We seemed to have learned little or nothing from the fact that we had no problems with drugs until we quite literally talked ourselves into having one: We declared first this, then that drug "bad" and "dangerous"; gave them nasty names like "dope" and "narcotic"; and passed laws prohibiting their use. The result: our present "problems of drug abuse and drug addiction."
—Thomas Szasz, Ceremonial Chemistry (1974)

It is a sad fact that, in 1996, one of the two major parties chose to whip up hysteria about marijuana use as an election-year tactic. Both Republicans and Democrats need to be reminded that in another time and place medical science met hysteria, in an apolitical atmosphere, and medical science prevailed.

During the Progressive Era, the Panama Canal offered tangible proof of what scientific rationalism and the United States government could achieve. It was a spectacular monument to the engineer's art and the same type of men who built it also ruled over the zone extending out five miles from either bank.

One task that the American leaders in the Zone took upon themselves, consisted of a study of marijuana use by soldiers in their charge. These engineers and physicians went about the job in the only way they knew how, in a manner totally consistent with the ideals of science. They designed investigations, collected data and drew conclusions. These were conclusions completely at odds with most of the period's literature on the topic. These were conclusions based on actual observation and empirical evidence. These were conclusions that did not fit what would eventually become the United States government's official position on the subject. This paper will address three specific aspects of the Canal Zone studies: the setting in which they took place, their findings and their significance in later debate over marijuana prohibition.

A 1928 guidebook for tourists called the Panama Canal Zone "the best governed section of the United States if not the world."1 One resident, in an article entitled "Here is Utopia" which compared living in the Zone with living up north, remarked that "their life is no more like the harassed life of their fellow citizens in the states than milk is like beer."2 One official likened it to "a school for citizenship" and called the Zone "a place where individualistic Americans could learn community thinking."3 Journalist Willis Abbot asserted the Zone provided "an education in collectivism."4 Some early visitors to the enclave saw a remarkable similarity to the society described by the late 191 century radical reformer Edward Bellamy, in his book Looking Backward. Essentially, the Zone developed an almost "civic religion" putting ships through the canal and all activities related to it. This dogma called upon the engineers to produce a twofold accomplishment; the canal itself and an American community on its sides.5

In order to achieve the rational, efficient society deemed necessary for the greater goal of swift and secure passage, two things were required: knowledge and control. New theories of scientific management offered a strategy for combining both of these elements. Engineer Frederick W. Taylor first systematized this mode of bureaucratic thought with a philosophical rationale based on pragmatism. In discussing this doctrine, historian Robert Wiebe contends that "by treating truth as a process instead of an essence, and knowledge as the continual testing of hypothesis against life's facts instead of incucation of fixed truths, it seemed to offer just the fluidity required by the new orientation."6 The influence of this fundamental principle can be seen throughout the handling of the marijuana question in the Zone.

The United States achieved the control necessary to apply the above technique when Panama signed the Bunau-Varilla treaty. The document gave America, in perpetuity, the use, occupation and control of an area five miles wide on either side of the canal. Upon ratification, the United States government purchased all private property within the Zone. The Panama Canal Company, in addition to being the sole civilian employer, owned all businesses and all homes located in the American jurisdiction.7

Washington appointed a governor who also served as corporation head and president of the Panama Railroad Company. Officers from the Corps of Engineers occupied this post. Army men considered the Zone governorship, along with command in Washington D.C., as the department's two prize positions. Upon stepping down, after four years as governor, Brigadier General Meriwether L. Walker remarked that the waterway still functioned perfectly after fifteen years and that the original plan of administration remained largely unchanged. The Zone, he declared, "is one of the most wonderful organizations I have ever known."8 The man following Walker, Colonel Harry Burgess, had been honor man at West Point and received the traditional posting to the engineering unit. The New York Times pointed out that commensurate responsibilities would earn substantial compensation in the private sphere and editorialized that his 1928 assignment as governor "brings into the news again another of those too infrequent reminders of the high calibre of this particular branch of public service."9 When, four years later, Lieutenant Colonel Julian L. Schley succeeded Burgess the same paper wrote that "His appointment by President Hoover follows a precedent that gives the operation of the canal a continuity of plan and policy that probably exists in no other branch of the government of the United States, and has been one of the secrets of the unusual success of the operation of the canal for 18 years."10 Each of the above men had served at least three years as Engineer of Maintenance immediately prior to becoming governor. President Taft would liken the governor to a man with his hand on the controls of a machine. In order to keep the machine free of bugs, the United States vested the governor with broad powers, including the unquestioned authority to deport.11

