II. THE RIOT PROCESS

'The Commission has found no "typical" disorder in 1967 in terms of intensity of violence and extensiveness of damage. To determine whether, as is sometimes suggested, there was a  typical "riot process," we examined 24 disorders which occurred during 1967 in 20 cities and three university settings." We have concentrated on  four aspects of that process:

•    The .accumulating reservoir of grievances in the Negro community;
•    "Precipitating" incidents and their relationship to the reservoir of gnevances;
•    The development of violence after its initial outbreak;
•    The control effort, including official force, negotiation, and per-suasion.

We found a common social process operating in all 24 dis-orders in certain critical respects. These events developed similarly, over a period of time and out of an accumulation of grievances and increasing tension in the Negro community. Almost  invariably, they exploded in ways related to the local community and its particular problems and conflicts. But once violence erupted, there began a complex interaction of many elements—rioters, official control forces, counter-rioters—in which the differences between various disorders were more pronounced than the similarities.

The Reservoir of Grievances in the Negro Community

Our examination of the background of the surveyed disorders revealed a typical pattern of deeply-held grievances which were widely shared by many members of the Negro community.27

The specific content of the expressed grievances varied somewhat from city to city. But in general, grievances among Negroes in all the cities related to prejudice, discrimination, severely disadvantaged living conditions and a general sense of frustration about their inability to change those conditions.

Specific events or incidents exemplified and reinforced the shared sense of grievance. News of such incidents spread quickly throughout the community and added to the reservoir.

Grievances about police practices, unemployment and under-employment, housing and other objective conditions in the ghetto were aggravated in the minds of many Negroes by the inaction of municipal authorities.

Out of this reservoir of grievance and frustration, the riot process began in the cities which we surveyed.

Precipitating Incidents

In virtually every case a single "triggering" or "precipitating" incident can be identified as having immediately preceded —within a few hours and in generally the same location—the outbreak of disorder.28 But this incident was usually relatively minor, even trivial, by itself substantially disproportionate to the scale of violence that followed. Often it was an incident of a type which had occurred frequently in the same community in the past without provoking violence.

We found that violence was generated by an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which typically not one, but a series of incidents occurred over a period of weeks or months prior to the outbreak of disorders.29 Most cities had three or more such incidents;

Houston had 10 over a five-month period. These earlier or prior incidents were linked in the minds of many Negroes to the pre-existing reservoir of underlying grievances. With each such incident, frustration and tension grew until at some point a final incident, often similar to the incidents preceding it, occurred and was followed almost immediately by violence.

As we see it, the prior incidents and the reservoir of underlying grievances contributed to a cumulative process of mounting tension that spilled over into violence when the final incident occurred. In this sense the entire chain—the grievances, the series of prior tension-heightening incidents, and the final incident—was the "precipitant" of disorder.

This chain describes the central trend in the disorders we surveyed, and not necessarily all aspects of the riots or of all rioters. For example, incidents have not always increased tension; and tension has not always resulted in violence. We conclude only that both processes did occur in the disorders we examined.

Similarly, we do not suggest that all rioters shared the conditions or the grievances of their Negro neighbors: some may deliberately have exploited the chaos created out of the frustration of others; some may have been drawn into the melee merely because they identified with, or wished to emulate, others. Some who shared the adverse conditions and grievances did not riot.

We found that the majority of the rioters did share the adverse conditions and grievances. Although they did not necessarily articulate in their own minds the connection between that background and their actions.

Newark and Detroit presented typical sequences of prior incidents, a build-up of tensions, a final incident, and the outbreak of violence:

NEWARK

Prior Incidents

1965: A Newark policeman shot and killed an 18-year-old Negro boy. After the policeman had stated that he had fallen and his gun had discharged accidentally, he later claimed that theyouth had assaulted another officer and was shot as he fled. At a hearing it was decided that the patrolman had not used excessive force. The patrolman remained on duty, and his occasional assignment to Negro areas was a continuing source of irritation in the Negro community:

April, 1967: Approximately 15 Negroes were arrested while picketing a grocery store which they claimed sold bad meat and used unfair credit practices.

