Since the mid-1980s the basic philosophy of policing has changed drastically with the advent of the war on drugs. The police, with increased authority, have become paramilitary arms of federal, state and local government, violating civil liberties on a large scale and physically brutalizing citizens, all in the name of ridding this country of illicit drugs. This new role of the officer embodies the fact that the problem of illegal drug abuse is thought by many law enforcement and government personnel to be a crime problem to be handled, controlled and eradicated solely by law enforcement efforts. As a result of this philosophy, the number of arrests has risen at an unprecedented rate, our prison system is overcrowded and our courts are backlogged with pending cases. This has all been achieved at the expense of the families of those officers and undercover agents who have lost their lives in the name of the drug war.1

By continuing this trend of mass arrests and interdiction, law enforcement personnel could easily create a problem even worse than already exists. By interfering with the supply-and-demand cycle, prices of illicit drugs shoot straight up thus causing drug users to commit more serious and violent crimes to support their habit. Thus, there is a dilemma in law enforcement: the more successful law enforcement is, the more they fail and the more the public suffers as a consequence.2

Thus it becomes obvious that seeking a solution to the drug problem entirely from law enforcement will never succeed. This is true not only because no matter what the United States does as a country we will always have a drug problem (alcohol included), but because law enforcement as it stands right now does not have the qualities or capabilities to deal with the many underlying social problems that lay at the root of much criminal activity.

We can no longer subscribe to the philosophy that law enforcement is the primary solution to drug abuse. We must encourage the institutions of society such as the family, churches and the field of medicine and education to help in reducing the demand for drugs.3

Problem-Oriented Policing and the War on Drugs

The war on drugs has created a major image problem for the police. They are caught in a catch-22 position. As violence on the streets escalates police become more apprehensive to walk the beat for fear of being caught in the crossfire. As one officer of the Houston Police states, "Its hard to walk up to a drug dealer who's carrying an Uzi and say, 'Howdy neighbor, I'm Officer Friendly'."4 Although this may be an extreme view, the only way society can increase its effectiveness in deterring crime is to regain its respect for the police and this can only be achieved by putting police back on the street to mingle with the citizens of their communities and develop mutual bonds of trust.

Problem-oriented policing does just this by setting out to bring together the police, the community and social agencies to help get at the root causes of criminal behavior to eliminate it and deter future crime. Simply defined, problem-oriented policing is a method of working with citizens to help them identify and solve problems in their community.5 Such problems include sexual assault, drunk driving, auto theft, spouse abuse, burglary and drug abuse. Inherent in the philosophy of problem-oriented policing is the idea of crime prevention. This, as opposed to "law enforcement" is the primary responsibility of the police.6 The function of the police should be to assist the people to exercise social control.7

The Ineffectiveness of Current Narcotics Enforcement Strategies

Unfortunately, today's philosophy dictated by the Federal government lacks this understanding of social control. In the tradition of the Office of Nation al Drug Control Policy budgeting scheme, once again in 1992, it has allotted another six percent increase in funding for more militaristic and ineffective law enforcement strategies which employ increased federal and military intervention to combat the drug problem here in the United States. Yet this stepped up approach creates results that are directly opposite to those desired and expected.

Increased Enforcement and its Relation to Violence

In deciding to increase levels of narcotics enforcement it is imperative that one understand the dynamics of the drug trade and its resulting levels of violence. Understanding such an issue is fundamental to developing an effective narcotics enforcement strategy.

The issue of violence on the streets is not one to be taken lightly. By ignoring the relationship between increased drug arrests and increased violence we would be, and have been to the present, jeopardizing the lives of law enforcement personnel by placing them in the crossfire. The sacrificing of law enforcement officers in the name of the war on drugs should not be viewed as an effective law-enforcement policy.