The governor extended his control by means of seven bureaus, Engineering, Marine, Supply, Transportation, Civil Affairs, Personnel and Health, whose chiefs reported directly to him. According to 19-year residents and educators, Herbert and Mary Knapp, two related goals preoccupied those in authority, to keep things quiet and to preserve an image as a proficient model community. The Knapps asserted that "The Zone's managers generally remained passive until someone's behavior became a public issue."12 As marijuana periodically became a question, leaders needed hard information as to whether the drug or its prohibition constituted a real threat to the Zone's image and ability to function.

The United States Military had previous experience with drug use as a potential menace. In August of 1918, the New York Times reported "a concerted effort by German agents to supply soldiers in army cantonments with drugs has been discovered."13 The government arrested two men and prices were said to be very low. Four months earlier, the paper had alleged the enemy murdered someone about to disclose a plot to smuggle large quantities of drugs into army training centers. Concurrent stories about nefarious men giving dope-laced candy to school children abounded. Anxiety about drug use did not end with the war. The New York Times, under the headline "Fear Outbreak by Men Needing Drugs," told about the 100,000 addicts in the city and maintained that, "included in the victims, are a remarkably high percentage of discharged soldiers and sailors."14

The exaggeration of peril evident in reporting a possible "outbreak" typified much of the era's discourse on drugs. Earlier literature had emphasized the exotic rather than imminent danger. Harper's Monthly in November 1883 described a visit to a New York City hemp house of "oriental magnificence," where adventure seekers changed into wondrous clothing and tasseled smoking caps. The many (the author estimated 600 ladies of good social standing) needed to be discreet when they entered. Despite the upscale patronage, the observer assured the reader that those who used resin of hemp would suffer a life of "exquisite torture" and so should beware.15 As the "new" drug, marijuana, received increased attention, warnings became more explicit. Apprehension about possible violent behavior and insanity predominated. In 1928, William Randolph Hearst employee Winifred Black, in her book Dope, the Story of the Living Dead, revealed to a sensation hungry public that "the man under the influence of Hasheesh catches up his knife and runs through the streets hacking and killing everyone he meets."16 She went on to assert that "You can grow enough Marihuana in a window box to drive the whole population of the United States stark, staring, raving mad."17

Most information generated from governmental sources, at least until the mid-1930s, stood in sharp contrast to Black's assertions. Britain's 3,281- page Indian Hemp Drugs Commission report of 1894, contended that "Viewing the subject generally, it may be added that the moderate use of these drugs is the rule, and that excessive use is comparatively exceptional. The moderate use produces practically no ill effects."18 At January 1911 hearings of the House Ways and Means Committee concerning a federal narcotics act, a representative of the National Wholesale Druggist Association strenuously protested the inclusion of cannabis in the discussion. At the same proceeding, Albert Plaut, of the New York pharmaceutical firm Lehn and Fink, spoke of the drug and "attributed its reputation more to literary fiction, such as the description of hashish in the Count of Monte Cristo, than to informed opinion.19 Such arguments kept cannabis off the list of drugs outlawed by the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914. Even the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics took somewhat moderate tones. Their annual report for the year 1931 commented on the interest generated by newspaper articles concerning marijuana and it contended that "This publicity tends to magnify the extent of the evil and lends color to an influence that there is an alarming spread of the improper use of the drug, whereas the actual increase in such use may not have been inordinately large."20 The next year, in a section on the Canal Zone, the summary maintained that "the use of Indian Hemp is not a problem of the population of this'area except to a very small extent in military personnel."21 They repeated this message in the following year's report. As late as 1930, 32 states and the federal government had no laws against the use of marijuana.