Late May, early June: Negro leaders had for several months voiced strong opposition to a proposed medical-dental center to be built on 150 acres of land in the predominantly Negro Central Ward. The dispute centered mainly around the lack of relocation provisions for those who would be displaced by the medical center. The issue became extremely volatile in late May when public "blight hearings" were held regarding the land to be condemned: The hearings became a public forum in which many residents spoke against the proposed center. The city did not change its plan.

Late May, June: The mayor recommended appointment of a white city councilman who had no more than a high school education to the position of secretary to the board of education.

Reportedly, there was widespread support from both whites and Negroes for a Negro candidate who held a master's degree and was considered more qualified. The mayor did not change his recommendation. Ultimately, the original secretary retained his position and neither candidate was appointed.

July 8: Several Newark policemen, allegedly including the patrolman involved in the 1965 killing, entered East Orange to assist the East Orange police during an altercation with a group of Negro men.

Final Incident

July 12, approximately 9:30 p.m.: A Negro cab driver was injured during or after a traffic arrest in the heart of the Central Ward. Word spread quickly, and a crowd gathered in front of the Fourth Precinct station-house across the street from a large public housing project.
Initial Violence

Same day, approximately 11:30 p.m.: The crowd continued to grow until it reached 300 to 500 people. One or two Molotov cocktails were thrown at the station-house. Shortly after midnight the police dispersed the crowd, and window-breaking and looting began a few minutes later. By about 1:00 a.m., the peak level of violence for the first night was reached.

DETROIT

Prior Incidents

August 1966: A crowd formed during a routine arrest of several Negro youths in the Kercheval section of the city. Tensions were high for several hours, but no serious violence occurred.

June 1967: A Negro prostitute was shot to death on her front steps. Rumors in the Negro community attributed the killing to a vice squad officer. A police investigation later reportedly unearthed leads to a disgruntled pimp. No arrests were made.
119
ad one arm in a cast, and some of the younger Negroes in ie crowd intervened because they

thought the police were handling him too roug,hly.
PROTEST ACTIVITIES
Approximately 22 percent of the prior incidents involved Negro demonstrations, rallies, and

protest meetings." Only five involved appearances by nationally-known Negro mili-tants."
Protest rallies and meetings were also identified as the final incident preceding five

disturbances. Nationally-known Negro militants spoke at two of these meetings; in the other

three Only local leaders were involved." A prior incident involving alleged police

brutality was the principal subject of each of these three rallies." Inaction of municipal

authorities was the topic for two other meetings."
WHITE RACIST ACTIVITIES
About 17 percent of the prior incidents involved activities by whites intended to discredit

or intimidate Negroes, or vio-lence by whites against Negroes." These included some 15

cross-burnings in Bridgeton, the harassment of Negro college students by white teenagers in

Jackson, Mississippi, and, in Detroit, the slaying of a Negro by a group of white youths.

No final incidents were classifiable as racist activity.
PREVIOUS DISORDERS IN THE SAME CITY
In this category were approximately 16 percent of the prior incidents, including seven

previous disorders, the handling of which had produced a continuing sense of grievance.41

There were other incidents, usually of minor violence, which oc-*curred prior to seven

disorders" and were seen by the Negro community as precursors of the subsequent

disturbance. Typi-- cally, in Plainfield the night before the July disorder, a Negro youth

was injured in an altercation between white and Negro teenagers. Tensions rose as a result.

No final incidents were identified in this category.
DISORDERS IN OTHER CITIES
Local media coverage and rumors generated by disorders in other cities were specifically

identified as prior incidents in four cases.43 In Grand Rapids and Phoenix, the Detroit

riot was commonly identified, and in Bridgeton and Plainfield, the
121
June 26: A yo    Negro man on a picnic was shot to death
while reportedly    ng to protect his pregnant wife from assault
by seven white youths. The wife witnessed the slaying and mis-carried shortly thereafter.