The Enforcement Dilemma

With the advent of the war on drugs we are now in the midst of what one former police chief and FBI agent calls "The Enforcement Dilemma."8 Citing the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, John McHale tells us that with the aid of combined police and military efforts in combatting drug interdiction and trafficking, less than five to 15 percent of the contraband is stopped before crossing our borders thus proving that government forces have had little or no impact.9 He states:

Narcotics now costing addicts hundreds of dollars could easily soar into the thousands if we seriously interfered with the supply-and-demand cycle, thereby driving these desperate users into committing even more robberies, burglaries, muggings, purse-snatchings, assaults, and murders than they do now.

The dilemma of law enforcement, therefore, is that the more successful we are, the more we fail and the more the public suffers as a consequence.10

Drug-related violence is largely a derivative of drug market instability. Recent research has shown that the greatest proportion of drug-related violence is the product of battles between drug traffickers over territorial and financial claims.11

In explaining this phenomenon we must understand basic economics and look at criminological theory and its explanation of Deterrence Theory. The supply curve for illicit drugs (that is, the relationship between price and the quantity of the product that dealers will be willing to offer) is determined largely by perceptions of risk.12 Dealers will be willing to incur various risks attendant on participation in the trade (incarceration, loss of assets, physical injury by other participants) in return for an appropriate level of earnings. 13 If those risks increase, some participants can be expected to drop out unless the expected earnings rise correspondingly. This increase in earnings is realized through higher prices, which in turn decreases consumption.14 It is exactly this cycle and especially the decrease in consumption which causes massive violence as dealers struggle to maintain their territory where the availability of consumers has consequently been reduced. The result is turf wars and deadly competition. Also, given that much drug-related violence is related to conflicts over market share, violence is likely to increase as these new dealers compete for control of territories left unserved and unprotected as a result of successful enforcement activity.15

Even former Drug Czar William Bennett admitted to the existence of this phenomenon in an article by the Associated Press on June 15, 1990. An excerpt from the article follows below:

A shortage of cocaine indicated by rising prices in some cities may trigger increased violence as "the same number of dogs" compete for "a smaller number of bones" National Drug Control Director William J. Bennett predicted. Although Bennett has long cited a need to get rid of drugs to cut down the violence connected to drug-trafficking in the cities, he said disruption of cocaine flow may have the opposite effect.16

Thus this cycle also embodies Deterrence theory in showing that the threat of punishment is simply a moot issue for many of those involved in illicit drug activity. Much of the cause of this reduction in deterrence can be attributed to the ineffectiveness of our criminal justice system where, ironically, increased enforcement has caused a back log of cases for the district attorneys and the courts and prisons alike. No longer does there exist swift and expedient punishment. We are now seeing the realization of the fact that as enforcement increases this consequently increases the earnings of drug dealers. This increase in earnings creates more violence and decreases levels of deterrence thus making increased enforcement ineffective.

Federal Intervention Creates More Problems Than it Solves

The key to success in any cooperative venture has always been the nature and quality of the working relationship with involved agencies acting as a joint responsibility.17Yet realistically this has not been the case. The incidences of miscommunication between federal, state and local agencies, which have resulted in the death of many officers in the most extreme cases, as well as total lack of communication, abound.

The example of the South Florida Task force is a good illustration of this point. In February of 1982, President Reagan designated Vice President Bush to supervise an unprecedented federal effort to stem the flow of drugs into South Florida. Included in this effort were agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and the Coast Guard. Although the effort proved successful in South Florida, the task force also succeeded in displacing the illegal activity throughout the Gulf Coast and as far North as Maine.18 Even Francis C. Hall, then Assistant Chief Inspector in command of the New York City Police Department's Narcotics Division, stated that "the millions of dollars spent on the South Florida Task Force had done nothing to reduce the flow of cocaine into New York City."19 It was later stated during hearings conducted by the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in 1985 that local officials blamed the lack of progress in halting the spread of narcotics on the lack of interaction between the locals and the federal representatives which had lead to a breakdown in com-munication.20 Chief of Police of West Palm Beach, John Jamason testified, "I have never spoken to anyone from the (federal) Task Force since its inception.. .All I know of the Task Force is what I read in the newspapers.21Not only was there a lack of communication but this led to confusion as to who was in charge: "...who's in charge. I don't even know who to contact, as a matter of fact to talk with them."22