The task of sorting out the conflicting information on cannabis use and of providing the hard data necessary for policy decisions fell largely to the Canal Zone's medical department. The drug had a history of medicinal employment dating back to China 5,000 years ago. Writing in 1891, noted drug use authority Dr. J. B. Mattison stated that he believed cannabis to be "a drug that has a special value in some morbid conditions and that the intrinsic merit and safety of which entitles it to a place it once held in therapeutics."22 The doctor's attempt to halt a growing decline in the drug's application, failed as younger physicians turned increasingly to morphine. The authors of a 1933 Military Surgeon feature followed this trend when they suggested that marijuana could be unstable and unreliable when compared to other compounds. However they also included quotations from the United States Dispensating Epitome of US. Pharacopeiea and The National Formulary. The Canal Zone medical department considered cannabis a legitimate medicine, just not an especially useful one.23

The organization's first head, Dr. William Crawford Gorgas, had played a decisive role in virtually eradicating Yellow Fever on the isthmus. The Knapps maintain that he "helped forge a new belief system based on the infallibility of the scientific expert and on the beneficial effects of social compulsion under his direction."24 In 1928, The Gorgas Memorial Institute of Tropical Research and Preventative Medicine began operating in Panama. The institute's board designated member, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph F. Siler, "a sanitarian of international reputation," to select the staff.25

On January 4, 1929, the Secretary of War appointed Siler chief health officer of the Panama Canal Zone. Siler had spent three years as chairman of the Army Medical Research Board in the Philippines, where he co-wrote a definitive text on Dengue Fever. He also held the position of president of the American Society for the Study of Tropical Medicine. When Siler left Panama five years later, he went on to become Director of the Laboratories at the Army Medical Center in Washington.26

While he served in the Zone, Siler oversaw a department also charged with the compilation of vital statistics. In 1932, it employed 1,126 people, including 63 doctors, and had a budget of $1,702,218.98. In November of the following year, the medical journal Military Surgeon published the report on marijuana use by soldiers stationed in the Canal Zone; the lead author was Dr. Joseph F. Siler.27

Army-enlisted personnel comprised the principal object of study. They occupied the lowest level in white society. Despite its utopian pretensions, the Canal Zone was a de facto segregated community. In 1904, the only employer set up a system with two payrolls, gold for almost entirely white American citizens and silver for foreign workers, primarily black West Indians. Gold workers enjoyed not only significantly higher rates of pay, but also benefited from furnished housing, superior exclusive schools, sick leave and paid home leave. Those on the silver list were denied these perks, along with access to many public facilities. Soldiers and non-commissioned officers, not being employees of the Canal Commission, were also barred from anything maintained for the comfort of the civilians. A private's monthly pay equaled less than that of the lowest paid unskilled worker. Additionally, the Army required them to wear their uniform when in town, thereby making them easy targets for hostile Panamanian police. At a Coco Grove brothel in 1912, the constabulary shot and killed three unarmed marines.28

Soldiers also had to contend with the less dangerous Zone police and with alcohol prohibition. Historian Michael L. Conniff relates that "From all accounts the Canal Zone police system was intimidating and effectively kept the Zone peaceful."29 Because Panama had no laws against drink, government efforts to enforce American Prohibition had a somewhat futile quality. The attempt did, however, contain a heated dispute between the Zone's district attorney and circuit court judge over the application of the Volstead Act, which resulted in a presidential dismissal of the lawyer and a senate investigation of the judge. Those arrested for violations included the Panamanian judge of the First Circuit of Colon and the Panamanian Consul General at Kingstonjamaica. An Irish seaman, who could not bring himself to break his whiskey bottle, went to jail instead.30