Of the white youths, only one was charged. The others were released.
Final Incident
July 23, approximately 3:45 a.m.: Police raided a "blind pig," a type of night club in the

Negro area which served drinks after hours. Eighty persons were in the club—more than the

police had anticipated—attending a party for several servicemen, two of whom had recently

returned from Vietnam. A crowd of about 200 persons gathered as the police escorted the

patrons into the police wagons.
Initial Violence
Approximately 5:00 a.m.: As the last police cars drove away from the "blind pig," the crowd

began to throw rocks. By 8:00 a.m., looting had become widespread. Violence continued to

in-crease throughout the day, and by evening reached a peak level for the first day.
In the 24 disorders surveyed, the events identified as tension-heightening incidents,

whether prior or final, involved issues which generally paralleled the grievances we found

in these cities." The incidents identified were of the following types:
POLICE ACTIONS
Some 40 percent of the prior incidents involved allegedly , abusive or discriminatory

police actions." Most of the police incidents began routinely and involved a response to,

at most,
a few persons rather than a large group.82
A typical incident occurred in Bridgeton, New Jersey five days before the disturbance when

two police officers went to the home of a young Negro man to investigate a nonsup- , port

complaint. A fight ensued when the officers attempted to take the man to the police

station, and the Negro was criti-cally injured and partially paralyzed. A Negro minister

rep-resenting the injured man's family asked for suspension of the two officers involved

pending investigation. This procedure had been followed previously when three policemen

were ac-cused of collusion in the robbery of a white-owned store. The Negro's request was

not granted.
Police actions were also identified as the final incident pre-ceding 12 of the 24

disturbances.33 Again, in all but two cases, the police action which became the final

incident began rou-tinely.34
The final incident in Grand Rapids occurred when police
attempted to apprehend a Negro driving an allegedly stolen car. ,
A crowd of 30 to 40 Negro spectators gathered. The suspect
120
11.
ances.49 The cumulative reinforcement of grievances and heightening of tensions found in

all instances were particularly evident in these cases.
The Development of Violence
Once the series of precipitating incidents culminated in violence, the riot process

followed no uniform pattern in the 24 disorders surveyed." However, some similarities

emerge. The final incident before the outbreak of disorder, and the initial violence

itself, generally occurred at a time and place in which it was normal for many people to be

on the streets. In most of the 24 disorders, groups generally estimated at 50 or more

persons were on the street at the time and place of the first outbreak.51
In all 24 disturbances, including the three university-related disorders, the ivaitial

disturbance area consisted of streets with relatively high concentrations of pedestrian and

automobile traffic at the time. In all but two cases—Detroit and Milwaukee —violence

started between 7:00 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., when the largest numbers of pedestrians could be

expected. Ten of the 24 disorders erupted on Friday night, Saturday or Sun-day.52
In most instances, the temperature during the day on which violence first erupted was quite

high.53 This contributed to the size of the crowds on the street, particularly in areas of

con-gested housing.
Major violence occurred in all 24 disorders during the evening and night hours, between

6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., and in most cases between 9:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m.54 In only a few

disorders, including Detroit and Newark, did substantial violence occur or continue during

the daytime.55 Generally, the night-day cycles continued in daily succession through the

early period of the disorder.58
At the beginning of disorder, violence generally flared al-most immediately after the final

precipitating incident.57 It then escalated quickly to its peak level, in the case of one-

night disorders, and to the first night peak in the case of continuing disorders.58 In

Detroit and Newark, the first outbreaks began within two hours and reached severe, although

not the high-est, levels within three hours.
In almost all of the subsequent night-day cycles, the change from relative order to a state

of disorder by a ntunber of peo-ple typically occurred extremely rapidly—withiia one or two

hours at the most."
Nineteen of the surveyed disorders lasted more than one night." In 10 of these, violence

peaked on the first night, and
123
Newark riot had a similar effect. The major disorders in De-troit and Newark appeared,

however, to be important factors in all the disorders which followed them.
Media coverage and rumors generated by the major riots in nearby Newark and Plainfield were

the only identifiable final incidents preceding five nearby disorders.44 In these cases

there was a substantial mobilization of police and extensive patrolling of the ghetto area

in anticipation of violence.
OFFICIAL CITY ACTIONS
Approximately 14 percent of the prior incidents were iden-tified as action, or in some

cases, inaction of city officials other than police or the judiciary.45 Typically, in

Cincinnati two months prior to the disturbance, approximately 200 representa-tives (mostly

