manual labourers. Some control such as that outlined in the above discussion of the corresponding provisions of the Single Convention, over such persons employed in work relating to the controlled activities seems however to be needed. It may be that the parties to the Vienna Convention would consider such a control as part of their obligation to control the "enterprises" engaged in the activities in question.

Contrary to the Single Convention which has no specific provision requiring inspections 497 the Vienna Convention would obligate parties to maintain a system of inspection of manufacturers, exporters, importers and wholesaler and retail distributors of psychotropic substances and of medical and scientific institutions which use such substances.498

Organs of Domestic Control ("Special Administration").—In order to implement their obligations under the Single Convention or under the Vienna Convention when in force governments are bound to charge some of their organs with the performance of the various tasks which must be carried out. It is submitted that although it is not expressly required by a provision of these Conventions it is nevertheless implied that governments are bound to entrust with drug control functions some special organs, which are specialized in those particular aspects of the drug problems which are their concern and which are exclusively charged with carrying out drug control activities.499 There is moreover need for centralization of information on the illicit traffic and for domestic and international co-ordination of the work of the various enforcement agencies engaged in the campaign against the illicit traffic. Provision must also be made that expeditious legal assistance is given and, in particular, the required legal papers are quickly transmitted to foreign prosecutors and courts in cases of the illicit traffic. Arrangements must also be made that communications of international organs regarding drug questions are routed to the competent national agencies concerned; moreover, reports which must be furnished to international control organs must quite often be obtained from different government agencies and must be collected and reproduced in a single document by a central national office.

Finally, it would also be desirable that the various multidisciplinary efforts to deal with the drug problem should be co-ordinated and at least some of them undertaken in accordance with a single plan.

All this would require a high degree of centralization and co-ordination in the field of drug control. It is for this reason that the Conference which adopted the 1931 Convention recommended that governments should consider the desirability of establishing a single authority, with the duty of regulating, supervising and controlling the traffic in dangerous drugs and of preventing and combatting drug addiction and the illicit traffic.129 Such an organization of drug administration is however possible only in very few countries. Some countries are prevented by provisions of their federal constitutions and many more by other systems of decentralized government from establishing a single authority for purposes of drug control or even from achieving in this area a sufficiently high degree of centralization and co-ordination. This is in many countries also impossible or at least very difficult even in respect of the police organs engaged in the campaign against the illicit traffic. The competence of many police organs is limited to some localities or territories or even to specially assigned substance matters. They are often not subject to the authority of a central national police and sometimes even not to directions or orders of central government organs. Anyway the constitutional and administrative systems of states are too different to make it possible to prescribe in a treaty reasonably precise rules regarding the structure of government agencies, which would be widely acceptable. It is for this reason that the Single Convention's provision regarding the obligation of parties to establish a "special administration" for the implementation of this treaty is even more vague than the provision of the 1931 Convention on the same point.500 The provisions of the Single Convention concerning the administrative measures which Governments have to adopt in their fight against the illicit traffic are also more indefinite than those of the 1936 Convention.501 The Vienna Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances even would not render obligatory the establishment of a "special administration", but declares it only desirable 502 and its provisions 5°3 on the administrative measures which parties would have to carry out in the campaign against the illicit traffic are actually the same as those of the Single Convention.

Penal Laws to be Applied to Violations of Laws Enacted to Implement the Single Convention.—The Vienna Convention provides that measures of treatment and rehabilitation which it enumerates could be applied in addition to punishment or as substitute for the conviction or punishment of persons who would be themselves abusers of psychotropic substances and would commit intentionally any of the actions which the Convention declares to be punishable offences and which if serious it requires to be liable to adequate punishment, particularly by imprisonment or other penality of deprivation of liberty 5°4

This provision stipulating that in the case of offenders who would abuse psychotropic substances measures of treatment and rehabilitation could be taken in addition to punishment or as substitute for conviction or punishment appears to apply also to intentional participation, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit, any of the acts which under the terms of the Convention would be punishable offences, as well as to preparatory acts and financial operations in connection with such offences."'

The Protocol of 1972506 would introduce virtually the same provision 507 into the Single Convention in regard to persons who would abuse narcotic drugs and would commit intentionally the offences which are punishable under this Convention and if serious are liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty. This new provision of the Single Convention would also apply to intentional participation, conspiracy, attempts, preparatory acts and financial operations in connection with the offenses punishable under the present or amended text of the Single Convention.'" The only difference between the text to be introduced into the Single Convention and the corresponding provision of the Vienna Convention would be that the former provides for measures of treatment and rehabilitation in addition to conviction or punishment while the latter provides for such measures in addition only to punishment. It goes without saying that a government may submit to measures of treatment and rehabilitation an illicit trafficker who abuses narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances in addition to convicting or punishing him (as the Protocol of 1972 provides) or in addition to punishing him (as the Vienna Convention stipulates) and that it does not require an authorization by a treaty to do this. What it needs for this purpose is authorization by its own national law and not that by an international treaty.

These provisions of the Vienna Convention and of the Protocol of 1972 509 apply to all illicit traffickers who abuse psychotropic substances or narcotic drugs respectively no matter how serious their crimes may be. It is submitted that in most countries this would hardly give rise to any problem since it can be expected that they would carry out their treaty obligations in good faith. There are however a few countries in which major illicit traffickers have very close relations with the local authorities. A provision authorizing the substitution of measures of treatment and rehabilitation for conviction or punishment of any illicit trafficker who abuses narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may be used by such corrupt authorities as pretext not to prosecute or punish major illicit traffickers.

The provision of the Protocol of 1972 authorizing the substitution of measures of treatment and rehabilitation for conviction or punishment of offenders who would abuse narcotic drugs would for a number of states remain ineffective for a very long time after the coming into force of the Protocol. Those States which would be parties to the unamended and amended text of the Single Convention would continue to be bound to carry out the old text in relation to those countries which would be parties only to the unamended treaty.

Much of the effect which the proponents of these provisions of the Vienna Convention and of the Protocol of 1972 intended to reach could also be obtained by those countries which would adopt the opinion that the purchase and possession of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption are not punishable offenses under the treaty provisions concerned, as well as by those states which would consider that such purchase and possession though punishable offenses are not of a serious nature and could therefore be subjected to such lenient sanctions as fines, censure or confiscation of the drugs or substances involved. It will also be recalled that in the same sub-section 510 in which these legal views were presented it was also submitted that some governments could even consider that the gratis delivery of a small quantity of a relatively less dangerous narcotic drug or psychotropic substance to a friend would not be a "serious" offense, at least in some particular cases. In presenting these views it must be stressed again that the writer of this paper only attempts to describe the law on these problems under the international treaties concerned and does not advocate a particular policy which in his opinion the United States Government should adopt in respect of these questions. No provision of a drug treaty would prevent the United States to impose on violators of its drug control laws such severe penalties as it may consider to be necessary.

Those provisions of the Protocol of 1972 5" which would amend the rules of the Single Convention concerning extradition 512 were described in "The Evolution of Penal Law in the Field of International Drug Law". This amendment would constitute a very important progressive step in the fight against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.

The difficulties which in many countries are in the way of prosecuting crimes committed abroad by nationals and even more in the way of prosecuting such crimes of foreigners were referred to in the above mentioned Section. These difficulties explain why the Single Convention subjects to a party's constitutional limitations, legal system and domestic law its obligation to prosecute serious offenses of the illicit traffic which were committed abroad;5" but all countries which adhere strongly to the maxim that in general crimes committed abroad should not be tried by their courts make at least one exception, namely in the case of piracy. Many of these countries make also exceptions in a few other cases in which important national interests dictate such a course.

It is suggested that in view of the deterioration of the international ..drug situation since 1961 when the Single Convention was concluded many Governments concerned may at present find the prosecution of serious offenses of illicit traffic committed abroad much less objectionable on grounds of principle than they did in 1961 and therefore may find it justified to include these offenses among their exceptions from the principle of territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases. Looking at the problem from a world wide angle the question of the illicit traffic is perhaps today a more serious problem than piracy which appears still to occur only in some limited places of the sea. The question may be examined how far such actions as are defined as offenses by its own law. States and its several states; and if the answer is in the affirmative the United States by diplomatic means including appropriate interventions at the international conferences in question could try to persuade the other states concerned to adopt the same attitude.

The punishment of crimes of illicit traffic committed abroad also presents some problems of legislation because a State can obviously prosecute only such actions as are defined as offences by its own law. The crimes of illicit traffic constitute violations of the national drug law of one or several states and not "crimes of international law". To produce a definition of a crime of illicit traffic which although committed abroad in violation of foreign law should be punishable in another country in which the trafficker can be found may present a rather difficult problem of legislative technique, particularly also in the United States.

It would not be advisable, at least for the present, to try to obtain by a new treaty the general acceptance of an obligation to prosecute crimes of illicit traffic committed abroad. It is suggested that such a treaty obligation would not be adopted without some restrictive conditions such as those for which the Single Convention provides. It appears to be more hopeful to win over by diplomatic means individual states to the suggested new position than to persuade at a Conference a group of opposing states to adopt the proposed exception from their traditional principles governing criminal jurisdiction.514

While the adoption of a national policy on the treatment in penal law of illegal possession of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption and thus also on the treatment in penal law of illicit consumption of such products depends on a number of considerations which are outside the scope of this paper it may be permitted to mention that in the view of many in a number of countries penal sanctions deter at least under certain conditions more or less numerous persons from abusing dangerous drugs.

Limitation of Narcotics Supplies.—The Single Convention's system of limiting the narcotics supplies which each country or territory 515 may annually obtain by manufacture or import or both 516 is nearly the same as that of the 1931 Convention. Contrary to the 1931 Convention the Single Convention applies its limitation system also to extracts and tinctures of cannabis which are "manufactured" drugs and to opium 517, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin which are agricultural products. As regards the supplies of these agricultural commodities the Single Convention establishes only the maximum amounts which may be obtained by importation and not those which may be acquired by production (harvesting) .518

The separate functions of the Supervisory Body and Permanent Central Board regarding the administration of this limitation system under the 1931 Convention 516 are under the Single Convention carried out by a single organ—the International Narcotics Control Board which replaced these two organs. The statement which the Supervisory Body and Permanent Central Board 520 had to issue under express provisions of the 1931 Convention 521 are now published by the International Narcotics Control Board under the more general provisions of the Single Convention requiring the Board to publish an annual report on its work and such additional reports as it considers necessary containing inter alia an analysis of the estimates and statistical information at its disposal. In addition to these reports the Board must, at such times as it shall determine but at least annually, issue such information on the estimates as in its opinion will facilitate the carrying out of this Convention.522

Some features of the limitation system of the Single Convention will be affected by the Protocol of 1972 when in force. The provisions which the Protocol would introduce into the Single Convention include estimates of the area of land to be used for the cultivation of the poppy for any purpose and of the approximate quantity of opium to be produced and those regarding the obligation of parties not to grow the poppy on a larger than the estimated area and to organize and control opium production in such a manner as to ensure that, as far as possible, the quantity of the opium harvest does not exceed their estimates.523 The Protocol would however introduce some other provisions into the Single Convention which require attention; namely those concerning synthetic drugs and some additional provisions in respect of opium.

Some of these provisions would give, in respect of opium and synthetic drugs, the phrase "the total of the estimates" a meaning which would be different from that which this phrase has in regard to other drugs under the amended text and in respect of all drugs under the unamended text of the Single Convention.

The expression "the total of the estimates" is a device of legislative technique used by the Single Convention 524 in order to avoid the need for repeating all the addenda and subtrahends of which this "total" is composed, in provisions in which all of them form the basis of a computation of legally relevant quantities. The Single Convention uses the formula "the total of the estimates" only for the calculation of import limits and it does this twice: once to calculate the excessive drug imports of a country or territory which under article 21, paragraph
authorize the International Narcotics Control Board to require the parties to the Single Convention to discontinue further exports of the drug or drugs concerned to such a country or territory during the currency of the year in question.525 This phrase is used a second time in the provision which requires parties not knowingly to permit the export of drugs to any country or territory except within the limits of "the total of estimates" for that country or territory, with the addition of the amounts intended to be reexported. It is nowhere used for calculating the limits of the supplies which may be obtained by manufacture or import or both.528

The addenda which must be included in "the total of estimates" are the estimated figures of the requirements of the drug concerned for the different purposes foreseen in the definition of this phrase.527 The subtrahend which must be deducted from the sum of these addenda is the quantity available without need for acquiring it by manufacture or import, that is, the quantity which remained from excessive supplies of the preceding years.528 As can be seen the quantity of "the total of the estimates" is related to the quantity needed by the country and territory in question. The total of the estimates therefore can appropriately be used for calculating the import limits as the Single Convention does in the two provisions referred to above.529 In considering the changes which would be effected by the Protocol of 1972 in the definition of "the total of the estimates" for opium and in that of this total for synthetic drugs one must keep in mind that the Protocol does not change the Single Convention in its use of the phrase "the total of the estimates" exclusively for the computation of the import limits to be established under these two provisions.

With regards to drugs other than opium or synthetic 53° drugs the situation would not be changed by the Protocol because the definition of "the total of the estimates" for those drugs would not be altered by the Protocol.530

The amendments introduced by the Protocol would require parties to furnish annual estimates of the number of industrial establishments which would manufacture synthetic drugs as well as estimates of the quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by each of these establishments.532 "The total of the estimates" for a synthetic drug, under the amendment introduced by the Protocol 533 would either be the total as defined in the unamended text or subject to the deductions referred to in article 21, paragraph 3 534 the sum of the estimated amounts to be manufactured by each of the above mentioned establishments whichever of these two quantities 535 would be the higher. Two different situations could arise under this new definition of the total of the estimates of synthetic drugs. One in which subject to the deductions referred to above the sum of the estimated quantities of the drug concerned to be manufactured by the different establishments of a country would be smaller than (or equal to) the total of the estimates for that drug as computed under the definition of the unamended text of the Single Convention. In this case the amendment would be without any effect; the import limits of the country in question in respect of the synthetic drug involved would be computed for the purposes of article 21 paragraph 4 and of article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) on the basis of the same "total of estimates" as under the unamended text of the Single Convention. The second situation would be one in which again subject to the/ above mentioned deductions the sum of the estimated quantities of the synthetic drug involved to be manufactured by the establishments of the country concerned would be bigger than that country's "total of the estimates" for the drug in question, as computed under the old text of the Single Convention. In such a case that bigger sum would be "the total of the estimates" which would serve as basis for calculating the import limits under the above mentioned provisions. Consequently, a country which does not manufacture a synthetic drug or only a small quantity of it not sufficient for its needs could be entitled to import less of this drug under these provisions than a country which manufactures larger amounts of that drug than its requirements. The latter country if it is a big manufacturer of the synthetic drug involved could under the cited provisions of article 21 and 31 import a multiple of its requirements. It may be concluded that the results of this amendment of the Single Convention are hardly of any value from the view point of drug control and that its motivation is not quite clear.

The question also arises whether the obligation to furnish estimates of "the number of industrial establishments" which would manufacture synthetic drugs and of "the quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by each" of these establishments involves an obligation to identify each of such establishments.536 It is submitted that the better opinion would be that such an obligation does not exist. The country furnishing the estimates could give the estimated number of establishments and indicate the amount of the synthetic drug involved to be manufactured by the first, second, third, etc. of the establishments. For example, the estimated number of establishments which would manufacture pethidine would be 3 and that the establishment numbered 1 would manufacture 2 kgs. of this drug, the establishment numbered 2 3 kgs. and the establishment numbered 3 1 kg.537 It is however admitted that this suggested interpretation could be controversial.

The estimate of the quantity of a synthetic drug to be manufactured by a particular establishment would be binding upon the party furnishing the estimate; the party would have to see to it that the establishment does not manufacture more than the amount stated in the estimate 538; but this estimated amount would quite frequently have to be modified during the year to which the estimate relates. In such a case, the country concerned would not only have to make revised allocations of the amounts of the synthetic drug in question to be manufactured by individual establishments—as it might also have to do under the unamended Single Convention—but would also have to amend, by supplementary estimates, the estimates of the quantities of the drug involved which would have to be manufactured by those establishments whose quotas would be changed. Not everybody will agree that this additional burden imposed upon governments is of any value from the viewpoint of narcotics control particularly since there is no significant diversion of manufactured "narcotic" drugs from legal manufacture into illicit channels.

Some similar problems as those arising from the amendment's revised definition of the phrase "the total of the estimates" for synthetic drugs will result from the new definition of this phrase for opium. The Protocol of 1972 would provide in regard to opium for two different calculations of the amount of "the total of the estimates". The bigger of the two amounts which would result from these provisions would be "the total of the estimates" which would serve as basis for computing the limits of opium imports of the country or territory concerned under the above mentioned provisions of article 21 and 31.

Under the first of these two calculations "the total of the estimates" would be this total as established under the terms of the unamended text of article 19, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention less the amount which the International Narcotics Control Board may decide to deduct under the terms of article 21 bis, paragraph 2 which would be introduced by the Protocol into the Single Convention. Since the same amount may under certain conditions be deducted by the Board from the amount of opium which a country would be authorized to produce it appears to be advisable to postpone the discussion of this deduction to be made for the purpose of defining "the total of the estimates" until the deduction from authorized opium production is being considered.

The amount to be established under the second of the two calculations for which the Protocol would provide and which if bigger would be "the total of the estimates" for computing the limits of opium imports under the above mentioned provisions would be, subject to the deductions referred to in article 21 bis, paragraph 2 of the amended text and to those mentioned in article 21, paragraph 3 of the Convention, the estimate which the country concerned would furnish of the "approximate quantity of opium" which it would produce.

Here again a somewhat pecular situation may arise. If the country concerned does not produce opium or only less than its requirements its total of the estimates for computing its import limits under the relevant provisions would be the amount established by the first of those two methods of calculating this total which were described above, since this amount would (normally 539) be smaller than its estimates of its opium production less the deductions to be made as stated above. In the case of big opium producers—those which produce more than or even a multiple of their requirements—their estimates of opium production subject to the deductions would be their "total of the estimates" which would form the basis of the amounts of opium which they could import under the provisions repeatedly referred to above. A country such as India could import hundreds of tons of opium which it obviously does not need.

The provisions of article 21, paragraph 4 and those of article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) are intended to prevent countries from importing drugs in excess of their requirements. The new definitions of "the total of the estimates" for opium and synthetic drugs would deprive these provisions in a number of cases of some of their usefulness for the purpose for which they have been intended.540

The interpretation of article 19, paragraph 2, subparagraph (d) of the amended Single Convention may need some consideration. This sub-paragraph requires that "the estimates furnished under the preceding sub-paragraphs of this paragraph shall be appropriately modified to take into account any quantity seized and thereafter released for licit use as well as any quantity taken from special stocks for the requirements of the civilian population.' The sub-paragraph refers to "the estimates furnished under the preceding sub-paragraphs" of paragraph 2; but no estimates are furnished under these subparagraphs; they are furnished under paragraph 1 of article 19. The "preceding sub-paragraphs" give only three different definitions of the phrase "the total of estimates", one for opium (sub-paragraph (b) ), one for synthetic drugs (sub-paragraph (c) ) and one for the other drugs (sub-paragraph (a) ). It is therefore submitted that not the "estimates" which are furnished,5" but the amounts of "the totals of the estimates" computed under the preceding sub-paragraphs are to be "appropriately" modified under the terms of sub-paragraph (d).542

The two items by which the totals of the estimates are to be "appropriately" modified are:
•    Any quantity of the drug concerned which was seized and thereafter released for licit use.
•    Any quantity of the drug concerned taken from "special 543 stocks" for the requirements of the civil population.

These two items play a role in the computation of legally relevant quantities under the terms of provisions of the Single Convention which would not be amended by the Protocol of 1972.54' Each government must deduct these items from its drug supply limits which are computed by adding the figures of article 21, paragraph 1 relating to requirements of drugs for different purposes.545 It will be recalled that for calculating these limits of drug supplies which may be obtained by manufacture or import or both the Single Convention does not use the phrase "the total of the estimates"; and this would not be changed by the Protocol of 1972; it will therefore be noted that the supply limits of synthetic drugs which a country may obtain by manufacture or import and the supply limits of opium which a country may obtain by imports under article 21, paragraphs 1 and 2 would not be affected by provisions of the Protocol while the import limits of these drugs (synthetic drugs or opium) for the purpose of applying article 21, paragraph 4 or article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) may be changed by the new definitions of the phrase "the total of the estimates" under the amendments which would be introduced by the Protoco1.546 In computing "the total of the estimates" under the amended or unamended Single Convention the deductions required by article 21, paragraph 3 must always be made. The figures which must be deducted under this provision are the amounts of drug supplies which parties acquired by manufacture or import or both in excess of the amounts allowed to them by the provisions of article 21, paragraphs 1 and 2 i.e. the sum of the figures referred to in paragraph 1 minus the two items which are mentioned in article 19, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (d) of the amended Single Convention and are therefore under consideration.547 In computing the excesses over the supply limits of the preceding year which the Board under article 21, paragraph 3 must deduct from "the total of the estimates" for the current year i.e. the year to which this total 548 refers the Board must take into account the two items under consideration, that is, it must deduct from the sum of the figures referred to in article 21, paragraph 1 and the amounts of seized drugs released for licit use and those taken from "special stocks" for the requirement of the civilian population in the preceding year.549

The question arises whether under the sub-paragraph (d) under consideration the quantities of seized drugs releasQd for licit use and those taken from "special stocks" for the requirements of the civilian population should be those released and taken in the preceding year or those released and taken in the current year in which "the total of the estimates" refers. In the first case any such deductions made to modify "appropriately" the various "totals of the estimates" would duplicate the substractions which were already made under article 21, paragraph 3 and which must be made in any calculation of "the total of the estimates" either under the amended or the unamended text of the Single Convention. In the second case the modification of "the total of the estimates" by the deduction of the items under consideration would in practice hardly be possible if not even impossible. One must recall again that the phrase of "the total of the estimates" is used only for the computation of two legally relevant quantities. First, to determine the excessive imports of a country which under article 21, paragraph 4 would authorize the Board to require parties to discontinue further exports of the drug or drugs concerned to the country involved during the currency of the year in question. Secondly, to establish the import limits for the purpose of article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) according to which parties are required not knowingly to permit the export of drugs to any country or territory except within the limits of "the total of the estimates for that country or territory" with the addition of the quantities intended to be reexported. In the first case the Board must compute "the total of the estimates" in order to establish whether it has authority to require the discontinuation of further exports. In the second case the exporting party must obtain from the Board the required information on "the totals of the estimates" which are the most important factors in calculating the quantities which it would be authorized to export. In both cases the Board would not be able to deduct from "the total of the estimates" of the current year the quantities of seized drugs released for licit use or of those of the drugs taken from "special stocks" for the requirements of the civilian population in the same year, because it would not know these quantities. Under the terms of the Single Convention parties are required to furnish to the Board the statistical data on such release for licit use or transfer from "special stocks" in a given year only by June 30 of the following year.5" The Board would therefore learn the size of the quantities which it should use in modifying "the total of the estimates" of a given year under the sub-paragraph (d) under consideration only rather late in the subsequent year. It is held that sub-paragraph (d) could be applied in practice only if the parties were willing to report immediately to the Board any release of seized drugs for licit use and any withdrawal from "special stocks" for the needs of the civilian population; but there appears to be no provision in the Single Convention which would require them to do this.5" It is also questionable whether the deductions of the quantities released for licit use or transferred from "special stocks" in the current year from "the total of the estimates" of the same year would be any value from the view point of drug control since such release and transfer in the preceding year had to be taken into account in computing "the totals of the estimates" of the current year and the release and transfer in the current year will have to be considered in calculating the totals of the estimates of the following year under article 21, paragraph 3.

The provisions of article 21 bis paragraph 2 which would be introduced by the Protocol into the Single Convention and by which the Board would under certain conditions be authorized to make some deduction from the amount of opium which a party would be authorized to produce and from that party's "total of the estimates" may be considered because they may need some explanations and because—it is held —they may give rise to some difficulties of application.

The conditions under which the Board may apply these provisions may be summarized as follows:
• A party which under article 19, paragraph 1, furnished an estimate of the approximate quantity of opium to be produced, has not organized and controlled opium production in such a manner 552 as to ensure that, as far as possible, the quantity produced in the year to which the estimate relates should not exceed its estimate.'" It is suggested that it was hardly the intention of the authors of article 21 bis, paragraphs 2-5 to limit their application to parties which have furnished estimates of their opium production. They certainly meant to apply these provisions also to parties which have failed to supply such estimates and for which the Board has established them in accordance with article 12, paragraph 3.
•    As result of this failure to take the required measures of organization and control referred to under the first category, the party has not limited its opium production to "licit purposes" and to quantities not exceeding in a significant measure the approximate estimates of its opium production which it had furnished or which had been established by the Board. The "licit purposes" are, except for the purpose of the provisions of article 49,554 "medical and scientific purposes." The assumption that the excess must be significant is concluded from the fact that the estimate which should be furnished and which should not be exceeded needs only to be "approximate".
•    A significant amount of opium produced within the borders of that party, whether licitly or illicitly, has been introduced into the illicit traffic.

It is required that the Board finds the existence of these conditions on the basis of information at its disposal in accordance with provisions of the Single Convention. This information would consist of the statistical data 555 which governments would furnish,
3- of facts supplied by them to complete or explain their statistical data and of matters brought to the attention of the Board by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, by other United Nations organs, by specialized ' agencies or by those other intergovernmental or nongovernmental international organizations which are referred to in article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) of the amended text of the Single Convention.556

Under these conditions, the Board may, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by article 21, paragraph 2, decide to deduct from the amount of opium which the party concerned would be authorized to produce and from that party's "total of estimates" for opium, all or a portion of the quantity of opium which has been introduced into the illicit traffic. Such a decision which the Board may (but is not required to) make shall apply to "the next year in which such a deduction can be technically accomplished, taking into account the season of the year and contractual commitments to export opium." As far as the deduction from "the total of the estimates" is concerned it will cause no technical difficulties of the kind of those to which Article 21, paragraph 2 refers to make the deduction in the year following that in which the Board's decision would be taken. It would even be possible to make this deduction in the same year in which the Board would make its dedision particularly if the Board would do this very early in the year. It is however concluded from the use of the words "the next year" that the year following the year of the Board's decision would be the first year in respect of which the deduction from "the total of the estimates" for opium may be decreed by the Board. It is however submitted that such a deduction would not be very meaningful. It would only reduce the amounts of opium which the parties would under article 31, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) be authorized to export to the offending party and also decrease the quantity of that drug which such a party could import without causing the Board to obtain under article 21, paragraph 4, the right to require other parties to discontinue further opium exports to that party for the currency of the year in question. It will be recalled here again that the quantity of "the total of the estimates" is pertinent only in regard to the import limits under the two provisions just referred to. It may safely be assumed that major opium producers particularly if a significant amount of their opium production is diverted into the illicit traffic will hardly be in particular need of importing opium. To determine in the light of the technical difficulties to which the paragraph under consideration refers the "next year" in which the deduction should be made from the amount of opium which the offending party would be authorized to produce might cause the Board considerable difficulties. It is required that it should be the next year in which such a deduction could be technically accomplished. It cannot be that year for which at the time of the decision of the Board the administrative and agricultural preparations of opium production (e.g. the issue of licenses to the cultivators or the sowing of the poppy plants) are already advanced.557

The Board might also have considerable difficulties in taking into account "contractual commitments to export opium", when considering the determination of the "next year" in which the deduction should be made.

In periods of shortages of opium such as those occurred in some recent years the offending country might have entered into contractual commitments to sell in advance to a particular drug manufacturer or legal opium importer at least a large part of its opium harvest in several future years. The reduction of legal opium production—the amount of opium collected by the national opium agency—might increase a possibly already existing shortage of opium available for medical purposes and that opium once in the hands of the agency is not diverted into illicit channels, but only as long as it is in the possession of the individual private cultivators of the poppy. The threat of such reduction might have some value as additional means of persuading the opium producing country involved to increase its efforts to improve its control regime; but the reduction would normally have very little if any effect on the extent of the illicit traffic in opium, particularly in opium collected in countries which have no legal control or are not able to exercise effective control in the poppy growing districts. Even those countries which have a good system of control in accordance with the requirements of the Single Convention, are not able to prevent the diversion by licensed private individual cultivators of a significant portion of their opium crops.558

The Single Convention states nowhere in which way the Board should determine for the purpose of applying article 21 bis, paragraph 2, the size of the "significant amount of opium" which would have been introduced into the illicit traffic. Normally no country knows or even can know the exact quantity of opium or of any other drug flowing into illicit channels. Only those governments would be an exception who have members who participate in or even lead the illicit traffic as actually was the case in some countries.558

The question arises whether the Board should be authorized to make an estimate of the amount of opium introduced into the illicit traffic. Several suggestions have been made to make estimates of the amounts of drugs in the illicit traffic. Some have proposed to multiply for this purpose the amount of seized drugs by twenty, others by ten; but the amount of seized drugs depends also on the efficiency of the enforcement services and in countries which have a good narcotics police the amounts of drugs seized may form a larger portion of those in the illicit traffic than in countries which have less adequate services. There may be other factors which may determine the relationship between the size of seizures and the amounts in the illicit traffic such as the length of the border which have to be watched, the nature of the frontier regions. Moreover, if the Board should base its estimates on the statistical figures on seizures of opium which governments must furnish 580 how would it be able to establish with a reasonable degree of certainty that the seized opium was produced in the country against which it would consider to take action pursuant to article 21 bis, paragraph 2? Governments sometimes report what they believe to be the origin of drugs which they seized; but they declare quite often that the origin which they indicate is only probable. They state only in relatively few oases that this information is certain. Moreover how should the Board verify that the information which it receives from governments regarding the origin of opium is correct? Should it request a sample of each quantity of opium seized and have the sample examined by the United Nations Laboratory of the Division of Narcotic Drugs? Will governments always supply such a sample? There is no provision in the Single Convention which impose upon the parties a legal obligation to do this. The Laboratory will also often be able to determine the origin of opium only with a high degree of probability and not with certainty. It may sometimes find it particularly difficult to distinguish opium grown in a country from opium grown in a neighboring country.

Finally can it be assumed that article 21, paragraph 2 would authorize the Board to decide to make the deductions in question on the basis of its estimates?
The Board could find in some cases that a certain amount of opium produced in a particular country was, beyond any reasonable doubt, introduced into the illicit traffic. This certainty could normally be established only in regard to relatively small quantities; but the Board could, under the conditions of article 21, paragraph 2 decide to deduct such quantities if "significant," from the authorized opium production and the total of the estimates of the country of origin of the opium. Such a certainty could be established, for example, with respect to some quantity of Turkish opium introduced illegally into Iran when the latter country maintained a regime of prohibition of opium production with great success.561 It must however not be overlooked that an opium producing country could, by furnishing supplementary estimates, undo that effect on the amount of its authorized production which a deduction decreed by the Board under Article 21, paragraph 2 would have. It may be necessary here to refer again to the amendment by the Protocol of the Single Convention according to which in a case of disagreement between a government and the Board concerning that government's estimates or supplementary estimates the Board would have the right to establish, communicate and publish its own estimates or supplementary estimates.562 The amendment would however not change the provision which stipulates that estimates or supplementary estimates can be changed only with the consent of the government furnishing them. In the case of the above mentioned controversy the estimates of the government and not those of the Board would have the legal effect of determining the legally authorized quantities which depend on them. The estimates of the Board would only have a moral effect. No provision of the amended Single Convention would exclude from these legal provisions the estimates or supplementary estimates 563 of the approximate quantity of opium to be produced by a country or the amendment's stipulation that these estimates should determine, as far as possible which quantity of opium the party furnishing them would be authorized to produce.564 Thus, it would be the government and not the Board which would finally determine which quantity of opium a country would be authorized to produce and this would apply also to article 21, paragraph 2 whatever deduction the Board might decide to make under this provision.

It was not the principal aim of the authors of article 21 to give the Board authority to make deductions from an offending party's authorized opium production or from that party's "total of the estimates" for opium. Their main intention appears to have been to give the Board additional means to persuade, and if necessary to bring pressure to bear upon an offending opium producing country. This intention can be seen from the provisions which would require the Board in considering a decision under article 21, paragraph 2, to take also into account any relevant new control measures which the party concerned might have adopted 565 and after notifying to the party concerned its decision to make deductions pursuant to paragraph 2, to consult with that party in order to resolve the situation satisfactorily.566 Article 21 bis also adds that if the situation would not satisfactorily be resolved the Board would be able to utilize the provisions of article 14 where appropriate.567

It may be concluded that despite the difficulties of interpreting and applying its paragraph 2 the new article 21 could be of considerable usefulness as means of persuasion and of exercising pressure.

The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances does not provide for "estimates" which parties would have to furnish nor would it limit the quantities of supplies of psychotropic substances which countries or regions would be authorized to acquire annually. It would also normally not require parties to prevent an excessive accumulation of such substances in the possession of manufacturers or traders. There would however be an important exception with respect to substances in Schedule I. Parties, to the Vienna Convention would be bound to restrict the amounts of such substances supplied to a duly authorized person to the quantities required for his authorized purpose; 568 and this would apply to specially licensed or in advance specially authorized manufacturers of, traders 569 in and distributors of substances in Schedule I as well as to those persons who under the restrictions provided for in the Convention, would be duly authorized to use these substances for scientific and "very limited medical purposes".5"

The value of a government's estimates of its opium production for determining the quantity of opium which it should be authorized to produce has been subjected above to a critical appraisal; but more generally, the whole system of estimates of drug requirements, furnished by governments, and of limiting the narcotics supplies of each country and territory in accordance with these estimates has been questioned by some critics. Doubts have been expressed that legal manufacturers or traders would divert into illicit channels quantities of drugs which would exceed those needed for legitimate business purposes or even that they could do this under the existing strict narcotics regime. It was asserted that such surplus quantities would only induce manufacturers to reduce their output and importers to decrease their purchases abroad. It is also added that by now manufacturers and importers already know the quantities which they need and that it is much more important for purposes of narcotics control to keep down the number of drug manufacturers and traders and particularly that of manufacturers than to limit the quantities of narcotics supplies by a complex system. Some of the critics of the estimate system admit however that it played an important part in preventing diversion of legal supplies into illicit channels in the years following the adoption of the 1931 Convention which introduced this system and that it may still be of some value in the case of countries which are newcomers in the field of drug manufacture.

This criticism is not justified and the estimate system has retained much of its value. The estimates which governments furnish to the Board and the information which they must supply at that organ's request in order to complete or to explain their figures "' and which could relate practically to all essential factors of their drug manufacture, trade and consumption enable the Board to review the drug situation in each country and territory from a worldwide angle and to do this on the basis of advance information and not only post factum as the Board could proceed on the basis of the statistical information which it receives.572 The Board is thus in a position to engage in early consultations about defective controls with the governments concerned and in appropriate cases to assist them in taking early corrective measures. This is particularly important in the case of those countries which rely for their drug supplies not on their own manufacture, but on imports. These importing countries include a good many states which are less advanced economically and often have a less efficient administration than the drug manufacturing countries. Such importing States, whether they are parties to the Single Convention or not, must furnish to the Board estimates of their drug requirements in order to be able, under the relevant provisions of this treaty,573 to obtain from exporting parties quantities of drugs which are calculated on the basis of their own estimates and not on the basis of those which the Board would establish if they would fail to furnish estimates themselves.574 Such importing states are thus compelled to correspond with the Board and weak administrations may thus enter quite naturally into relations of consultation with the Board which may often lead to an improvement of their drug control systems.