For those few who could not obtain spirits, marijuana from the Chiva-Chiva trail farmers might be purchased. These peasants lived on the Pacific side of the canal and engaged in small-scale hemp cultivation for their own needs. They sold any surplus to soldiers.31

The practice first came to the attention of authorities in 1916. The chief of police heard about soldiers of the Puerto Rican unit smoking "weed," but upon "investigation officers of the regiment stated that they knew nothing of this and expressed surprise when the subject was brought up."32 An article in Military Surgeon stated that "As far as can be ascertained marijuana was not used for smoking by the personnel engaged in construction of the Panama Canal, and police records do not show any cases of marijuana intoxication during that time.33 After 1916, it took six years before the issue surfaced again.

On May 26, 1922, the Provost Marshal at Quarry Heights questioned the Board of Health Laboratory about marijuana. Several months later the chief of police also inquired as to whether or not the substance was a narcotic drug. Period correspondence showed a perceived increase in use and in cases of delinquency being attributed to marijuana. Headquarters Panama Canal Department issued circular number five which prohibited the possession of cannabis on January 20, 1923.34

A little more than two years later, the department commander wrote to the governor and suggested a conference of legal, medical, police and military authorities to review the marijuana situation. Governor Walker appointed Chief Health Officer Colonel Weston P. Chamberlain to head a committee composed of the district attorney, the chief of the Division of Civilian Affairs, the chief of Division of Police and Fire, the department judge advocate, the chief of the Board of Health Laboratory, the superintendent of Corozal Hospital for the Insane, and a representative from the Navy Medical Corps. Their investigation lasted from Afiril to December 1925. They held hearings where they invited post commanders to give their opinions on the subject. The members visited Fort Davis and the Corozal Hospital where they observed soldiers smoking. Lastly, two Canal Zone policemen and four physicians used the drug in the presence of the committee and rendered written reports as to its effect. The board found no evidence that marijuana was "habit forming" or that it had a deleterious effect on those using it. They recommended, "That no steps be taken by the Canal Zone authorities to prevent the sale or use of marijuana, and that no special legislation be asked for."35 On January 29, 1926, Walker rescinded circular number five. The Republic of Panama National Assembly repealed the law forbidding use of cannabis in December of 1928. Citing the 1925 study in a 1929 article, the New York Times reported that no act of violence was observed, no indication of insanity was seen, and no evidence for the drug being addictive was found. The piece further stated that "the influence of this drug when used for smoking is uncertain and appears to have been greatly exaggerated."36

Some Army officers disagreed with the findings of the board, and, in June 1928, the department commander directed an additional study of cannabis. The order commanded that all cases of suspected marijuana intoxication be sent to the surgeon for investigation, with the clinical results reported monthly to the department surgeon. The instruction admonished that "It should be understood that only concrete facts are desired. Opinions or hearsay evidence are not wanted.37 After a year-long inquiry the department surgeon concluded that "The reports of the 12 months indicate that the use of the drug is not widespread and that its effects upon military efficiency and upon discipline are not great. There appears to be no reason for reviving the penalties formerly exacted for possession and use of the drug."38 Nevertheless, the department commander issued a rule on December 1, 1930, prohibiting the use of marijuana and promising charges for each and every offense. Six months later he wrote the governor suggesting a reinvestigation for the express purpose of gathering evidence supporting further regulation.

On June 30, 1931, Governor Burgess designated the committee headed by Chief Medical Officer Colonel Siler. It consisted of three Health Department officials, two Army Medical Corps officers, and a naval doctor. They hospitalized 34 soldiers who were known users of marijuana where they were observed by a psychiatrist member of the board. The inquiry included a complete neuropsychiatric examination, clinical scrutiny of the individual after smoking the drug, and study of signs and symptom after its withdrawal. In addition, the panel collected statistical data on the extent of marijtrana smoking and the amount of delinquency caused by its use.39

Evidence gathered from eight post surgeons showed low rates of cannabis consumption. With the exceptions of Fort Clayton at 20 percent usage and Fort Davis at 5.4 percent, use ranged from 0.6 percent to 3.1 percent.