Negroes) of the inner-city community councils sought to appear before the city council to

request summer recreation funds. The council permitted only one person from the group to

speak, and then only briefly, on the ground that the group had not followed the proper

procedure for placing the issue on the agenda.
No final incidents were identified in this category.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Eight of the prior incidents involved cases of allegedly dis-criminatory administration of

justice.48 Typical was a case in Houston a month and a half before the disorder. Three

civil rights advocates were arrested for leading a protest and for their participation in

organizing a boycott of classes at the predominantly Negro Texas Southern University. Bond

was set at $25,000 each. The court refused for several days to reduce bond, even though TSU

officials dropped the charges they had originally pressed.
There were no final incidents identified involving the ad-ministration of justice.
In a unique case, New Haven, the shooting of a Puerto Rican by a white man was identified

as the final incident be-fore violence.47
Finally, we have noted a marked relationship between prior and final incidents within each

city. In most of the cities surveyed, the final incident was of the same type as one or

more of the prior incidents. For example, police actions were identified as both the final

incident and one or more prior incidents preceding seven disturbances.48 Rallies or

meetings to protest police actions involved in a prior incident were iden-tified as the

final incident preceding three additional disturb-
122
the level of activity on subsequent nights was the same less.61 In the other nine

disorders, however, the peak w. reached on a subsequent night."
Disorder generally began with less serious violence against property, such as rock and

bottle throwing and window break-. ing.63 These were usually the materials and the targets

closest to hand at the place of the initial outbreak.
Once store windows were broken, looting usually followed.. Whether fires were set only

after looting occurred is unc - Reported instances of fire-bombing and Molotov cockt: in

the 24 disorders appeared to occur as frequently during one cycle of violence as during

another in disorders which continued through more than one cycle." However, fires seemed to

break out more frequently during the middle cycles of rio lasting several days.66 Gunfire

and sniping were also repo more frequently during the middle cycles.07
The Control Effort
What type of community response is most effective once disorder erupts is clearly a

critically important question. Chap-, ter 12, "Control of Disorder," and the Supplement on

Control of Disorder to this report consider this question at length We consider in this

section the variety of control responses, official and unofficial, which were utilized in

the 24 surveyed disorders, including:
•    Use or threatened use of local official force;
•    Use or threatened use of supplemental official force from other jurisdictions;
•    Negotiations between officials and representatives from the Negro community;
•    On-the-street persuasion by "counter-rioters."
Disorders are sometimes discussed as if they consisted of succession of confrontations and

withdrawals by two cohesiv groups, the police or other control force on one side and

riotous mob on the other. Often it is assumed that there IN: no effort within the Negro

community to reduce the violence. Sometimes the only remedy prescribed is mobilization of

the largest possible police or control force, as early as possible.
None of these views are accurate. We found that:
•    A variety of different control forces employed a variety of tactics, often at the

same time, and often in a confused situation;
•    Substantial non-force control efforts, such as negotiations and on-the-street

persuasion by "counter-rioters," were usually under way, often simultaneously with forcible

control efforts; counter-
124
rioter activity often was carried on by Negro residents of the disturbance area, sometimes

with and often without official recognition;
•    No single tactic appeared to be effective in containing or reducing
violence in all situations.
LOCAL OFFICIAL FORCE
In 20 of the 24 disorders, the primary effort to restore order at the beginning of violence

was made entirely by local police.68 In 10 cases no additional outside force was called for

after the initial response." In only a few cases was the initial control force faced with

crowds too large to control."
The police approach to the initial outbreak of disorder in the surveyed cities was

generally cautious." Three types of response were employed. One was dispersal (clearing the

area, either by arrests or by scattering crowds), used in 10 cases." Another was

reconnaissance (observing and evaluating developments), used in eight cases." In half of

these instances, they soon withdrew from the disturbance area, generally because they

believed they were unable to cope with the disorder." The third was containment (preventing

movement in or out of a cordoned or barricaded area), used in six -cases."
No uniform result from utilization of any of the three control approaches is apparent. In

at least half of the 24 cases it can reasonably be said that the approach taken by the

police did not prevent the continuation of violence." To the extent that their

effectiveness is measurable, the conclusion appears to hold for subsequent police control

responses as well." There is also evidence, in some instances, of over-response in