Reports to International Narcotics Controls Organs.—These reports are the basis for the international control of the implementation of the Single Convention in individual countries and territories. The Single Convention has separate provisions regarding the information which parties must supply to the International Narcotics Control Board and concerning that which parties are required to furnish to the Secretary General and through him to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

The items of information which parties must furnish to the Board are composed of two main groups: the estimates of their drug requirements for different purposes and statistical data on every phase of their drug economy.

While preparations are normally subject to the same regime as the drugs which they contain furnishing of estimates and statistics distinct from those dealing with those drugs is not required.575 This means that the statistical returns on manufacture need not contain figures on the amount of preparations which were compounded, but only the amount of basic drugs which was made, whether it was later used for the compounding of preparations or not. The statistical figures on consumption, import, export, stocks, on import or procurement within the country or territory for "special purposes" and on the withdrawal from "special stocks" for the requirements of the civilian population must not include the amounts of preparations involved, but the quantities of the drugs contained in these preparations. This applies also to seized preparations and their disposal, to the utilization of preparations for the compounding of preparations in Schedule III and to all the estimates. If it is estimated that preparations would be utilized for the manufacture of preparations in Schedule III the amount of drugs contained in the preparations to be so utilized must be included in the estimated quantities of these drugs to be employed for this purpose.576

As regards preparations in Schedule III, only estimates of the amount of drugs to be used for their compounding and statistical figures on the amounts of drugs actually so used need to be given.577

The items on which parties must furnish estimates of their drug requirements are laid down in article 19, paragraphs 1 and 2.578 They are under the unamended text of the Single Convention nearly the same as those which parties had to furnish under the 1931 Convention. The differences were pointed out in the discussion of the 1931 Convention in "The Gradual Evolution of the International Drug Treaty System" and in "Limitation of Narcotics Supplies". It was reported in the same section that the Vienna Convention does not require parties to furnish estimates to the Board.

The additional estimates concerning opium production and "synthetic drugs" which parties to the Single Convention would have to furnish under the amendment of this treaty were also considered in "Establishment of a Comprehensive System of Control of the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy for the Production of Opium and of the Production of Opium" in "The Situation at the End of World War II"

The statistical information which parties to the Single Convention have to supply to the Board is described in article 20.579 It refers to the production 580 or manufacture of drugs, utilization of drugs for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule III and of substances not covered by the Single Convention, utilization of poppy straw for the manufacture of drugs, consumption of drugs, imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw, seizures of drugs and disposal thereof, stocks of drugs as at 31 December of the year to which the statistical information relates, drugs imported into or procured within the country or territory for "special purposes" 581 and drugs withdrawn from "special stocks" for requirements of the civilian population. An amendment introduced by the Protocol of 1972 would also require parties to furnish statistical information on the "ascertainable area of cultivation of the opium poppy" for any purpose.582

The statistical information which parties to the Single Convention are bound to supply is very similar to that which was required under the narcotics regime preceding that Convention.583 Principal differences are (1) that this regime did not require consumption statistics for drugs in Group II of the 1931 Convention while the Single Convention provides for such statistics in respect of the corresponding group of drugs which forms now its Schedule II and (2) that figures on imports and exports of drugs in Group II had to be reported only annually while such figures in respect of drugs in Schedule II must now be supplied quarterly.584

The statistical information, which in accordance with forms prepared by the Board, parties would have to furnish under the Vienna Convention would be much more limited than that which they are required to supply under the Single Convention. It would refer only to the manufacture of substances in Schedules I, II, III and IV; to stocks of substances in Schedules I and II held by manufacturers; to the export and import of substances in Schedules I and II, these export and import figures to be subdivided by country or region of destination of origin, as the case may be; to the total quantities of substances in Schedules III and IV exported and imported without any indication of the country or region of origin or destination; to substances in Schedules II and III 5" used in the manufacture of preparations exempted pursuant to article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3 586 and to substances in Schedules II, III and IV used for industrial purposes, that is, the manufacture of non-psychotropic substances or products.587

The International Narcotics Control Board would also be entitled to require parties to furnish information in respect of the quantity of any substance in Schedule III or IV exported to and imported from each country or region. Parties would, however, have to furnish such information only if requested by the Board to do so and the Board would have to treat as confidential its request for information as well as the information given on the basis of this request if the party concerned asks for it."'

The Convention expressly states that those statistical figures which would have to be given on manufacture of psychotropic substances do not include the quantities of preparations manufactured. Only the amounts of psychotropic substances which would be manufactured would have to be furnished whether they would be employed later for the compounding of preparation or not. While normally the provisions of the Vienna Convention which would apply to the psychotropic substance concerned would also apply to the preparations which contains this substance, nevertheless, it is submitted that the stock, import and export figures which would have to be supplied pursuant to article 16, paragraphs 4-5 would not have to include the quantities of the preparations involved, but the amounts of the psychotropic substances which these preparations would contain. This would also apply to preparations if any which would be used for industrial purposes.

As regards preparations of substances in Schedules II and III, which would be exempted pursuant to article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3, only the quantities of these substances which would be used for the manufacture of these preparations would have to be reported. In respect of preparations so exempted, which would contain only a psychotropic substance in Schedule IV even this information would not be required. But this limitation of the obligation to furnish statistical data would apply only to those parties which would exempt the preparation in question and would include among the provisions from which they would exempt these preparations the relevant provisions of article 16, paragraphs 4-5. Otherwise, these parties would have to include in their stock, import and export statistics the quantities contained in the exempted preparations. All parties which would not exempt such a preparations exempted by other parties would of course have to do the same.5"

The Vienna Convention contains no separate provision which would authorize the Board to require such further information as it would consider necessary to complete or explain the information contained in the statistical returns which it would receive."' It may however be assumed that the Board would have such a right since the Vienna Convention would require the Board "to prepare annual reports on its work containing an analysis of the statistical information at its disposal, and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of Governments." 590

The Vienna Convention does not require the supply of statistical data on the production "of psycho-tropic substances." What is called "production" in the Single Convention namely "the separation of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin from the plants from which they are obtained" if applied to the separation of psychotropic substances from the plants in question would be covered by the term "manufacture" in the Vienna Convention and the quantities of such "production" would therefore have to be included in the figures on manufacture.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs could require parties to furnish to the Secretary General such statistical data on psychotropic drugs as the Board would not receive under the terms of the Vienna Convention if the Commission would find them to be necessary for the performance of its functions.

The estimates and statistical data which are enumerated in articles 19 and 20 of the Single Convention and which the Board receives under these provisions give only a very incomplete and perhaps even a somewhat misleading picture of the kind and extent of the information which the Board may receive in respect of narcotic drugs and their control in each country or territory. The Board is expressly authorized to require such further information as it considers necessary to complete or explain the information contained in the estimates and statistical information which it receives. This additional information may practically relate to any control provision of the Single Convention.591 Defective or incomplete estimates and incomplete or inaccurate statistical returns may be explained by a badly organized special administration or by a lack of such an administration.592 Manufacutre and imports in excess of the supply limits prescribed by the Convention "3 may be due not only to a defective organizational structure but also to an incorrect administration of the system of licensing and permits in regard to the manufacture of drugs 594 and of the import certificate and export authorization system.

There is no provision of the Single Convention which would limit the kind of information which the Board may use for its work, except in regard to the application of article 14. It may be induced by several kinds of reliable information from responsible resources to require governments to complete or to explain the data contained in the estimates or statistical returns which they have furnished. It may however be assumed that in such cases they may not rely on information furnished by private citizens or private organizations 595 although it has now become quite common that United Nations organs obtain information from private citizens and such organizations often without any constitutional authority to do so and even base some of their actions on such information. It is submitted that the Board would not act ultra vires when asking a country for an explanation why its statistical figures on the consumption of opium are very small, if one of its members has personally seen in that country a considerable number of opium dens which are tolerated by the local authorities although the government of such a country has indicated in its annual reports that it has prohibited opium smoking. The Board may in any event use information furnishel by the Commission,596 the Secretary General and other organs of the United Nations and those of specialized agencies even for the purposes of the sanction procedure of article 14 of the Single Convention in its unamended version.597 The amendment of article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) by the Protocol of 1972 would expressly admit for use in this sanction procedure information supplied by specialized agencies. It would add for this purpose information furnished "by either other intergovernmental organizations or international non-governmental organizations which have direct competence in the subject matter and which are in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council under Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations or which enjoy a similar status by special agreement with the council",599 provided that the organization concerned belonging to one of the two latter groups of organizations is approved by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on the Board's recommendation.

The Protocol of 1972 would also introduce an amendment 599 into the Single Convention which would require parties to furnish, "if they deem it appropriate," to the Board and the Commission, "in addition to information required by article 18, information relating to illicit traffic activity within their borders, including information on illicit cultivation, production, manufacture and use of, and on illicit trafficking in, drugs" and to do this, "as far as possible" "in such manner and by such dates as the Board may request." The amendment adds that "if requested by a party, the Board may offer its advice 600 to it in furnishing" this "information and in endeavoring to reluce the illicit drug activity" within its borders.

This provision regarding information on the illicit traffic would not create an obligation of the parties. It may also be recalled that article 18 of the Single Convention imposes upon parties an obligation to furnish to the Secretary General 601 "such information as the Commission may request as being necessary for the performance of its functions, and in particular" (inter alia) "such particulars as the Commission shall determine concerning cases of illicit traffic.'1 602 Moreover, parties are bound to furnish this information "in such manner and by such dates and use such forms as the Commission may request." 603 The Commission is also expressly authorized to call the attention of the Board to any matter which may be relevant to the functions of the Board.604 It is also submitted that the Board is already under the unamended text of the Single Convention authorized to require parties to furnish most or all the information to which the amendment under consideration refers. Parties are bound to do this in supplying such additional information to complete or explain data contained in their own statistical returns or in those of other governments as the Board may require as being necessary for this purpose. These returns relate also to seizures of drugs and to the disposal thereof.

The past Permanent Central Board as well as the present International Narcotics Control Board have repeatedly rendered its advice and even assistance to countries requesting it in regard to their drug administration and even in some of their reports declared their readiness to give advice and assistance in improving national control regimes to countries desiring it. There does not seem any provision in the unamended text which would prevent the Board from offering or rendering such advice or assistance. It is however held that it is useful to call in the text of the Convention itself the attention of governments to the possibility of obtaining this advice."605

It may be useful to mention that governments whether parties to the Single Convention or not, generally fully carry out their obligation to furnish to the Board estimates and statistical returns. For 1972 out of a total of 188 countries and territories which had to furnish estimates 174 (131 countries and 43 territories) sent their estimates themselves and only fourteen estimates (10 countries and 4 territories) had to be established by the Board. Only 20 countries or territories (14 countries and 6 territories) out of a total of 188 did not supply all or some of their annual or quarterly statistical returns for 1970.6"

This high degree of treaty implementation is of course also due to the loyal cooperation of many countries including all economically advanced and all drug manufacturing countries 607 and to the desire of countries with less efficient administrations to obtain quantities of narcotics supplies calculated on the basis of their own estimates and not on the basis of estimates established for them by the Board. This relatively satisfactory situation is however also to a considerable extent due to the fact that the Board's Secretariat sends continuously reminders to tardy governments, calls in writing the attention of the national authorities concerned to the incompleteness, inaccuracies and inconsitencies of the data contained in their documents and particularly also to discrepancies between their own import and export statistics and the corresponding export and import information of other countries. The Secretariat engages in fact continuously with a number of governments, either by correspondence and sometimes by personal meetings, in that kind of dialogue or consultation, for which the amended Convention would very usefully expressly provide.'" The Secretariat dispatches in this connection more than two thousand and probably several thousands of communications each year.

The Information which parties would have to furnish to the Secretary General and through him to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs is described in article 18 of the Single Convention. This obligation is defined in general terms according to which the parties are required to furnish to the Secretary General such information as the Commission may request as being necessary for the performance of its functions 809 and to do this in such manner and by such dates and by using such forms as the Commission may request.61° Some of the specific reports which are included in this general obligation of parties are specially mentioned: 6" annual reports on the working of the Convention in each country or territory,612 the texts of laws and regulations promulgated to give effect to the Single Convention,613 important cases of the illicit traffic and the names and addresses of the government authorities empowered to issue export and import authorizations or certificates.614

In the form whose use the Commission prescribes for use in preparing the annual reports,615 governments are required to furnish to the Secretary General and thus to the Commission information which covers inter alia: steps including preliminary steps taken to become a party of the ten multilateral drug treaties in force; 616 other international agreements or arrangements relating to narcotic drugs, whether bilateral or concluded by more than two countries; laws and regulations enacted to implement any of the four treaties under whose terms the annual reports are made; administrative arrangements for drug control; control of the international trade; control of manufacture, including the names and addresses of narcotics factories and the drugs each of them is authorized to make and their designations; 617 control of domestic trade; prohibition of manufacture of, international and domestic trade in, and use of some narcotic drugs; data on cultivators of plants from which narcotic drugs are obtained; statistical figures on drug abuse; and illicit traffic with many details.
In the form 618 which the Commission prescribes for use by governments in making their reports on important individual cases of the illicit traffic governments are required to supply information which includes inter alia: the kind and weight of the seized drug; the place and date of the illicit transaction or seizure; packing, labelling and trade mark of the seized substance; type of transportation used by the illicit trafficker (including name, owner, nationality and ,registration of ships, aircraft or other vehicle involved); route followed by the drug; destination; place of acquisition of the drug by the culprit; place where the drug was manufactured or where the plant was cultivated from which the drug was obtained; means by which the drug was obtained; in case of clandestine laboratories the apparatus seized; personal data of the trafficker and judicial or administrative measures taken against him.

This large list of data which is by no means exhaustive would give the Commission much material for the purpose of reviewing the working of narcotics control in each country and territory. Unfortunately, however, the reporting of governments to the Secretary General for use by the Commission is often very unsatisfactory. Some of the defects of the reports which are being submitted were summarized by the past Permanent Central Board. Essential data are frequently missing. The phrase "does not apply" or the word "nil" is used as answer to many important questions contained in the Commission's forms to be used for the reporting. Very often the same answer as in an earlier report is literally reproduced in subsequent reports without consideration of new developments; different reports of the same country sometimes contradict one another; the reported data are not unfrequently even incorrect as travellers in the countries concerned can quite easily observe; one can often note that a considerable number of the reports have been written in a routine fashion and sometimes by officials who are not equal to their tasks or do not appreciate the importance of their work or do not even know and are not able to obtain all the relevant data on which they have to report.619 While the reporting on the illicit traffic although still very unsatisfactory may be a little better, the reporting on the extent of drug addiction is particularly deficient. This is still so although the reports of a few countries have improved in this respect in recent years. Many of the numbers of addicts given in the annual reports of governments are so low as to leave hardly any doubt that they are far from reality.620 As regards countries in which addicts cannot obtain their drugs from legal supplies, but must rely for them on the illicit traffic it is certainly difficult to establish with some degree of accuracy the number of such addicts as it would be difficult to compute the numbers of other types of legal offenders; but even such countries are surely able to give a much more realistic estimate of the extent of their problem of addiction than they actually often do in their annual reports to the Secretary General. In other countries in which all or some addicts obtain their drugs on medical prescription doctors often refuse to report addicts to the authorities, justifying their position by the principle of the confidential character of the relationship between doctor and patient; but despite this principle they are bound and agree to report cases of contagious diseases; and drug addiction may be considered to be a contagious condition. Where doctors are willing to report the numbers, but not the names of the addicts whom they treat, the computation of the number of addicts is quite often impeded by the fact that some of them are "treated" by two or more doctors. Some countries whose addicts are supplied from legal sources have also made efforts to arrive at an estimate of the number of addicts by analysing the prescriptions which pharmacies are under the Single Convention required to maintain for a minimum period of two years.621

The quality of annual reports which have been furnished in recent years is considerably inferior to what it was in the period of the League of Nations and in the early years of the United Nations. This is certainly to a considerable degree due to the fact that a number of newly independent States lack experienced personnel while formerly their annual reports were prepared by colonial officials of their respective metropolitan countries; but this cause will certainly lose its effect as the new countries succeed in developing their own efficient civil service. But there are other reasons for this deterioration which are caused by the administrative practice of the United Nations itself.

Contrary to the earlier practice, the Secretary General does not anymore distribute to governments copies of the annual reports or of the individual reports on important cases of the illicit traffic. These reports are retained in the archives of the United Nations. This change was apparently done for economy reasons, because the translation of the reports into the five "official" languages 622 or even only into the "working" languages 623 and to some extent also the reproduction and distribution of such extensive documentation would involve great expenses. As before the United Nations secretariat prepares summaries of the annual reports,624 and also some summaries of the reports on cases of the illicit traffic.625 These summaries are transmitted to governments and also reviewed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Which facts contained in the Annual Reports are important to be included in the summary is therefore decided by the officer of the Division of Narcotic Drugs and the Commission is not in a position to consider the full annual reports but only those parts of them which an international civil servant selects for this purpose. In fact the Commission has in recent years devoted very little attention to these summaries, particularly to those of the annual reports.626 Its members prefer to discuss the situation in those countries which are of particular interest to them as sources of their narcotics supplies and they rely in this discussion more on information which they receive through their own governmental channels than on that which they may learn from the annual reports furnished under the narcotics treaties. This discussion is however impeded by worldwide political considerations of the victims of the illicit traffic 627 as well as by the increased national sensitivity of those countries whose stewardship should be subjected to the opprobrium of international public opinion by its discussion in public sessions of the Commission.

The quality of the reports of government could be improved if they would be sent again to governments and also individually reviewed by the Commission which, by the reforms suggested below in "The Commission on Narcotic Drugs," would be in a position to discuss the drug situation in different countries with less attention to political problems than it can do today.

It would also be useful if the United Nations secretariat would engage in persistently reminding tardy Governments and in calling their attention to lacunae, inconsistencies and other defects in their reports, similarly as the Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board proceeds in respect of estimates and statistical returns. The United Nations Secretariat is expressly authorized by a resolution of the Economic and Social Council 628 to ask governments to furnish such explanations or additional information regarding statements contained in annual reports, seizure reports, texts of laws and regulations or in other reports forwarded by them to the Secretary General as may be necessary to enable the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to discharge its functions. The United Nations Secretariat does this to some extent; but its efforts should be increased and it should be enabled to do this by obtaining the required additional staff qualified for this task.

The Protocol of 1972 would not amend article 18.629 Despite appearances to the contrary the Vienna Convention would not impose on parties less far-reaching obligations to report, through the Secretary General, to the Commission on psychotropic substances than the Single Convention does in regard to "narcotic drugs." 630

The obligation of parties to make these reports under the Vienna Convention is formulated in literally the same general terms as the corresponding obligation of parties under the Single Convention. The parties to the Vienna Convention would be required to furnish to the Secretary General such information on psychotropic substances as the Commission would request as being necessary for the performance of its functions.631 They would also have to do this in such a manner and by such dates as the Commission would request.632 Although the Vienna Convention would not expressly authorize the Commission to prescribe the forms which governments should use in reporting to the Commission it is submitted that its right to determine the "manner" in which the reports should be made, would also include the right to prescribe these forms. The Vienna Convention mentions some reports which parties would have to make in accordance with their general obligation. So does the Single Convention. The Vienna Convention indicates some of the contents which the annual reports would have to include, namely: important changes in the laws and regulations concerning psychotropic substances and significant developments in the abuse of and the illicit traffic in psychotropic substances; the Single Convention does not do this in respect of narcotic drugs, but the Commission requires the inclusion in the annual reports of this information in regard to such drugs and in any event would be authorized to require this inclusion. The Vienna Convention also mentions expressly the obligation of parties to notify the Secretary General of the names and addresses of the governmental authorities which would be charged with the administration of its control regime for international transactions in psychotropic substances and would require the Secretary General to make this information available to all parties.633 The Single Convention requires the parties to supply the same information in regard to narcotic drugs without however expressly indicating an obligation of the Secretary General to furnish this information to the parties; 634 but the Secretary General does this anyway.

The Vienna Convention would expressly require—as the Single Convention does—that parties should furnish reports on important cases of the illicit traffic.836 While both treaties stipulate that a case may be important because of the quantities involved, the method employed by the illicit traffickers or the light thrown on the sources from which the illicit supplies are obtained the Vienna Convention adds that a case may also be important because of the new trends of illicit traffic which it may revea1.636 The Vienna Convention would also require parties immediately to send copies of their reports on important cases of the illicit traffic to the other parties directly concerned, either through the diplomatic channels or the competent authorities designated by the parties for this purpose.637 The Single Convention does not provide for such a communication, but the Secretary General transmits summaries of these reports to all parties to the Convention and to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Vienna Convention would not expressly require the furnishing of the text of all laws and regulations promulgated in order to give effect to its provision as the Single Convention does in respect of its own provisions;6" but the Commission under its general authority to require parties to furnish such information as it would request as being necessary for the performance of its functions under the Vienna Convention, could obligate parties to supply the texts of the laws and obligations enacted to carry out this treaty.

It is submitted that these divergences between the two treaties which have just been described in some detail only indicate the different emphasis which the authors of the two treaties might have placed on particular types of information. They are legally irrelevant, since the Commission could under both treaties obtain from the parties all the information which it would request as being necessary for the performance of its functions under the treaty concerned.

Changes in the Schedules of the Single Convention

Under the Single Convention as well as under the Vienna Convention, changes in their respective Schedules can be brought about in a procedure in which
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs as well as the World Health Organization must take part.639 The role which the World Health Organization plays in this procedure is different under the terms of these two treaties. Under the Single Convention the Commission may make a change in any of its Schedules only in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, but it can refuse to act in accordance with this recommendation. It cannot make any change which was not recommended by the World Health Organization!'" However, under the terms of the Vienna Convention the Commission could make a change in any of the Schedules which would not agree with the World Health Organi7ation's recommendation. In making its decisions the Commission would take into account the recommendation of the World Health Organization whose assessment would be "determinative as to medical and scientific matters" and bear in mind "the economic, Social legal, administrative and other factors" which it might consider relevant.'

The United States could prevent any decision of the Commission concerning a change in a Schedule of the Vienna Convention which would run counter to a policy agreed upon by the government departments in question 642 in the spirit of the relevant provisions of the "Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970." 643 This opinion is based on the provision of article 17, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention which stipulates that decisions of the Commission changing a Schedule would require a two-thirds majority of its members. However it is also held that the United States could not only prevent decisions of the Commission which would run counter to such a policy, but would also generally be able to obtain the required consent of the Commission's two-thirds majority to placing an additional substance under the control of the Vienna Convention whenever it considers such a measure necessary in accordance with a national policy adopted by the two departments."'

Despite important differences the procedures of the two conventions for effecting changes in their respective Schedules also show considerable similarities. In both cases the procedure can be initiated only by a notification either of the Party to the Convention concerned or by the World Health Organization to the Secretary General. A party or the World Health Organization is required to make such a notification if it has information which in its opinion may require an amendment to any of the Schedules of the treaty in question.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs may require parties to subject a substance, not yet controlled by the Convention, to provisional control pending its final decision on the control status of that substance while it would not have this power under the Vienna Convention.845 Parties to the Vienna Convention would however be required to examine the possibility of the provisional application to a substance which is a subject of the procedure pursuant to article 2, of all measures of control applicable to substances in Schedule I or Schedule II, as appropriate, if the information transmitted to them together with the notification of a party or the World Health Organization which would have initiated the procedure, would indicate that the substance involved would be suitable for inclusion in Schedule I or Schedule II. This requirement of examining the possibility of applying such provisional control would apply to substances which would not yet be controlled by the Vienna Convention as well as to substances which would already be in Schedule II, III or IV, of that Convention. The parties would have to make this examination "in the light of all information available to them." 646

Before discussing the descriptions, in the two Conventions, of the conditions under which a substance could be placed under the control regime of the treaty concerned three general observations may be made:

•    Only a substance which would not yet be "under international control" could be placed under the control regime of the Vienna Convention.847 What is meant by "international control" is control by the Single Convention, and not control by a preceding narcotics treaty. All drugs covered by control provisions of the earlier treaties are at present also controlled by the Single Convention. It is submitted that removal of a drug from the control of the Single Convention would under the conditions of article 2 of the Vienna Convention make it possible to subject it to an appropriate regime of the latter treaty although that drug might continue to be controlled by provisions of earlier narcotics treaties. There is on the other hand no provision of the Single Convention which would make it impossible to place under the regime of that treaty a substance which would be and continue to be controlled by the Vienna Convention. However, such an arrangement would hardly be practicable although the application of the provisions of both treaties to the same substance would be possible since they would not be incompatible with each other.

•    Under the Single Convention not only dangerous substances which it defines for this purpose can be placed under international control but also those. which are "convertible" into drugs already under the control of that treaty. The Vienna Convention would not provide for the control of substances which would be "convertible" into psychotropic substances already under its control or into substances which would have the dangerous properties which under the provisions of article 2 would render it possible to place them under that control.648

•    The definitions in the two Conventions, of the dangerous substances which may be placed under their respective regime are overlapping.

Definition of the dangerous substances which may be placed under international control under the two treaties under consideration

Single Convention

Under the Single Convention the Commission on Narcotic Drugs may place under the Convention's control 649 only a substance which the World Health Organization has found to be liable to "similar" abuse and productive of "similar" ill effects as the drugs in Schedule I or Schedule II (i.e. as drugs already under the Convention's control) or to be convertible into a "drug" (a substance already under the Convention's control). 650 One could formulate this definition in more popular term by declaring that the substances involved must be found to be liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as morphine, cocaine or cannabis or to be convertible into drugs already under the control of the Single Convention.

It is of course within the competence of the World Health Organization to decide whether a substance has such properties and to interpret the relevant provision of the Single Convention when applying it. There may also be varying degrees of "similarity" and the Single Convention does not indicate what degree is required. It is therefore left to the judgment of the World Health Organization to decide what it considers to be "similar" for the purpose of this provision. In doing this it will also be guided by the risk which in its opinion the substance presents for public health and social welfare. One may mention that the World Health Organization has in practice not refused to assume the similarity of the dangerous properties of a substance with those of a drug already under control because the substance is much more potent than the drug as long as the dangerous effects of the substance are similar in kind to those of the controlled drug with which it is being compared. Etorphine and acetorphine are many times more potent than morphine. Following the above mentioned line of reasoning both of these drugs have been placed in Schedules I and IV of the Single Convention because they have morphine like effects. It may therefore be assumed that tetrahydrocannabinols which are in Schedule I of the Vienna Convention could be placed under the control of the Single Convention because they have cannabis like effects although much more potent ones than cannabis or cannabis resin.

It has been admitted by officials of the World Health Organization in meetings as well as in discussions with the writer of this paper that the ill effects of amphetamines could for the purpose of applying articic 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii) be considered "similar" to those of cocaine, both causing central nervous system stimulation. They have equally asserted that the ill effects of barbiturates which are addiction producing and of those tranquilizers which are also addiction producing could also for this purpose be considered to be similar to the ill-effects of morphine, all of these drugs producing central nervous system depression. The reason why the World Health Organization cannot assume this similarity is not necessarily technical, but legal. The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations ruled, in an opinion given to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its twenty-third session that barbiturates, tranquilizers and amphetamines were outside the scope of the Single Convention. The Office based this opinion on the consideration that there was an understanding at all stages of the drafting of the Single Convention and in particular also at the Conference of 1961 which adopted the Single Convention that this treaty should not be applicable to these three types of substances although the effects of the amphetamines have some degree of similarity to cocaine and those of barbiturates and some tranquilizers to morphine. It may be added that this understanding was reached at the 1961 Conference particularly at the insistence of the American delegation. This delegation was obviously motivated in this by the opinion that the huge burden which would be placed on international and national control organs by subjecting amphetamines,65' barbiturates and tranquilizers to the narcotics regime would fatally weaken this regime in the campaign against addiction to narcotic drugs and thus frustrate international efforts which had been made for more than half a century. The delegation also appears to have held that the narcotics regime was not suitable for those barbiturates and tranquilizers which were consumed in quantities which were a multiple of the amounts of even the most popular narcotics such as codeine which were prescribed for legitimate therapeutic purposes. One would have to keep a proper balance between the requirements of fighting drug abuse and those of facilitating legitimate medical use.

vention to amphetamines, barbiturates and tranquilizers if no party. to the Convention would object to such a course cif action!'652

The legal opinion did not exclude the hallucinogenic drugs from the scope of the Single Convention. Those of them which the World Health Organization would find to have ill-effects "similar" to those of cannabis and cannabis resin could therefore be placed under the international narcotics regime by the operation of article 3 of the Single Convention.

The Possibility of Placing Amphetamines under the International Narcotics Regime.

It is possible that there would now be no objection to placing some or all of the amphetamines under the narcotics regime. The agreement of all parties many of which accepted the Single Convention on the basis of the above mentioned understanding would be required for this purpose. The following procedure could be followed: A resolution could be introduced in the Economic and Social Council requesting all parties to the Single Convention to agree to setting aside the understanding referred to repeatedly, in respect of amphetamines to be indicated and stating that all parties which would not expressly object in writing to the Secretary General within an indicated period of time would be considered to have agreed. If this resolution is adopted by the Council and no party objects to the suggested agreement the amphetamines in question could be notified to the Secretary General,'" the required finding and recommendation of the World Health Organization could be obtained and the Commission could decide to place the amphetamines involved under the narcotics regime. Another course of action could also be considered. The inclusion of the amphetamines in question in Schedule I of the Single Convention 654 could be brought before the Council in form of a treaty amendment and the Council could be asked to circulate the proposed amendment pursuant to article 47, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention. If no party objects within the eighteen months referred to in article 47, paragraph 2 the amendment would enter into force. It is held that this procedure would probably take more time than the first proposed above for placing amphetamines under the international narcotics regime. In the case of both procedures it would be necessary that the United States and other interested countries such as Sweden inform all parties to the Single Convention of their interest in placing the amphetamines under the narcotics regime. Such a course of action would most vested interests to move uninformed or otherwise influenced governments to object to the placement of the amphetamines concerned under the narcotics regime.

The two proposed procedures for placing the amphetamines in question under the narcotics regime, if successful, would probably have the advantage of achieving quicker the aims of placing these drugs under international control than this would be the case under the Vienna Convention whose entering into force may perhaps take a very long time. Moreover, the narcotics regime applicable to drugs in Schedule I is somewhat stronger than the regime which would be applied to amphetamines in Schedule II of the Vienna Convention.

There are however two very serious arguments against placing the amphetamines under the narcotics regime in order to frustrate the efforts of probably delay and perhaps prevent the coming into force of the Vienna Convention. Moreover, it would set a precedent which would strengthen the position of those who might wish to place, by the same kind of procedure, barbiturates and tranquilizers under the narcotics regime. This would be very undesirable and in the case of some of the more valuable and widely used of these drugs very harmful from the viewpoint of public health. The United States and other countries, by their objection, could prevent the placement of these drugs under the narcotics regime. But the pressures which would arise would be very unpleasant and the position of the United States in its efforts to make its views on opium control prevail on the international scene might be considerably weakened.

Substances which may be placed under the control of the Vienna Convention.
The exclusion from this control of substances already under "international control" and of those which do not have themselves the required dangerous properties but are only "convertible" into such dangerous substances has been mentioned above.

A substance could be placed under the regime of the Vienna Convention only if it would be found by the World Health Organization to have the capacity to produce

•    A state of dependence and certain mind altering effects (i.e. central nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor function or thinking or behavior or perception or mood), or

•    Similar abuse and similar ill effects as a substance in Schedules I, II, III or IV.

Moreover, even a substance having these dangerous properties could be placed under the control of the Vienna Convention only if the World Health Organization would find "that there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing of the substance under international control." 655

It would be required that the abuse or likelihood of abuse of the dangerous substance constitutes an international health and social problem in the sense that lack of control or defective control in one country would endanger the effectiveness of the control measures in another country. If this would not be the case the problem would not be "international" solely because the abuse or the likelihood of abuse of the substance would occur in more than one country. If the term "international" would not be understood in this sense certainly alcohol and most probably also tobacco could be placed under the Vienna Convention because they would be found to have the required dangerous properties and because they constitute "a public health and social problem" in many countries. The authors of the Vienna Convention had undoubtedly no intention to place alcohol and tobacco under its regime. Moreover if the term "international" were not understood to have the suggested meaning and if the very improbable situation would arise in which the Commission would consider the international control of alcohol or tobacco the United States could doubtless prevent such control particularly also because the Commission would have to take the decision to control by a two-thirds majority of its members.656

The definitions, in the Single Convention and the Vienna Convention, of the substances which could be placed under their respective regimes are overlapping. An examination of the definition of the Vienna Convention, reveals that any of the drugs under the Single Convention which are themselves liable to abuse and productive of ill-effects as described in that treaty's definition "7 and not only convertible into such dangerous drugs could be placed under the Vienna Convention if it would be removed from the control of the Single Convention.

Under both Conventions the Commission would not be bound to make a change in a Schedule if all conditions required for such action would exist."8 It would in such a case have discretionary power to adopt or reject the revision of the Schedule in question.

The decisions of the Commission amending the Schedules of the Single Convention may be adopted by "a majority of its members present and voting" 659 while those amending the Schedules of the Vienna Convention would require a two-thirds majority of its total membership.858

Schedules

Both Conventions have several lists (Schedules) of substances to which they apply somewhat divergent regimes of varying strictness. The differences between the regimes of the Vienna Convention are greater than those between the regimes of the Single Convention.

The Single Convention has three such Schedules: Schedule I which is subject to the standard regime, Schedule II which is exempted from a few controls applicable to Schedules I and IV which is subject to controls formulated in rather vague terms,"° in addition to those applicable to Schedule I.

The Vienna Convention has four Schedules numbered I, II, III and IV subject to four different control regimes. A Schedule with a lower number is controlled by a more strict regime than a Schedule with a higher number.

The Single Convention has, in addition, a Schedule III which does not list drugs but preparations which are subject to a particularly lenient regime. While preparations of narcotic drugs are generally subject to the same regime as the drugs which they contain preparations in Schedule III whether they contain drugs in Schedules I or II are even exempt from some provisions which apply to preparation of drugs in Schedule II, the most important being those requiring the application of the import certificate and export authorization system. If the World Health Organization finds that a preparation because of the substances which it contains is not liable to that abuse and cannot produce those ill-effects which would justify placing a substance under the control of the Single Convention and that the drug therein is not readily recoverable the Commission may, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, include that preparation in Schedule III.'" Such a decision is effective for all parties and all of them may apply to the preparation concerned the lenient regime provided for preparations in Schedule 111.662

The Controls applicable to the different Schedules of the Single Convention and of the Vienna Convention were discussed above in connection with the relevant provisions of the Single Convention or with that of corresponding provisions of earlier drug treaties.

The Vienna Convention does not have a Schedule corresponding to Schedule III of the Single Convention. Similarly as the Single Convention it would provide that a preparation should normally be subject to the same measures of control as the psyehotropic substances which it would contain and if it would contain more than one psychotropic substance, to the measures applicable to the most strictly controlled of these substances.663 However, a party by its unilateral action, could under certain conditions exempt from some required controls a preparation containing a psychotropic substance other than a substance in Schedule I. It could do this in the case of a preparation which would be compounded in such a way that it would present no, or a negligible risk of abuse and that the psychotropic substance could not be recovered by readily applicable means in a quantity liable to abuse, so that the preparation would not give rise to a public health and social problem.664 A party could exempt such a preparation from all or some of the prescribed control measures other than:

•    Article 8 except insofar as it would require the licensing of the manufacture of exempted preparations.

•    Article 11 except insofar as it would require the manufacturer of exempted preparations to keep records as to the quantity of each psychotropic substance used in the manufacture of an exempted preparation, and as to the nature, total quantity and initial disposal of the exempted preparation manufactured from that substance.