In a search of the judge advocate's records, the board found scant evidence of discipline problems. The files revealed that cannabis incidents were "negligible in number when compared with delinquencies resulting from the use of alcoholic drinks. "40 In the two year period ending June 30, 1932, only 51 incidents or 1.7 percent of all cases involved marijuana offenses. Of these a mere four or 0.09 percent could be classified as a charge of insubordination or violence. One man, who was also drunk, struck a military policeman. One soldier showed disrespect to a non-commissioned officer and another disobeyed orders. In the fourth case, the defendant broke arrest.41

The subjects studied directly seemed to be ordinary soldiers. Their characteristics broke down as follows:

None of the subjects exhibited psychotic symptoms but 62 percent were classified constitutional psychopaths and 23 percent were considered morons. It must be remembered that, at the time, these words had much more expansive definitions than they do now. For example, controversial data collected by the Public Health Service in 1913 had classified over 75 percent of immigrants from four major groups as morons.42 The board concluded that "The evidence obtained suggests that organization commanders in estimating the efficiency and soldierly qualities of delinquents in their command have unduly emphasized the effects of marijuana disregarding that a large proportion of the delinquents are morons and psychopaths, which conditions of themselves would serve to account for delinquency."43

The rather mundane common effects experienced by the soldiers included mild intoxication, increased appetite, and induction of sleep after one or two hours. In the intoxication stage, which the men called being brushed-up, high, happy, peppy, rosy, dopy or satisfied, tests measuring mental ability and neurological functioning were performed equally as well as previously. The committee observed no ill effects from continuous smoking for several days and also no deprivation syndrome. Only 15 percent of the subjects stated that they missed marijuana when they could not have it and 71 percent said they preferred tobacco. Finally the board suggested that present regulations prohibiting use on military installations be retained but that "with the evidence obtained and considered by the committee no recommendations for further legislative action to prevent the sale or use of marijuana in the Canal Zone, Panama, are deemed advisable under existing conditions."44

The results of this inquiry were kept confidential until their publication in November of 1933. In a short piece immediately following the report, Military Surgeon's editor told of his intention to publish only the proceedings of the organization's annual meeting in that issue. However he felt special conditions made publication necessary "so that an authoritative statement may relieve the public curiosity and the pressure upon the authorities in the Canal Zone by the press for information on the subject."45

During 1933 lurid stories about marijuana began to appear more frequently. In May of the former year, in a tale about a 17-year-old-knifewielder on a train, The Panama American noted "a murderous desire to see red blood flow — inspired by some narcotic or by a sadistic instinct."46 Two days later the paper reported allegations by local physicians that insanity caused by marijuana use had sharply increased. They claimed that 21 such cases arrived at the Corozal Asylum in the last 21 days. The following day, on the front page, Zone officials ardently disputed the previous story and asserted that no evidence that marijuana caused insanity had ever been found at the hospital. The authorities pointed out that while most civilized countries had an insanity rate of 2.5 per 1,000, Panama's rate equaled 1 per 1,000. Such information did not stop the paper's columnist, Persiflage, from later that month, offering a five-part narrative on the "devilish herb," which began with a now almost mandatory yarn of middle eastern assassins. In September, Ignacio Noli, Night Judge of Police Court, Panama City called on the National Assembly to pass laws prohibiting the use of the drug. He asserted that, when young boys use the "weed," they become ruthless and commit pranks. Noli further stated that "It is a fact that many persons are in the local asylum because of using marijuana."47 Within a week the newspaper printed an article with the headline, "Boy killer is addict of devil weed." In the body of the piece the reader learned that the murderer executed his girlfriend because she had threatened to leave him and that he denied being under the influence of cannabis when the deed was done.'48