Congressman Tom Lewis of Florida, during the same hearings in 1985 observed that the distrust between the federal and local law enforcement cornmunity is long standing, and institutionally based. He testified:

There seems to me to be a great margin of distrust whether it is because who is going to get the most press, or who is going to make sure the press is available or whether we have a real serious turf problem. Apparently, we have some sort of turf problem between Federal agencies; always have had. And now it appears that we have even a greater turf problem between the feds and local agencies.23

This lack of distrust and poor communication was not unique to just the South Florida Task Force. The Committee also conducted hearings in New York City; Redding, California; Corpus Christi, Texas and Honolulu, Hawaii. All areas expressed the same frustrations. It was clear from all the testimony that the local perception of cooperation between state/local and federal law enforcement personnel battling the narcotics problem was not satisfactory.24 State/local law enforcement officials admitted their need for additional cooperation, support and resources from the federal government if the interdiction and control strategies were to be successful. All testifying agencies agreed unanimously on four basic concerns: the lack of information exchange between state/local and federal officials; the lack of federal manpower support; the lack of federal dollars and equipment; and the lack of trust between local and federal agencies.

Not only did these concerns pertain to interagency cooperation but these were also intra-agency problems with poor communication among and within the federal agencies themselves consequently compounding the problem.25

An example of this intra-agency confusion was found during a investigation of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, created in 1983 designed to coordinate the work of all federal agencies involved in law enforcement and interdiction from six regional offices at border locations around the United States:

It was the view of the Select Committee that too many levels of bureaucracy existed in NNBIS; it lacked effective communication, coordination and cooperation with State and local agencies; and that serious questions remained over just who was in charge and was responsible for actions taken in coordination with the NNBIS.26

Because of the bureaucratic nature of law enforcement agencies themselves and in cooperation with others in the United States, this is a major obstacle. Although this obstacle may be overcome, most likely only with the nationalizing of the police, it is best to simplify the task of single agencies by sharing only the tools necessary to effectively combat illicit narcotics activity. With proper funding and training this can be accomplished by local agencies themselves thus encouraging more effective enforcement. Intensive federal involvement would cause more problems than it would solve.

Thus, with bureaucratic constraints leading to the seeming lack of distrust and poor communication along with the violence attributed to higher degrees of enforcement, it is essential that state and local governments, the private sector, and individual community members take responsibility for sustained social and economic improvements.27

In deciding upon the use of increased enforcement with the aid of the federal government, one must seriously look at these facts and decide whether jeopardizing the lives of officers is intended as part of a means to an end. Since 1972, more than 140 local, state, and federal officers have been slain attempting to enforce the drug laws.28 It must also be recognized that our present strategies, which include increased funding for such law enforcement tactics as the employment of the Military, SWAT teams, temporary crackdowns and stings, buy/bust operations and increased arrests of traffickers, all of which use similar militaristic strategies as those involved in illegal drug activity, are ineffective. These tactics which focus solely on the trafficker and dealer are actually counterproductive to our goals of decreased demand, consumption, trafficking, and violence. The word "reduced" is used here specifically because the goal of an absolutely drug-free society is unrealistic. That specific goal has created the type of law enforcement strategies which now exist and which only serve to perpetuate the problem. Therefore our new goal necessitates alternative strategies.

Problem-Oriented Policing as Effective Reform

Traditionally, policing took on the nature of being reactive or incident-driven. The police were a community's professional defense against crime and disorder and citizens felt that they should leave the control of crime and maintenance of order in the hands of the police.29 As a result, for the past 30 years the police have spent the bulk of their time responding to calls for service.30 Yet research shows that fewer than 10 percent of the addresses calling for police service generate over 60 percent of the total calls for service during a given year.31 Such statistics have brought on large scale frustration among those officers on patrol who see that they are constantly called to the same addresses dealing with the same problems which they fail or are unable to solve.

Recently there has been a drive to change from this premise of incident-driven policing to a more community oriented approach mainly stemming from the fact that there is widespread disenchantment with police services and tactics stemming from such declarations as the war on drugs. These tactics have insulated the police and virtually isolated them from community involvement.