•    Article 13 which would require parties to take measures to ensure that none of those psychotropic substances should be exported from their territories to a Party or to its region or regions concerned whose import into its country or into one or several of its regions that party would have prohibited by a notification addressed, through the Secretary General, to all the other Parties. Quantities whose import the prohibiting party would in each case authorize by a "special import license" would however be excepted from this import and export prohibition. This prohibition with its exceptions would apply to "exempted preparations" as to other preparations of the psychotropic substances concerned.

•    Article 15 insofar as it would require Parties to provide for inspections of the premises, stocks and records of the manufacturer of exempted preparations.

•    Article 16 insofar as it would require parties to furnish to the International Narcotics Control Board statistics on the quantities of each substance in Schedules II and III used in the manufacture of exempted preparations.

•    Article 22 insofar as the application of its penal provisions would be necessary for the repression of acts contrary to laws and regulations adopted to carry out the obligations referred to above. Article 22 would also have to• be applied to the extent necessary for the repression of acts contrary to laws and regulations adopted to carry out other provisions from which the party concerned would not have exempted the preparation concerned or those provisions whose inclusion in the exemption would have been cancelled pursuant to article 3, paragraph 4.665

Only the party which would make the exemption would be freed from the obligation to apply to the preparation concerned the provisions from which it would exempt that preparation. Other parties would not have that freedom except if they would also exempt this preparation and only to the extent as their own exemption would provide for the discontinuation of application of control measures.

The requirement of a medical prescription 666 and that of applying the import certificate and export authorization system to substances in Schedule II 667 as well as the obligation to declare the export of substances in Schedule III 668 are among the measures from which a preparation could be exempted. Any exemption of a preparation made by a party could be partially or fully terminated by a decision of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs taken in accordance with a procedure 669 which is patterned after the procedure which would have to be followed in the case of changes in the Schedules of the Vienna Convention.670 The Commission would have to adopt, by a two-thirds majority of its members,67' its decision to terminate, partially or fully, an exemption. Its decision would take effect within 180 days from "the date" of its communication by the Secretary General to the Members of the United Nations, to non-member States parties to the Vienna Convention, to the World Health Organization and to the International Narcotics Control Board.

No provision is made for review of the Commission's decision by the Economic and Social Council nor for partial "rejection" of the Commission's decision on the pattern of that for which article 2, paragraph 7 provides in cases of changes by the Commission in the Schedules of the Single Convention.

It is quite possible that a provision such as that of article 3 permitting unilateral exemption by parties of preparations from some controls had to be included in the Vienna Convention in order not to impede the easy availability of very useful and widely employed medicined. It may however be added that article 3 unless carried out in good faith by all parties might seriously reduce the effectiveness of the control provisions governing psychotropic substances in Schedule II, III and IV.

Criteria for Inclusion in Particular Schedules.

The texts of both Conventions provide for some criteria which might guide the World Health Organization in recommending and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in deciding in which Schedule a substance should be included.

The Single Convention stipulates that the Commission may, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, include in Schedule IV a drug listed in Schedule I, if that Organization finds that this drug is particularly liable to "abuse" and to produce "ill effects" 672 and that such liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances other than drugs in Schedule IV.673

The views of the Technical Committee of the Conference which adopted the Single Convention, as regards the kind of drugs (Schedules I, II and IV) and preparations (Schedule III) which should be included in that Convention's different Schedules.

The Committee reported that in composing the Schedules it was guided by the substance's "degree of liability to abuse" and its "risk to public health and welfare."

In Schedule I were in particular to be included those drugs which:

•    Have addiction-producing or addiction-sustaining properties greater than those of codeine and more or less comparable to those of morphine,

•    Are convertible into substances having addiction-producing or addiction-sustaining properties with an ease or yield such as to constitute a risk of abuse greater than that of codeine,

•    Have a liability to abuse comparable to that of cannabis, cannabis resin or cocaine or,

•    Are convertible into substances having a liability to abuse comparable to that of cannabis, cannabis resin or cocaine.

The Technical Committee's detailed rules would provide for inclusion in Schedule II the following drugs:

•    Those having addiction-producing or addiction-sustaining properties not greater than those of codeine but at least as great as those of dextropropoxyphene, or 674

•    Those being convertible into a substance having addiction-producing or addiction-sustaining properties with an ease and yield such as to constitute a risk of abuse not greater than that of codeine.

In the Technical Committee's view the following drugs were to be included in Schedule IV:

•    Which have strong addiction-producing properties or a liability of abuse not offset by therapeutic advantages which cannot be afforded by some other drug, and/or

•    Whose deletion from general medical practice is desirable because of their risk to public health.

The Committee finally held that the following preparations could be included in Schedule III:

•    Which are intended for legitimate medical use, and

•    Which have a specified drug content and are compounded with one or more ingredients in such a way that the preparation has no, or a negligible risk of abuse, and in such a way, that the drug cannot be recovered by readily applicable means or in yield which would constitute a risk to public health.675

In practice the World Health Organization in its recommendations and the Commission in its decisions have been guided by the provisions of the Convention (Article 3, paragraph 4 for preparations in Schedule III and article 3, paragraph 5 for drugs in Schedule IV) and by considerations of the degree of liability of abuse and by the extent of the risk to public health and welfare, of the drug or preparation concerned and not necessarily by the more detailed rules of the Technical Committee.

The Vienna Convention also points to certain factors which the World Health Organization would have to take into account in recommending the particular Schedule in which in its opinion a substance under consideration should be placed. These factors are in essence very similar to those' which guide in the choice of a Schedule under the Single Convention. The World Health Organization would, under the Vienna Convention, be required to communicate to the Commission an assessment of the substance under consideration, which would include not only its finding regarding the dangerous properties of that substance, but also its views on the extent or likelihood of abuse of the substance, on the degree of seriousness of the public health and social problem which the substance constitutes, and on the degree of its usefulness in medical therapy. The Organization would also have to transmit to the Commission, together with this assessment, its recommendations on the control measures, if any, that would be appropriate in the light of this assessment.676 It will be recalled that this assessment would be "determinative" as to medical and scientific matters.877

In deciding whether a substance would be controlled and if so in which Schedule it should be placed the Commission would have to take into consideration all these elements contained in the World Health Organization's communication and would also have to bear in mind the "economic, social, legal, administrative and other factors" to which it is referred by the Convention.678

Legal Remedies available to Parties against decisions of the Commission regarding changes in the Schedules of the Single Convention or of the Vienna Convention

Under both treaties such decisions are subject to review by the Economic and Social Council at the request of any Party to the Convention concerned. Under the Vienna Convention a party would moreover have the right to refuse to carry out some of the obligations which would be imposed upon it by the Commission's decision.

Review by the Economic and Social Council"679

Under the Single Convention only those decisions of the Commission which would amend any of its Schedules would be subject to review by the Council while under the Vienna Convention not only such decisions but also those which would refuse to make an amendment to any of its Schedules could be reviewed by the Council at the request of a party to this treaty.680

Under both treaties a request for review would not have a suspensive effect. During the pendency of the review the original decision of the Commission would remain in effect, in the case of the Vienna Convention subject to the right of a party to refuse to carry out some of the control measures which would be required by the Commission's decision!'681

The value of the possibility of review by the council of the Commission's decision is questionable. The Council is composed of Government representatives few, if any, of which would have the technical knowledge required for such a review. Many of these representatives do not have qualified technical advisers or even the possibility of obtaining from their governments technically sound instructions for this purpose.682 This was even the case when the Council was composed of 18 members as was the case when the Single Convention was adopted in 1961. The Council's membership was meanwhile increased to 27 by an amendment of the Charter of the United Nations 633 and will be increased to 54 by another Amendment of the Charter when in force.6" The membership of the Social Committee of the Council was already increased to 54.685 It is this Committee which deals with drug problems and whose recommendations on this matter are normally accepted by the Council's Plenary Session. This increase in membership obviously reduces the capacity of the Council to review decisions of the Commission in a technically sound manner. Review of administrative action by a superior authority is an appropriate remedy in national administration but rarely in international administration which does not have the required kind of organizational machinery for this purpose.

The decisions of the Commission concerning the Schedules of the two Conventions could only be reviewed under the conditions and in accordance with the procedure required by the treaty concerned. They could not be reviewed by the Council as the Council could do in regard to decisions of its Functional Commission which are taken under their terms of reference granted to them by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations.686

The Vienna Convention does not provide for review by the Council of a decision of the Commission to terminate, under its article 3, paragraph 4, fully or partially the exemption of a preparation while decisions under the Single Convention to place a preparation in Schedule III or to remove it therefrom are subject to such a review.

Since the Single Convention came into force there was not a single request for review by the Council of a decision by the Commission to change a Schedule of that Convention.

The right of a party to refuse to carry out some control measures which would be required by a decision of the Commission amending a Schedule of the Vienna Convention ("Right of Non-Acceptance" or "Right of Rejection") 687

A party would have to exercise this right within 180 days after the "date" of the .Secretary General's communication of the Commission's decision "to all Members of the United Nations, to non-member States to this Convention, to the World Health Organization and to the (International Narcotics Control) Board." The party would have to do this in case of a "decision adding a substance to a Schedule" by a written notice addressed to the Secretary General that, "in view of exceptional circumstances," it would not be in a position to give effect to all of the provisions of the Convention applicable to substances in that Schedule. The notice would have to state the reasons for the exceptional situation which would move the Party to give such a notice. A party which would give such a notice would nevertheless have to apply, as a minimum, certain control measures which would differ in regard to substances placed in different Schedules.688

There cannot be any doubt that this right of a party would not only apply to a previously uncontrolled substance which would be added to a Schedule because provision is made not only for such a case 686 but also for a case in which a substance would be transferred from a Schedule subject to less strict controls to a Schedule governed by stricter controls.690

Although the introductory sub-paragraph appears to authorize the written notice under consideration in the case of any, addition of a substance to a Schedule which would also include the transfer of a substance from a Schedule, subject to a more severe regime, to a Schedule controlled by a more lenient regime no provision is made for the effects which the notice would have in the case of such a transfer. It would be the better opinion that the provisions regarding the written notices in question do not apply to such a transfer.

Article 2, paragraph 7 does not apply to the removal of a substance from control 691 and to a decision of the Commission to terminate, in accordance with article 3, paragraph 4, partially or entirely the exemption of a preparation.

The question arises as to the effect of the written notice pursuant to paragraph 7 regarding partial noncompliance with a decision of the Commission, in the case of review of this decision and its possible alteration by the Economic and Social Council under paragraph 8. It must be admitted that the text of the Convention is not clear on this point.

The relief which parties could obtain by a written notice pursuant to paragraph 7 was not intended to be only provisional if the Commission's decision would be reviewed by the Council and definite only if such a review would not take place. The "exceptional circumstances" which under paragraph 7 would cause a party to give a written notice that it would not be in a position to give effect to all the provisions applicable to the Schedule to which the substance concerned would be added, would not be changed by a decision of the Economic and Social Council. Moreover, it was expressly proposed at the Conference which adopted the Vienna Convention that the effect of the written notice should be only provisional in the case of review by the Council of the Commission's decision. It was proposed that a provision such as that contained in article 2, paragraph 8, subparagraph (d) of the Revised Draft Protocol on Psychotropic Drugs in the version suggested by a minority of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs which prepared this draft, should be included in the Vienna Convention. This sub-paragraph (d) reads:

"If the Council confirms or alters the decision of the Commission a Party shall comply with the decision of the Council, notwithstanding any notice of non-acceptance that it has made."692

This question was discussed rather extensively in the Committee on Control Measures of the Conference which adopted the Vienna Convention.693 The Committee decided not to include the proposed additional provision and to transmit to the Plenipotentiary Conference a text without it.694 The Conference acted in accordance with the Committtee's recommendation.695 The refusal of the Conference to accept the provision requiring a Party to comply with the Council's decision notwithstanding its written notice that it would not be in a position to carry out all the measures required by the Commission's decision which would have been reviewed by the Council, appears to show clearly that it was not the Conference's intention to deprive the Party's notice of its effects in a case of this kind.

The texts of article 2, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (c) of the Vienna Convention and of article 3, paragraph 8 sub-paragraph (c) of the Single Convention are literally identical, except that the latter provision contains the words "and the decision of the Council shall be final" while the former does not.

If one accepts the view which accords with the Conference's intention that the written notice given pursuant to paragraph 7 would remain effective although the Commission's decision in question would have been reviewed and might even have been altered by the Council the rather difficult question arises what should be the effects of the notice. Here again the text of the Convention does not give an answer. Two possible views are suggested for consideration:

• The effects of the notice would not be affected by the review or by the results of the review by the Council. This means that the minimum obligations of a Party which would give the notice under consideration would depend on the Schedule to which the previously uncontrolled substance would be added 696 by the Commission or on the more strictly controlled Schedules to which a substance from a more lenient regime would be moved,697 no matter which Schedule would be finally chosen in the reviewing process, or

•    The effects of the notice would be those mentioned above pending the Council's review 698 and would later be those which they would have been if the Commission's decision would have been the same as that adopted by the reviewing Council, that is, the notice would after the end of the Council's review impose upon the Party concerned such obligations as if the Council's decision would have been the original decision of the Commission.

The view suggested under the first alternative would cause no difficulties if the Commission's decision would be confirmed by the Council; but if the Council would decide that the substance should not be controlled and sometimes if it would place the substance in a less strictly controlled Schedule than the Commission did, the obligations of the Party which would have given the notice would be even heavier than if it had not given that notice.

It is held that the view presented under the second alternative would yield more rational results. The differences in the minimum obligations of parties which pursuant to paragraph 7 would give notice in respect of additions to different Schedules are motivated by the different degrees of seriousness of the public health and social problem and of usefulness in medical therapy which the substances in question present. One must assume that evaluation of such a situation by a higher instance would be more accurate than that by a lower instance as one must do in all procedures providing for a legal remedy against a decision by appealing to a higher authority.699 This is anyway the theory on which procedural provisions are based which allow review of decisions of a lower organ by a higher organ. The minimum obligations of parties which would give the written notice would thus finally be determined by the Schedule to which the substance in question would be added by the Commission's decision in its final form either in the version in which the decision would be adopted by the Commission itself if no review by the Council would take place or in the version in which it would appear as altered or confirmed by the Council."°

The Senate's resolution giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the Vienna Convention and the instrument of ratification itself might usefully contain a declaration indicating the interpretation by the United States of the effects of notices given pursuant to paragraph 7 in the case of the review of the Commission's decision by the Council."'

Effects of a written notice given pursuant to article 2, paragraph 7.

First two provisions should be kept in mind; one very vague and one specific:

•    If the Commission would adopt a decision adding a previously uncontrolled substance to Schedule I the party which would give the notice under consideration, would, in addition to carrying out the prescribed minimum obligations, have to take into account, as far as possible, the special control measures applicable to substances in Schedule I under article 7.702

•    If the Commission would transfer a substance from a more lenient regime to a Schedule providing for stricter controls the party would have to apply as aminimum all the control measures required by the former more lenient regime. The question arises what would be the situation if such a substance would be transferred to a Schedule which would require as a minimum more strict controls than those provided for in the former lenient regime, if not that substance but a previously uncontrolled substance would be added to that Schedule. If the text of the Convention would be taken literally the minimum which the party would have to carry out would be the measures prescribed under the former more lenient regime. This conclusion would have to be drawn from the fact that the provisions of paragraph 7, sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) refer to minimum obligations in the case of additions of previously uncontrolled substances to any of the four Schedules. It seems however somewhal incongruous that if a substance which would already be in Schedule IV would be transferred to Schedule I it would require, as a minimum, the application of the regime applicable to substances in Schedule IV while if a previously uncontrolled substance would be added to Schedule I it would be subject to the much more strict control measures of paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (a) 703

A notice given by a party pursuant to paragraph would not free that party from applying the following control measures to a previously uncontrolled substance which would be added to any of the four Schedules:

•    Licensing or another similar control measure in respect of the manufacture, trade (including export and import trade) and distribution (Article 8).

•    Controlling under license or other similar control measure the establishments and premises in which manufacture, trade or distribution might take place 704 (Article 8).

•    Taking measures to assure that no substance would be exported to the country or region of a party whose import would have been prohibited by that party into its country or into the region concerned, with the exception of such quantities as such a party would in each case authorize by a special import license (article 13).

•    Applying the penal measures under article 22 for the repression of acts contrary to laws and regulation adopted by the party to implement its obligations.705

If the previously uncontrolled substance would be added to Schedules I, II or III, the party would moreover not be exempted from applying to that substance the following measures:

•    Requiring medical prescriptions for the supply or dispensation of the substance for use by individuals (article 9).

•    Applying the import certificate and export authorization system to a substance placed in Schedules I or II and carrying out the provisions regarding export declarations in cases of exports of a substance placed in Schedule III (Article 12). This obligation would however not apply to international transactions in a substance added to Schedules I or II or to the export of a substance included in Schedule III in relation to another party which in respect to such a substance has also given the written notice pursuant to paragraph 7, introductory sub-paragraph.

However, if the previously uncontrolled substance would be added to Schedules I or II, the party would with respect to such a substance also have to furnish to the Board statistical information on the quantities of the substance manufactured, exported to and imported from each country or region as well as on stocks held by manufactures; 7" and in case of an addition to Schedule lithe party's statistical report would moreover have to include data 707 on the quantities of the substance used in the manufacture of exempt preparations and on those used for "industrial" purposes.708

A party would in respect of substances added to Schedule I or II also have to require the keeping of such records as would enable it to obtain the information needed for its statistical reports to the Board.

A party which would make a written notice pursuant to paragraph 7 in regard to a previously uncontrolled substance added to Schedules II, III or IV could also exempt a preparation of such a substance in accordance with the provisions of articles 3, paragraphs 2 to 4.709

However, the party would in such a case have to apply to the preparation all the control measures required by article 3, paragraph 3 as well as those which would be prescribed by a partial termination of the exemption by the Commission pursuant to article 3, paragraph 4. It would not be freed from applying to the "exempted" preparation those measures which it would not be bound to apply to the substance contained in the preparation under article 2, paragraph 7; 71" but if the Commission would terminate the exemption entirely or if the party would do this itself the party would be obligated to subject the preparation only to those controls which it would have to carry out in regard to the substance included in the preparation under article 2, paragraph 7 and article 3, paragraph 1.

It may be permitted to suggest that the right of "rejection" or "non-acceptance" for which article 2, paragraph 7, would provide, is not of great interest to the United States. This view is based on two considerations:

•    The United States could most probably prevent the addition of a previously uncontrolled substance to a Schedule or the transfer of a controlled substance from a more lenient to a more severe regime because such an action would require a decision of the Commission adopted by a two-thirds majority of its total membership.'"

•    The United States could by unilateral actions exempt preparations from practically all really burdensome controls. Such exemption could also be terminated, partially or entirely, only by decisions of the Commission adopted by two-thirds majorities of its total membership."711

It is believed that a party would hardly expose itself to the opprobrium of international public opinion, by making use of the right of "rejection" or "non-acceptance" in the case of a really dangerous substance, and if it would do it would most probably be forced by public opinion to withdraw its "rejection". Moreover, those countries which would manufacture the substances in question and would be the ones which would profit from the lack of control would normally be the economically more advanced nations whose political institutions would generally make them rather sensitive to the pressures of public opinion,

However, it is held that the fact that countries other than the United States would also have the right of unilateral exemption of preparations might constitute a much more serious problem than the possibility of "rejection" or "non-acceptance" by a government not acting in good faith. Not justified exemptions would most probably be terminated by the Commission under article 3, paragraph 4; but some time would pass between the exemption and the Commission's decision during which considerable harm could be done to public health.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs.—The Commission on Narcotic Drugs is a "Functional Commission" of the Economic and Social Council. Its composition and its members are determined by the Council. So are its Rules of Procedure and those of its functions which the Council desires to grant to the Commission,712 in addition to those with which this organ has been charged by the international drug tre aties .713

The Commission is composed of government representatives, but the Council could give it any other constitutional structure. It could even decide that the Commission should consist partially or entirely of independent experts. Not only members of the United Nations, but also non-member states may be elected to membership of the Commission if they are members of a specialized agency or parties to the Single Convention. Originally consisting of fifteen government representative its membership has several times been increased, more recently to 30.714 The Commission is meeting normally biennially and the term of office of its members is four years.715

The members of the Commission are chosen with due regard to adequate representation of countries which are important manufacturers of narcotic drugs, of those which are important producers of opium or coca leaves and of those in which drug addiction or the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitute a serious problem. The principle of equitable geographic distribution is also taken into account in this election.

Only the decisions of the Commission regarding the Schedules of the Vienna Convention and those terminating partially or entirely exemptions of preparations under this Convention are taken by a two-thirds majority of its total membership; all other decisions of the Commission and all its recommendations are taken by a majority of the members present and voting.

The Commission's decisions taken under article 3 of the Single Convention are subject only to review by the Council in accordance with the procedure of paragraph 8 of this article.716 All other decisions of the Commission and all of its recommendations adopted pursuant to the Single Convention are subject to approval or modification by the Council or the General Assembly in the same way as other decisions or recommendations of the Commission. The Commission's decisions and recommendations whether in form of recommendations to the Council, of draft resolutions suggested for the Council's adoption or of actions in the name of the Commission itself are included in the Commission's reports to the Council. They are normally not transmitted by the Secretary General to governments or to international organs to which they may be addressed until they have been approved by the Council either direct or indirectly by "taking note" of the Commission's report containing them. Only Commission resolution of minor importance which are not controversial, which have no financial implications and which if they concern a specialized agency have been accepted by that agency are dispatched for implementation before they are so approved by the Counci1.717

The decisions which the Commission would take under powers granted to it by earlier drug treaties would also not be subject to the authority of the Council or General Assembly. While decisions of the Commission regarding Schedules of the Vienna Convention are subject to review by the Council in accordance with the procedure of article 2, paragraph 8 of that Convention all other decisions and all recommendations of the Commission under the Vienna Convention,7" being "treaty functions" are not subject to the authority of the Council and the General Assembly. The Vienna Convention does not contain any provision providing for such an authority.

Prior to the coming into force of the -Single Convention the Commission had very limited treaty functions.7" It carried out the major part of its work under the terms of reference which it received from the Council. The terms authorized the Commission to assist the Council in all matters concerning narcotic drugs, to consider improvements of the narcotics regime, to submit proposals to the Council for this purpose and to perform such other functions relating to narcotic drugs as the Council would direct; 720 but the Commission had a very broad view of its powers. It did not only deal with "narcotic" 1 drugs, but also with "psychotropic" drugs and in fact considered any aspect of the problem of drug abuse whose examination it held necessary. In adopting this broad view of its "Charter functions" it has never met any objection by the Council which took note of the Commission's reports dealing with subjects which were actually outside its "terms of reference" if interpreted literally. The Council even approved resolutions proposed by the Commission concerning such subjects.

Many of the specific functions which the Commission has under the Single Convention were already discussed above in connection with the consideration of control provisions of this treaty.721 So were those functions which would be conferred upon the Commission by the Protocol of 1972 amending the Single Convention.722

The Commission has also been granted the far-reaching authority to discuss all matters pertaining to the aims of the Single Convention. This right is not limited to the discussion of the implementation of the provisions of the Single Convention. It has also been authorized to make recommendations not only for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention but also for that of its aims. The Commission has also been expressly empowered to draw the attention of nonparties to its decisions and recommendations with a view to their considering taking action in accordance therewith.723

The most important weapon of the Commission in the fight against the illicit traffic is its power to discuss publicly the failure of a government to carry out provisions of the Single Convention and thus to bring the pressure of the power of public opinion to bear upon such a government. This was also the most powerful weapon of the Commission's predecessor in the League period, of the League's Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs". Public criticism of governments was in fact an important feature of the work of the Advisory Committee and, in its very early years, of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The late Stuart J. Fuller, who was American observer on the Advisory Committee pointed to this feature of the Committee's discussions in an address before the Rotary Club of Washington in 1938 in which he said: "The Opium Advisory Committee affords the one forum in the world where the problem of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs can be and is publicly discussed and where any government whose territory has been used as a base for the illicit traffic may without fear or favour be publicly asked to account for its stewardship. Most of the progress made in the past ten years has been due to publicity, and the value of this committee as an organ of publicity is widely recognized and, in some quarters feared." 724 It is also the view of the writer of this paper that the insistent public criticism of Iran by the American representative, aided by the Canadian delegate, in the early years of the Commission was to a large extent responsible for the later prohibition of opium production in Iran, which before and in the years after the war was the origin of huge quantities of illicit opium. Despite its recent resumption of opium production the position of Iran as a source of illicit opium appears still to be immensely better than at that time. If the information at the disposal of the present writer is correct Iran is still a victim of the illicit traffic coming from abroad and not the origin of significant quantities of opium appearing in other countries.725

Public and completely frank discussion of defective controls in some countries has not been the practice of the Commission since the end of the forties, in the same manner as it was the practice of the League's Advisory Committee and of the Commission in its very early years. The increased national sensitivity of the population of the offending countries and political considerations are responsible for this weakness of the Commission's work. Reports of the Commission have sometimes even praised the efforts of countries which have been notorious as sources of opium in the international illicit traffic. When the past Permanent Central Board, in the report of its work in 1966 referred to the persistent clandestine manufacture of heroin in Marseilles the only public reaction in the Commission was a criticism of the Board's statement by the representative of France.

One should however not underestimate the efforts which the representatives of the United States made to bring pressure to bear on the representatives of the offending countries outside public meetings of the Commission. The sessions of the Commission which formerly took place annually but in recent years unfortunately normally only bienually,726 offered a good opportunity for this kind of effort. The efforts made on a bilateral basis and the practice of permanently stationing narcotics agents in the countries in which the illicit traffic originates have also been very valuable. It is however a fact that we have world-wide interests which are often of vital importance to us. However, we may dislike it narcotics questions cannot always take precedence over all our other national interests. The following suggestion is made to ensure a more frank public criticism of defective national controls even in cases in which for important political reasons it would be difficult for the United States to take the initiative. It has been mentioned above that the Economic and Social Council is the master of the composition of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. An attempt should be made to move the Council to add to the membership of the Commission consisting of Government representatives, several independent persons to be appointed by the Secretary General who would certainly nominate a U.S. citizen, a national of socialist country and a national of an "unaligned" country if the number of the independent members would be three. The Council would follow, in adopting such an American motion, the precedent of the League of Nations. The League's Advisory Committee had, in addition to government representatives, three independent members called "assessors". These assessors could participate in the meetings of the Committee with the same rights as the members, except that they could not be elected as officers and were not entitled to vote. They were not paid, but received their travelling expenses and a daily subsistence allowance. The institution of such assessors 727 may not have been of particular value at the time of the League since public discussions in the Advisory Committee were not impeded by political considerations in the same degree as they were and could be impeded in the discussions of the Commission. If the American assessor would be expert, energetic and courageous and appointed for a period of five years the institution of assessors could be very useful in ensuring public criticism of offending governments in meetings of the Commission. A long term of office of the assessor would be necessary to avoid pressure on the Secretary General by interested governments not to reappoint an assessor who during his short term of office would have been effective in criticizing their conduct.

In view of its functions and, in particular, in view of the part which the Commission has in preparing new treaties it is sometimes called the "policy making" and "legislative" organ of international drug control.

Similarly, as the Single Convention, the Vienna Convention also authorizes the Commission not only to consider all matters pertaining to the implementation of its provisions and to make recommendations relating thereto, but also to do this in respect of all matters pertaining to its aims.728 Although in less words than article 8 of the Single Convention the Vienna Convention gives the Commission the same broad powers of considering problems of psycho-tropic substances and of making recommendations concerning them as the Single Convention has in regard to narcotic drugs.729 The Vienna Convention also does not contain any provision which would prevent the Commission from addressing its recommendations to non-parties.

The International Narcotics Control Board

Constitutional Provisions

The constitution of the International Narcotics Control Board is not determined by the Economic and Social Council, but laid down in the Single Convention. Its eleven members are elected for a term of office of three years. Three must be chosen from a list of at least five persons nominated by the World Health Organization who must have medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical experience. The remaining eight members are elected by the Council from a list of persons nominated by the Members of the United Nations or by Parties of the Single Convention which are not Members of the United Nations.

The members of the Board are not government representatives, but should be independent experts. It is a sound organization principle to strengthen the independence of officials by granting them a long term of office. The short period of three years for which members of the Board are elected under the present text of the Single Convention is therefore not a good feature of this treaty. The provision of the Protocol of 1972 which would extend the term of office of members of the Board to five years would therefore constitute a very useful amendment.730

The Protocol would also increase to 10 the number of members which the Council is required to choose from the list of candidates nominated by governments. The total membership of the Board would thus be raised to thirteen."' The Convention requires that in electing the members of the Board the Council, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographic representation, should give consideration to the importance of including on the Board, in equitable proportion, persons possessing a knowledge of the drug situation in the producing,732 manufacturing 733 and consuming 7" countries, and connected with such countries."'

The Single Convention requires that the members of the Board should be "persons who, by their competence, impartiality and disinterestedness, will command general confidence."

As regards competence, it may be suggested that knowledge and understanding of international narcotics control and particularly also a comprehension of the ways in which international administration works and which are very difficult from those of domestic administration, are very important. In view of the fact that those three members which are elected from the list of persons nominated by the World Health Organization have medical pharmacological and pharmaceutical knowledge it is very desirable that the remaining members have the required knowledge and understanding of international administration.736

The Single Convention contains provisions to ensure the impartiality, disinterestedness and independence of the member of the Board. It requires that during their term of office the members should not hold any position or engage in any activity which would be liable to impair their impartiality in the exercise of their functions. The members must not only not be in a position which would make them subject to instructions of their governments, but also not in one which would make it likely that they could favour private enterprises which might be interested in influencing the work of the Board.

Arrangements to ensure the technical independence of the Board

The Convention contains another very important provision to ensure the impartiality of the Board. The Council is required to make, in consultation with the Board, all arrangements necessary to ensure the full technical independence of the Board in carrying out its functions.

It is suggested that such arrangements should in any event:

•    Grant the Board a separate secretariat bound to carry out its decisions even in cases in which they might differ from instructions given by higher secretariat officials. It is admitted that such a conflict between decisions and instructions will rarely if ever arise; but the principle of the precedence of the Board's decisions is very important since it is unfortunately a fact that contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 737 some governments try unduly to influence the actions of the United Nations secretariat.

•    Grant the Board some influence over the composition of its secretariat or at least the right to be consulted about the appointment of the Chief of its secretariat.

•    Grant the Board some discretionary budgetary powers within limits set by the General Assembly each year. It would certainly be incompatible with the independence of the Board if a civil servant charged with United Nations budgetary functions could, by its decision, render impossible such actions of the Board as a local inquiry of the drug situation in a country in which an extensive illicit traffic originates and whose government has agreed to the inquiry.

The Council, in consultation with the Board, has adopted such administrative arrangements necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions in full technical independence. The arrangements are contained in the Annex to Council resolution 1196 (XLII) of May 16, 1967 and incorporate the three principles just mentioned. Since they are due to expire on March 1, 1974 the United Nations Conference of 1972 to Consider Amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 adopted a resolution in which it recommended the continuations of the system instituted by the Secretary General in accordance with the Council's arrangements.7" It is suggested that it would be helpful in strengthening the effectiveness of the Board if the United States would use its influence to ensure a prolongation by the Council of the arrangements of 1967 in accordance with the resolution of the Conference.

Other provisions of the Single Convention which strengthen the independence of the Board are those which authorize that organ to meet as often as, in its opinion, may be necessary for the proper discharge of its functions 739 and to submit to the Council as many reports as it considers necessary with any observations and recommendations which it desires to make."'740

Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention provides that "the State concerned" may bring before the Council a recommendation of the Board that the parties should discontinue the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to an offending country or territory. The state against which the embargo has been recommended—no matter whether against the state as a whole or only against any of its territories—is the "State concerned" in the meaning of this provision. It is suggested that the Council could in such a case not alter the Board's recommendation since this would be incompatible with that organ's constitutional technical independence. The Council may however consider the merits of the Council's recommendation, may make suggestions as to the way in which the Board should handle the matter in the future and may also adopt its own recommendations on the subject.

The Protocol of 1972 would add to article 9 of the Single Convention which contain the basic provisions regarding the Board's constitutions, two paragraphs, numbered 4 and 5. According to these new paragraphs the Board, in co-operation with governments, and subject to the terms of the Single Convention, would have "to endeavor to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation,741 production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs."742 It is also required that all measures taken by the Board under the Single Convention should be "those most consistent with the intent to further the co-operation of governments with the Board and to provide the mechanism for a continuing dialogue between governments and the Board which will lend assistance to and facilitate effective national action to attain the aims of this Convention.

It is undoubtedly very useful that these new provisions would re-emphasize the aims of the Single Convention 743 and the value of the Board's cooperation with governments,744 of its continuing dialogue with governments whose controls are defective and of its rendering assistance to such governments in improving their weak administration.745

Other amendments to the Single Convention which would be introduced by the Protocol of 1972 also refer to consultations of the Board with governments whose administrations would require improvement and to advice or assistance to be given by the Board or other international organizations.

Under article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) as amended the Board would have the express right to propose to a country the opening of consultations if that country, without any failure in implementing the provisions of the Single Convention, has become, or if there exists evidence of a serious risk that it may become an important centre of illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of or traffic in or consumption of narCotic drugs.746

So was the provision of article 14 which would be introduced by the Protocol of 1972, according to which the Board would be authorized, with the agreement of the government concerned, to recommend to international organizations to render technical or financial aid; the Board would be entitled to do this either in addition to or as an alternative of the "sanctions" provided for in article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2.

The consultation between the Board and an offending party under article 21, paragraph 3 of the amended text of the Single Convention were also referred to earlier, so was the advice which, if requested by a party, the Board might offer under article 35, paragraph (g) of the amended Single Convention. Article 38 of the amended text provides that a party would be able to obtain the technical advice of the Board in connection with the agreements to which this provision refers and which would contemplate the development of regional centres for scientific research and education to combat the problems resulting from the illicit use of and traffic in narcotic drugs.

Various other functions of the Board were considered in the discussion of provisions of the Single Convention and of those of earlier drug treaties which are related to activities of the International Narcotics Control Board or of its two predecessors, the Permanent Central Board and the Drug Supervisory Body.

Publicity the Principal Weapon of the International Narcotics Control Board

The measures which the Board may adopt under article 14 to assure the execution of provisions of the Single Convention are not its most potent means of influencing governments to carry out their treaty obligations. The most extreme measure which the Board can take under this provision is to recommend to parties that they discontinue the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory which has seriously failed to implement the Single Convention. Such measures would be of questionable value under present conditions which are very different from those which prevailed in the early period of the international narcotics regime when measures of this kind might have aided in reducing the illicit traffic.747 Even among the steps foreseen in article 14 those measures would be most effective for purposes of international narcotics control which would result in publicity as: calling the attention of the parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter 748 or publishing a report on the serious failure of a country to carry out its obligations, which would have to be communicated by the Board to the Council which in its turn would have to forward this erport to the parties.749 The Protocol of 1972 would amend article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) 75° to the effect that the Board could call the attention of the parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter not only if the government concerned has failed to give satisfactory explanations of its serious failure to implement the treaty when called upon to give such explanations or has failed to adopt the remedial measures, if any, which it has been requested by the Board to take but also if the Board would find that there is a serious situation that needs co-operative action at the international level with a view to remedying it. The amendment appears to mean that the Board could in this second case also call the attention of the parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter even though it would find that the explanations of the country concerned are satisfactory and that that country has adopted the remedial measures, if any, which it has been called upon by the Board to take. This amended text could also be understood to mean that the Board would be entitled to take the action in question even in cases in which the government concerned would not have been asked to give any explanations or to adopt any remedial measures under article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) respectively. If such an interpretation would be accepted it would mean that under the amended text the Board could call the attention of the parties and of the above mentioned international organs to the matter even though the country concerned would not have committed any serious failure or any failure at all to carry out the provisions of the Single Convention, provided that the Board would find that there is nevertheless a serious situation that needs co-operative action at the international level with a view to remedying it. However, it must be admitted that such an interpretation which appears to follow from the amended text, would be inconsistent with the assumption that article 14, paragraph 2 would in all cases continue to have a punitive character.