Interestingly, the Spanish-language edition of the paper ran a story that concentrated solely on the relationship between killer and victim. That article did not use the word marijuana. On September 28 this edition published an analytic account headlined "Inofensiva la marihuana al organismo," which cited the Army's 1928 studies extensively. No corresponding article appeared in the paper's English version.49

Possible explanations for the contrast in coverage enter the heart of historiographical debate on the subject of marijuana prohibition. The origin of federal legislation against marijuana in 1937, along with discussion of widespread contention over use in the late 1960s and early 1970s, constitute the two basic issues. The "Mexican thesis" as supported by such scholars as John Helmer and Dr. David Musto can be tested by events in Panama,. This theory uses the work of Sociologist Joseph Gus-field as a framework to explain 1930s marijuana prohibition in terms of status politics. In The American Disease, Musto maintains that "In areas with concentrations of Mexican immigrants, who tended to use marihuana as a drug of entertainment or relaxation, the fear of marihuana was intense."50 Therefore, laws against cannabis originated from popular sentiment and their purpose was to subordinate a minority culture.'51

On the surface the discrepancies between English and Spanish editions of The Panama American would seem to support the above argument, another ethnic attack. However, the situations of the United States and Panama differed a great deal. First, the Panamanians were the overwhelming majority in the country. Second, the strongest attacks against marijuana had Panamanian sources. A much more likely target, for the type of attention described by Gusfield, existed in the large number of West Indian canal workers.

As the Depression wore on and the number of jobs on the waterway remained in short supply, feelings against excess West Indian workers increased. Historian Michael Conniff argues that "The year 1933 brought some employment gains but also the worst agitation against West Indians yet experienced."52 In May, publisher of The Panama American, Nelson Rounsevell, in his column "Rambling, Gambling and Publishing," called for the "Repatriation of every unemployed foreigner in the Republic who cannot show legitimate means of livelihood and lawful ability to provide for himself and family."53 Occupations he suggested that belonged mostly to foreigners included pimps, prostitutes, gamblers, burglars, pick-pockets, confidence men and dope peddlers. He asserted that "West Indians have no one to blame but themselves."54 Yet, in 1933, despite references to selling dope, there seems to be little evidence of an explicit attempt to link West Indians to the marijuana trade or its use.

The combination of Island people, cannabis, and intense conflict would not occur until the following year, 11 months after the publication of the Canal Zone studies. In October 1934, a 17-year-old boy died when police raided a Colon beach where West Indians were said to be smoking marijuana. This in turn precipitated a riot. By then stories about the drug, in American newspapers, had told of the "poisonous weed" and its devastating effect on mind and body. Tales of dope rings specializing in this "highly intoxicating" material surfaced.55

The origins of such rhetoric and its contrast to the Zone data touch upon an alternate historiographical proposition concerning marijuana prohibition. The earliest proponent of this thesis, deviance student Howard Becker, contended that outlawing of marijuana became the result of a deliberate campaign by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. He wrote that "The enterprise of the bureau had produced a new rule, whose subsequent enforcement would help create a new class of outsiders — marihuana users."'56 As evidence Becker cited The Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, which showed a notable upsurge in articles unfavorable to cannabis immediately before the enactment of the federal statute. This literature was almost wholly produced or heavily influenced by people in government, especially Federal Bureau of Narcotics head Harry Anslinger. Other authors, Dr. Alfred Lindesmith, Dr. Lester Grinspoon and David Solomon, largely concurred with Becker's notion. However, critics of the theory maintain that it does not do much to explain motivation.57

In additional criticism, Sociologist Jerome Himmelstein, asserts that the Readers Guide data really point to a profound lack of public interest in the question. However, a bibliography of Anslinger's writings during the period reveals many platforms not listed in the guide. These included among others: Elks Magazine, Indiana Police Chief, National Parent Teacher, Kiwanis Magazine, Pennsylvania's Health, Federal Bureau of Investigation Bulletin, American Journal of Surgery, Pacific Coast International, Medical Economics, Inc. Magazine, Florida Peace Officers Magazine and The Wisconsin Medical Journal. Also, the strikingly heterogeneous nature of Anslinger's audience would indicate increased importance for his views. The limited discussion that took place had a high probability of being dominated by the bureau's official line. Therefore, its chief controlled the entrance of the Canal Zone studies into debate.'58