subsequent cycles of violence.78
The various tactical responses we have described are not
•    mutually exclusive, and in many instances combinations were employed. The most

common were attempts at dispersal in the disturbance area and a simultaneous cordon or

barricade at the routes leading from the disturbance area to the central ,commercial area

of the city, either to contain the disturbance or to prevent persons outside the area from

entering it, or .both.72
In 11 disorders a curfew was imposed at some time, either as the major dispersal technique

or in combination with other techniques."
In only four disorders was tear gas used at any point as a dispersal technique.8'
Only Newark and New Haven used a combination of all three means of control, cordon, curfew

and tear gas."
125
SUPPLEMENTAL OFFICIAL FORCE
The addition of outside force from other jurisdictions w. also not invariably successful.
In nine disturbances--involving a wide variation in the intensity of violence—additional

control forces were brought in after there had been serious violence which local police had

been unable to handle alone." In every case furthet, violence occurred, often more than

once and often of equ or greater intensity than before."
The result was the same where extra forces were mobil' - prior to serious violence. In four

cities where this was done, violence nonetheless occurred, in most cas-s more than once,

and often of equal or greater intensity than in the original o break.87
In the remaining group of seven cities no outside contr forces were called,88 because the

level and duration of violen• were lower. Outbreaks in these cities nevertheless followed

the same random pattern as in the cities which did use outsi. forces.89
NEGOTIATION
In 21 of the 24 disturbances surveyed, discussion or negq. tiation occurred during the

disturbances. These took the fo of relatively formal m etings between government officials

an Negroes during which grievances and issues were discussed and means were sought to

restore order."
Such meetiruss %Akre usually held either immediately befOre or soon after the outbreak of

violence.91 Meetings often con-tinued beyond the first or second day of the disorder and,

in a few instances, through the entire period of the disorder.92
The Negro participants in these meetings usually were es-tablished leaders in the Negro

community, such as city court-cilmen or membs rs of human relations corrunissions,

ministers, or officers of civil rights or other community organizations." However, Negro

youths were participants in over one-third of these meetings." In a few disorders both the

youths and the adult Negro leaders participated," sometimes without the participation of

local officials."
Employees of community action agencies occasionally par-ticipated, either as intermediaries

or as participants. In some cases they provided the meeting place.97
Discussions usually included issues generated by the t's, order itself, such as the

treatment of arrestees by the police." In 12 cases, prior ghetto grievances, such as

unemploymen
126 and inadequate recreational facilities, were included as sub-jects.99 Often both

disorder-related and prior grievances were discussed"" with the focus generally shifting

from the former ,to the latter as the disorder continued.
How effec ive these meetings were is, as in the case of forci-ble response, impossible to

gauge. Again, much depends on who participated, timing, and what other responses were being

made at the same time.
COUNTER-RIOTERS
In all but six of the 24 disorders, Negro private citizens were active on the streets

attempting to restore order primarily by means of p( rsuasion.101 In a Detroit survey of

riot area resi-dents over the age of 15, some 14 percent stated that they had been active

as counter-rioters.'"
Counter-riot -rs sometimes had some form of official recog-'nition from either the mayor or

a human relations counci1.198 Police reaction in these cases varied from total opposition

to close cooperation.1" In most such cases some degree of offi-cial authorization was given

before the activity of the counter-rioters be gan,1" and in a smaller number of cases,

their ac-tivity was not explicitly authorized but merely condoned by the authorities.'"
Distinctive insignia were wom by the officially recognized counter-rioters in at least a

few cities.197 In Dayton and Tam-pa, the white helmets issued to the counter-rioters have

made the name "White Hats" synonymous with counter-rioters.
Public attention has centered on the officially-recognized counter-rioters. However,

counter-rioters are known to have acted independently, without official recognition, in a

number of cities.'"
Counter-rioters generally included young men, ministers, community action agency and other

anti-poverty workers and well-known ghetto residents.'"
Their usual technique was to walk through the disturbance ?area urging people to "cool it,"

although they often took other positive action as well, such as distributing food.1"
How effective the counter-rioters were is, again, rlifficult ,to estimate. Authorities in

several cities indicated that they believed they were helpful.