Under the unamended text as well as under the amended text it is in the cases just mentioned within the discretion of the Board to call the attention of the parties and of the organs concerned to the matter or not to do it; but under the amended text it would become an obligation of the Board to take this action if

•    The aims of the Convention are being seriously endangered and it has not been possible to resolve the matters satisfactorily in any other way.

•    The Board would find that there is a serious situation that needs co-operative action at the international level with a view to remedying it and that bringing such a situation to the notice of the parties, the Council and the Commission is the most appropriate method of facilitating such cooperative action. It is submitted that an obligation of the Board to take such action in these two cases would exist even though the country concerned would not have committed a serious failure to carry out provisions of the Single Convention."'

The question arises whether the Council, after considering the reports of the Board, and of the Commission if available on the matter, could call the attention of the General Assembly to the matter in all four cases mentioned in sub-paragraph (d) of the amended text or only in the fourth (and last) case mentioned therein. It appears to follow from the semicolon in the third line from the bottom of sub-paragraph (d) that this right of the Council would apply only to the fourth case. However, it is submitted that neither in its unamended nor in its amended form the Single Convention can affect the right of the Council under the Charter of the United Nations, to make recommendations to the General Assembly, with respect to any economic, social, cultural, educational and related matters and to make reports thereon.752 These matters also include international drug contro1.753

The Reports of the Board

The Board's reports under article 15 may be that organ's most important instrument for the promotion of effective international and domestic drug control. Its power to call the attention of the parties, the Council and the Commission to a matter with which it deals under article 14 or to publish a report on such a matter is limited by restrictive conditions and would also remain so under the amendments of the Protocol of 1972. The Board's possibilities to appeal to public opinion under article 14 are consequently also limited. However, the Board's reports under article 15, are not subject to such restrictions and therefore represent its most effective instrument for appealing to public opinion which is generally recognized to be a very important factor of strength in the international narcotics regime.754

By article 15, the Board is required to prepare an annual report on its work and such additional reports as it considers necessary. These reports755 have to contain an analysis of the estimates and statistical information at its disposa1,756 and in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations given by or required of governments; 757 but what is much more important is that the reports may contain "any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make." It is provided that the Board's report should be submitted to the Council through the Commission which may make such comments as it sees fit. This provision can however not prevent the Council from considering the Board's report at any time as is its right under the Charter of the United Nations to consider any other economic or social matter. The Council has in fact, at its forty-eighth and fiftieth sessions, decided to consider the Board's annual report prior to the examination of that document by the Commission.758 The Council did this to avoid too long a delay of its discussion of the Board's report. Such a delay may in particular be caused by the fact that the Commission meets normally only biennially. Too long a delay in the Council's consideration of the Board's report may render "dated" the facts contained in that report, deprive them of their "news value" and thus of much of their effect on public opinion.

Particularly since 1963, both the International Narcotics Control Board and its predecessor the Permanent Central Board have taken a very broad view of what they may include in their reports. They have not only reported on the implementation of, or failure to implement, provisions of the drug treaties, but also given a comprehensive review of the international control regime and sometimes presented a report of the problem of drug abuse with its manifold aspects, including the political, economic, social and administrative questions which may explain the phenomenon of extensive drug abuse and of the weakness of control in a number of countries.

The Convention requires that the Board's reports should be communicated to the parties and subsequently published by the Secretary General. The parties are bound to permit the unrestricted distribution of the Board's reports. This provision is explained by the view of the authors of the Single Convention that such an unrestricted distribution could assist the Board in gaining the support of public opinion for its work.

The Protocol of 1972 would not amend article 15 of the Single Convention referring to these reports of the Board. The Vienna Convention on Psycho-tropic substances contains nearly the same provisions as the Single Convention requiring the Board to make annual and additional reports to the Council. It would provide for their submission to the Council through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs which could make such comments as it would see fit, for communication of the reports to the parties and for their subsequent publication by the Secretary General. Parties to the Vienna Convention would also be bound to permit the unrestricted distribution of the Board's reports. The Vienna Convention does not require that the Board's reports should contain-an analysis of the estimates.759 The Vienna Convention does not provide for estimates.

It may be assumed that the Board would, under the Vienna Convention, take the same broad view of its right to include in its reports comments and recommendations as it does under the Single Convention.

Measures by the Board to Ensure the Execution of Provisions of the Single Convention (Sanctions).
It is provided that the Board could initiate the procedure under article 14 only on the basis of information submitted by governments under the provisions of this

Convention, or of information communicated by United Nations organs and bearing on questions arising under those provisions. It has already been pointed above 76° that this information is by no means as limited as it might appear. It has been explained that the Board does not only receive estimates of drug requirements and statistical information but is authorized to require governments to supply additional information which it considers necessary to complete or explain the estimates and statistics and that this additional information may practically relate to any control provisions of the Single Convention. It has also been mentioned that the term "United Nations" as used in the unamended article 14 also covers "specialized agencies". The right of the Board which would be introduced by the Protocol of 1972 to use also information obtained from other intergovernmental organization and from certain international non-governmental organizations.

Under the unamended text the board has the right to commence the procedure under article 14 only if it has "reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention". The Protocol of 1972 would amend this provision by requiring that the Board would have to have "objective reasons" to believe that such a situation exists in order to initiate the procedure whose first step 761 would be the Board's right (but not an obligation) to ask the government concerned for explanations. The amendment would, in addition, grant the Board the express right to propose to the Government concerned the opening of consultations. It is however submitted that the Board may also propose the opening of consultations without being expressly authorized to do so by the unamended text.

Under the unamended text of article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) the Board is required to treat as confidential its request for explanations from an offending government as well as the explanations which it would receive in response to such a request. This obligation of the Board would however end if the Board continues the procedure of article 14 to the stage at which it would call the attention of the parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter under sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph in its unamended version.

Under the amended text of article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) the Board would be bound to treat as confidential its request for explanations from an offending government, the explanations received from that government, its proposal to a government to open consultations, no matter whether addressed , to an offending government or to a government which has not failed to carry out the Single Convention, and its consultations held with both kinds of these governments. The Board's obligation to treat these matters as confidential would also end if the Board = would continue its procedure to the stage at which it would call the attention of the Parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter under sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 1, of the amending text; but while the Board could, under the unamended text, take this action only in respect of offending countries, it could under the amended text do this also in regard to a country which would not fail to comply with the Single Convention, but whose drug situation would nevertheless be serious as described in the amended text (sub-paragraph (d) ). It may be ' considered to be somewhat incongruous that the 'Board could reveal the contents of its consultations with such a country which would originally have been held on a confidential basis. This may affect the conduct of the consultations with that country and perhaps their value.

The question may also be raised whether the Board's report on a matter dealt with under article 14 would relieve that organ of its obligation to treat as confidential the matters in question. Article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) does not free the Board from this obligation in case of such a report which under article 14, paragraph 3 the Board has the right to publish and to communicate to the Council which in its turn is required to forward the report to the parties. Article 14, paragraph 3 is silent on this question. The Board could publish in such a report the confidential matters involved if the report deals with a case which has reached the stage at which the Board has called the attention of the parties the Council and the Commission to the question under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of the unamended text or sub-paragraph (d) of the amended text. It will be noted that article 14, paragraph 3 would not be amended by the Protocol of 1972.

The Board is not required to treat as confidential the remedial measures which it may request Governments to adopt pursuant to article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b).

The information on the basis of which the Board may conclude that it has objective reasons to believe that a serious failure to implement provisions of the Single Convention exists could not apply to the right of the Board to propose the opening of consultations to a government which would not fail to comply with provisions of the Single Convention. The above mentioned provision could also not apply to the other measures which the Board would under the Protocol of 1972 be authorized to take in relation to Governments which would not fail to carry out the treaty provisions. The question arises whether the Board could in such cases use information furnished by intergovernmental organs, other than organs of the United Nations and their specialized agencies, or by the non-governmental agencies referred to in article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) as amended. As can be seen, the introduction into an article which provides for a procedure against offending countries of provisions concerning countries which would have complied with the terms of the Single Convention, but would nevertheless have a serious drug situation might lead to several difficulties of interpretation.

After having asked for explanations from the offending country concerned under the unamended text of article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) the Board has under the unamended text of subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the right, but not an obligation, to propose to the offending country such remedial measures as it may consider necessary. Under the Protocol of 1972 the Board would have this right also in regard to countries which would not fail to comply with provisions of the Single Convention, but to whom the Board would have proposed the opening of consultations as foreseen in the amended text of article 14, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a).

The provision of article 14, paragraph 1, subparagraph (c) as it would read under the amendment of the Protocol of 1972 was considered above in connection with the discussion of the institution of the "Local Inquiry" of the 1953 Protoco1.762
The Board has the right to call the attention of the parties, the Council and of the Commission to a drug situation in offending countries as well as to that in other countries."'

Article 14, paragraph 2 provides under the unamended text as well as under the amended text for authority of the Board to recommend that the parties discontinue the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to "the country or territory concerned." The Board may make such a recommendation "when calling the attention of the parties, the Council and the Commission to a matter in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) 764 above". The Board can, under the unamended text, call the attention of the parties and of these two organs to the matter with which it has dealt only in respect of a country which has seriously failed to carry out the provisions of the Single Convention and can therefore recommend the import embargo or export embargo or both only against such a country. Therefore, the Board's recommendation has doubtless a punitive character under the unamended text. It has the nature of a sanction.

Under the amended text of article 14, paragraph 2 which is literally the same as its unamended text except that the reference is to "paragraph 1(d)"  instead of "paragraph 1(c)" the Board could under the same conditions make the above mentioned recommendation.

However, the Board could, under sub-paragraph (d) of the amended text call the attention of the parties and of the two organs to a matter with which it would have dealt not only in the case of governments which would have seriously failed to carry out provisions of the Single Convention, but also in the case of countries which would have a difficult drug situation although they would have fully complied with the provisions of that treaty. The Board could thus make the recommendation not only in regard to countries which would not have carried out the provisions of the Convention but also in regard to countries which would have done so. If this view is accepted the Board could apply article 14, paragraph 2, as sanction against offending countries; in regard to other countries it might make a recommendation pursuant to this provisions if it would consider that a discontinuation of the export of some drugs to such a country might aid in improving its difficult drug situation. However, such a case could rarely occur under present conditions since the country itself could normally prevent the imports concerned by refusing to issue the required import authorizations; but one case may be mentioned in which a recommendation to discontinue the export of drugs to a country or territory could assist the government of that country or territory in its efforts to control its drug situation: A part of a country could have declared itself independent under an insurrectionist government which might have been recognized by a drug exporting country. Some of the members of such a government might engage themselves in the illicit traffic or co-operate with illicit traffickers—and this has not been a very rare event in the past. In a case of this nature a recommendation of the Board to discontinue drug exports to the territory under the control of the insurrectionist authorities might be very helpful to the legitimate government to control the drug situation in its national territory, but perhaps also to other governments. It is, however, admitted that this example of the use of article 14, paragraph 2 is rather far-fetched. It seems to be the better view that the authors of the Protocol of 1972 did not wish to deprive article 14, paragraph 2 of its exclusive character of a sanction against countries which would not comply with the provisions of the Single Convention in a very serious manner. It seems that it was overlooked to make in article 14, paragraph 2 the revisions consequential to the amendments which would be introduced by the Protocol of 1972 into the sub-paragraph, designated (c) under the unamended text and (d) in the new text, of paragraph 1 of the article 14.

Another possibility would be that the authors of the amendments of the just mentioned sub-paragraph considered it unnecessary to revise 76' article 14, paragraph 2, because they held that in all cases in which the Board would, under that sub-paragraph as revised by the Protocol, be authorized or required to call the attention of the parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter, the government concerned would also have failed to carry out provisions of the Single Convention. It is however submitted that such an interpretation could hardly be reconciled with the actual text of article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (d).

The export or import embargoes of drugs, which may be useful medicines, are of questionable value as sanctions under the present conditions which are very different from those of the time at which this type of sanctions was conceived. Sanctions or the threat of sanctions of a more general economic nature would be much more appropriate at present. A threat of sanctions of this nature might be helpful in inducing some governments to make a greater effort to improve their drug control administration. It is therefore suggested that it would be useful to authorize the Board in extreme cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the Single Convention, to propose to the Economic and Social Council to recommend some economic sanctions against an offending government. The writer of this paper is of course aware of the possibility that some countries may raise the objection to such an idea, that sanctions are under the Charter of the United Nations within the competence of the Security Council and not within that of the Economic and Social Council; but in the case of the suggested provision the Economic and Social Council would not act under the Charter but under the treaty containing this provision. It is quite usual that United Nations organs have under special treaties powers which they could not exercise under the Charter. Whether a proposal to provide in the Single Convention for economic sanctions would be widely acceptable at present or in the near future is of course another matter. However, it is suggested that the value of economic sanctions in the drug field is worthwhile considering and may well be taken into account in more longrange plans to improve the international drug regime.

The Board may apply to parties and nod-parties alike the provisions of article 14. This would remain so under the amendments which would be introduced by the Protocol of 1972.

The provisions regarding the measures (sanctions) which the Board may take under the Vienna Convention to assure the execution of the provisions of this convention are nearly the same and mostly literally the same as those of article 14 of the Single Convention in its unamended version:766 The definition of the information on the basis of which the Board could initiate the procedure differs somewhat from that definition in the unamended article 14 of the Single Convention. In view of the interpretation given above to this definition in the Single Convention there is hardly any real difference in the scope of information which the Board may take into account in the procedures of the two treaties to ensure their implementation.

There is however one important difference between the enforcement procedure of the Single Convention and that of the Vienna Convention. Under the latter treaty a party, but a written notice addressed to the Secretary General, could declare that, in view of exceptional circumstances, it is not in a position to give effect to all the provisions applicable to a formerly uncontrolled substance which would be placed by the Commission in a Schedule of the Vienna Convention. A party could do the same in the case of psychotropic substances transferred by the Commission to a Schedule subject to more strict controls from a Schedule subject to a more lenient regime. In the case of such a written notice the party concerned would, under article 2, paragraph 7, be freed from some of the obligations which would result from the Commission's decision. The Vienna Convention would provide that the Board could also adopt its enforcement procedure if it would have reason to believe that the aims of the Convention would be seriously endangered as a result of a decision of a party taken under article 7, paragraph 2 as result of a written notice of a party:767 The Single Convention does not provide for such a partial nonacceptance of decisions of the Commission placing drugs under international control or under a more strict regime.

All other provisions 768 of the Vienna Convention concerning measures by the Board to assure the execution of the provisions of the Convention could be applied to parties and non-parties alike.

EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL

In view of the vast illicit traffic and the epidemic-like spread of drug use in many countries in recent years, one could be inclined to attach very little value to the international narcotics regime, but such a view would not be justified. It would certainly be wrong to overrate the importance of the international system, since it can affect only one of the causative factors of drug abuse—the availability of substances with a potential for abuse and not the other elements which are responsible for this social evil:769 But it would equally be wrong to underestimate the beneficial effects of this system as can be substantiated by a comparison of the situation as it existed before international narcotics control became effective and as it exists today.

When making an evaluation of the international narcotics regime, the following factors must not be overlooked:

•    The illicit traffic is a consequence of the control. Experience has shown that any control of an economic activity is accompanied by a black market. The truth of this in the field of drugs could be seen in the United Kingdom at the time at which addicts could easily obtain prescriptions of heroin gratis under the British Health Insurance system, but could not similarly obtain marihuana. At that time in the United Kingdom an illicit traffic in marihuana, but not in heroin, existed. Unrestricted prescription of heroin by physicians would not eliminate the illicit heroin traffic in the United States. It might lead to a reduction of the price of heroin on the illicit market since the illicit distributors would try to remain competitive with the prices charged by physicians,'" who would be willing to give addicts the heroin which they would desire.

•    The present tremendous increase in drug abuse does not prove the failure of international narcotics control. By analogy, the usefulness of a medicine is not negated by the fact that the disease which it has succeeded to contain for some time is aggravated by complications for which the medicine has not been designed to treat. The discontinuation of the medicine may often render the condition of the patient even more serious than it would be otherwise. Although the views on the special causes of the spread of drug abuse necessarily differ, there can be no doubt that this phenomenon is due to a complexity of social factors, including the increasingly rapid economic and social change with its impact on human behavior. The increased incidence of crime and mental disease under contemporary conditions represents a somewhat similar complex problem.

•    A large part of the increase in abuse of drugs does not refer to the abuse of manufactured narcotic drugs whose legal trade is effectively controlled by the narcotics regime, but refers to psychotropic drugs, which are not similarly controlled and which pose quite different control problems than narcotic drugs. Marihuana"' (cannabis and cannabis resin) is the most widely abused drug. It is defined as one of the "narcotic" agricultural products whose control undoubtedly represents the weakest point of the international regime. The control of the cannabis plant is even more difficult than that of the opium poppy and the coca bush.772 The cannabis plant, cannabis and cannabis resin have been subject to a comprehensive system of international control only since the Single Convention came into force on December 13, 1964.

A comparison between the drug abuse situation as it existed before the international control system became effective and the situation as it exists today is very difficult. Only a very few countries have statistical data from which per capita narcotics consumption for the period prior to the narcotics regime can be computed. Moreover, statistical data on the extent of drug addiction is unavailable. Nevertheless, the past Permanent Central Board, on the basis available data, came to the conclusion that the relative incidence of addiction to manufactured drugs has appreciably diminished since the beginning of narcotics control. The Board admitted that the old figures cannot readily be compared with recent figures. It recognized that legitimate per capita consumption must have increased in the wake of economic and social advancement and the evolution of modern medicine and of national health schemes. The Board compared the earlier figures of countries, which prior to the narcotics regime had advanced medical services, with their recent figures, and found that the recent legal per capita consumption of narcotic drugs has been greatly reduced. The Board held that the consumption figures for the period prior to narcotics control included quantities consumed by addicts. Taking into account the increased per capita consumption for legitimate purposes, the Board found that the relatively greater per capita consumption in the past was helpful in determining the extent of addiction in a country prior to the introduction of effective narcotics contro1.773

Among the countries studied by the Board, the United States received particular attention. The Board did not include cocaine in its study although the United States consumed more than five times as much prior to 1914 than in 1966 with half the 1966 population. The Board omitted it because the reduction in its per capita consumption to a large extent was caused by a decline in its therapeutic uses. The Board also omitted cannabis because it had no data for its study. The Board limited itself to opiates.

The Board had at its disposal the quantities of opium imported into the United States in the years preceding World War I and could estimate its morphine content. In making its examination the Board had to take into account that the number of natural opiates in use was much greater than before the international narcotics regime and the Harrison Act was enacted. Moreover, considerable quantities of synthetic drugs which are consumed today, were unknown before World War I.

A comparison of the quantity of a particular opiate consumed before World War I with the amount used now would not be very meaningful for the Board's study. The Board reduced its estimates of the quantities of drugs annually consumed to a common denominator in order to allow for the differing potencies of various narcotics. The Board did not compare the weight of the amounts consumed, but rather the numbers of therapeutic dosages. It was aware that this procedure was far from perfect. However, it felt justified in stating that the annual legal per capita consumption of narcotics immediately before 1914 was about twice as much as it was in 1966. The Board also assumed that American patients now received whatever quantities of narcotic drugs were needed for medical purposes. It inferred that the much larger per capita consumption before World War I was to a great extent due to the fact that huge quantities of narcotics from legal sources were at that time used by addicts. The Board concluded that the quantities legally consumed before World War I were sufficient to maintain between 400,000-600,000 addicts in a population one-half that of 1966.

In judging the accuracy of the Board's calculation, consideration must be given to the fact that in 1914 physicians more readily prescribed narcotics for analgesic and antitussive purposes than today. This situation also contributed to the continuation of addiction for many physicians, who first gave patients prescriptions for these purposes later prescribed narcotics to maintain their patients' addiction. The difference between the per capita consumption of narcotics prior to 1914 and in 1966 can be explained only to a minor, if any, extent by the former readiness of physicians to prescribe narcotic drugs for analgesic and antitussive purposes.774

The Board's calculation also was based on the hypothesis that the proportion of narcotics consumed in the form of codeine was the same before World War I and during 1966. However, it felt that the proportion of codeine consumption was much smaller before the war because widespread use of heroin indicated a lower codeine use rate. The Board concluded that the number of addicts, who obtained narcotic drugs from legal sources in the United States before World War I, must have been even greater than the estimate of 400,000-600,000, which was computed solely on the basis of comparing the per capita consumption of therapeutic dosages of narcotic drugs in the two periods.775

It cannot be doubted that addiction to opiates was until a few years ago much lower than it was before the introduction of narcotics control. Even now when the number of American addicts is estimated at 500,000-600,000, at least the relative incidence of addiction to opiates is still much lower than it was before World War I.

These results could never have been achieved without control in other countries, otherwise narcotic drugs could freely flow into America from legal sources abroad. It is the basic achievement of international narcotics control that no significant diversion of manufactured narcotics drugs from legal manufacture and trade into illicit channels occurs anymore. There is also no significant diversion of opium once it is in the possession of the national opium agencies and has entered the controlled legal trade. This great achievement is not minimized by the fact that retailers sometimes illicitly sell drugs. To evaluate this great success of the international narcotics regime it may be useful to consider the situation as it existed before international control became effective. The two conventions which established the international regime of manufactured narcotic drugs are the 1925 Convention and the 1931 Convention which entered into force in 1928 and in 1933, respectively.776 Since the mid 1930's illicit traffickers in manufactured narcotics could not obtain their supplies from legal sources and had to rely on clandestine manufacturers. This emergence of clandestine manufacture and its continued existence has become possible because international efforts failed to deprive them of the opium and coca leaves which they need and which they can still obtain with relative ease.

A few examples taken from a report of the Permanent Central Board may give a picture of the situation before international control became effective.

Reports from manufacturing countries between 1925 and 1929 showed that seventy-three metric tons of narcotic opium derivatives and six tons of cocaine escaped from legal trade into the illicit traffic. During 1927 and in the first three months of 1928 a single legal factory exported 860 kgs. of morphine, 2,711 kgs. of heroin and 40 kg of cocaine to a single country for illicit purposes. This factory handled about one-third to one-half of the world's legal manufacture of narcotic drugs. In 1929 a country of Southern Europe, which had never before manufactured drugs, suddenly authorized three narcotics factories. Two were founded by well-known illicit traffickers. During the first six months of 1930 this country exported 2,300 kgs. of morphine and 4,300 kgs. of heroin, including 1,400 kgs. of morphine and 2,700 kgs. of heroin to Greece alone. The alleged countries of destination reported that the drugs never arrived.777

The tasks of the American enforcement services are very difficult; but one can hardly imagine how much more difficult they would become if the situation described above existed abroad today. Even this principal achievement of international narcotics control—the prevention of diversion of significant quantities of legally manufactured narcotic drugs into illicit channels—would be endangered if countries whose governments are unable to exercise effective control would commence the manufacture of narcotic drugs.

International efforts to control the production of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin and to deal with the clandestine manufacture of narcotic drugs have been a failure; but it would be a mistake to assume that with regard to the production of opium no results were obtained. In the years 1934 to 1937 those governments which furnished information reported a total opium production of 18,500 metric tons; 1,100 tons were reported to have been used for domestic consumption by addicts, 800 tons to have been exported for opium smoking and 1,400 tons 7" to have been used for medical purposes including the manufacture of morphine and codeine. 15,200 metric tons were entirely unaccounted for. This does not include the huge amounts of opium produced in Manchuria and Jehol in the 1930's.779 According to present estimates only an annual quantity of about 1200 to 1400 metric tons of opium obtained by diversion from legal production or from illegal or uncontrolled production is available for illicit purposes. This reduction has been brought about by prohibition of opium production or by introduction of a control system as required by the 1953 Protocol or the Single Convention. Those opium-producing countries which do not permit licensed individual farmers to cultivate the poppy for opium have been most successful in their control efforts.7" But this reduction of opium production could not solve the problem of the illicit traffic in manufactured drugs. It reflects inter alia the virtual elimination of opium smoking in China; but 1,200 tons of opium which are still available for illicit purposes are enough to manufacture large amounts of morphine and heroin to supply millions of addicts. On the assumption that an addict daily consumes not more than three therapeutic dosages of morphine or heroin it has been estimated that 1,200 metric tons of opium would be sufficient annually to supply more than 10 million morphine addicts and more than 20 million heroin users.78' In any event, enough opium remains in illicit channels to supply the American illicit market with heroin.

A SUMMARY APPRAISAL OF THE PROTOCOL OF 1972 AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961.782

In the present state of international relations, it is nearly inevitable that highly technical treaties which are the product of large multilateral conferences contain a number of defects, including weak draftsmanship, obscure provisions and valueless provisions, which had to be accepted by way of compromise. The Protocol of 1972, which is the product of many difficult compromises, contains a number of weaknesses.

There are some provisions which will not easily be acceptable to a number of countries, specifically those provisions which would require parties to furnish to the Board annual estimates of the area and geographic location of land to be used for the cultivation of the opium poppy for any purpose (and not only of the area to be used for the production of opium)783 and annual statistical figures on the "ascertainable area of cultivation of the opium poppy" for any purpose.784                           
Another such provision would obligate governments to furnish to the Board annual estimates of the number of industrial establishments which will manufacture synthetic drugs, and of the quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by each of these establishments.7" These latter provisions will probably not only be unacceptable to several countries, but are certainly completely useless from the viewpoint of drug control, and may even make such control more difficult. These provisions resulted. Several "Third World" countries insisted on it and were backed in this by some opium producing countries which appear to have desired to impose on industrial countries some burdens in compensation for those which they believed to take upon themselves tinder the terms of the new Protocol. Their motives were largely emotional.                        

A few other provisions of the Protocol are obviously based on a misunderstanding of the working of the international narcotics regime and in particular of the part played by section, "The Total of the Estimates." 786 The new definition of the "Total of the Estimates" for opium and that of the "Total of the Estimates" for a synthetic drug will have the effect in some opium producing countries and in some countries manufacturing the synthetic drug that these countries will be able to import more opium or the synthetic drug than under the terms of the unamended Convention. This will certainly be the case of the very large producers of opium and of large manufacturers of the synthetic drug. Such countries will be able to import huge quantities which they will not need, while the definition of the "Total of the Estimates" in the unamended text of article 19, paragraph 2 serves the purpose of limiting the import of drugs to the real requirements of the country or territory.787

Moreover, the United States for a long time will not be able to apply article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) which would be introduced into the Convention by the Protocol. Our country and others which are parties to the unamended Convention will remain bound to apply article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) and not be authorized to substitute sub-paragraph (b) of the Protocol. They will be obligated to those parties to the Single Convention which would not accept the Protocol, that is, as long as all parties to the unamended Single Convention will not have become parties to the amended text.'"

The advantages which the Protocol would considerably outweigh its defects.

First of all, the Protocol would greatly strengthen the Board. The increase of the term of office of the members of the Board from three to five years would certainly aid in assuring their independence."'" Under the Protocol, the Board whose memberships would also be increased from eleven to thirteen,79° would be an organ different from that under the unamended Convention; but this would not prevent the new Board from carrying out its functions in relation to those parties to the unamended treaty which would not accept the Protocol. First, the Board is authorized to implement most of its tasks even in relation to nonparties.791 Second, it would be entitled to act in relation to states which would be parties only to the unamended text, for the reasons given by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinions on the South-West African case.792

The Board would also be assured of having its own secretariat.793 The fight against the illicit traffic would be facilitated by the new provisions regarding extradition of traffickers:794

A number of the new provisions clearly show that the authors of the Protocol had a full understanding of the nature of the international society as a society of sovereign states. They would emphasize and strengthen those activities of the Board, of other international organs and of Governments themselves in the drug field which are most appropriate and generally most effective. Special emphasis is laid on the need for strengthening the cooperation of the Board with Governments. The Board is expressly required to further this cooperation, to provide the mechanism for a continuing dialogue with them and to give them assistance and advice if requested to do so:795 The Board is entitled or even required to initiate consultations with concerned governments.7" The need for co-operative action at the international level between governments themselves as well as between governments and international organs is stressed.797

The incapacity of some governments, by their own efforts, to make a full contribution to the achievement of the aims of the Convention is recognized and the Board is expressly authorized, with the agreement of the concerned governments to recommend to the competent United Nations organs and to the specialized agencies that technical or financial assistance, or both, be granted to those governments in support of their efforts to carry out their obligations.798

Provision is made for the Board's right to propose to a government which has a serious drug situation to make a study of this situation and thus to obtain a better understanding of its drug problems and of the remedial measures which might be required. The government may request the Board to make available for such a study the expertise and the services of one or more competent persons to assist it in the proposed study. The persons made available by the Board are subject to the approval of the government.799

The importance of the prevention of drug abuse, of the early treatment and rehabilitation of persons abusing drugs, of the need for training of personnel employed in such treatment or rehabilitation, and for promoting an understanding of the problems of drug abuse by drug personnel and by the general public, if there is a risk that drug abuse will become widespread, must be recognized by governments, who are required to undertake these measures.'"

It may also be worthwhile mentioning that the Protocol clearly explains and usefully emphasizes the aims of the Convention and in general terms the part which the Board should play in this context.

It is suggested that for all those reasons it is in the interest of the United States to ratify the Protocol of 1972, especially since the United States has taken the diplomatic initiative in bringing about the conclusion of this treaty.

A SUMMARY APPRAISAL OF VIENNA CONVENTION OF 1971 ON PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES."'

When appraising the provisions of the Vienna Convention it would be useful to keep in mind:
•    Many of the psychotropic substances which fall under the regime of the Vienna Convention are not only very useful medicines—as some narcotic drugs also are—but are also very widely used, often many times more than codeine, the most popular narcotic drug. It is the view of a number of countries, including in particular European countries with advanced medical services, that controls to prevent drug abuse should as little as possible reduce the ease of availability of needed medicines. Strict controls are, in their opinion, often imcompatible with a desirable ease of availability of useful drugs. This is also the reason why even under the narcotics regime drugs in Schedule II, such as codeine, can be sold without medical prescription. Many public health services try to maintain in their policies a proper balance between the need for making easily available drugs, whose wide use for therapeutic purposes they consider desirable, and the need for fighting drug abuse. Some public health services give precedence to their desire to make easily available very useful drugs over considerations of preventing abuse. In maintaining a correct balance between these two considerations which determine public health policies toward drugs, the degree of harm which a drug may cause a person abusing it is, of course, also relevant. All this explains why the Vienna Convention provides rather weak controls with regard to substances in Schedule III which contain some widely used medicines. Its Schedule IV controls are even weaker because this Schedule was intended to include medicines which are even more widely used or considerably less dangerous, or both, than those listed in Schedule III.

•    The Conference which adopted the Vienna Convention demonstrated that to provide for protective measures against future dangers, that is, to prevent the emergence of foreseeable, but not yet existing social evils, was even more difficult in the field of international legislation than in the field of domestic legislation.

The provisions of the Vienna Convention have been considered above in connection with corresponding provisions of the Single Convention, of the Protocol of 1972 amending this Convention and of earlier drug treaties. Apart from some special rules governing psychotropic substances in Schedule I and a few other rules, the Vienna Convention, in general, takes over administrative controls which are employed in the narcotic regime and applies them in varying degrees to four different categories of psychotropic substances, listed in four Schedules.

There are however some important differences:

•    The Vienna Convention does not require Governments to furnish to the Board annual estimates of their requirements of psychotropic substances which each country may annually acquire by manufacture or import or both. It will be recalled that the Single Convention provides for such a limitation of narcotics supplies with the quantities of the supplies determined on the basis of the estimates of governments, drug requirements which sent to the Board each year. Reference may also be made to the criticism of the value of the estimates and of the limitations system based thereon.802

•    The Vienna Convention also does not limit to the amounts required for the normal conduct of their business the quantities of psychotropic substances which manufacturers or traders may possess. There is only one exception: parties to the Convention are required to restrict the quantities of substances in Schedule I supplied to a duly authorized person to the amounts needed for their authorized purposes.803

•    The Vienna Convention does not control the cultivation of plants from which psychotropic substances may be obtained or even of those plants which are grown for this purpose. This lack of control is motivated by a number of reasons. Some of these plants are not cultivated and the psychotropic substances in question are obtained from wild growing plants. The control of the cultivation of other plants in question would not be possible in practice. For example, ergot is a fungus disease of rye. It is not only a material from which LSD can be made, but it has itself effects on the functioning of the brain and may if used in large quantities or on a chronic basis lead to serious mental defects. However, according to available information it is not so used because it does not create a state of euphoria. Anyway it would of course be impossible to subject the cultivation of rye, which may yield ergot, to controls of the kind which are employed in the field of drugs. It is also possible that the lack of control of any plant from which psychotropic substances may be obtained is to some extent due to the speed with which the Vienna Convention was prepared, which would have made it impossible to select the plants which could be controlled and to elaborate a control regime, which could discriminate among different plants, depending on whether they are cultivated or grow wild.

The Vienna Convention does not use the term "production" or provide for the control of "production". As will be recalled "production" is defined in the Single Convention to mean the "separation of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin from the plants from which they are obtained." 804 Separation of psychotropic substances from the plants from which they may be obtained would be covered by the term "manufacture" as used in the Vienna Convention 805 and would therefore be subject to all the controls which would apply to the manufacture of such substances.

•    The Commission on Narcotic Drugs may change the Schedules of the Vienna Convention without following the recommendation of the World Health Organization. Such a recommendation must however in each case be obtained and is "determinative as to medical and scientific matters." 808

•    Preparations can be exempted from some controls by unilateral action of a party but only with respect to its own administration; under the Single Convention such exemptions can be made only by the Commission, but effective for all parties. The unilateral exemptions under the Vienna Convention can be terminated by the Commission partially or entirely while exemptions under the Single Convention can be ended by the Commission in the same way as it can make other changes in the Schedules of this Convention i.e. "in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization." 8°7

•    Changes in the Schedules and partial or full termination of exemptions of preparations must under the Vienna Convention be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Commission 8°8 while under the Single Convention changes in its Schedules may be adopted by a simple majority of the members of the Commission present and voting.85°

•    Under the Vienna Convention parties have the possibility of refusing to carry out some of the obligations which would be imposed upon them by a decision of the Commission adding a previously uncontrolled substance to a Schedule or transferring a substance to a more strictly controlled Schedule.809 Such a right of "non-acceptance" or "rejection", which is not provided for in the Single Convention, is of little interest to the United States because the decisions in question must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Commission and because each party may by its unilateral action exempt preparations from some measures of control.

•    The definition of dangerous substances in the Vienna Convention appears to permit it to place under its control only psychotropic substances which themselves have the dangerous properties in question and not those substances which by themselves do not have such properties but are convertible into such dangerous substances."° The Single Convention authorizes not only the control of dangerous drugs, but also of substances convertible into dangerous drugs."'