It is certain that Harry Anslinger knew about the Army's investigations, as the board sent him a copy of the final report dated October 21, 1932. Eight months later, he in turn sent copies to Ernest L. Ives of the State Department and to Dr. Walter L. Treadway, Assistant Surgeon General, United States Public Health Service. A memo, found in Anslinger's papers, containing a synopsis of the release, featured the following in a different larger typeface: "It is evident that the Panama Board did not have the proper evidence at its disposal when it reached its conclusion."59

Beginning in 1934 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics began to push state legislatures to adopt a Uniform Narcotics Drug Act, which reclassified cannabis and criminalized its use. Needless to say, the Canal Zone studies found no place in official pronouncements on marijuana. Conspicuously absent from congressional hearings prior to federal prohibition was Dr. Treadway, by then head of the of the Public Health Service, an organization that had employed some of the doctors who took part in the Panama investigations. Himmelstein contends that such treatment fit a pattern. Sources that downplayed the damages of cannabis such as the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission report, the Canal Zone studies, and the work of Dr. Walter Bromberg, all found meager mention during the period, and all taken together constituted the most systematic work done on the subject.'60

At least two individuals did take notice of the work done in Panama. In a 1943 issue of Military Surgeon, Colonel James A. Phalen described the Canal Zone examinations and he editorialized that "It is further considered that legislation in relation to marihuana was ill-advised, that it branded as a menace and a crime a matter of trivial importance."61 He went on to hope that no "witch hunt" would commence over a problem that did not exist. Perhaps, as yet the most important receiver of Canal Zone wisdom can be found in the person of Fiorello La Guardia. As mayor of New York he instituted a committee to study, among other things, the relationship between violence and marijuana use. The findings of this body, that there was no relationship, critically changed the future debate over cannabis use and substantially put to rest the myth of the marijuana crazed killer. As a young congressman La Guardia heard testimony on the Canal Zone studies. In the foreword to his commission's report the mayor cited those investigations as the origin of his interest in marijuana.62

The history of marijuana prohibition in the 1930s incorporates the triumph of the political over the scientific, the anecdotal over the empirical and the repressive over the tolerant. In Panama, solid data produced by highly creditable men came into being in a unique setting. As one Zonian in 1933 put it "There is no politics and no need for any."' Herein lies a possible explanation for the momentary ascendancy of fact over other considerations. This did not last long and, in the end, the evidence was ignored and proscription enacted.

Keith Halderman is one of the first place winners ofDPF's Student Paper Competition.
He is a graduate student at American University, in the School of Public Affairs.