•    The Vienna Convention authorizes parties to make reservations with respect to wild growing plants which contain such psychotropic substances in Schedule I which are "traditionally used by certain small clearly determined groups in magical or religious rites." Such a reservation could free the reserving party from the obligation to apply to the plants "the provisions of article 7, (which contain the principal rules governing substances in Schedule (I) except for the provisions relating to international trade." The interpretation of this provision 812 may cause some difficulties. The Vienna Convention does not control the plants and article 7 applies only to psychotropic substances in Schedule I which may be parts of plants. The authors of this provision permitting the reservation apparently wanted to permit the uncontrolled "manufacture" 805 of, domestic trade in, distribution and use of such parts of the plants with respect to which the reservation would be made. This reservation could be made for an unlimited period of time. The Single Convention expressly permits reservations regarding the non-medical use of some drugs only for defined limited periods of
time.813

The measures which the Vienna Convention takes over from the Single Convention and applies to psychotropic substances may be described in general terms as follows: 814 limitation of all phases of the trade in psychotropic substances and of their use to medical and scientific purposes; requirement of governmental authorization of all phases of the trade in psychotropic substances; governmental authorization of establishments and premises in which such trade takes place; requirement of medical prescriptions for use of psychotropic drugs; application of the import certificate and export authorization system, but only to psychotropic substances in Schedules I and II; requirement of keeping records by manufacturers, traders and distributors; provisions regarding possession of psychotropic substances and regarding organs of domestic control; requirement of penalizing actions of illicit traffickers in violation of laws promulgated to carry out the Convention; obligation of parties to make reports to international organs; international supervision of the implementation of the treaty by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board including measures to be taken by the Board to ensure the implementation of provisions of the Convention; provision for extending control to additional substances, for freeing substances from control, for exempting preparations from some controls and for rescinding such exemptions.

A few details concerning these measures may be recalled because they may be of particular importance for evaluating the Vienna Convention:

The use of psychotropic substances in Schedule I is permitted only to scientific and very limited medical purposes. The restriction of the use to very limited purposes is without any value from the viewpoint of international drug control. The possibility that a substance in Schedule I might be found to be very effective in curing a frequently occurring serious disease cannot be discounted. Should a government not permit the wide use of such a substance until the Commission has transferred it to a different Schedule?

The use of psychotropic substances in Schedule I would be permitted only "in medical or scientific establishments which are directly under control of their government or specifically approved by them." The American delegation at the Vienna Convention which adopted the Convention expressly declared that it would consider offices of doctors to be such establishments. This provision 815 will therefore be less burdensome for our country than its text would appear to be.

The import certificate and export authorization system would not apply to substances in Schedule III and IV. International transactions in such substances would normally not require any specific government authorization. However, exporters of substances in Schedule III, but not in Schedule IV would have to declare each export 818 to the authorities of their own country.

The additional measures which would be required for international transactions in substances in Schedule I are hardly very meaningful.817 A government which would authorize a person or enterprise to import and/or export such substances, would grant the specific authorization required by the Convention. If it applies, in addition, the import certificate and export authorization system to such transactions it would carry out all the obligations which it would have in this connection.

The records which would have to be kept by manufacturers of, traders in and distributors of psychotropic drugs in Schedules I and II would differ very little if at all from those to be kept under the Single Convention with regard to drugs in Schedule 1.818 The Vienna Convention also requires 819 that persons performing medical or scientific functions with substances in Schedule I keep records concerning the acquisition of the substances and the details of their use. It will be recalled that under the Single Conventions medical practitioners are not required to keep any records. It may also be assumed that the records to be kept by scientists under the Single Convention with regard to drugs in Schedule
I may be a little less detailed than the records of scientists using psychotropic substances.

The records to be kept by manufacturers of, wholesale traders in, wholesale distributors and exporters and importers of psychotropic substances in Schedule III would be the same as those to be kept with regard to Schedules I and II drugs under the Single Convention. The provision regarding the records to be kept with regard to substances in Schedule III by retail distributors, institutions for hospitalization and care and by scientific institutions are rather vague and would be less detailed than the records to be kept by retail distributors and such institutions with respect to Schedules I or II drugs of the Single Convention.

The provisions of the Vienna Convention regarding records to be kept with regard to substances in Schedule IV would only require manufacturers, exporters and importers to show the quantities manufactured, exported and imported.82°
While the records to be kept with respect to psychotropic substances in Schedules I and II and the records to be kept by manufacturers, wholesalers, exporters and importers of psychotropic substances in Schedule III would be as satisfactory for the purposes of control as those records kept under the Single Convention, the record requirements for psychotropic drugs are generally less strict than for drugs under the Single Convention, but this is considered by many countries to be a practical necessity in view of the extensive use of many psychotropic substances in Schedules III and IV.

It may however be added that governments theoretically could be compelled to require the keeping of more extensive records than those expressly prescribed by the Vienna Convention. This would be the case if the Commission would require 821 parties to furnish information which they could obtain only from enterprises engaged in the trade in psychotropic drugs which would keep records for this purpose.

While the Single Convention requires 822 parties not to permit the possession of narcotic drugs without legal authority the Vienna Convention makes this requirement only with respect to substances in Schedule 1.823 The Vienna Convention only declares it to be "desirable" that parties do not permit possession of Schedules II—IV substances, except under legal authority.824

Contrary to the Single Convention, the Vienna Convention does not make obligatory the maintenance of "a special administration" for the execution of its provisions. It declares only that it would be desirable to maintain and establish such an administration."'
The Penal Provisions of the Vienna Convention 828 are nearly the same as those of the unamended Single Convention,827 except that the former provides for the application of measures of treatment and rehabilitation either as an alternative of conviction or punishment or in addition to punishment, in the case of all offenders who are abusers of psychotropic drugs, including the most criminal illicit traffickers.828 The same provision would be introduced into the Single Convention by the Protocol of 1972.829

The Vienna Convention requires parties to furnish to the Board much less statistical data than does the Single Convention; but the Commission theoretically could require parties to supply all the statistical figures which are expressly provided for in the Single Convention; but not in the Vienna Convention,8" if it finds this necessary for the performance of its functions. It could forward these figures to the Board. One must not overlook in this context that the Commission is authorized to consider all matters pertaining to the aims and to the implementation of the Vienna Convention "' just as it is authorized to do under the Single Convention.832

The provisions of the Vienna Convention regarding the measures to be taken by the Board to assure the execution of provisions of the Vienna Convention (Sanctions)833 are with the exception of one paragraph 8" mutatis mutandis literally the same as the "sanction" provisions of the unamended Single Convention."' This paragraph authorizes the Board to apply the sanction procedure also if it has re thon to believe that the aims of the Vienna Convention are being seriously endangered as a result of a party's "non-acceptance" ("rejection")836 of a decision by the Commission to place an uncontrolled substance under control or to transfer a substance to a more strictly controlled Schedule.

The authors of the Vienna Convention thought they could not provide for very strict controls of very widely employed medicines because it would reduce the ease of their availability for therapeutic purposes. Instead, they emphasized the usefulness of knowledge of the dangerous properties of the substances involved and of education in the fight against drug abuse.

Therefore they included in the Convention a provision under which the parties, taking into account any relevant regulations or recommendations of the World Health Organization, are bound to require such directions for use, including cautions and warnings, to be indicated on labels where practicable and in any case on the accompanying leaflet of retail packages of psychotropic substances, as in their opinion, are necessary for the safety of the user. Parties would also be bound, with due regard to their constitutional provisions, to prohibit the advertisement of psychotropic substances to the general public.837

Such measures are certainly valuable and should be included in domestic public health regulations. However, the provision regarding the contents of the labels and of the leaflets accompanying the retail packages are very vague and leave the individual governments very wide discretion. It certainly does not do any harm to include such a provision in the Convention. However, the view that the way in which a country deals with its problems of drug abuse is—from the viewpoint of international drug control—normally no international interest as long as that country effectively prevents the illegal export of internationally controlled drugs from its territory into other countries.

These considerations apply also to another provision of the Vienna Convention which requires Parties to take all practicable measures for the prevention of the abuse of psychotropic substances and for the early treatment and rehabilitation of abusers of such substances and to coordinate their efforts to this end, to promote, as far as possible the training of personnel in such treatment and rehabilitation and to assist persons whose work so requires to acquire an understanding of the problems of abuse of psychotropic substances and to promote such understanding also by the general public if there is a risk that such abuse will become widespread.838 A very similar provision regarding narcotic 1 drugs would be introduced by the Protocol of 1972 into the Single Convention.836

It may be concluded that the controls which the Vienna Convention would apply to psychotropic substances in Schedule II which includes the amphetamines would be approximately as effective as those which would be offered by the Single Convention if it were applied to these substances.

However, one cannot be sufficiently sure that the Vienna Convention would give better protection against the abuse of psychotropic substances in Schedule I than the Single Convention if its application were extended to them. The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations did not exclude the hallucinogenic drugs from the scope of the Single Convention. Such drugs could therefore be placed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Schedules I and IV of that Convention in accordance with article 3 of this treaty.84°

The value of the provision of the Vienna Convention restricting the use of substances in Schedule I to scientific and "very limited" medical purposes has been criticized from the viewpoint of drug control. Its compatibility with sound medical policies has also been questioned. Under the Single Convention parties are required to prohibit the production, manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of drugs in Schedule IV, except for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific research, only if, in their opinion, the prevailing conditions in their countries render such a prohibition the most appropriate means of protecting public health and welfare."'

The requirement of a "special" license or prior authorization for engaging in any phase of the trade in psychotropic substances in Schedule I does not necessarily provide better protection than the requirement of licensing under the Single Convention. Manufacturers of narcotic drugs which must be allocated manufacturing quotas by their governments for each drug in order to enable their countries not to exceed their drug supplies as required by the Single Convention in fact also have "special licenses" or "prior authorizations".842

The provision of the Vienna Convention regarding the international trade in psychotropic substances in Schedule I by government agencies are not mandatory. Governments are entitled to permit such trade to "specifically authorized" private persons or enterprises. In both cases the import certificate and export authorization system has to be applied."' The Single Convention requires that the international trade in narcotic drugs be carried out by state enterprises or under license and that the import certificate and export authorization system be applied to each international transaction.'" The provisions of both treaties are nearly the same.

The Vienna Convention's provision restricting the amount of psychotropic drugs to be supplied to a duly authorized person to that required for his authorized purpose,846 may be compared with the provisions of the Single Convention requiring parties to prevent the accumulation of drugs in Schedule I and II in the possession of manufacturers, traders, distributors and persons duly authorized to perform therapeutic or scientific function in excess of that needed for their normal business needs."' There is one strong provision in the Vienna Convention worthwhile mentioning which was already indicated above and which does not have its counterpart in the Single Convention. The former treaty requires persons performing medical functions with substances in Schedule I to keep records concerning the acquisition of these substances and the details of their use while medical practitioners are not required by the Single Convention to keep any records; but one may assume that a doctor will hardly unduly prescribe a dangerous hallucinogenic substance such as those in Schedule I of the Vienna Convention and certainly not in quantities which could be significant for purposes of illicit trafficking. In any event, such a doctor would be quickly discovered by reason of the amounts which he would have to buy. As was stated above the other records which would to be kept under the Vienna Convention with regard to substances in Schedule I differ very little if at all from those required by the Single Convention with regard to drugs in Schedule I.

It may also be maintained that the Vienna Convention provides that the establishments and premises in which manufacture, trade or distribution may of Schedules II, III and IV substances take place to be controlled "under license or other similar control measure", while all use "for scientific or very limited medical purposes by duly authorized persons" of Schedule I take place "in medical or scientific establishments which are directly under the control of their governments or specifically approved by them". This omission of requiring licensing of establishment •and premises in which manufacture of, trade in or distribution of psychotropic substances in Schedule I may take place is certainly an oversight.847 The Single Convention, on the other hand, requires control under license of all establishments and premises in which the manufacture of drugs or preparations or the trade in, or distribution of drugs (but not preparations) may take place.848

This omission of the Vienna Convention does not free governments from an obligation to exercise strict controls over establishments and premises in which the manufacture, trade in or distribution of substances in Schedule I may take place, since they are bound to provide for close supervision of such manufacture, trade and distribution. These controls may include control of the establishments and premises under license or other similar control measure and other security measures such as those which parties are bound to apply with regard to substances in other Schedules.849

Without going into further details,880 words like "special" or "close supervision" which are used in the Vienna Convention in provisions regarding psychotropic substances in Schedule I are not precise enough to assure the required strict controls. Much will depend, of course, on the interpretation of these terms by the individual governments.

One may safely assume that the provisions of the Single Convention governing drugs in Schedule I which are effective in preventing diversion from legal trade into the illicit traffic would be equally effective with regard to the psychotropic substances in Schedule I of the Vienna Convention. It might perhaps be useful to consider the advisability of placing hallucinogenic substances in Schedule I (and IV) of the Single Convention if the Vienna Convention should not come into force for a long time. When the latter treaty enters into force one could remove these substances from the Schedule(s) of the Single Convention.

In any event it will be very difficult to fight the illicit traffic in some of these hallucinogenic drugs because of their high potency in extremely small quantities and of their ease of manufacture.

The provisions of the Vienna Convention regarding substances in Schedules III and IV will hardly be effective in preventing the illicit importation of such substances obtained from the legal trade. The United States could of course prohibit the importation of such substances with the exception of those quantities which it would expressly authorize by "a special import license" in individual cases.881 Our country could assure that the import certificate and export authorization system would be applied to such "prohibited" substances by parties to the Vienna Convention. Manufacturers of substances in Schedule IV would not be required to keep any records of their domestic sales 852 and international shipments of these substances would not be subject to any controls. Exporters of substances in Schedule III will have to record their foreign shipments; 853 but it may be very difficult if not impossible to check the accuracy of these records if the substances are sent to a party which does not require the importer to transmit to its control authorities a copy of the export declaration which accompanied the shipment. The importing party is not bound' to provide for such a requirement.854 In the case of legally manufactured substances in Schedules III and IV, they could easily be sent abroad to be diverted into the illicit traffic and then smuggled into the United States or other victim countries. However, it can hardly be foreseen whether a significant international illicit traffic will develop in Schedules III or IV substances, since they can be obtained easily on medical prescription or otherwise from domestic sources.

There are a number of reasons why it is in the interest of the United States to ratify the Vienna Convention. Some of them may be indicated:

•    The international control of amphetamines is highly desirable because some quantities of them are diverted from licit channels into the illicit traffic and are illegally imported into other countries. They have become a real internation problem because defective control in some countries prevents effective control in other countries. If no party to the Single Convention objects, amphetamines could be placed under the international narcotics regime; but such a procedure would have some disadvantages;855

•    The fact that under the Vienna Convention the Commission could place a substance in a Schedule other than that recommended by the World Health Organization should not be an obstacle to ratification. All decisions of the Commission regarding Schedules must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of its total membership. It is highly improbable that under these circumstances the Commission would place a substance in a Schedule against the determined opposition of the United States. The American policy in such cases could be adopted by a procedure which would be agreed upon by the departments concerned in a way similar to that which is followed in domestic legislation with regard to the control regime of a drug; 856

•    The limited right of "non-acceptance" ("rejection") is no longer of any importance to the United States.887 It lost its former importance by including in the Convention the provision regarding the two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Commission for decisions regarding changes in the Schedules and also by the inclusion of the unilateral right of the parties to exempt preparations from important controls. These exemptions can be terminated only by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Commission;

•    The refusal of the United States to ratify the Vienna Convention would seriously weaken its international efforts to improve the opium situation; and

•    The Vienna Convention would not impose any particular burdens upon the United States which has stricter controls than those which would be required by the Convention.

FURTHER DESIRABLE AMENDMENTS OF DRUG TREATIES

In the near future it would not be very easy to induce the necessary number of States to agree to the convocation of an international conference for the purpose of amending the Single Convention or the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs. Moreover, at present the principal American interest in the international drug field is to eliminate or at least to reduce the opium supplies which are available to clandestine manufacturers of morphine and heroin. Improvement of the Single Convention could make only a minor contribution to the achievement of this aim. The flow of illicit opium from uncontrolled or illicit production cannot be suppressed by the present treaties or any amendments.

But this does not mean that some improvements in the drug treaties are not desirable and that the United States should not attempt to bring them about at an appropriate moment. Some of the possible amendments may be mentioned as follows:

•    Conclusion of a Single Treaty to replace the existing 12 treaties in the field ( 10 in force plus the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs and the Protocol of 1972 amending the Single Convention) .858

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which entered into force in 13 December 1964 has not yet terminated any of the earlier drug treaties, except as between parties to the Single Convention. However desirable the conclusion of the Single Treaty under consideration might be, it may be assumed that in view of the rules of international treaty law the conclusion of this treaty would for a long time only have the effect of adding a thirteenth treaty to the already existing twelve drug treaties. Therefore, the adoption of such a Single Treaty should not constitute an aim of American policy in the drug field in the foreseeable future. However, this does not mean that the idea of concluding a Single Treaty should not be taken up if at some time in the future a favorable international atmosphere should develop.

•    Amendment of the provisions of the Single Convention concerning the control of opium production. It is impossible to prevent diversion by licensed private individual cultivators of a part of their opium crops even in countries which are capable of applying the provisions of the Single Convention governing opium production.859 It would therefore be desirable to amend the Single Convention to the effect that cultivation of the poppy for opium production by private farmers be prohibited and that only state farms or relatively large corporate bodies should obtain licenses to engage in the cultivation of the poppy for the production of opium. It might be easier in the present international atmosphere to provide in the amendment that only state farms or cooperatives (collective farms) may be licensed to produce opium.

•    Amendment of the provisions of the Single Convention governing the cultivation of the coca bush.86° The regime which the Single Convention applies to the cultivation of the opium poppy is not adequate for the coca bush. It has been proposed that the United States should enter into negotiations with the countries interested in the cultivation of this plant with a view to achieving an agreement to revise the Single Convention provision concerning the coca bush. Such an agreement, if proposed to the Economic and Social Council under article 47 of the Single Convention as an amendment to that treaty, would be circulated by the Council to the parties to the Convention asking them whether they accept the proposed amendment. It is probable that no party, within the eighteen months foreseen in article 47, would object to an amendment agreed upon by all interested parties and that the amendment would thus enter into force without any need for having it adopted by a Plenipotentiary Conference. Without being able to anticipate the results of the suggested negotiations, it would again be necessary to prohibit the cultivation of the plant by private farmers who could not be prevented, even by a very good administration, from diverting part of their crops into illicit channels. If coca leaf chewing would be ended—and without the suppression of coca leaf chewing an effective control of the cultivation of the bush is hardly possible—the amounts needed for the manufacture of cocaine and of a flavoring agent for beverages would be very small. It is very probable that it would not be very difficult to obtain the agreement that the cultivation of the coca bush and the trade in the leaves should become a monopoly which could be exercised either by a government agency or by a large private corporate body to which the government could grant the monopoly rights.

•    Amendment of the provisions Single Convention governing the provision of the cannabis plant.96' It would be unduly optimistic to assume that in the foreseeable future such an amendment of the Single Convention's provisions regarding the cannabis plant which would be generally acceptable and adequate for purposes of drug control could be obtained. The Single Convention's application of the poppy regime to the cultivation of the plant and only to that cultivation which is undertaken for the purpose of obtaining the drugs is not satisfactory. Such a regime cannot prevent the diversion of drugs by private cultivators, who are authorized to produce cannabis and cannabis resin, nor the clandestine production of the drugs by cultivators of the plant for industrial purposes. It is suggested that a really effective control system would have to prohibit the private cultivation of the cannabis plant for any purpose (excepting drug free varieties )359 and to provide for the destruction of all wild growth wherever it can be found, which would be extremely difficult. Not only the cultivation of the plant but also the trade in all parts of the plant would have to be a government monopoly (excluding perhaps the ready fiber and the oil obtained from the seeds). This monopoly could also be exercised by a large private corporate body authorized by the government.

•    Amendment of the provisions of the Single Convention and the Vienna Convention regarding the enforcements measures (sanctions) by the International Narcotics Board to assure the execution of the provisions of these conventions.992
The sanction of an import or export embargo of drugs is obsolete and even questionable from the viewpoint of public health. The idea of discontinuation of the export of drugs to an offending country was conceived under conditions which were entirely different from today's. It is therefore suggested that the provisions of the Single Convention and of the Vienna Convention authorizing the International Narcotics Control Board to recommend an export or import embargo, or both, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances should be amended. They would usefully be replaced by the right of the Board to prepose to the Economic and Social Council to recommend some economic sanctions against an offending country.

•    Introduction of a provision into the Single Convention and into the Vienna Convention which would make it possible to use the Convention for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear with a view to prohibiting the manufacture of narcotic drugs and/or psychotropic substances in those countries which are not capable of exercising control and from whose manufacture or wholesale trade diversion of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances into the illicit traffic takes place.

The principal success of the international narcotics regime consists of the fact that no significant diversion of narcotic drugs currently occurs. This success would be endangered if countries which do not have an effective administration would enter the field of manufacturing basic narcotic drugs. It is highly improbable that in the present international atmosphere and in the foreseeable future a provision would be adopted which would require governments whose administration would be defective, not to permit the manufacture of narcotic or psychotropic drugs. Such a provision would be rejected on the ground that it would be contrary to the present policy of the international society regarding economic development. Moreover, a country desiring to commence manufacturing narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances would not admit that it has a defective administration. Therefore it is suggested that the provision to be introduced into the Single Convention and into the Vienna Convention should be patterned after article 22 of the Single Convention. The new provision should stipulate that whenever the prevailing conditions in the country or territory of a party render the prOhibition of the manufacture of narcotic drugs and/or of psychotropic substances the most suitable measure for preventing the diversion of narcotic drugs and/or psychotropic substances into the illicit traffic, the party should be required to prohibit the manufacture of such drugs and substances. Such a treaty provision would of course have to be carried out in good faith and the party's real rather than its alleged opinion would be relevant. Such a provision could be used to exercise pressure on the party not to commence manufacture, to improve its controls if it has already started manufacture and finally to prohibit manufacture

•    Introduction into the Single Convention and into the Vienna Convention of a provision that in countries in which the manufacture of, wholesale trade in, export and import of, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is not carried out by State enterprises, the number of manufacturing, wholesale, export and import licenses 863 should be limited to such a minimum as would be compatible with some degree of competition and with promotion of research. An oligopolitical system of the trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is advantageous from the viewpoint of control.

QUESTION OF TREATY PROVISIONS PREVENTING POLICY OPTIONS ON CERTAIN CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS

•    Punishment of the Acquisition (including Purchase) and Possession of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances for Personal Consumption

The terms "possession" and "purchase" used in the penal provisions of the Single Convention 864 mean only possession and purchase for the purpose of illicit traffic. Consequently unauthorized possession and acquisition (purchase) of narcotic drugs for personal consumption need not be treated under the Single Convention either as punishable offenses or as serious offenses. If a government does not accept this view, they may consider purchase and possession for personal use to be offenses punishable by fines, censure or the confiscation of the drugs, or to be serious offenses punishable by deprivation of liberty, including imprisonment."'

The provisions of the Protocol of 1972 permitting the substitution of treatment and rehabilitation for conviction or punishment of addicted offenders will remain ineffective for the United States at least for a very long time."'

However, nothing in the Single Convention would prevent the United States from imposing on illegal purchase and possession of narcotic drugs for personal consumption penalties it considers advisable.

The Vienna Convention does not require parties to prohibit the possession of psychotropic substances in Schedules II, III or IV without legal authority,'" but only to provide that the possession of substances in Schedule I should be prohibited without a special license or prior authorization.888 The penal provisions of the Vienna Convention 8" are patterned after those of the Single Convention although the former define the punishable offenses in general terms instead of using the largely enumerative method of the latter. The penal provisions of the Vienna Convention aim at the illicit traffic; illicit acquisition (purchase) and possession of all psychotropic substances for personal consumption are not punishable offenses under the Vienna Convention, even though the government concerned might not permit the possession of substances in Schedules II, III and IV without legal authority. Here again a government which does not share this view, could in any event treat such purchase and possession as offenses which are not serious and which are punishable by fines, censure or even only by confiscation of the substances involved. The liberty of governments to impose heavy penalties would not be restricted by the Vienna Convention.

These legal considerations are of less importance in the Vienna Convention than in the Single Convention because the provision of the former, permitting the substitution of measures of treatment and rehabilitation for offenders who abuse psychotropic substances for their conviction or punishment, could be applied by the United States.

•    Distribution and Sale of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

Illicit distribution and sale of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances would be treated as serious punishable offenses subject to appropriate punishment, particularly by deprivation of liberty, including imprisonment. However, governments would be permitted to treat them as non-serious offenses and to punish them by fines, by censure or by confiscation. Such a case would include possession or distribution of a small amount of a relatively less dangerous drug for distribution to a friend without consideration or without profit.

Under the Vienna Convention, treatment and rehabilitation of all distributors of psychotropic substances, who abuse such substances, could be substituted for their conviction or punishment.

The corresponding provision of the amended Single Convention would remain ineffective for the United States, at least for a very long time.

•    Legalization of the Non-Medical Use of Cannabis and Cannabis Resin

As long as cannabis and cannabis resin remain in the Schedules I and IV of the Single Convention, or are removed only from Schedule IV or are transferred to Schedule II, which involves deletion from Schedule IV, the United States is bound by the Single Convention to prohibit their non-medical use.

In accordance with a recommendation of the World Health Organization, the Commission, by a simple majority of its members present and voting, could remove cannabis and cannabis resin from the Schedules of the Single Convention. Cannabis and cannabis resin would thus cease to be drugs within the meaning of this Convention and would be freed from all drug control provisions.870 No longer considered drugs, cannabis and cannabis resin could be produced, exported, imported, distributed, traded, used and possessed for non-medical purposes without any controls, except those which the United States would wish to maintain or establish. However, a somewhat anomalous situation would exist because article 28, paragraph 1 of the Single Convention would continue to be in force, except if deleted by an amendment of this treaty. It would continue to require that the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis and cannabis resin be controlled as is the cultivation of the poppy for the production of opium; but despite these controls the cannabis and cannabis resin could be produced for any purpose, including non-medical consumption.

The legalization of the non-medical use of cannabis and cannabis resin presupposes that these substances would not be included in a Schedule of the Vienna Convention.

•    The Non-Medical Use of the Leaves of the Cannabis Plant.

The Single Convention "' does not prohibit the non-medical use of the leaves of the cannabis plant if they are not accompanied by the tops of the plant.872 Parties are required to adopt such measures as might be necessary to prevent the misuse of and illicit traffic in the leaves. The measures required to prevent misuse might include the prohibition of the sale of very potent leaves, of the sale of excessive quantities to one individual and of the sale to persons below a certain age. These are only a few examples of what parties might have to do under the vague provision of the Convention. The obligation to prevent the illicit traffic in the leaves may be carried out by limiting the trade in the leaves to government shops or licensed traders. Generally speaking such measures as are adopted in many countries to prevent excessive consumption of alcohol and illegal trade in alcohol may be sufficient.

•    Maintenance Programs

The treaty provision limiting the use of drugs "to medical and scientific purposes" 873 has always been interpreted by some governments to permit consumption by persons whose addiction has proved to be incurable of the minimum quantities of addictive drugs required to prevent painful withdrawal symptoms and to make it possible for these addicts to lead a "normal" life. No party to the drug treaties has objected to this interpretation. However, the use of drugs in maintenance programs must in all cases be determined by medical considerations, which include the desire to help the addicts or other abusers of controlled drugs.874

MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT TREATY AMENDMENT AND WHICH MIGHT BE DESIRABLE

•    Opium

Opium producing countries which have an effective administration and which apply the provisions of the Single Convention governing opium production should be induced through diplomatic efforts not to authorize private individual farmers to cultivate the poppy for the production of opium or any purpose, since even the best administration cannot prevent the diversion. Such authorizations should be granted only to state farms or to large private corporate bodies.

Opium-producing countries which cannot prevent diversion of a significant part of their legal opium crop into illicit channels and which are not willing to adopt the above measure should be pressed to prohibit the cultivation of the poppy. They should be told that it was impossible not to be of the opinion that such prohibition would be the most suitable measure for preventing the diversion of opium into the illicit traffic 875 if such diversion from their territories in significant quantities has taken place for many years.876 Such pressure should be exercised only with due consideration to the necessity of maintaining adequate legal supplies of opium. A shortage of opium for medical purposes must be avoided.

Countries which because of their low wage level would be able to produce opium for the legal market should be discouraged from commencing opium production as long as they are not able to establish a competent control machinery and are not willing to authorize only state farms or big corporate bodies to cultivate the opium poppy and to produce opium.

Countries which do not have an effective administration and are not able to exercise full governmental controls over their poppy growing districts should be made to recognize that the opium question is not only a problem of the United States and a few other countries, but a universal problem of interest to the whole family of nations.

All steps should be taken to prepare a plan of economic and social modernization for each district in which uncontrolled or illicit opium production takes place and whose economy depends on such production.

•    The Coca Bush

The abolition of coca leaf chewing and the required economic and social reforms should be pressed because, without the suppression of coca leaf chewing, effective control of the coca bush cultivation and elimination of the clandestine manufacture of cocaine is hardly possible. Necessary foreign aid for this purpose should be favored.

Negotiations should be initiated with the primarily interested countries to achieve an agreement on an amendment of the Single Convention with a view of providing the special controls which would be adequate for the cultivation of the coca bush.

•    The Cannabis Plant

The program of breeding a drug-free variety of the plant should be undertaken.359

Pressure should be brought to bear on those countries which are the principal foreign sources of cannabis drugs in our country to prohibit the cultivation of the cannabis plant for any purpose, to destroy, as far as possible, any wild growth, to improve their enforcement services and to co-operate closely with our own enforcement services. Foreign aid to the countries concerned should be favored for this purpose.

•    Question of Placing Hallucinogenic Substances Under the Single Convention

According to the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations, amphetamines barbitures and tranquilizers are outside the scope of the Single Convention. However, the Office maintains that a drug belonging to one of these three groups could be placed under the Single Convention if no party to the Convention objects. This legal opinion does not relate to hallucinogenic substances, which are included in Schedule I of the Vienna Convention. The question arises whether one should not consider the advisability of placing the hallucinogenics under the Single Convention, by operation of article 3 of this treaty, pending the Vienna Convention's coming into force. After this Convention comes into force and has been accepted by a sufficiently large number of countries, the hallucinogens could be removed from the control of the Single Convention.877 In the interval, parties to both treaties could apply the relevant provisions of both Conventions. In examining whether it would be advisable to place the hallucinogens under the Single Convention, it may be important to consider whether it would delay the coming into force of the Vienna Convention.

•    The Question of Placing• Amphetamines under the Single Convention

The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations maintains that even though amphetamines, barbiturates and tranquilizers are excluded from the scope of the Single Convention according to an understanding of the participants in the Conference of 1961 which adopted this Convention, it is possible to place a drug, belonging to any of these three groups, under the Single Convention, if no party to the Convention objects.

It is widely believed that amphetamines should be placed under the narcotics regime. This opinion is in particular also shared by a number of European countries. There were at least two serious arguments against attempting to place, by agreement of all parties, amphetamines under the Single Convention. First, such an action would most probably delay and perhaps prevent the coming into force of the Vienna Convention. Second, it would create an undesirable precedent and might increase considerably the pressure of those who have taken the position that barbiturates and tranquilizers should also be placed under the international narcotics regime. This would be undesirable from the viewpoint of public health, particularly in the case of very valuable drugs, the wide use of which is desirable because of its therapeutic effect.

Nevertheless if it is decided to attempt to place the amphetamines under the Single Convention, the following procedure could be followed:

A resolution could be introduced in the Economic and Social Council requesting the parties to the Single Convention not to object to the placing under the Single Convention of amphetamines. The resolution should also state that parties which do not make their objection in writing within a period to be indicated in the resolution would be considered to consent to setting aside the understanding reached at the Conference of 1961 regarding amphetamines. It might also be necessary to take the necessary diplomatic measures to frustrate the efforts of vested interests to induce uninformed or otherwise influenced governments to object to the Council resolution. Such diplomatic efforts could be made not only by the United States, but also by other interested countries, such as Sweden. It may be assumed that the World Health Organization would in the required procedure pursuant to article 3 of the Single Convention recommend the placing of amphetamines in Schedule I of this Convention, since it appears to hold that not technical reasons but only those of a legal nature render this action impossible.

Another possible course of action involves placing the amphetamines under the Single Convention by revising the Convention's Schedule under article 47, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) and paragraph 2.

This would also require that no party to the Single Convention objects.

•    Prosecution of Crimes of Illicit Traffic Committed Abroad

The Single Convention as well as the Vienna Con-wide perspective, the question of the illicit traffic is of the illicit traffic committed abroad, if extradition to a party which would have jurisdiction in the case cannot be carried out.878 But this obligation is "subject to the constitutional provisions", the "legal system" and the "domestic law" of the party concerned. A number of countries strictly adhere to the principle that crimes committed abroad should not be tried by their courts; but many of them make exceptions for strong national interests and all of them make an exception for piracy. From a worldwide perspective the question of the illicit traffic is probably at present a much more serious problem than piracy. The reasons for exempting serious crimes of the illicit traffic from the principle of territorial jurisdiction are perhaps now more cogent than those for exempting piracy. If this view is acceptable to the United States and its component states and if our country decides to prosecute serious offenses of the illicit traffic committed abroad, it is suggested that diplomatic efforts should be made to persuade other states which are strong adherents of the principle of territorial jurisdiction in criminal matters, to assume the same position. Such efforts may include resolutions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Economic and Social Council and of the General Assembly to treat, for purposes of criminal jurisdiction, serious offenses of the illicit traffic similar to piracy.

It is admitted that the definition of a crime of illicit traffic committed abroad in violation of foreign law, but punishable by other countries, may create some difficulty of legislative technique; but this difficulty can be overcome.
The aim of achieving universal criminal jurisdiction in grave cases of the illicit traffic should—at least for the present—be pursued by the suggested diplomatic means and not by an attempt to amend the Single Convention and Vienna Convention or to conclude a new treaty to this effect.

•    Changes in the Composition of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs

It has been reported above that the Economic and Social Council has full authority to determine the composition of the Commission. It would be useful to add to the government, representatives of which the Commission consists at present, a number of "assessors".878 These assessors should be independent from their governments, appointed by the Secretary General for a long term of office to strengthen their independence, and receive no payment,88° except their travel expenses and a daily subsistence allowance. They should have the same right as other members of the Commission to participate in the discussion, but no right to vote or to be elected as officers. Public discussion of the failure of a government to carry out its treaty obligations may be very useful. Appeal to public opinion can be a strong force in the field of drug control. The institution of assessors would assure public discussion in the Commission of defective national control regimes in cases where government representatives would be prevented from criticizing publicly another government. Important political considerations may compel a government not to question in public the drug situation in another country. The League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs had "assessors" of the kind of those proposed above. They were however not as useful in the pre-War atmosphere as they would be to-day.

It may be emphasized that under present conditions public criticism by an independent expert may sometimes be even more effective than by a government representative.

• Ratification of Treaties

It is in the interest of the United States to ratify the Vienna Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances as well as the Protocol of 1972, Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.88' It would be useful to include in the instrument of ratification of the Vienna Convention a declaration that it is the understanding of the United States that the word "establishments" in article 7, paragraph (a) also includes offices of doctors. This declaration was already made by the U.S. delegation at the Vienna Conference which adopted the Convention.

 

1 The term "narcotic drugs" is used for referring to those drugs which are subject to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, while the term "psychotropic substances" is applied to the drugs which would be controlled by the Vienna Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances. If the words "narcotic" and "psychotropic" are used in their normal meaning and not in that employed by these two treaties all drugs falling under the 1961 Convention are psychotropic substances and not all of them are narcotic (e.g. Cocaine). Moreover, many of the substances which would be subject to the 1971 Convention are in this sense narcotic drugs.

2 The only notable exception was the proposed International Opium Monopoly which would have applied only to the legal international trade in opium and would have had no effect whatsoever on the illicit traffic in that drug. The United States was also among those democratic states which manufacture and export important quantities of drugs and which at the Vienna Conference of 1971 and at the preceding sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs were willing to accept the most farreaching measures for the control of psychotropic substances.

3 About 2.2 pounds.

4 It is assumed that 10 milligrams represent a normal therapeutic dosage of morphine and 5 milligrams such a dosage of heroin. The dosages which abusers of these drugs may require to prevent withdrawal symptoms and particularly to obtain the euphoria which they crave may be considerably higher, depending on the degree of their addiction.

5 The conversion of a quantity of morphine into heroin yields a considerably larger amount of the latter drug. '

6 Report of the Permanent Central Narcotics Board on its work in 1965, United Nations document E/OB/21, paragraph 106 (p. XXVI). It has however become more and more the custom of illicit traffickers to convert the opium to morphine near the place where they obtain the opium from uncontrolled or illicit cultivation or by diversion from legal cultivation since morphine—as heroin—is much smaller in bulk and lighter in weight than an equivalent amount of opium and therefore can much more easily be concealed. Not infrequently, the morphine is immediately converted into heroin.

7 Article VII of the Agreement concerning the Manufac-ture of, Internal Trade in and Use of Prepared Opium, signed at Geneva on 11 February 1925. The article re-quires governments to use their utmost efforts by suitable instruction in schools, dissemination of literature and other-wise, to discourage the use of prepared opium, except where a government considers such measures undesirable under its particular conditions.

8 Article 15 of the Convention for Limiting the Manu-facture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, signed at Geneva on 13 July 1931. This article stipulates that governments should create a special administration inter alia for the purpose of "organizing the campaign against drug addiction, by taking all useful steps to prevent its development and to suppress the illicit traffic".

9 Recommendation IX of the Conference which met in Bangkok from 9 November to 27 November 1931 on the Suppression of Opium-smoking. It urged upon governments "the importance of adequate provision being made for the treatment of all persons genuinely desiring to be cured of their addiction, and of governments taking active steps to encourage persons to seek the cure of their addiction, and to promote, or encourage through voluntary effort, the after-care of persons who have undergone a cure, with a view to safeguarding them against relapse."

10 Article 38 in its present form and as it would be amended by the Protocol of 1972, when in force.

11 Article 20 and article 22, paragraph 1, sub-para.(b)

12 Article 14 of the Protocol amending article 36, para-graph 1 of the Single Convention and article 15 of the Protocol amending article 38 of the Single Convention.

13 " There is also another important consideration which must be taken into account in appraising the great diffi-culties and even the virtual impossibility of including in the multilateral drug treaties detailed rules providing for obligations of governments to adopt prescribed specific measures of dealing with drug abusers. The motivation of human behavior is a highly controversial subject if looked upon from a world-wide viewpoint. This problem is in fact a question of the nature of man. Widely different views are held in countries which are governed by different politi-cal ideologies, as regards the influence of genetic or envi-ronmental causes (including economic and social factors), religion, education, and the effects of penal law. Differences in the national attitude towards particular psychological or psychoanalytical schools of thought and even towards the value of psychoanalysis in general may also be caused by divergent ideologies. All these matters are related to the principal contemporary ideological philosophies which in-fluence national policies. Also it can not be denied that a totalitarian country, which has succeeded in building up an effective police apparatus, is capable of controlling the distribution of all medicines and all movements over its borders in such a strict way as to succeed in preventing practically all abuse of controlled drugs. But the serious alcohol problem which one such country has shows that this strict and effective control does not solve the social problem of which drug abuse is merely a symptom. Non-totalitarian countries can hardly adopt such "extreme" control measures.
One must keep in mind that the international drug treaties, in order to be etTective, must obtain the adherence of states of different ideological camps. The recognition of the need for controlling the availability of drugs in the fight against drug abuse is not affected by these divergent political philosophies.

14 Such obligations could however be included in treaties or other agreements betvveen the opium or coca leaf pro-ducing country concerned and one or several other coun-tries supplying the required foreign assistance, or in an agreement between the producing country and an interna-tional organization furnishing the aid.

15 See article 7 of the Protocol of 1972 amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which will introduce, when in force, article 14 into that Convention. Resolu-tions of United Nations organs have also recognized the importance of aid to governments for drug control; see General Assembly resolutions 1395 (XIV) and 2719 (XXV) (the latter welcoming the establishment of a "United Na-tions Fund for Drug Abuse Control") and resolution 1559 (XLIX) of the Economic and Social Council, also relating to this Fund.

16 Report of the Permanent Central Opium Board on its work in 1963, paragraph 34 (page XIII) (United Nations document E/OB/12) and Report of the Permanent Central Narcotics Board on its work in 1966, paragraph 126 (page XXIX) (United Nations document E/OB/22). The Board which was established by Chapter VI of the Inter-national Opium Convention of 1925 was called "Perma-nent Central Board" in the treaties referring to it. It took, however, the designation "Permanent Central Opium Board" and from 1965 on that of "Permanent Central Narcotics Board" to indicate the nature of its tasks. It has been replaced by the present International Narcotics Control Board as of 2 March 1968 (Article 45, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention and resolution 1106(XL) of the Economic and Social Council).

17 It must be emphasized that no program of drug main-tenance is advocated here. This would, moreover, be out-side the scope of the present paper.

18 Article 18, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs expressly requires parties to furnish to the Secretary General of the United Nations such information as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs may request as being necessary for the performance of its functions. See also Form• of Annual Reports on the working of the Single Convention (and other narcotic treaties), Chapter X headed "Abuse of Drugs (Drug Addiction)" Questions 31-37 (United Nations document E/NR. FORM/Rev. 2).

19 Article 8 of the Single Convention authorized the Com-mission on Narcotic Drugs to consider all matters pertain-ing to the aims of this Convention.

20 This problem was at that time very serious in the United States although perhaps not fully recognized. It is held to have been much graver than after the international narcotics treaties became effective, anyway until recently. See report of the Permanent Central Opium Board on its work in 1963, United Nations document E/OB/19, para. 10 (page X) and the 1966 Report, United Nations document E/OB/22, para. 32 (page XV).

21 Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 51, p. 337.

22 Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 177, p. 373. No further consideration of the Agreements of 1925 and 1931 appears to be required since both are completely obsolete as a result of the prohibition of opium smoking in the Far Eastern territories after their reconquest from the Japanese and as a result of the provisions of the Protocol of 1953 for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Whole-sale Trade in, and Use of Opium (Text in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 456, p. 3) and of those of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Text in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 520, p. 151).

23 Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 81, page 317.

24 The Chinese delegation also withdrew from the Con-ference. The memorandum which the American delegation submitted to the Conference to explain its withdrawal pointed to the unwillingness of the Conference to adopt provisions which would lead to the control of the produc-tion of opium in such a manner that there would be no surplus available for non-medical and non-scientific pur-poses. It also stated that the use of opium products for other than medical or scientific purposes was abuse and not legitimate. (The Convention of 1925 did not limit the use of raw or "prepared" opium to medical or scientific pur-poses). It is also interesting to note that the memorandum stated that the manufactured opium and coca leaf deriva-tives could not be effectively controlled if the production of raw opium and coca leaves would not be strictly limited to medical and scientific purposes. The memorandum pointed thus to a basic condition of effective international narcotics control which until today has not been fulfilled in a satisfactory manner. It also pointed to a problem whose solution has remained probably the most important task of international efforts in the sphere of drug control; see League of Nations document C.760. M.260. 1924. XI. vol. I, p. 202.

25 World Peace Foundation, Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. VI, Boston 1945, pp. 475-476.

26 The British Government was informed of this French decision on 3 January 1944; League of Nations document C.77. M.77. 1945. XI.

27 The policy of prohibition of opium smoking adopted by the Chinese Government was also hardly successful before 1949. It appears, however, that the present totalitarian re-gime has succeeded in oppressing this social evil.

28 Supra, footnote 1.

29 Text reproduced in the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 8, p. 187.

30 The Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 had adopted only recommendations which were of course not legally binding.

31 Article 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the 1912 Convention.

32 Article 21 of the Convention.

33 Article 12, 13 and 14, see also the introductory para. of article 10.

34 Article 20. It may also be assumed that by the opera-tion of article 14 this provision did not only apply to these expressly mentioned drugs but in addition to the explicitly named raw opium and prepared opium to all the drugs referred to above under (a).

35 See, however, "voeu" (recommendation) II of the Conference which adopted the Convention. In this "voeu" the Conference considered "it desirable to study the ques-tion of Indian hemp (cannabis) from a statistical and sci-entific point of view, with the object of regulating its abuses, should the necessity thereof be felt, by internal regulation or by an international agreement."

36 Chapter I and II of the Convention.

37 Article 55, paragraph (b) of the Charter.

38 Fifth Report of the Drafting Committee II/3 of the San Francisco Conference, document WD 40/11/3/A/5; statements of the Canadian, Chinese, Indian and U.S. rep-resentatives in Committee 11/3, verbatim minutes of 19th meeting, 4 June 1945.

39 Article 5 of the Convention.

40 League of Nations, The Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings (Geneva, 1920) pp. 538-539; the Committee had the assistance of "Assessors", independent experts who participated in its meetings with the same rights as Government representatives except that they could not be elected officers and were not entitled to vote. The Committee was often shortly referred to as "Opium Advisory Committee."

41 Article 5. Galenical preparations (extracts and tinc-tures of cannabis) were, however, subjected to this limita-tion. Neither this Convention nor the Convention of 1912 related to codeine.

42 Article 6.

43 Article 7 of the 1925 Convention and article 11 of the 1912 Convention; see, however, article 20 of the 1912 Convention.

44Article 22. As regards the obligation of Parties to furnish the laws and regulations enacted to implement the 1925 Convention; see article 30.

45 As regards "prepared opium" Governments had also to furnish statistical information on manufacture of such smoking opium, on the amount of raw material used for this manufacture and on consumption, article 23 of the 1925 Convention.

46 Chapter V. The international trade in cannabis and cannabis resin and ordinary preparations of which the resin forms the base were subjected to additional control mea-sures; see article 10 of the 1925 Convention.

4T Article 31.

48 The Health Committee of the League of Nations had to submit the question for advice and report to the Permanent Committee of the past "Office international d'Hygiene publique"; article 10 of the 1925 Convention. This author-ity was transferred to the World Health Organization by the Protocol of 1946.

49 One will note that the same words are used by the Single Convention in describing the additional drugs which may be placed under control, article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii) of the Single Convention.

50 Article 8 of the 1925 Convention; one will note that the same conditions are required by the Single Convention for placing preparations in Schedule III i.e. for exempting them from some measures of control, article 3, paragraph 4 of the Single Convention.

51 Article 19.

52 Articles 22 and 23.

53 Article 25.

54 Article 24, paragraph 1.

55 Not only manufactured narcotics, but also raw opium, prepared opium, coca leaves, canabis or cannabis resin.

56 Article 24, paragraphs 1 and 2.

57Article 14.

58 Middlemen" who were authorized to collect on behalf of the national opium agency, the opium harvest from the cultivators were also responsible for such diversion.

59 Article 26; the language of the sanction provisions would, by itself, allow such an application.

60 Articles 28 and 29.

61 Text reproduced in the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 139, p. 301.

62 Not including the galenical preparations (extracts and tinctures) of cannabis.

63 "Territory" (not defined in the Convention) is a part of a state forming a separate administrative entity for the purpose of applying the narcotics Convention, in a way as if it were a separate country. See the definition of this term in article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (y) of the Single Convention for the purposes of this treaty.

64Chapter III, specially articles 6, 7 and 12 of the 1931 Convention.

65 Article 2, paragraph 1, Article 4 and Article 5; see also above footnote 16.

66 Article 3 and Article 5, paragraph 5.

67 Commonly referred to as the "Drug Supervisory Body" to indicate the nature of its work; the Supervisory Body is one of the two organs which were replaced by the present International Narcotics Control Board, the other organ being the Permanent Central Board, see above foot-note 16.

68 Article 5, para. 6. During the League Period the Ad-visory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dan-gerous Drugs, the Permanent Central Board, the Health Committee of the League of Nations and the Office Inter-national d'Hygiene publique were each entitled to appoint one member. Under the terms of the Protocol of 1946 (see further below) amending the pre-war narcotics treaties two members were appointed by the World Health Organi-zation, one by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and one by the Permanent Central Board.

69 Article 2, paragraph 2 and 3.

70 Article 5 of the 1925 Convention together with article 13, para. 1 of the 1931 Convention and article 6, para. 1, sub-para. (a) of the latter treaty. It was also not expressly stated that the quantities of drugs needed for conversion, for export, for addition to reserve stocks and for the main-tenance of Government stocks should be limited to such purposes, but this was obviously their aim. No government could be absolutely certain whether the drugs which were exported were used exclusively for medical or scientific purposes. It normally had to rely on assurance given in the import certificate of the importing country. For the text of the import certificate annexed to the 1925 Conven-tion see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 81, pp. 354 and 355.

71 Except in regard to requirements for "Government purposes" (see article 1, para. 4; article 4, para. 2; article 5, para. 2, sub-para. (d) and concluding sub-para. and para. 6, second sub-paragraph).

72 Article 5, paragraph 6.

73 Article 14, paragraph 2. The Board acted on the basis of the quarterly import and export statistics which it received under article 22 of the 1925 Convention and of information which it obtained under article 14, paragraph 1 of the 1931 Convention. Article 14, paragraph 1 need not be dealt with here since its substance is obsolete and was therefore not taken over by the Single Convention; Article 14, paragraph 2 of the 1931 Convention is basically the same as article 21, paragraph 4 of the Single Conven-tion; but while the 1931 provision imposes an obligation on the Permanent Central Board the Single Convention confers discretionary power on the International Narcotics Control Board. The practice of the Permanent Central Board was, however, to apply article 14, paragraph 2 only in cases it considered desirable to subject to this procedure.

74 On consumption, manufacture, conversion, imports, exports and use for compounding of "exempted" prepara-tions ("preparations, exports of which do not require export authorizations").

75 Article 14, paragraph 3 of the 1931 Convention. Ex-ceeding the supply limits in a large measure could also be considered to be a failure to carry out the provisions of the Single Convention so as to endanger seriously the aims of this Convention and thus justify the initiation of the procedure of article 14 of that treaty.

76 Articles 12, 19 and 21 in connection with articles 13 and 20 of the Single Convention.

77 The limitation provisions apply only to the import and not to the "manufacture" of these agricultural products since they are not "manufactured." Subject to the tempo-rary exceptions of article 49, parties of the Single Con-vention are however required to limit exclusively to medi-cal and scientific purposes the production of these agricul-tural substances (Article 4, para. (c)).

78 Article 21. This article was amended by the Protocol of 1946 (see footnote 68 above; see also further below) to replace the Secretary General of the League by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Advisory Committee by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

79 Article 23; the Protocol of 1946 replaced the Secretary General of the League by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

80 Article 20. The Protocol of 1946 substituted the Sec-retary General of the United Nations for the one of the League. As regards the obligations to furnish the laws and regulations enacted to implement the 1931 Convention see article 21 of this Convention.
81 Article 22. This class of preparations was exempted from the application of the 1925 Convention and conse-quently also from that Convention's import certificate and export authorization system. It corresponds to the category of preparations included in schedule III of the Single Convention which although subject to a more strict control are also not subject to the import certificate and export authorization system.

82 Article 18, para. 1, sub-paras. (a) and (c) and para. 2, and article 20, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b).

83 Article 18, para. 1, introductory paragraph of the Single Convention; see also Form of Annual Reports on the working of the Single Convention and other conventions, Chapter V, question 13, United Nations doc. E/NR.FORM/ Rev. 2; see also annex II of this form.

84 Drugs corresponding to those in Schedule I of the Single Convention.

85 Drugs corresponding to those in Schedule II of the Single Convention.

86 Article 13, paragraph 1 of the 1931 Convention; Article 13 paragraph 2 of the 1931 Convention; "the interpretation of this paragraph presents certain difficulties"; League of Nations. Historical and Technical Study of the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of July 13th, 1931, League of
Nations Document C.191. M. 136. 1937 XI, paragraph 135.

87 By entries in books or retaining medical prescriptions; see article 6, para. (c) of the 1925 Convention.

88 A few other provisions regarding drugs in Group II may also be mentioned. Retailers were not prohibited from delivery of these drugs to unauthorized persons and they, as well as persons other than drug manufacturers, whole-salers and international traders, were not prohibited from the unauthorized possession of such substances (Article 7 of the 1925 Convention in connection with article 13, para. 2 of the 1931 Convention). The manufacture, sale, use of and international trade in Group II drugs were not legally limited to medical and scientific purposes (Article 5 of the 1925 Convention in connection with article 13, para. 2 of the 1931 Convention). Statistics on the international trade in Group II drugs had to be supplied annually not quar-terly in contrast to other narcotics (including opium, coca leaves and cannabis drugs) (article 22, para. 2 of the 1925 Convention in connection with article 13, para. 2 of the 1931 Convention). No consumption statistics has to be furnished in respect of Group II; see also article 5, para. 3 and para. 6 of the 1931 Convention.

89 Article 2, para. 2 and article 30, para. 6 of the Single Convention.

90 Other factors which were undoubtedly responsible for this lack of an illicit traffic were their availability to abusers from legal trade in many countries, their weak potency and the difficulties of converting them into more potent drugs in clandestine factories which could easily obtain from the illicit traffic opium and coca leaves for the illegal manu-facture of such potent drugs as morphine, heroin and cocaine.

91 Article 13, paragraph 2 of the 1931 Convention and above footnote 86; see the document referred to in footnote 86, commonly called "Commentary to the 1931 Conven-tion" paragraph 135.

92 These preparations referred to by the 1931 Convention as "preparations for the export of which export authoriza-tions are not required" or commonly as "exempted prepa-rations" correspond to those included in Schedule III of the Single Convention which, although subject to some measures of control, are exempted from others, including the import certificate and export authorization system.

93 The Convention referred to these drugs as "capable of producing add'ction"; but the word "addiction" was not meant to be limited only to a dependence which was psy-chological as well as physical. The phrase used by the Convention also applied to cocaine and was meant to include morphine-like and cocaine-like drug effects.

94 The term "convertible" was interpreted to mean "read-ily convertible" or "convertible with relative ease", see reso-lution 7.7 of the World Health Assembly (May 1954).

95 Commentary to the 1931 Convention (above footnote 91), para. 8, pp. 29-30, codeine which is widely used in medicine was included in Group II because it was consid-ered to be convertible into addiction-producing drugs and not because it is itself slightly addiction-producing.

96 Article 21, paragraph (b).

97 Articles 22 and 23.

98 Article 21; The implementation of article 20 requiring Governments to furnish information on drug manufacturing also makes it necessary to obtain some data from the manufacturers.

99 Raw materials were opium, coca leaves, (cannabis and cannabis resin) and poppy straw in 1931.

100 Article 17 of the 1931 Convention. A provision like this article was not included in the Single Convention; but parties to this treaty must undoubtedly obtain reports of this kind from manufacturers, in some cases also from international traders and occasionally also from other trad-ers in order to carry out their obligation to limit their narcotics supplies to the quantities needed for medical and scientific purposes and to prevent the excessive accumula-tion of drugs and poppy straw in the possession of manu-facturers and traders; article 21, article 29, paragraph 3 and article 30, paragraph 2 sub-paragraph (a).

101 The Health Committee of the League of Nations after consulting the Permanent Committee of the Office interna-tional d'Hygiene publique on the question; 'The protocol of 1946 transferred this authority to the World Health Organi-zation acting "on the advice of an expert Committee appointed by it"; see below.

102 See below.

103 Article of the Protocol.

104 The 1931 Convention required the application of pro-visions of the 1925 Convention governing manufactured drugs; see above.

105 See above footnote 94.

106 Article 4 of the Protocol.

107 Article 3, paragraph 3-6 of the Single Convention.

108 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii).

109 And in Schedule IV.

110 See below.

111 United Nations document E/CONF. 58/6; see also United Nations Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. XXIII, No. 3.

112 The Convention does not use the terms "mind alter-ing" but the phrase "capacity to produce . . . central ner-vous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hallu-cinations or disturbances in motor function or thinking or behaviour or perception or mood."

113 This would literally apply to a substance which would be controlled by any of the earlier narcotics treaties al-though not by the Single Convention; but all the substances under control by these earlier treaties are at present also controlled by the Single Convention. It is theoretically pos-sible, however, that a substance would in the future be placed under the 1948 Protocol but not under the Single Convention, as long as the 1948 Protocol remains in force. It is submitted, however, that the authors of the Vienna Convention considered "international control" to mean "control by the Single Convention." A substance which would be removed from the Schedules of the Single Con-vention, but would remain subject to an earlier narcotics treaty, therefore could be placed under the Vienna Con-vention.

114 Article 2, para. 4, 5 and 6 of the Vienna Convention.

115 Article 2, para. 7. The obligations to which Parties could be subjected by such decisions of the Commission would also be reduced by their unilateral right to exempt preparations from important control provisions. Such uni-lateral exemptions could, however, be terminated by the Commission. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention.

116 i.e. those which are "addiction-producing" as this term is widely used.

117 Article 11, para. 1, first sub-para.

118 Article 11, para. 1, second sub-para; the strict control was that applicable to drugs in Group I.

119 As regard the division of Group I into the two sub-groups, see above.

120 A proposal was made at the United Nations Confer-ence of 1961 for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to include in Schedule I of this Convention the two general groups: "any other product obtained from any phenanthrene alkaloid of opium" and "any other product obtained from the ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf" which would thus have been subject to the control regime governing drugs in Schedule I until the product in question would have been removed from control or trans-ferred to Schedule II by operation of article 3 of the Single Convention. This proposal was rejected because it could not obtain the required two-thirds majority, Official Records of the Conference, vol. I, pp. 191 and 193, United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24. A recommendation of the World Health Organization to insert these two general groups in Schedule I was also not accepted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, acting under article 3 of the Single Convention; Report of the Commission on its Twenty-first session, U.N. Doc. E/4294, paras. 65-66 and Report of the Commissioh on its Twenty-second ses-sion, United Nations document E/4455, paras. 41-42.

121 Article 2.

122 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (ii).

123 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii).

124 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (i).

125 The regimes applicable to Schedule I and II.

126 Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention.

127 Article 15.

128 Records of the Conference of 1931 for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, League of Nations document C.509. M.214. 1931. XI, vol. I, pp. 186, 201 and 251; see also Model Administrative Codes to the International Opium Conventions of 1925 and 1931, League of Nations document C. 774. M. 365. 1932. XI, p. 7.

129 Recommendation I, see the Records referred to in the preceding footnote, vol. I, p. 415.

130 Article 17.

131 The Records referred to above in footnote 120, vol. I, pp. 36 and 120-122, and vol. II pp. 249-254, p. 278, foot-note 87 and p. 289, footnote 56; see also Conference document E/CONF. 34/L. 18, the same Records, vol. II, pp. 63-65. See also article 35, para. (a) of the Single Convention requiring parties, having due regards to their constitutional, legal and administrative systems, to make arrangements at the national level for coordination of preventive and repressive action against the illicit traffic; see also articles 11 and 12 of the Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (reproduced in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 198, p. 299), requiring Parties, within the framework of their domestic law, to establish a "central office" for the supervision and coordination of all operations in the fight against the illicit traffic and for international co-operation in this area.

132 Article 6 of the Vienna Convention.

133 Article 10; in contradistinction to the situation in 1931 the legal consumption of heroin for medical purposes has become quite unimportant. Only two countries con-sumed more than 1 kg. in 1970 (the United Kingdom 42 kg. and Belgium 1 kg.), International Narcotics Control Board, Statistics on Narcotic Drugs for 1970 paragraph 59, United Nations document E/INC. B/15.

134 Recommendation VI, the Records referred to above in footnote 128, vol. I, p. 417.

135 Article 2. para. 5 and Schedule IV. Prior to the Single Convention, several recommendations of intergovernmental organs had suggested the discontinuation of the medical use of heroin. Most governments followed these recom-mendations.

136 Of the drugs in Schedule IV at present cannabis and cannabis resin are "produced"; see article 1, para. 1, sub-para.(t) of the Single Convention.

137 The Plenipotentiary Conference rejected the idea of making mandatory the prohibition of the medical use of drugs in Schedule IV; see article 2, para. 1, sub-para. (e) of the Third Draft of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Conference Records referred to in footnote 120, vol. p. 3; Conf. doc. E/Conf. 34/C.2/L.7, these Conference Records, vol. II, p. 261 and vol. I, p. 65. The Plenipotentiary Conference included in Schedule IV: cannabis and cannabis resin, desomorphine, heroin and ketobemidone. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, under article 3 of the Single Convention added acetorphine and etorphine, Report of the Commission on its twenty-second session, para. 43, U.N. doc. E/ 4455.

138 Article 7, paragraph (a).

139 Article 19 of the 1931 Convention and article 30, para. 5 together with article 2, para. 3 of the Single Convention. Under the latter treaty this requirement need not apply to a drug or its preparations dispensed to an individual on medical prescriptions; the Vienna Convention on psychotropic drugs would obligate governments to require that where practicable the labels of retail packages of psychotropic drugs and in any case the leaflets accompanying such retail packages should indicate such directions for use, including cautions and warnings, as in their opinion would be necessary for the safety of the user (Article 10, paragraph 1).

140 Article 16, paragraph 2.

141 "Drugs" may be raw material for the manufacture of other drugs ("conversion" into other drugs).

142 Article 29, para. 3 and article 30, para. 2, sub-para. (a) and para. 6 of the Single Convention. The Vienna Convention does not provide for the prevention of the possession of excessive amounts of psychotropic substances by manufacturers or traders except that it requires governments to restrict the amount of drugs in Schedule I supplied to a duly authorized person to the quantity required for his authorized purpose, article 7, paragraph (d).

143 See, however, article 7 of the 1953 Opium Protocol, see above footnote 22.

144 Article 20 of the 1912 Convention and articles 28 and 29 of the 1925 Convention; see also article IX of the Agreement of 1925 concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in and Use of Prepared Opium and article II, para. 2 of the Agreement of 1931 for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East, footnote 22 above.

145 Article 36, para. 1 of the Single Convention.

146 Article 2 of the Convention of 1936 for the Sup-pression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 198, p. 299).

147 Article 36, paragraph 1.

148 Article 22, paragraph 1, see supra, footnote 111; Ar-ticle 14 of the Protocol (Text in U.N. doc. E/Conf. 63/8) containing a revised version of article 36, para. 1 of the Single Convention.

149 Article 2, paragraphs (b) (c) and (d).

150 Article 36, paragraph 2, introductory sub-para. and sub-para (a), clause (ii) of the Single Convention and article 22, para 2, introductory sub-para and sub-para (a), clause (ii) of the Vienna Convention.

151 Article 1 of the 1912 Convention and article 2 of the 1925 cannot be considered as providing for such control.

152 Articles 7 and 8.

153 Article 9, para. 1.

154 Article 9, paragraph 2.

155 Article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), clause (IV).

156 Article 22, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (3a), clause (IV).

157 Article 36, para. 2, sub-para. (b).

158 Article 22, para. 2, sub-para. (b). fickers."9 The Protocol 1" would replace the extra

159 See article 19 of the Protocol.

160 Article 14, amending Article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention.

161 These provisions of the amending Protocol are taken from the Convention of 1970 for the Suppression of Un-lawful Seizure of Aircraft, Article 8, paragraphs 1-3, (Text in American Society of International Law. International Legal Materials, vol. X, Number 1, January 1971, p. 133). They are similar to those of the 1936 Convention.

162 Article 9, paragraph 4, see also article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) of the unamended Single Convention and article 22, paragraph 2, sub-para. (b) of the Vienna Convention.

163 Articles 11 and 12, see also article 13.

164 It was also provided that the functions of the "central office" may be delegated to the "special administration" to be maintained pursuant to article 15 of the Convention of 1931; article 11, paragraph 5 of the Convention of 1936.

165 Article 35.

166 Article 35, para. (a).

167 Article 21.

168 Article 10.

169 Article 37.

170 Article 22, para. 3.

171 As regards the obligation of parties to furnish annual reports on the working of the Convention and the laws and regulations implementing the Convention, see article 16 of the Convention of 1936.

172 League of Nations document C. 341. M. 216. 1936, XI. pp. 174-176.

173 This document, p. 175.

174 This document, p. 176; see, however, article 5 of the 1936 Convention.

175 Article 44 of the Single Convention, Article 9 of the 1936 Convention is, however, replaced by article 36, para. 2 sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention except that a Party to the Single Convention and to the 1936 Convention may, by notification to the Secretary General, continue in force this article 9.

176 The only treaty provisions regarding the control of the production of opium, prior to World War II were article 1 of the 1912 Convention which required parties to enact "effective laws and regulations for the control of the pro-duction . . . of raw opium" and article 2 of the 1925 Con-vention by which governments undertook to enact laws and regulations to ensure the effective control of the production ... of raw opium. Even such general and vague treaty pro-visions did not exist in respect of the production of coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin.

177 See however the American Statement referred to above, at the Conference which adopted the 1936 Con-vention, concerning the need for punishment of "illegal cultivation and gathering of cannabis."

178 Such synthetic drugs could be placed only under the provisions of the 1925 Convention by operation of that treaty's article 10 whose application was not limited to particular chemical groups. This was actually done with respect to pethidine in 1945 (League of Nations Circular letter 6.1945.Xl). A substance whose chemical structure would have been identical with any product obtained from any of the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or from the ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf, but which would not have been so obtained, but would have been made by a fully synthetic process could have been placed by applica-tion of article 11 of the 1931 Convention, under full inter-national control. Morphine can now be synthetized, but this was not the case before World War II, article 1, para-graph 2 of the 1931 Convention and Commentary to the 1931 Convention, paragraph 109, (see footnotes 86 and 91).

179 As regards the limited functions of the Office inter-national d'Hygiene publique, an organization created before the establishment of the League of Nations, see articles 8 and 10 of the 1925 Convention and article 11 of the 1931 Convention.

180 See Adolf Lande, The Adjustment of the International Opium Administration to an Eventual Dissolution of the League of Nations, Columbia Law Review, May 1945, p. 392; see in particular p. 411 as regards the tasks of the Family of Nations as they then appeared to result from the post War situation.

181 Text in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 12, p. 179.

182 See also Protocol of 1946 concerning the International Office of Public Health, United Nations Treaty series, vol. 9, P. 3.

183 See above footnote 16.

184See above footnote 67.

185Text in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 44, p. 277.

186 League of Nations document C.175.M.104.1939.XI. Annex I, pp. 11-21.

187 See Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its Third Session, United Nations document E/799, p. 24 and Report of the Commission on its Fourth Session, United Nations document E/1361, p. 26; see also resolutions of the Economic and Social Council 49 (IV), 159 (VII) E and 246 (IX)D.

188 Resolution 436A (XIV) of the Economic and Social Council; see also that Council's resolution 478 (XV).

189 Text in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 456, p. 3.

190 There was no requirement of licensing the trade in raw opium; Only the pre-war general provisions of article 1 of the 1912 Convention and of article 2 of the 1925 Con-vention to control effectively the distribution of such opium continued to apply.

190A The use of medicinal opium was already limited to such purposes by the 1925 Convention (Article 4, para. (a) in connexion with article 3).

191 Article 2.

192 Article 19.

193 Use of opium for "quasi-medical purposes".

194 See article 4, para. (c) and article 49 of the Single Convention.

195 Article 24, para. 5, sub-para (a) of the Single Con-vention; see also article 6, paragraph 3 of the 1953 Protocol.

196 Referred to in the Single Convention as "national opium agency". The agency may under both treaties con-sist of one or more Government agencies. The functions of the control in question must however be performed by a single government agency if the constitution of the party permits this. Article 3, para. 1 of the Protocol and article 23, para. 1 and 3 of the Convention.

197 Article 3, para. 2 of the Protocol.

198 Article 3, para. 3 and 4.

199 Article 3, para. 5. The Single Convention also requires that the Agency shall purchase and take physical possession of the crops "as soon as possible" but not later than four months after the end of the harvest", Article 23, para. 2, sub-para. (d).

200 Article 3, para. 6 of the Protocol. The Single Conven-tion expressly exempts from this monopoly of holding opium stocks also those held by manufacturers of medicinal opium and opium preparations, Article 23, para. 2, sub-para (e) of the Single Convention. It may be noted that under article 1 of the Protocol the term "opium" includes "medicinal opium" but not "galenical" opium preparations. Article 23, para. 2, sub-para (e) of the Single Convention, moreover, stipulates that Parties need not extend the monopoly of the international and wholesale trade in opium and of holding opium stocks, to medicinal opium and opium preparations; see article 2, para. 3 of the Single Convention. It may be noted that the text of article 3 of the Protocol, but not article 23 of the Convention confers the functions referred to under (i), (ii) and (iv) upon "the Agency or other competent government authorities"

201 "Government" as the term is used here does not in-clude a tribal organization.

202 Report of the Permanent Central Board on its work in 1965, para. 105, United Nations document E/OB/21.

203 Article 22 of the Single Convention; see also article 24, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b).

204 Article 6, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a).

205 These are the countries which, according to information furnished by the Secretarial of the International Narcotics Control Board, during ten years immediately prior to 1 January 1961, exported opium which they produced. Article 24, para. 3 of the Single Convention; see also this article, para. 4, sub-paragraph (a), clause (i).

206 This admission to the international trade of opium produced in the territory of non-parties was motivated by the desire to permit the export of opium produced in countries such as North Vietnam, which during the ten years in question had exported opium of its own harvest, but could not become a party to the Single Convention without being invited by the Economic and Social Council (Article 40). Such an invitation could not be expected under the political conditions as they existed in 1961. The pro-vision admitting such opium (article 24, para. 4, sub-para. (b)) represented a concession to the view point of those countries which favoured the so-called "all State clause" i.e. the admission to the treaty of all states. This veiw point was specially presented by the Communist states.

207 Other than the privileged countries referred to under the first category above.

208 Article 24, para. 2, sub-para. (a) and para. 4, sub-para. (a) clause (ii).

209 Article 24, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) and paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (a), clause (iii).

210 Article 24, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph (b); see the restrictions of article 7 of the 1953 Protocol on the disposal of seized opium, which were not taken over by the Single Convention.

211 See the figures on production and utilization of opium in the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 as published by the International Narcotics Control Board, Statistics on Narcotic Drugs for 1970, United Nations Document E/ INCB/15, Table I, p. 15; see also paragraph 36, p. X of this document.

212 Report of the Permanent .Central Board on its work in 1966, United Nations document E/OB/22, paragraph 51, p. XVIII.

213 If the information at the disposal of the writer is cor-rect the price of I kg of opium containing 10 percent of morphine rose to about 24 to 26 dollars.

214 Legal opium production although not economically justified may also be authorized by a country which desires to obtain autarchy in respect of this important commodity.

215 This question will also be referred to further below.

216 The document referred to in footnote 211 above, Table L p. 14.

217 Article 11-13.

218 See the definition of "territory" in article 1 of the Protocol; see also footnote 63.

219 Article 12, para. 2 and 3 and article 13 of the embargo.

220 See also above the discussion of article 24 of the 1925 Convention.

221 As regards the application of provisions of narcotics treaties to non-Parties see also the above discussion of articles 24 and 26 of the 1925 Convention and of the esti-mate system of the 1931 Convention.

222 Article 11, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (d).

223 Article 6 of the Protocol. The provision which by amending the Single Convention would be introduced into this Convention would be numbered article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c).