REFERENCES

1. Knapp, Herbert and Mary Knapp. Red, White and Blue Paradise: The American Canal Zone in Panama. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich Publishers. 1984, 85.
2. The Panama American, 22 July 1933. 15:2.
3. Knapp and Knapp, 4.
4. Ibid. 31.
5. Ibid. 4, 93.
6. Wiebe, Robert H. The Search for Order: 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 151.
7. Knapp and Knapp, 11, 76.
8. New York Times, 3 September 1928, 12:8.
9. Ibid. 17 September 1928, 22:5.
10. Ibid. 6 November 1932, II 8:1.
11. Knapp and Knapp, 82, 86.
12. Ibid. 82.
13. New York Times, 20 August 1918, 4:4.
14. Ibid, 10 April 1919, 1:2; King, Rufus. The Drug Hang-Up: America's Fifty Year Folly. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher. 1972, 26.
15. Kane, H.H. "A Hashish House in New York", Harper's Monthly 67, November 1883, 944-949, In Morgan H. Wayne ed. Yesterdays Addicts: American Society and Drug Abuse 1865-1920. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974, 160-169.
16. Black, Winifred. Dope, the Story of the Living Dead. New York: The Star Company, 1928, 42.
17. Ibid.
18. Arnold S. Trebach, "Ignoring the Great Commission Reports." In Trebach and Zeese eds., Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations. Washington D.C.: The Drug Policy Foundation, 1990, 34.
19. Musto, David F. The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, 217.
20. U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics. Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs Report by the Government of the United States of America For the Year Ending December 31, 1931. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932, 51.
21. Ibid. year ending December 31, 1932, 71.
22. Mattison, J.B. "Cannabis indica as an Anodyne and Hypnotic." St. Louis Medical Surgical Journal 61 (1891): 266, in Grinspoon and Bakalar. Marihuana, The Forbidden Medicine. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, 6.
23. Ibid, 6,6; Siler, Joseph F., W.L. Sheep, L.B. Bates, G.F. Clark, G.W. Cook, W.A. Smith, "Marihuana Smoking in Panama," Military Surgeon. Journal of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States. 73, November 1933, 272.
24. Knapp and Knapp, 22.
25. The New York Times, 27 August 1928, 10:1, 16 June 1929, 6:8.
26. Ibid, 5 January 1929 11:3, 1 July 1934, 25:7; Siler, Joseph F., Milton W. Hall, and A. Parker Hitchens. Dengue: Its History, Epidemiology, Mechanism of Transmission, Etiology, Clinical Manifestations, Immunity and Prevention. Manilla: Bureau of Printing, 1926).
27. Siler, Joseph F., Colonel Medical Corps United States Army, Chief Health Officer. Report of the Health Department of the Panama Canal for the Calendar Year1932. Mount Hope, Canal Zone: The Panama Canal Press, 1933, 5, 7, 9.
28. Conniff, Michael L. Black Labor on a White Canal: Panama 1904-1981. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, 32-33; McCullough, David. The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977, 568.
29. Conniff, 36.
30. New York Times, 15 March 1928, 13:6; 29 March, 22:8; 21 May 1929, 56:3; 27 July 1929, 2:7; 20 August 1929, 16:2.
31. Siler, et al. Military Surgeon. 271.
32. Ibid, 273.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. 274.
36. New York Times, 9 September 1929, 10:4.
37. Siler, et al. Military Surgeon, 275.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid, 269, 276.
40. Ibid, 279.
41. Ibid, 277, 279.
42. Kraut, Alan. Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes and the Imminent Menace. New York: Basic Books, 1994, 74.
43. Siler et al. Military Surgeon, 277, 279.
44. Ibid. 277, 278, 280.
45. Ibid. 281.
46. The Panama American, 16 May 1933, 1:6.
47. Ibid. 21 September 1933, 6:5.
48. Ibid. 18 May 1933, 6:5; 19 May 1933, 1:7; 26 September 1933, 1:3.
49. Ibid. 26 September 1933, 1:3; 28 September 1933, 5:6.
50. Musto, 219.
51. Himmelstein, Jerome L. The Strange Career of Marihuana: Politics and Ideology of Drug Control in America. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983, 20, 24.
52. Conniff, 83.
53. The Panama American, 20 May 1933, 7:5.
54. Ibid.
55. New York Times, 3 December 1933, IV 6:5; 16 September 1934, IV 6:3; 6 October 1934, 4:8.
56. Becker, Howard S. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: The Free Press, 1963, 145.
57. Ibid, 141; Himmelstein, 26.
58. Ibid 38; Harry J. Anslinger Collection, Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn State University, Box 8, File 4.
59. Ibid, Box 9, File 17, File 9
60. Himmelstein, 29, 70; Musto, 225.
61. James A. Phalen, "The Marihuana Bugaboo." The Military Surgeon. 93, July 1943, 95.
62. The Marihuana Problem in the City of New York. Report of Mayor La Guardia's Committee on Marihuana, In Soloman, David, ed. The Marihuana Papers. New York: Signet Books, 1966, 280.
63. The Panama American, 23 July 1933, 15:2.