224 Article 14, paragraph 1, sub-para. (a) of the Single Convention as it would be amended by article 6 of the Protocol.

225 Article 15, paragraph 1.

226 The view may perhaps also be held that the Board could propose such a study as part of the request for explanations which it could make under the unamended text of article 14, paragraph 1.

227 The government would, however, under the un-amended text not be required to communicate to the Board the results of its study and to indicate the remedial mea-sures which it would consider necessary to take although it might be interested in doing this in the explanations which it would desire to give under article 14, para. 1.

228 Article 8, para. 1, and 4-11 of the Protocol.

229 See above the discussion of the 1931 Convention in chapter II of this paper headed "The gradual evolution of the international drug treaty system."

230Article 8, para. 3.

231Article 8, paragraph 10. The estimates of opium re-quirements, on the other hand, were not permitted to be exceeded".

232 Article 19.

233 Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paras. (e) and (f) and para. 5 and article 21 bis, para. 1 as these provisions would be worded by the Protocol of 1972 (Articles 9 and 11).

234 Article 21, para. 3 and article 21 bis, para. 2 (the latter provision as introduced by article 11 of the Protocol of 1972). opium which it may harvest from a unit of area of land in regions whose weather conditions are unstable.

235 Article 19, para. 1, sub-para. (e) and article 20, para-graph 1, sub-para. (g) as these provisions would be worded by articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol of 1972; Article 19, para. 3 (not amended by the Protocol), article 19, para. 1, sub-para. (f) of the amended Convention, article 21, para-graph 1 of the amended text and article 12, paragraph 5 of both texts; Article 19, para. 5 and article 21, para. 1 of the amended text.

236 It appears at least questionable whether the Board could under Article 12, para. 1 and article 19, para. 1, introductory sub-paragraph require governments to fur-nish separate figures on the area to be used for the culti-vation of the poppy for the production of opium.

237 As regards the obligation of parties to furnish to the Secretary General an annual report on the working of the 1953 Protocol and a report on the legislative and administrative measures adopted in accordance with this Protocol, see article 10 of this treaty.

238 Their number was increased to ten by the addition of the Single Convention, but will rise to 12 when the Vienna Convention of 1971 and the Protocol of 1972 will come into force.

239 But only of "medicinal opium"; see article 4, para. (a) and article 5 of the 1925 Convention.

240 Moreover, the 1953 Protocol which was adopted on June 23, 1953, came into force only on March 8, 1963. It was accepted only by a relatively small number of countries. As of December 31,1971, it numbered only 49 Parties while the Single Convention had 81 on this date.

241 Report of the Commission on its Third Session (1948), United Nations document E/799, p. 23.

242 Report of the Commission on its Third Session, United Nations document E/799, pp. 23-24 and Report of the Commission on its Fourth Session, United Nations docu-ment E/1361, p. 41.

243 It did also some work at its fourteenth session in 1959 regarding the preparations to be included in Schedule III of the proposed Single Convention; Report of the Com-Mission on its Fourteenth session United Nations document E/3254, p. 13.

244 This resolution was also adopted on the recommenda-tion of the Commission, Report of the Commission on its Thirteenth Session, United Nations document E/3133, PP. 57-58.

245 United Nations documents C/CN. 7/AC.3/3 and E/CN. 7/AC.3/7.

246 United Nations document E/CN. 7/AC.3/9 and Ad-dendum 1.

247 The name given to the political organ which should take the place of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

248 Section 13, para. (b) of the First Draft. While the statistical data and the estimates, which Parties have to furnish, are spelled out in articles 19 and 20 of the Single Convention of 1961, this Convention still gives to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs the general authority to require parties to furnish to the Secretary General "such information" as it "may request as being necessary for the performance of its functions." This may include statis-tical data in addition to those expressly prescribed by the terms of article 20 of the Single Convention.

249 The name proposed for the independent (semi-judicial organ) 16 which was to take the place of the Permanent Central Board and of the Supervisory Body.62

250 Section 23, paragraph 1 of the First Draft.

251 See article 10 of the 1925 Convention, article 11 of the 1931 Convention, article 1 of the 1948 Protocol and article 3, para. 3, sub-para. (iii) of the Single Convention.

252 Section 3 of the First Draft.
253 Text in United Nations. doc. E/CN. 7/519, p. 76.

254 United Nations document E/CN. 7/519, para. 26.

255 See, however, the limited right of rejection in article 2, para. 7 of the Vienna Convention of 1971 on Psychotropic Substances.

257 Section 24 of the First Draft.

258 Separation of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and can-nabis resin from the plants from which they are obtained, Section 1, paragraph (g) of the First Draft; see also article 1, para. 1, sub-paragraph (t) of the Single Con-vention.

259 Drugs in Schedule C, Article 2, paragraph 3 of the draft.

260 The two alternative versions of paragraph 5 of article 2 of the Second Draft; see, however, article 40 of this draft which would have introduced a regime of mandatory pro-hibition of cannabis and cannabis resin.

261 Article 2, paragraph 1, sub-para. (e); Schedule IV included heroin, desomorphine, cannabis drugs, and keto-bemidone. Article 39 would have provided for a regime of prohibition of cannabis drugs making, however, excep-tions for such drugs to be used in the indigenous systems of Ayurvedic, Unani and Tibbi medicine on the Indian-Pakistani subcontinent. There seems to be some incon-sistency between the above provision of article 2 and Schedule IV on the one hand and article 39 on the other hand.

262 Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Single Convention. The content of this provision was given above in the discussion of the 1931 Convention in connection with the considera-tion of the heroin question as it was treated by the Confer-ence which adopted the 1931 Convention.

263 See above the discussion in Chapter I of this paper headed "The national interest in international control of dangerous drugs".

264 See above the reference to this provision in the dis-cussion of the 1931 Convention.

265 Section 26, paragraph 2, sub-para. (c) and (d).

266 As regards opium it may, however, cause or increase shortage of opium in other countries and thus be undesirable from the view point of public health; see supra, discussion of the sanctions of the 1953 Protocol. The 1925 and 1931 Convention provided only for the discontinuation of exports to the country or territory concerned and not for the cessation of imports from such offenders; the 1953 Protocol was the first treaty whose sanction system covered imports as well as exports, but only in respect of opium.

267 Article 23, paragraph 2, sub-para. (d) of the Second Draft and article 22, para. 4 of the Third Draft. The Second and Third Draft, but not the First Draft permitted an Appeal against a mandatory embargo. The 1953 Protocol also did this; Article 23, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c) of the Second Draft and article 22, paragraph 3 of the Third Draft.

268 The Board could make such a recommendation of assistance also either in addition to, or as an alternative of, the "enforcement" measures provided for in article 14, para. 1 (proposing to the offending Government the opening of consultations (1972 Protocol), request of explanations of serious failures to carry out treaty provisions, pro-posal of a study by the Government concerned of a local situation (1972 Protocol), requesting the adoption of remedial measures, and calling the attention of the Parties, the Economic and Social Council and of the Commission and (1972 Protocol) of the General Assembly to the matter.

269 They include measures referred to supra, footnote 268 as well as the recommendation of an embargo.

270 Article 19, paragraphs 1 to 6; para. 7 is new. It provides for the application of the sanction rules of para-graphs 1 to 6 to a party which by the exercise of its right of partial rejection of control decisions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs causes results which give the International Narcotics Control Board reason to believe that the aims of the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances are being seriously endangered.

271 Section 23, para. 7. The estimates would have been binding, Section 23, para. 8.

272 Section 23, para. 8 and Section 24.

273 The name given by the Second Draft to the inde-pendent (semi-judicial) control organ (Article 6) and maintained by the final text of the Single Convention.

274 Article 21, paragraph 6.

275 The application of the provisions of the estimate system to non-Parties.

276 Article 21, paragraph 4, sub-para. (b).

277 Article 20, paragraph 5.

278 Article 12, paragraph 5.

279 Article 5, paragraph 6.

280 Article 8, paragraph 7.

281 Report of the Commission on its Twenty-Fourth Ses-sion, United Nations document E/5082, paragraph 571 and Annex VII, Section A.

282 Article 5 of the 1972 Protocol.

283 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-para. (t); i.e., the sepa-ration of the opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis plant from the plants from which they are obtained.

284 Article 21 bis, para. 1 of the Single Convention as it would be introduced by the 1972 Protocol.

285 The amounts collected by the national opium agencies.

286 See the production figures published by the Interna-ficmal Narcotics Control Board, Statistics on Narcotic Drugs for 1970, United Nations document E/INC. B/15, Table I, pp. 14-15.

287 See Table II, p. 16 and page XV of the document referred to in the preceding footnote.

288Section 27 of the First Draft.

289 Article 20, para. 2 of the 1925 Convention in its tmamended version and as revised by the 1946 Protocol.

290 Article 5, para. 6 of the 1931 Convention in its un-amended version and as amended by the 1946 Protocol.

291 Under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

292 First under the Charter of the United Nations and now under this Charter as well as under article 16 of the Single Convention which requires the Secretary General to furnish the secretariat services of the Commission on Nar-cotic Drugs and of the International Narcotics Control Board. The Secretariat services of the Commission are rendered by the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations Secretariat.

293 General Assembly of the United Nations. Official Records. Fifteenth Session, vol. II agenda item 50, docu-ment A/4603, para. 7.

294 This was confirmed by a later management survey.

295 The World Health Organization has also a secretariat unit charged with problems of drug dependence.

296 Article 25a; this was, however, only an alternative provision.

297 Article 24, paragraph 2.

298 Article 16.

299 Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention.

300 As approved by resolution 1196 (XLII) of the Eco-nomic and Social Council. The Annex to this resolution contains the text of the arrangements.

301 Article 14, para. 1, sub-para. (a) in its present form and as it would be amended by the 1972 Protocol.

302Article 100, para. 2.

303 Article 16, as amended by article 8 of the 1972 Protocol.

304Called "poppy chaff" in the First Draft, Section 21.

305Article 32 and 33.

306 Article 31 and 32.

307Article 1, sub-para. (k) and Schedule I in the United Nations document E/CN. 7/AC. 9, Add. 1.

308 0r those of the first draft.

309 Morphine.

310 Article 25, paras. 2 and 3, article 20, para. 1, sub-paras. (b) and (d), article 29, para. 3 and article 30, para. 2, sub-para. (a).

311 Article 25, para. 1; see also article 4 of the 1953 Protocol.

312 Statistics of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1970, United Nations document E/INCB/15, Table III, p. 21. The sum of the percentages of morphine made from different raw materials in 1970 is not exactly 100; this is due to the fact that the data received by the Board were not yet complete at the time of compiling the figures.

313 Records of the Plenipotentiary Conference, United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24/Add. 1, vol. II, p. 67.

314 Article 37 of the Second Draft, article 36 of the Third Draft; the First Draft contained already very similar pro-visions, Section 32, para. 4-5.

315 Article 23 and Article 26; the most important differ-ence being that in the case of opium the national opium agency must take physical possession of the opium crop "as soon as possible, but not later than four months after the end of the harvest" while in the case of coca leaves the national coca leaf agency must take physical possession of the crops only "as soon as possible after the end of the harvest," no definite maximum period of time being pre-scribed for this purpose.

316 Section 32, para. 5 of the First Draft, article 39 of the Second Draft, article 38 of the Third Draft and Article 27 of the Single Convention.

317 Article 38; the reference to crude cocaine in these provisions was, however, placed in square brackets; it was thus indicated that as regards "crude cocaine" the proposed restriction represented only an alternative version of the text.

318 Article 37; the square bracket (see the preceding foot-note) around "crude cocaine" was omitted.

319 The import certificate and export authorization system would have applied to coca leaves and crude cocaine also under the drafts of the Single Convention.

320 Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its Twenty-Fourth Session, United Nations document E/5082, para. 582, and Annex VII, Section D.

321 Use of drugs as chemicals in industry for other than medical or scientific purposes provided that by denaturing or other means it is ensured that they are not liable to be abused or have ill effects and that the harmful substance can in practice not be recovered; see the similar provision of article 4, paragraph (b) of the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Drugs.

322 Facilitating the use of coca leaves for the preparation of a flavoring substance for beverages.

323 See also the above discussion of article 19 of the 1953 Protocol and the discussion in part (b) of chapter III of this paper, of the tasks to be accomplished by the Single Convention.

324 Article 5; the 1912 Convention (article 9) uses the term "medical and legitimate purposes."

325 Or other abusers in the case of controlled drugs which are not "addictive" in the technical sense.

326 Use for the analgesic or antitussive purposes for which these drugs are normally prescribed was of course permitted.

327 The uncontested practice of Governments in imple-menting treaty provisions is a very important consideration in the interpretation of treaties; see article 39, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (b) of the Vienna Convention of May 23, 1969 on the Law of Treaties (Text in United Nations docu-ment A/CONF./39/27). The Convention is not yet in force at the time of this writing.

328 AS regards the limitation "to medical and scientific purposes" in the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Sub-stances, see article 5, paragraph 2 and article 7, paragraph (a) of this Convention.

329 Article 5, para. 2; Parties may, however, permit the use of such substances in industry for the manufacture of non-psychotropic substances or products, subject to the ap-plication of the control measures required by the Vienna Convention until the psychotropic substances come to be in such a condition that they will not in practice be abused or recovered, article 4, para. (b); see also article 2, para. 9 of the Single Convention. The Vienna Convention does not control the cultivation of plants from which psychotropic substances may be obtained. The separation of the sub-stances from such plants would be "manufacture" and as such be controlled. The Vienna Convention does not use the term "production". Another exception would be the Vienna Convention's authorization of the use of psychotropic sub-stances in Schedule II, III and IV, (but not of those in Schedule I) for the capture of animals by persons specifi-cally authorized by the competent authorities to do this. Such use would, however, have to be subject to the controls required by the Convention, article 4, para. (c).

330 See, however, article 22 (applicable to the three plants grown for any purpose) and Article 25, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) (applicable to the poppy grown for any pur-pose other than opium).

331 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (j).

332 Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 5.

333 Article 1, para. 1, sub-para (s).

334 Article 2, paragraph 4. Such preparations are also ex-empted from the prescription requirement as are drugs in Schedule II and their preparations.

335 Report of the Permanent Central Board16 on its work in 1964, United Nations document E/OB/20, para. 9; Re-port of this Board on its work in 1965, United Nations docu-ment E/OB/21, paragraph 38 and Report of this Board for 1966, United Nations document E/OB/22, para. 58 (risk of diversion by individual farmers).

336 Statistics of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1969 and 1970, United Nations documents E/INC B/11, Table IX, p. 75 and E/INC B/15, Table IX, p. 74; India also follows the useful practice of refusing the renewal of a license to a farmer whose alleged opium yield from a unit of land is considerably lower than the amount of opium harvested by other farmers.

337 The role of the United States Government in bringing about these projects should, however, not be underrated; nor should the value of American efforts in inducing Turkey to prohibit poppy cultivation.

338 The Permanent Central Board16 in the report on its work in 1966, has pointed to this aspect of the problem, United Nations document E/OB/22, paragraph 118.

339 The Board suggested that such a plan should not only cover the opium question, but also the coca leaf problem.

340 Article 49, paragraph 2, sub-para. (e); the Convention entered into force on 13 December 1964.

341 Authorized permanently by article 27.

342 665 kilograms in 1966, 1391 kilograms in 1967 and 1039 kilograms in 1968.

343 United Nations document E/INC B/15, paragraphs 70-74, Table II, p. 16 and Table VI, p. 32.
344 The Report of the United Nations Commission of En-quiry on the Coca Leaf (United Nations document E/1666, p. 97) makes a number of useful recommendations which diowever suggest only in general terms the establishment of a system to control the actual production and distribution ;of coca leaf" and the setting up of an official organ or an Organ under official supervision which should be entrusted with "the task of applying the control measures to all operations affecting the coca leaf" and with a monopoly of the export of the leaves. Other recommendations of the Commmision included: gradual suppression of production of leaves for chewing within fifteen years; a cadastral ey of the cultivation of the coca bush; prohibition of 'vation outside designated areas; registration of existing ucers of, and dealers, in the leaves; registration of new lers should not be permitted and coca leaf plantations er than those already existing should not be authorized; y registered producers or dealers should be permitted to age in production or trade. Crop substitution was also
recommended; see also page 90 of the Report.

345 ANSELMINO, 0, ABC of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, ',Permanent Central Opium Board, 1931, p. 13 (League of Nations document C.C.P. 44(1), 1931. XI. 1).

346 The Report referred to in footnote 344, pp. 73-74.

347 United Nations document E/CN. 7/AC. 3/4/Rev. 1, p. 32. It is sometimes asserted that such wild growth repre-sents abandoned cultivation.

348 United Nations document E/CN. 7/AC. 3/9, article 36; Records of the Conference (U.N. document E/CONF. 34/24) Vol. I, p. 38.

349 Conference doc. E/CONF. 34/C. 7/L. 1, Records of the Conference Vol. II, p. 43.

350 i.e., the preparation of a flavouring agent for beverages.

351 Conference doc. E/CONF. 34/10, Records of the Con-ference, vol. II, p. 271.

352 Records of the Conference, vol. I, pp. 101-102.

353 For the texts of these two agreements see United Nations documents E/OB/20, paragraph 32 and E/OB/22, paragraph 95.

354 United Nations document E/INC B/15, Table IX, pp. 73-76.

355 Food and Agricultural Organization, Production Year-1970 (Vol. 24) Table 98, pp. 288-290.

356 Article 28, paragraph 2; in fact, any cultivation for any purpose other than the production of cannabis or cannabis resin is so exempted. Cultivation for the leaves would also be free from control as long as it is not undertaken also for the cannabis or the resin.

357 Report of the Marihuana Investigation (Summer 1937) of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, pp. 9 and 12.

358 Resolutions 548F II (XVIII) and 588 C(XX) of the Economic and Social Council; Reports of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Sessions, United Nations documents E/2606 (paragraph 118), E/2768 Rev. 1 (paragraphs 199-206), E/2891 (paras. 282-288) and E/3010, Rev. 1 (paras. 322-335).

359 See Bredemann, G., Schwanitz, F., and Von Seng-busch, R., "Problems of modern hemp breeding with par-ticular reference to the breeding of varieties of hemp con-taining little or no hashish", in United Nations Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. VIII, No. 3; see also United Nations docu-ments E/CN. 7/297 and E/CN. 7/324, paragraphs 49-58.

360 To prevent any abuse, it would be necessary to prohibit removal from the field of any parts of the cannabis plant except the mature stalks and the seeds and to burn the remainder. Such a measure would, however, be very imprac-tical and its correct implementation could hardly be con-trolled.

361 See footnote 359 above; the undertaking of a program of breeding drug-free cannabis plants might be advisable in any event.

362 Other than drug-free plants which might be bred.

363 And of extracts and tinctures of cannabis, article 49, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (d).

364 Paragraph 2, paragraph (f); this temporary exception must be ended within twenty-five years from the coming into force of the Single Convention (13 December 1964).

"365 Articles 5 and 9 of the Vienna Convention.

366 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention; it is however submitted that the term "international control" need in this paragraph was obviously meant to refer only to control by the Single Convention. The fact that a substance is controlled by provisions of an earlier narcotics treaty would not prevent its inclusion in a Schedule of the Vienna Convention. Cannabis and cannabis resin are controlled by some provisions of the 1925 Convention.

367 The defmitions, in article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paras. (b) and (d), of cannabis and cannabis resin would also remain.

368 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (j).

369Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (t).

370 Article 30, paragraph 2 (b), sub-para. (i) and para-graph 6 of the Single Convention; see also article 2, paragraph 2.

371 Article 4, paragraph (c); see, however, article 2, para-graph 9, article 27 and article 49.

372 Article 46.

373 Kaplan John, Marijuana, New York, World Publishing Company, 1970.

374 The 1925 Convention limits, however, the use of ex-tracts and tinctures of cannabis to medical and scientific purposes; article 4, paragraph (f) and article 5; the United States is not a Party to the 1925 Convention.

375 Article 5, article 7, paragraph (a) and article 9 of the Vienna Convention.

376 Article 46, paragraph 3 in connection with article 41, para. 1.

377 Article 21 and article 6, paragraph 2, sub-para. (a); the other three States mentioned in this subparagraph (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) declared they would not accept the 1953 Protocol.

378 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-para. (b).

379 Article 4, paragraph (c), article 1, paragraph 1, sub-para. (j) and Schedules I and II.

380 Article 28, paragraph 3; the term "illicit traffic" as used in this provision has not the same meaning as that given to it by article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (1).

381Article 2, paragraph 1 to 5; the provisions of para-graph 5 were indicated above in connection with the discus-sion of the 1931 Convention and of the heroin problem.

382 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (t); this type of licenses includes also the licensing of cultivators.

383 Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Single Convention; and article 8, paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention.

384 United Nations document E/CN. 7/519, pp. 32-33.

385 No matter whether an individual businessman, part-nership or corporate body.

386 Article 29, paragraph 1, article 30, paragraph 1, sub-para. (a) and article 31, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a).

387 As regards these preparations see also the above dis-cussion of the 1925 and 1931 Conventions.

388 See above and article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4.

389 Article 21.

390 League of Nations document C. 530, M. 241. 1934. XI., Section VII (d), p. 10; League of Nations Journal, 16th Year, No. 2, February 1935, p. 102; Report of the Commis-sion on Narcotic Drugs on its eleventh session, United Nations document E/2891, paragraph 258 and Annex II (p. 44). See also Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Section 303 (a) (1).

391 See the documents of the League referred to in the pre-ceding footnote; see also League of Nations documents
C. 256. M. 105, 1934. XI, p. 4 and C. 33. M. 14. 1935. XI. pp. 35-37; see also the report of the Permanent Central Board 1° on its work in 1963, United Nations document E/OB/19, paragraph 14.

392 Report of the Permanent Central Board on its work in 1966, United Nations document E/OB/22, paragraph 36-37.

393 Anyway not on the manufacturing and wholesale level; there is occasionally some diversion on the retail level.

394 Article 8, paragraph 1; applies to substances in Sched-ules II, III or TV.

395 Article 7, paragraph (b).

396 Article 29, para. 2 sub-para. (b); and article 30, para. '1, sub-para. (b), clause (ii).

397 Excluding the manufacture of medicinal opium and 'extract and tinctures of cannabis.

398 Article 6, para. (a) of the 1925 Convention and Article 13 of the 1931 Convention; see also article 10, para. (a) of the 1912 Convention.

399 Article 30, para. 1, sub-para. (c) of the Single Con-vention.

400 Article 8, paragraph 2, sub-paras. (b) and (c) and article 3, paragraph 1; the provisions of the Convention regarding licenses or other control measures respecting bus-inesses involved in manufacture of, trade in and distribution of substances in Schedule II, III or IV and respecting establishments and premises to be used for such purposes would 'lot apply to "persons duly authorized to perform or while operforming therapeutic or scientific functions," nor would ,the requirement of taking the security measures with regard to such establishments and premises (Article 8, paragraph 3).

401 Article 7, paragraph (a).

402 Article 7, paragraph (b).

403 Article 7, paragraph (c).

404 Article 29, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c).

405 Article 21.

406 Article 31.

407 Introduced by the 1931 Convention and taken over by the Single Convention in basically the same form; see in this connection the provision of the Vienna Convention which would bind the Parties to restrict the amount of sub-stances in Schedule I supplied to a duly authorized person to the quantity required for his authorized purpose; article 7, paragraph (d).

408 These preparations were those expressly described in article 13, paragraph 1 of the 1931 Convention in connec-tion with article 4, paragraph (d) of the 1925 Convention; those exempted by operation of article 8 of the 1925 Con-vention (see Schedule III of the Third Draft of the Single Convention, United Nations document E/CN. 7/AC. 3/9/ Add. 1) and those preparations of drugs in Group II of the 1931 Convention", "which are adopted to a normal therapeutic use" (article 13, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b)) and United Nations document C. 191. M. 136. 1937 XI. (Commentary to the 1931 Convention, paragraph 137).

409 Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Single Convention.

410 "Region" is defined by the Vienna Convention as a part of the national territory which is divided into two or more such entities for the purposes of applying the Conven-tion. (Article 28). The term may also apply to the territories of two or more Parties which have formed a customs union and which have decided to treat their territories as a single "region" for the purposes of the Convention. The term "re-gion" is about the same kind of entity which the Single Convention (article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (y)) calls "territory" and defines as part of a national area which is treated as separate entity for the application of the system of import certificates and export authorizations. The Single Convention permits also that the national area of two or more Parties which have formed a customs union be treated as a simple "territory", (Article 43); see also article 1 of the 1953 Protocol.

411 And the date of the receipt. Article 12, paragraph 2 contains the rules governing international shipments of substances in Schedule III.

412Article 8, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a).

413 Article 13.

414 Article 4, para. (a).

415 Article 12, para. 2.

416 Preparations corresponding to those in Schedule III of the Single Convention; the exemption, which could be made unilaterally by the government, would be subject to review by the World Health Organization and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Commission would be entitled to ter-minate the exemption partially or totally; article 3 of the Vienna Convention.

417 Article 27, paragraph 1 authorizing the possession of coca leaves for the preparation of flavoring substances is of no interest in this connection.

418Article 2, paragraphs 1-4.

419 Article 30, paragraph 2, sub-para. (b), clause (i) and para. 6; see also articles 2, paras. 2-4.

420 Article 2, para. 9, article 27, para. 1 and article 49.

421 Article 4, paragraph (c).

422 Article 33.

423 Article 5, paragraph 3.

424 Article 7, paragraph (b).

425 Article 2, paragraph (a).

426 Article 36, paragraph 1.

427 Article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a).

428 It is, however, admitted that one can assume another legal view, namely that possession of substances in Schedule II, III and IV for distribution is a punishable offense under the Vienna Convention if the government concerned does not permit the possession of these substances without legal authority since the Convention declares it desirable not to permit this possession without such authority (Article 5, paragraph 3).

429 Article 2, paragraph (a).

430 Article 36, paragraph 1.

431 This paragraph of article 22 provides that any psycho-tropic substance or other substance, as well as any equip-ment used or intended for the commission of any offenses covered by article 22 should be liable to seizure and con-fiscation. See also article 37 of the Single Convention and article 10 of the 1936 Convention.

432 Article 5, paragraph 3.

433 Article 9, paragraph 1; see, however, article 9, para-graph 3 and article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (d).

434 Article 7, paragraph (b).

435 Article 7, paragraph (f).

436 The requirement of close supervision of "specifically authorized" exporters and importers is not expressly fore-seen; article 7, paragraphs (c) and (f), but follows un-doubtedly from the purpose and intention of article 7.

437 Article 7, paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d).

438 Article 1, paragraph 2.

439 Article 2, paragraph 5, article 4, paragraph (c), article 32, paragraph 2 and article 49.

440 Article 2, paragraph 9, article 21, paragraph 1, sub-para. (b) and article 27, para. 1; the words are also em-ployed in various other meanings; see e.g. article 18, para-graph 2 and article 19, paragraph 4.

441 Article 4, paragraph (c).

442 Article 5, paragraph 2.

443 Article 7, paragraph (a).

444 Another exception is foreseen in article 32, paragraph 3 which need not be discussed in this paper (Administration of drugs in emergency cases on ships or aircraft engaged in international traffic).

445 Drugs of Group II of the 1931 Convention (corres-ponding to those at present in Schedule II) and their prep-arations and "preparations for the export of which export authorizations are not required" (i.e. preparations corres-ponding to those in Schedule III at present) were also exempted from the prescription requirement under the nar-cotics regime preceding the Single Convention; as regards Sydenham Laudanum, tincture of opium and Dover's pow-der, see article 9 of the 1925 Convention.

446 According to the view of the U.S. delegation at the .nference which adopted the Vienna Convention these 'establishments could be doctors' offices.

447 Article 7, paragraph (a).

448 Article 7, paragraph (c).

449 Article 7, paragraph (d).

450 Article 7, paragraph (e).

451 Article 9, paragraph 1.

452 Article 9, paragraph 2.

453 Article 3, paragraph 2-4 of the Vienna Convention.

454 Article 9, paragraph 3 and Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention

455 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (d).

456 Article 34, paragraph (b). The reference to counterfoil books in this paragraph need not be discussed in this paper. The use of such books appears to be discretionary, Article 30, paragraph 2, sub-para. (b) clause (ii) of the Single Convention.

457 Article 23, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b), article 26, paragraph 1 and article 28, paragraph 1.

458 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (y).

459 Article 12, paragraph 4, article 13, paragraph 3, Article 18 and Article 19, paragraph 4.

460 Records of the Plenipotentiary Conference, United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24 (Vol. I) p. 4 and E/CONF. 34/24/Add. 1 (Vol. II) pp. 145-146.

461 Article 7 paragraph (e) of the Vienna Convention.

462 The category corresponding to the group of those drugs which are at present in Schedule II, such as codeine.

463 Shortly also referred to as "exempted preparations"; see article 6, paragraph (c) of the 1925 Convention and article 13, paragraph 2 of the 1931 Convention; see also article 10, paragraph (c) of the 1912 Convention; and in particular League of Nations document C.191.M.136.1937. XI. (Commentary to the 1931 Convention) paragraphs 135-137.

464 Article 2, paragraph 2-4 in conneci on with article 34, para. (b).

465 Article 1 of the Protocol which amends to this effect article 2, paragraph 4 of the Single Convention; paragraph 4 describes the regime applicable to preparations in Schedule III.

466 Article 11, article 2, paragraph 7 and article 3, para. 3.

467 Article 7, paragraph (e).

468 Article 11, paragraph 1.

469 It will be recalled that the Single Convention interpreted literally applies its full system of recording also to drugs in Schedule II and their preparations and to preparations in Schedule III. It has, however, been submitted above that the retail sale of such drugs and preparations need not be recorded in accordance with a "kind of understanding" of the parties to the Convention.

470 Whether by manufacture or acquisition.

471 Article 34, paragraph (b).

472 Article 6, paragraph (c) of the 1925 Convention; see also article 10, paragraph (c) of the 1912 Convention.

473 Article 7, paragraph (e).

474 It may be questionable whether the disposal of drugs in Schedule II, their preparations and preparations in Schedule III would have to be recorded.

475 It might often be difficult to state whether a particular use is scientific or therapeutic. This difficulty would cause no problem in the case of psychotropic substances in Schedule I because in both instances the same type of records would have to be maintained; article 7, para. (e); in case of the Single Convention the medical practioners would not have to maintain records in respect of the therapeutic activities, but he would have to keep them in regard to scientific work.

476 Article 11, paragraphs 2 and 3.

477 Article 11, paragraph 2.

478 Article 11, paragraph 4.

479 Article 11, paragraph 5.

480 Preparations of psychotropic substances in Schedule I could never be exempted, article 3, para. 2 of the Vienna Convention. For the conditions and procedure of the exemption see the above description in the Section headed "Authorization of Consumption of Narcotic Drugs"; the exempted preparations of the Vienna Convention correspond in a way to the preparations in Schedule III of the Single Convention, differ however strongly from the latter by the unilateral methods of exemption and by the fact that the effects of the exemption would be restricted to the country which would make the exemption.

481 See also article 3, para. 3, sub-para. (b).

482 Article 11, paragraph 7. See above, as regards a similar period during which persons performing medical or scientific functions with psychotrophic substances in Schedule I must preserve their records concerning the acquisition of these substances and the details of their use, article 7, paragraph (e).

483 Article 2, paragraph 4-7.

484 A party would not have to require the keeping of records of these imports and exports if it could establish the figures from the import and export authorizations concerned which would be required for international transactions in substances in Schedule I and II, Article 12, paragraph 1.

485 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-para. (a), clause (v) and sub-para. (b), clause (v).

486 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (b), clause (v).

487 Article 12, paragraph 1.

488 Article 12, paragraph 2.

489 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (b), clause (v).

490 This opinion is based on the assumption that the provision of article 3, paragraph 3, would take precedence over article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (c).

491 See however article 17 of the 1931 Convention; see also article 12, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) of the Vienna Convention.

492 Article 29, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), article 30, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) clause (i) and article 31, para. 3, sub-paragraph (b); for similar provisions in earlier narcotic treaties, see article 10, first paragraph of the 1912 Convention and article 6, first paragraph of the 1925 Convention.

493 Records of the Conference, vol. II (United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24/Add. 1) pp. 124-125; see also Vol. I (United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24) p. 209.

494 Article 8, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a).

495 Article 7, paragraphs (b) and (c).

496 Article 7, paragraphs (a) and (c).

497 It may be noted that the title of article 34 of the Single Convention reads "Measures of Supervision and Inspection"; the body of the article however does not require or even refer to "inspection".

498 Article 15.

499 Although the "Special Administration" required by Article 17 of the Single Convention and declared to be desirable by article 6 of the Vienna Convention does not mean a single authority, the use of the word "special" seems to indicate that there is a need for some "special drug control organs".

500 One compare the relevant texts of article 17 of the Single Convention and of article 15 of the 1931 Convention.

501 One compare article 35 of the Single Convention with article 11-13 of the 1936 Convention.

502 Article 6.

503 Article 21; the only difference is that article 21 of the Vienna Convention prescribes that Parties should send to other Parties which would be "directly concerned" copies of those reports on cases of illicit traffic in psychotropic substances or on seizures from such traffic which they would be required to send to the Secretary General under article 16 of the Convention. For a more general obligation of parties to communicate to each other reports on the illicit traffic. see article 23 of the 1931 Convention.

504 Article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

505 Article 22, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), clause (ii) together with paragraph 1.

506 United Nations document E/CONF. 63/8.

507 Article 14 of the Protocol introducing the provision as article 36, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention.

508 Article 36, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the amended text of the Single Convention together with paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), clause (ii); see also article 36, paragraph 1 of the unamended text.

509 Article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Vienna Convention and article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the amended text of the Single Convention.

510 "Authorization of Possession of Narcotic Drugs."

511 See article 14 of the Protocol.

512 Article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b).

513 Article 36, para. 2, introductory sentence and sub-para. (a) clause (iv); there is no obligation to prosecute offenses committed abroad which are not serious.

514 See in this connection also article 36, paragraph 4 of the Single Convention and also article 14 of the 1936 Convention.

515 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (y).

516 Article 21, 12, 19, 13 and 20 of the Single Convention.

517 The system of limitation of narcotics supplies in regard to opium, was already introduced by the 1953 Protocol, see article 8, paragraph 1, 2, 4 to 11.

518 Article 21, para. 1; for the definition of "production" as separation of the drugs from the plants from which they are obtained see article 1, para. 1, sub-para. (t). "Manufacture" is of course no way of obtaining these agricultural products; see also in this connection the different limitation provisions of article 24 which do not limit the quantities of opium which each country or territory may obtain, but only the sources of opium for the international trade in this drug.

519 And under the 1953 Protocol in respect of opium.

520 For a description of these statements, see the outline of the limitation system in the discussion of the 1931 Convention.

521 Article 5, paragraph 7 and article 14, paragraph 3.

522 Article 15, paragraph 1 and article 12, paragraph 6.

523 Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) and paragraph 5, article 20, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (g) and article 21 bis, paragraph 1 of the amended text of the Single Convention and articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Protocol of 1972.

524 As by the 1931 Convention and by the 1953 Protocol. Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention, in its unamended form, defines this phrase for all drugs.

525 For a discussion of article 21, paragraph 4 of the Single Convention and of nearly the same provision of article 14, paragraph 2 of the 1931 Convention see "The Gradual Evolution of the International Drug Treaty System."

526 Article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention; The Convention does not provide for limits of the supplies which may be obtained by "production" nor for limits of the amounts which may be "produced."

527 The estimated quantities of drugs to be consumed domestically for medical and scientific purposes; the estimated quantities of drugs to be used for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule III and of substances not covered by the Single Convention; the estimated amounts of drugs required for bringing the actual stocks on hand at December 31 of the preceding year to the estimated level to be held as at December 31 of the year to which the estimates relate and the estimated quantities necessary for addition to "special stocks"; i.e., stocks held by the Government for use of the armed forces and to meet exceptional circumstances such as epidemics and natural catastrophes.

528 In computing the excessive supplies of the preceding year the quantity of the seized drug in question which was released for licit use and the quantity taken from special stocks for the requirements of the civilian population in that year must be deducted from the supply limits of the same year; i.e., of the year in which the supply limits were exceeded (Article 21, paragraphs 2 and 3). It must not be overlooked that "production" (Article 1, paragraph 1, subparagraph (t)); i.e., the amounts of opium, coca leaves, cannabis or cannabis resin which were produced play no part in the limitation scheme of the unamended text of the Single Convention; see also above footnotes 518 and 526A.

529 Article 21, paragraph 4 and article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b).

530 Neither the unamended text of the Single Convention nor the Protocol gives a definition of "synthetic". The Convention (in its unamended form) uses this word only once, in article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (j).

531 See, however, the deductions which might be required by article 19, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (d) of the new text.

532 Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (g) and (h) of the new text.

533 Article 19, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c).

534 Article 19, paragraph 2; the deductions referrea L,,in article 21, paragraph 3 would have to be made in both ways of defining "the total of the estimates". They would also have to be made in the definition of this phrase under the old text of article 19, paragraph 2. The subtrahend would be the amount which remained from excessive supplies of the preceding year.

535 "The total of the estimates" as defined in the old text or this "sum" less the deductions mentioned.

536 Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (g) and (h) of the amended Convention.

537 Article 12, paragraph 1 and Article 19, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph.

538 Article 19, paragraph 5 of the amended and unamended text.

539 "Normally" if the country concerned furnishes correct estimates in accordance with the provisions of the amended Convention. If it furnishes excessive estimates of opium production, these excessive amounts, subject to the required deductions, could under article 19, paragraph 2, sub-para. (b) of the amended text become its "total of estimates."

540 The provision of article 21, paragraph 4 is nearly the same as article 14, paragraph 2 of the 1931 Convention which was introduced for the purpose of preventing excessive imports. Article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) is new.

541 Or in case of a failure of country or territory to furnish them, "to the extent practicable" established by the International Narcotics Control Board", Article 12, paragraph 3.

542 A similar drafting in exactitude can be found in article 14, paragraph 1 of the 1931 Convention which uses the term "the estimates" for the phrase of "the total of the estimates", League of Nations document C.191.M.136.1937.- XI. (Commentary to the 1931 Convention), paragraph 144.

543 For the meaning of "special stocks" see article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (w) and above footnote 527.

544 Article 21 paragraphs 1-3 and paragraph 4, subparagraph (a).

545 The sum of the quantity consumed, within the limit of the relevant estimate; the quantity used, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule III and of substances not covered by the Single Convention; the quantity exported; the quantity added to the stock for the purpose of bringing that stock up to the level specified in the relevant estimate; and the quantity acquired, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for "special" purposes.

546 The provisions of article 21, paragraph 4 and of article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) were outlined above.

547 The two items are also mentioned in article 21, paragraph 2 where their deductions from the supply limits is required.

548 And its component estimates refer.

549 Each Government must also make this deduction in order to calculate its supply limits which it must not exceed.

550 Article 20, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (e), paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a) and paragraph 4.

551 Article 18, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph could not be applied because the information would not be necessary for the performance of functions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, but for functions of the Board.

552 Applying in particular also the provisions of article 23 of the Single Convention.

553 Article 21 bis, paragraph 1 of the amended text.

554 As regards article 49 see above, the sub-section headed "Limitation of all phrases of the narcotic drugs economy and of the use of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961."

555 Including the estimate of opium production under article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (f) of the amended text.

556 Article 20, article 8, paragraph (b), article 12, paragraph 4 and article 13, paragraph 3; see also article 14, paragraph 1 sub-paragraph (a) of the unamended text.

557 In some countries the sowing is done in the autumn and the opium harvested in the following summer.

558 See the proposed remedial measures in "Establishment of a Comprehensive System of Control of the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy for the Production of Opium and of the Production of Opium" in "The Situation at the End of World War II; see also "The Opium Poppy" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961".

559 See Report of the Permanent Central Board 16 on its work in 1965, United Nations document E/OB/21, paragraph 105 referring to "official corruption, even in high places."

560 Article 20, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (e) of the Single Convention.

561 Iran's attempts to suppress drug addiction failed, however, because of the flow into its territory of huge amounts of Turkish and Afghan opium.

562 Article 12, paragraph 5 of the amended text.

563 Article 12, paragraph 5 of the amended text in connection with article 19, paragraph 3.

564 Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (f) and paragraph 5 and article 21 bis, paragraph 1 of the amended text.

565 Article 21 bis, paragraph 5.

566 Article 21 bis, paragraph 3.

567 Article 21, bis, paragraph 4.

568 Article 7, paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and (f).

569 Including "specifically authorized" importers and exporters, article 7, paragraph (f).

570 Article 7, paragraph (a).

571 Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Single Convention.

572 Article 13, particularly its paragraph 3 and article 20, see also article 2, paragraph 9, article 27, paragraph 2 and article 49, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (b).

573 Article 21, paragraph 4 and article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b).

574 Article 12, paragraph 3.

575 Article 2, paragraph 3.

576 Article 19 and 20.

577 Article 2, paragraph 4.

578 Nearly all of these items are enumerated above in footnote 527; Parties must, in addition, supply estimates of the stocks of drugs to be held as at 31 December of the subsequent year (Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph
(c)) and must inform the Board of the method used for determining their estimates (Article 19, paragraph 4).

579 See also article 2, paragraph 9, sub-paragraph (b), article 27, paragraph 2 and article 49, paragraph 3, subparagraph (b).

580 Harvesting, article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (t).

581 For the armed forces and to meet exceptional circumstances such as epidemics and natural catastrophes, the drugs to be held by the government, article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (w).

582 This item was discussed in "Establishment of a Comprehensive System of Control of the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy for the Production of Opium and of the Production of Opium." The amendment of the Protocol would delete the present paragraph 3 of article 20 according to which Parties "may" as far as possible also furnish to the Board information in respect of areas cultivated for the production of opium. Under article 9, paragraph 1, sub-para. (a) clause (i) of the 1953 Protocol Parties were bound to furnish to the Permanent Central Board information on the area on which the poppy was cultivated for the production of opium.

583 Article 22 (and 23) of the 1925 Convention, article 13 and 22 of the 1931 Convention and article 9 of the 1953 Protocol.

584 The earlier regime did also not provide for quarterly statistics on international transactions in poppy straw. The 1953 Protocol however required already such data on an annual basis (article 4, paragraph (c)).

585 Preparations containing substances in Schedule I could not be exempted, article 3, paragraph 2.

586 See "Record Keeping and Reporting to and Control by Domestic Authorities" and "Authorization of Consumption of Narcotic Drugs" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961."

587 Substances in Schedule I could not be so used. The psychotropic substances would have to be subject to the controls of the Convention until they would come to be in such a condition that they could not in practice be abused or recovered, article 4, paragraph (b).

588 Article 16 paragraph 5.

589 See however article 13, paragraph 3 of the Single Convention.

590 Article 18, paragraph 1.

591 Article 12, para. 4 and article 13, para. 3.

592 Article 17.

593 Article 21, paragraphs 1 and 2.

594 Article 29, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c) and article 31, paragraphs 4-16.

595 See, however, article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) as amended by article 6 of the Protocol of 1972.

596 Article 8, paragraph (b).

597 It is quite clear from the Records of the Plenipotentiary Conference that the term "United Nations organs" as used in article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) was intended to cover organs of specialized agencies and in any event those of the World Health Organization, Records of the Conference, vol. II, p. 200, United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24/Add. 1.

598 The International Criminal Police Organization under resolution 1579 (L) of the Economic and Social Council.

599 Article 35, paragraphs (f) and (g) of the amended Convention.

600 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) defines "illicit traffic" to mean "cultivation or trafficking in drugs contrary" to the Single Convention; "cultivation" is defined in sub-paragraph (i) as "cultivation of the opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant", as regards the Board's function to give "technical advice" in the matter of agreements on regional centres for scientific research and education to combat the problems resulting from the illicit use of and traffic in drugs, see article 38 bis of the amended Convention.

601 And through him to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

602 Article 18, para. 1, introductory sub-para. and subpara. (c).

603 Article 18, paragraph 2.

604 Article 8, paragraph (b).

605 Article 13, paragraph 3 and article 20, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (e); See also the more general provision of article 9, paragraph 5 of the amended Convention according to which the Board would lend assistance to and facilitate effective national action to attain the aims of this Convention; see also article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of the amended treaty.

606 United Nations documents E/INC/B/15, pp. 3 and 4 and E/INC/B/14 paragraph 28; these documents contain the latest information published on this point at the time of this writing.

607 The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations played a negative part in this connection.

608 See article 9, paragraph 5, article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a), and article 21, paragraph 3 of the amended Convention. The consultations referred to in article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) would be of a different kind.

609 Article 18, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph.

610 Article 18, paragraph 2.

611 See also in this connection the discussion of the 1931 Convention in the Chapter headed "The Gradual Evolution ° of the International Drug Treaty System".

612 Annual reports had also to be furnished under the 1931 Convention (article 21), under the 1936 Convention (article 16) and the 1953 Protocol (article 10).

613 See also article 21 of the 1912 Convention, article 30 ' of the 1925 Convention, article 21 of the 1931 Convention, article 16 of the 1936 Convention and article 10, para. 1, sub-para. (b) of the 1953 Protocol.

614 Article 23 of the 1931 Convention; the lists of these authorities are published in the United Nations document series E/NA. 19.

615 See United Nations document E/NR. FORM/Rev. 2, dated 21 March 1966.

616 it is assumed that a revised form will extend this requested information to the Vienna Convention and to the Protocol of 1972; the writer of this paper does not yet have such a revised form.

617 Lists of factories indicating the drugs each of them is authorized to make, are published in the United Nations document series E/NF. 19 , A Multilingual List of Narcotic Drugs under International Control containing all known synonyms is published by the United Nations Laboratory in Geneva and brought up-to-date from time to time; see United Nations document E/CN. 7/513, Sales No. E/F/S/R.69.XI.I., see also the List of Narcotic Drugs under International Control published by the International Narcotics Control Board, 14th edition (March 1970), published as Annex to the statistical forms ("Yellow List").

618 Such a form is reproduced in Annex I of the United Nations document E/NR. FORM/Rev. 2.

619 United Nations document E/OB/21, paragraphs 124— 125.

620 United Nations documents E/OB/21, paragraph 152.

621 Article 34, paragraph (b).

622 Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.

623 Four at present for the Economic and Social Council: English, French, Russian and Spanish.

624 These summaries are published in the United Nations document series E/NR. 19     /SUMMARY.

625 Published in the United Nations document series E/NS. 19    /SUMMARY

626 Several years ago, the representative of Canada even suggested in a meeting of the Commission that the summaries of annual reports were superfluous and could be abolished.

627 Egypt is also such a country

628 Resolution 246 B (IX).

629 See article 35, paragraphs (f) and (g) of the amended Convention which however would not impose additional obligations on parties in regard to their reports to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs through the Secretary General.

630 Article 16, paragraphs 1-3.

631 Article 16, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph. One compare with this provision article 18, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph of the Single Convention. Attention is drawn to the provisions of article 17, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention which authorizes the Commission to "consider all matters pertaining to the aims of this Convention."

632 Article 16, paragraph 6. One compare this provision with article 18, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention (and also with article 12, paragraph 1, article 13, paragraph 1, article 19, paragraph 1, introductory sub-paragraph and article 20, paragraph 1, introductory sub-paragraph of this Convention.)

633 Article 16, paragraph 2, article 7, paragraph (f), article 12 and article 13, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention.

634 Article 18, para. 1, sub-para. (d) and article 31, paras. 4-16.

635 Article 16, para. 3 and article 18, para. 1, subpara. (c).

636 The answers to the questions included in the form which the Commission prescribes for use in reporting individual cases of the illicit traffic in narcotic I drugs would in fact reveal such new trends; see Annex I of the United Nations document E/NR. FORM/Rev. 2.

637 Article 16, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (d) and article 21, paragraph (b).

638 Article 18, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention.

639 Article 3 of the Single Convention; see also article 2 of the Vienna Convention; it is submitted that it could also be done by the procedure by which the Convention itself could be revised; article 47 of the Single Convention and article 30 of the Vienna Convention.

640 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii) and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

641 Article 2, paragraphs 5 ana 6.

642 U.S. Department of Justice (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) and U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

643 Those provisions of Section 201 regarding changes in the domestic control status of a drug or other substance with the exception of paragraph (d) under which such a change would be required by an American treaty obligation.

644 The writer is inclined to believe that the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in view of its composition, would be more ready to extend control to additional drugs or psychotropic substances than was the Conference of 1971 which adopted the Vienna Convention. It is of course assumed that the drug or substance would constitute an international problem.

645 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (ii); the provisional control to be applied would have to be, that control which must be applied to drugs in Schedule I of the Single Convention.

646 Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention; see also article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (i) of the Single Convention.

647 Article 2, paragraph 1.

648 Article 2, paragraph 4. It is submitted that it would be impossible to consider the definition of this paragraph as covering such "convertible" substances. The provision of article 2, paragraph 9 refers to a different matter. It corresponds to article 2, paragraph 8 of the Single Convention. For various proposals to bring precursors within the scope of the Vienna Convention see e.g. United Nations documents E/CONF. 58/C. 3/L. 8, L. 10/Add. 4, L. 14-19 and E/CONF. 58/C. 4/L. 61.

649 Either in Schedule I or II of the Convention. A drug may be placed in Schedule IV only if it is already in Schedule I, article 3, paragraph 5 and article 2, paragraph 5.

650 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii).

651 Amphetamines were considered much more medically useful in 1961 than they are today. Huge quantities of them were consumed for what were held to be legitimate medical purposes.

652 For the full text of the Legal Opinion see United Nations document E/CN. 7/L. 306; for an extensive summary, Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its twenty-third session, United Nations document E/4606/ Rev. 1, paragraph 354. This legal view was also shared by the past Permanent Central Board and Drug Supervisory Body, United Nations document E/OB/23-E/DSB/ 25, paragraphs 131-142.

653 In order to speed up the matter the procedure could be initiated before it has been established that no party objects. The Commission could of course take its decision only afterwards.

654 It is submitted that revising of the Schedules could be effected not only by the operation of article 3, but also by an amendment of the Single Convention.

655 Article 2, paragraph 4, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

656 Article 17, paragraph 2.

657 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii).

658 Article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii) and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Single Convention, article 2, paragraph 5 and 6 of the Vienna Convention.

659 Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council, United Nations document E/4767.

660 Article 2, paragraph 5.

661 Article 3, paragraph 4.

662 See, however, article 39 of the Single Convention.

663 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention.

664 Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention. One will note that these conditions for exempting preparations from controls are very similar to those for such exemptions under Article 8 of the 1925 Convention and article 2, paragraph 4 of the Single Convention discussed above.

665 This follows from the text of article 22, paragraph 1.

666 Article 9.

667 Article 12, paragraph 1.

668 Article 12, paragraph 2.

669 Article 3, paragraph 4.

670 Article 2, paragraphs 1-2, 4-6.

671 Article 17, paragraph 2.

672 "Abuse" and "ill effects" of the kind which under article 3, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (iii) would justify placing the substance under the control of the Single Convention.

673 Article 3, paragraph 5.

674 Dextropropoxyphene was removed from Schedule II and thus freed from control by a decision of the Commission under article 3, paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention; United Nations document E/3893, paragraph 157.

675 Records of the Conference vol. II, pp. 263-264, United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24/Add. 1.

676 Article 2, paragraph 4, closing sub-paragraph.

677 Article 2, paragraph 5.

678 It may be noted that "The Revised Draft Protocol on Psychotropic Substances" which was prepared by the Commission and which was used as working document by the Conference which adopted the Vienna Convention provided in its article 2, paragraph 4 some guidelines for the World Health Organization's recommendation of the Schedule in which a dangerous substance should be placed.

679 Article 3, paragraph 8 of the Single Convention, article 2, paragraph 8 of the Vienna Convention.

680 One compare article 3, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (a) of the Single Convention with article 2, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (a) of the Vienna Convention. It is however admitted that another interpretation would also not be impossible and that one could assume that the term "decisions" under this provision of the Vienna Convention refers only to decisions amending a Schedule and not to those refusing to make any change.

681 Article 3, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (d) of the Single Convention and article 2, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph
(d) of the Vienna Convention.

682 At least until recently even the World Health Organization's Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (previously called "Expert Committee on Dependence-Producing Drugs," "Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction" and earlier "Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs") had to rely largely on American sources in its findings on drugs whose international control status was considered.

683 General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII). The amendment entered into force on August 31, 1965.

684 General Assembly resolution 2847 (XXVI). According to paragraph 4 of this resolution the Council will be composed of 14 African countries, 11 Asian countries, 10 Latin American countries, six Socialist countries of Eastern Europe and 13 Western European and "other" countries.

685 Resolution 1621 A (L I), paragraph 2 of the Economic and Social Council.

686 Article 68 of the Charter of the United Nations; see also article 3, paragraph 9 and article 7 of the Single Convention.

687 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Vienna Convention.

688 Article 2, paragraph 7, introductory sub-paragraph.

689 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d).

690 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (e).

691 See in this connection article 23 of the Vienna Convention according to which a Party may adopt more strict or severe measures of control than those provided by this Convention; see also the corresponding provision of article 39 of the Single Convention.

692 Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its First Special Session (January 1970), United Nations document E14785, p. 17, footnote 11; see Conference document E/CONF, 58/C 4/Min, 4.

693 Documents E/CONF. 58/C4/Min. 3, Min 4, and Min 26.

694 Documents E/CONF. 58/C4/L. 60 and E/CONF. 58/C 4/Min 26.

695 Documents E/CONF. 58/L 4/Add. 9 and E/CONF. 58/SR 2$.

696 Article 2, paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (d).

697 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (e ).

698 Article 2, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (d).

699 Although this is often not the case and would particularly frequently not be the case in the event of the review, by a political organ of a technical decision by a technical organ.

700 As stated above, pending the Council's review the Commission's decision would in any event be determinative.

701 It is held that such a declaration would not be a "reservation"; if this view is not accepted reference is made to article 32, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention.

702 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (a).

703 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (a) does not expressly require records, while article 11, paragraph 5 would require the keeping of some records in respect of substances in Schedule IV. It has, however, been pointed out in "Record Keeping and Reporting to and Control by Domestic Authorities," that parties, in view of paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (a), clause (v) would, in the case of addition of a previously uncontrolled substance to Schedule I, have to require the keeping of records, different from but more strict than the records to be kept in case of substances in Schedule IV under article 11, paragraph 5. The same would be the case in the event of addition of a previously uncontrolled substance to Schedule II (paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (b), clause (v)).

704 This requirement may perhaps be doubtful.

705 This obligation would differ depending on the Schedule to which the previously uncontrolled substance would be added. The reference to article 22 in paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (d) would not be necessary since the obligation to apply article 22 in these four cases would also result from the text of article 22 itself.

706 Article 2, paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (a), clause (v) and sub-paragraph (b), clause (v) and article 16, paragraph 4 sub-paragraph (a).

707 Sub-paragraph (b) clause (v) of the paragraph cited in the preceding footnote and article 16, paragraph 4, subparagraphs (c) and (d).

708 Preparations of substances in Schedule I could neither be "exempted" nor used for "industrial" purposes, article 3, paragraph 2 and article 4, introductory paragraph and paragraph (b).

709 See "Record Keeping and Reporting to and Control by Domestic Authorities".

710 With the exception of those measures from which the party would also be freed under the provisions of article 3, paragraphs 3-4.

711 Article 17, paragraph 2,

712 Under its "Terms of Reference", "Charter functions"; Article 68 of the Charter of the United Nations, See also Rules 71 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, United Nations document E/3063/Rev. 1.

713 "Treaty Functions."

714 Resolution of the Economic and Social Council 1663 (L II) dated June 1, 1972.

715 Council resolution 1156 (XLI) If, dated 5 August 1966.

716 Article 3, paragraph 9.

717 See article 60 and 68 of the Charter of the United Nations and article 7 of the Single Convention; records of the Plenipotentiary Conference, vol. II, p. 211, United Nations document E/CONF. 34/24/Add. 1.

718 Article 3, paragraph 4, article 12, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a), article 14, paragraph 2, article 16, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph and paragraph 6, article 17, paragraph 1 and article 18, paragraph 1.

719 Article 5, paragraph 6 of the 1931 Convention (appointment of a member of the Supervisory Body), article 11, paragraph 4 of the 1931 Convention (appointment of a member of an ad hoc expert body) article 21 of the 1931 Convention (form of annual reports), article 2 of the 1948 Protocol (Provisional control of synthetic drugs) and article 10 of the 1953 Protocol (form of Annual Reports).

720 Council resolution 9 (I).

721 Article 3, article 8, paragraph (b) and article 18 paragraph 1, introductory sub-paragraph and sub-paragraph (c) and paragraph 2; reference may be made also to the article 15, paragraph 1, according to which the Board's reports should be submitted to the Council through the Council; to article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) and paragraph (2) concerning the Board's right to call the attention of the Commission to a serious failure of a government to carry out provisions of the Single Convention; to article 31, paragraph 5, according to which the parties shall follow as closely as may be practicable the form of the import certificate approved by the Commission; and to article 32, paragraph 2, according to which the Commission shall recommend safeguards to prevent the improper use or diversion of narcotic drugs in first-aid kits of aircraft or ships engaged in international traffic; see also article 49, paragraphs 3 and 4.

722 Article 6 of the Protocol amending article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) of the Single Convention and article 13 of the Protocol introducing article 35, paragraph (f) into the Convention; see also article 6, amending article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) under the new designation of sub-paragraph (d).

723 Article 8.

724 Department of State Press Release, February 5, 1938, p. 211.

725 United Nations documents E/5082, paragraph 174; see also paragraphs 303-339, and in particular paragraphs 308 and 324; see also United Nations document E/INCB/15, pp. 14 and 74.

726 Council resolution 1156 (XLI) II, dated 5 August 1966.

727 In the League period they were appointed for one year each time; see Renborg Bertil A., International Drug Control, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1947, pp. 35 and 38.

728 Article 2, article 3, paragraph 4 and article 16, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph and paragraph 6; see also article 12, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) (regarding the establishment by the Commission of a form for import and expert authorizations); article 14, paragraph 2 (concerning the Commission's recommendation on safeguards to prevent the misuse or diversion of psychotropic substances carried in first-aid kits of forms of public transport engaged in international traffic); article 18, paragraph 1 (routing the Board's reports to the Council through the Commission) and article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) and paragraph 2 (right of the Board to call to the attention of the Commission a serious failure to carry out provisions of the Convention.)

729 Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention.

730 Article 3 of the Protocol amending article 10, paragraph 1 of the Single Convention; for the basic provisions concerning the Board's constitution, see article 9, paragraphs 1-3 of this Convention.

731 Article 2 of the Protocol amending article 9, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Single Convention.

732 Mainly important opium producing countries, but also coca leaf producing countries.

733 Important manufacturers of narcotic drugs.

734 Countries which rely mainly on imports for their requirements of manufactured narcotics.

735 Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Single Convention. One will note the similarity of this provision with the principles which guide the Council in electing the members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. However, in the case of the Board no reference is made to countries in which the illicit traffic or drug addiction presents an important social problem,

736 United Nations document E/4761, Annex II, paragraph 14, see also Records of the Plenipotentiary Conference, vol. II. p. 6, footnote 16.

737 Article 100; see also "Some of the Controversial Problems which arose in the course of the preparatory work on the Single Convention" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961."

738 Resolution I of the Conference, United Nations document E/CONF. 63/9, P. 5.

739 Article 11, paragraph 2.

740 Article 15, paragraph 1

741 See the definition of "illicit traffic" in article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (1).

742 Paragraph 4.

743 Second paragraph of the Preamble and article 4, paragraph (c) of the Single Convention.

744 See also article 35, paragraph (c) of the Single Convention.

745 See "Reports to International Narcotics Control Organs" as regards the practice of the Board to maintain a continuous "dialogue" and to carry on consultations with Governments which have a weak administration, and to give advice and render assistance to such Governments.

746 The Board would also have the right, under the amended text of this sub-paragraph, to propose the opening of consultations to a government which has seriously failed to carry out provisions of the Single Convention, while under the unamended text the Board is expressly authorized only to ask for explanations which it could do also under the amended text. There is, however, no provision under the unamended text which would in such a case prevent the Board from proposing consultations.

747 In the discussion of the 1925 Convention in the Chapter "The gradual evolution of the international drug treaty system"; in the discussion of the 1953 Protocol in "The Situation at the End of World War II" and "Some of the Controversial Questions which arose in the course of the preparatory work on the Single Convention" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961."

748 Article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) (sub-paragraph (d) of the amended text).

749 Article 14, paragraph 3.

750 Which would become sub-paragraph (d).

751 "'It may be mentioned that under the unamended text the Board could in any event call the attention of the Parties and of the two organs to the matter only in a case in which it would have reason to believe that the aims of the Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of a failure of the country concerned to carry out the provisions of the Single Convention. This follows from the conditions laid down in article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) under which the procedure under article 14 may be initiated. This appears also to apply to the first of the cases in which, under article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph
(d) of the amended Convention of the Board would be entitled to take this action.

752 Article 62, paragraph 2 of the Charter.

753 See article 23, paragraph (c) of the Convenant of the League of Nations and of article 55, paragraph (b) of the Charter of the United Nations in "The Gradual Evolution of the International Drug Treaty System."

754 Records of the Plenipotentiary Conference of 1961, vol. I, pp. 73 and 81.

755 It is at present done in its annual report and in annexes thereto.

756 See "Limitation of Narcotics Supplies".

757 Under article 12, paragraph 4 and article 13, paragraph 3, see also "Reports to International Narcotics Control Organs".

758 United Nations document E/SR 1735 (12 January 1971), paragraps 40, 45 and 76-77.

759 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention; see also "Reports to International Narcotics Control Organs".

760 see "Reports to International Narcotics Control Organs".

761 Under the unamended text. Under the amended text the first step could, in the case of an offending country be: 'either a proposal to such a government to open consultations or a request to furnish explanations. In the case of a government which would not have failed to comply with lovisions of the Convention the first step would be the proposal to open consultations.

762 See "Establishment of a Comprehensive System of Control of the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy for the Production of Opium and of the Production of Opium" in "The Situation at the End of World War II."

763 In article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of the unamended text or sub-paragraph (d) of the amended text.

764 The unamended text is quoted. Under the amended text the reference is to "paragraph 1 (d) above".

765 Except to substitute the reference to sub-paragraph (d) for that to sub-paragraph (c).

766 Article 19 of the Vienna Convention.

767 Article 19, paragraph 7 of the Vienna Convention; see also the above Section "Changes in the Schedules of the Single Convention," Sub-section "Right of Non-Acceptance" or "Right of Rejection".

768 Article 19, paragraphs 1-6.

769 For further discussion of this point, see supra, "The national interest in international control of dangerous drugs".

770 However, comparatively small the number of such physicians would be, it would be sufficiently large to assist huge numbers of addicts.

771 The leaves of the cannabis plant are not subject to the international narcotics regime.

772 See discussion of "Cannabis Plant" in Supra, "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961."

773 United Nations document E/0B119, paragraphs 10 and 11.

774 This consideration applies also to those narcotics which in some states could be sold without medical prescription. The use of such drugs first taken for the alleviation of pain might later have been continued for the satisfaction of the craving of the user who became addicted.

775 United Nations document E/OB/22, paragraphs 30-32.

776 The 1948 Protocol only extended the regime of these two treaties to new synthetic drugs.

777 United Nations document E/OB/22, paragraph 34-36.

778 It seems that this reported figure is higher than the amount which was actually so used.

779 United Nations document E/OB/22, paragraph 41.

780 With regard to the difficulties of controlling the production of opium, coca leaves and cannabis see "Establishment of a Comprehensive System of Control of the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy for the Production of Opium and of the Production of Opium" in "The Situation at the End of World War II" and the sections on "The Opium Poppy", the "Coca Bush" and the "Cannabis Plant" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961".

781 United Nations document E/OB/21, paragraphs 108 and 109.

782 Text reproduced in United Nations documents E/ CONF.63/8 and E/CONF.63/9.

783 Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (e) of the amended text; see the Section "Establishment of a Comprehensive System of Control of the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy for the Production of Opium and of the Production of Opium" in the "Situation at the End of World War II".

784Article 20, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (g) of the amended text.

785 Article 19, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (g) and (h) of the amended Convention; see the "Limitation of Narcotics Supplies" of "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961".

786 Article 19, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c).

787 See article 19, paragraph 2, article 21, paragraph 4 and article 31, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the unamended Single Convention.

788 See "Authorization of Possession of Narcotic Drugs" and "Penal Laws to be Applied to Violations of Laws Enacted to Implement the Single Convention" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961"; For different reasons the provision of article 19, paragraph 2, subparagraph (d) of the amended text would also remain inapplicable, see "Limitation of Narcotics Supplies."

789 Article 10, paragraph 1 as amended.

790 Article 9, paragraph 1 as amended.

791 Article 12 and 13, article 14 in its amended and unamended versions, and article 21, paragraph 4.

792 Their discussion would be outside the scope of this paper.

793 Article 16 as amended.

794 Article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) of the new text.

795 Article 9, paragraphs 4 and 5, article 35, paragraph (g) and article 38 bis of the new text; see also article 14, paragraph 1 sub-paragraph (c) of this text.

796 Article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) and article 21 bis, paragraph 3 of the next text; see also article 14, paragraph 1 sub-paragraph (c) of the new text.

797 Article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (d) of the new text; see also article 4, paragraph (b) and article 35, paragraph (c).

798 Article 14 bis of the new text.

799 Article 14, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of the new text.

800 Article 38 of the new text; see, however, as regards the problem of drug abuse in foreign countries, "The national interest in international control of dangerous drugs".

801 The text of the Convention is reproduced in United Nations document E/CONF. 58/6 and in the United Nations Bulletin r, Narcotics, vol. XXIII, No. 3.

802 See "Limitation of Narcotics Supplies" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961".

803 Article 7, paragraph (d).

804 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (t) of the Single Convention.

805 Article 1, paragraph (i); it is submitted that the term "manufacture" was not intended to apply to the cultivation of plants, even though such cultivation may be one of the "processes by which psychotropic substances may be obtained".

806 See "Changes in the Schedules of the Single Convention" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs."

807 Article 2 and 3 of the Vienna Convention and article 3 of the Single Convention.

808 Article 17, paragraph 2.

809 Article 2, paragraph 7.

810 Article 2, paragraph 4; see, however, article 2, paragraph 9.

811 Article 3, paragraph 3; sub-paragraph (iii).

812 Article 32, paragraph 4.

813 Article 49, see, however, article 50, paragraph 3.

814 As mentioned above the details of these provisions were discussed in connection with the corresponding provisions of the Single Convention and sometimes also in connection with those of earlier drug treaties.

815 Article 7, paragraph (a).

816 Article 12.

817 Article 7, paragraph (f).

818 Article 11, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Vienna Convention and article 34, paragraph (b) of the Single Convention.

819 Article 7, paragraph (e).

820 Article 11, paragraph 5.

821 Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 6.

822 Article 33.

823 Article 7, paragraph (b).

824 Article 5, paragraph 3.

825 Article 6.

826 Article 22.

827 Article 36 and 37.

828 Article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b).

829 Article 36, para. 1, sub-para. (b); for a discussion and criticism of this provision see the Section "Panel Laws to be Applied to Violators of Laws Enacted to Implement the Single Convention" in the Chapter "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961"; see also the Section "The Evolution of Penal Law in the Field of International Drug Law" in the Chapter "The Gradual Evolution of the International Drug Treaty System."

830 Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 6.

831 Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention.

832 Article 8, introductory paragraph of the Single Convention.

833 Article 19.

834 Article 19, paragraph 7.

835 Article 14.

836 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Vienna Convention.

837 Article 10.

838 Article 20 of the Vienna Convention.

839 Article 38 of the Single Convention as amended; see also the Chapter "A Summary Appraisal of the Protocol of 1972 Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961"; see also the reference in footnote 838.

840 see "Changes in the Schedules of the Single Convention" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs".

841 See "The Gradual Evolution of the International Drug Treaty System".

842 Article 7, paragraph (a) of the Vienna Convention; article 29 of the Single Convention; see "Limitation of Narcotics Supplies" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1931".

843 Article 7, paragraph (f).

844 Article 31, see, in particular, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a) of this article.

845 Article 7, paragraph (d).

846 Article 29, paragraph 3 and article 30, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a). The requirement to limit the amount of drugs does not apply to the retail trade in drugs in Schedule II of the Single Convention, article 30, paragraph 6.

847 Article 7, paragraph (a) and article 8, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) of the Vienna Convention.

848 Article 29, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) and article 30, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), clause (ii); only the premises of persons duly authorized to perform and while performing therapeutic or scientific functions are excepted, article 30, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c).

849 Article 7, paragraph (c); Article 8, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c).

850 The provisions controlling psychotropic substances in Schedule I were described in connection with the corresponding provisions of the Single Convention and occasionally in connection with the discussion of earlier drug treaties.

851 Article 13 of the Vienna Convention.

852 Article 11, paragraph 5.

853 Article 11, paragraph 2.

854 Article 12, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (d).

855 See "The Possibility of Placing Amphetamines under the International Narcotics Regime" in "Changes in the Schedules of the Single Convention" in "The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961".

856 See Section 201 of the "Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970".

857 Article 2, paragraph 7.
858 Two of them, namely, the opium smoking agreements of 1925 and 1931 are completely obsolete and nowhere applied any more; a third, the 1936 Convention (except its article 9), was not intended to be replaced by the Single Convention, article 44 of the Single Convention.

859 Article 23.

860 Articles 26 and 27 in connection with article 23.

861 Article 28 of the Convention in connection with article 23.

862 Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention; article 19, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention.

863 Article 29, paragraph 1, article 30, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) and article 31, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a) of the Single Convention; article 7, paragraphs (b) and (f) and article 8, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention.

864 Article 36, paragraph 1 of the unamended version and paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) of the amended version.

865 Article 33 and (if considered to be punishable offenses) article 37.

866 Article 36, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the amended text.

867 Article 5, paragraph 3.

868 Article 7, paragraph (b).

869 Article 22.

870 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (j ) and article 2, paragraphs 1-5; see also article 4, paragraph (c)

871 Nor the Vienna Convention as long as the leaves are not included in one of its Schedules.

872 Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) and article 28, paragraph 3.

873 The first drug treaty which uses this term is the 1925 Convention; the 1912 Convention uses the phrase "medical and legitimate purposes".

874 The same would apply to the Vienna Convention, when in force, which also limits the use of psychotropic substances to "medical and scientific purposes".

875 Article 22 of the Single Convention.

876 As has been stated above this is the case of all opium-producing countries permitting the production of opium by private individual farmers, including India which has a good administration.

877 If placed under the Single Convention the hallucinogens would probably be in Schedule I and IV of this treaty.

878 Article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a) clause (iv) of the Single Convention; article 22, paragraph 2, subparagraph (a) clause (iv) of the Vienna Convention.

879 Three would probably be an appropriate number.

880 This would probably make it easier to obtain the adoption of this proposal by the Economic and Social Council.

881 The Protocol has been ratified by the United States after the present paper was completed.

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