One major problem stemming from this lack of community involvement has been that the officers are forced to depend on increasingly repressive methods of enforcement thatfurther alienate the people.32 Herman Goldstein, the innovator of the concept of Problem-Oriented Policing in America has stated:

Community Policing is a deterrent to the improper use of force because it strengthens officers' relationships with the community. The neighborhood support gives police a greater sense of confidence and authority which reduces their need for using force. If police officers feel they don't have the authority, the power, to handle a situation, they're more likely to resort to brute force.33

In the case of minority citizens, community crime control has become a mainstay of their sense of neighborhood security.34 Consequently they are calling for increased collaboration with police in the determination of police priorities in their neighborhoods.35

Another catalyst for change came in the late seventies with research done on police effectiveness including preventive patrol, response to calls for service and investigative work. As the results of this research were discouraging, a study was done in Newark, New Jersey designed to improve the quality of community life.36 The study called for taking officers out of the patrol car and placing them on foot patrol.

Initial reactions to the study were mixed. Although the governor and state officials were optimistic, police chiefs were skeptical. In their eyes, foot patrol reduced the mobility of the police, who thus had difficulty responding to citizen calls for service, and weakened headquarters control over patrol officers.37 Yet five years after the program began, the Police Foundation, in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. The results were encouraging showing that although there was no necessary reduction in crime, residents felt more secure and believed that crime had been reduced.38 Citizens took fewer steps to protect themselves and had a more favorable opinion of police. Officers walking the beat had higher morale, greater job satisfaction and a more favorable opinion towards citizens.39

Basic Principles of Problem-Oriented Policing

Often the terms community policing and problem-oriented policing are used interchangeably. Although the two concepts are very similar and often incorporate the same principles, community policing is often thought to be synonymous only with foot patrol or "walking the beat." Problem-Oriented policing goes beyond this idea. Simply stated the basic principles include: a new way of thinking, a greater concern for substantive community problems; addressed are those the community expects police to handle; using systematic inquiry and data-based decisions to identify the substantive matters to address; grouping individual police incidents so that they can be addressed more generically and effectively as problems rather than incidents; and searching for alternative responses to community problems that often go beyond the police agency and the criminal justice agency, and concentrates on preventive measures 40

Chief David Couper of the Madison, Wisc., police department, leader of one of the most effective problem-oriented policing programs in the United States, feels that there are three primary steps to be taken in order to achieve an effective level of problem-oriented policing.

The first step is the declaration of a vision: a clear understandable picture of the future. The department must make a statement to employees and the community of the direction in which it wants to go. This requires making an assessment of the needs of the employees and the community.41

The next step is to set a course to meet these needs, developing agreed-upon goals and a mission statement for the department. As an example, values guiding the mission statement of the Madison Police Department include:

A member of the department is honest, trustworthy and courageous, respects people and their diversity, obeys the law and defends the Bill of Rights, is physically and mentally fit, views citizens as customers, delivers quality service, is community oriented, works to identify and resolve community problems, is courteous and an active listener, is a leader and team player, demonstrates control in the use of force and continuously improves throughout his career.42

According to Couper, the power of effective problem-oriented policing comes from police organizations that are value-guided rather than rule-driven.

Lastly and most importantly is the idea of leadership. The quality of work life within the department must be improved before providing citizens with effective service.43 Managers cannot effectively lead employees who are not treated with respect and dignity and expect that they will in turn treat citizens with the same.44 Couper states that many departments demand centralization of decision making, uncompromising chain of command, thus producing closed organizations with little room for openness, creativity or feedback.

The end result is, as quality is defined by the customer, police leaders will know when they are practicing quality leadership when their employees tell them so. Similarly, leaders will know they are having an effect with problem-oriented policing when citizens tell them so.

The Professional Model as a Catalyst for Change

Goldstein believes that efforts to improve policing should focus on the end product of policing.45 Too often preoccupation with professionalizing departments placed a high value on police as apolitical resulting in centralized control, tight organization, pinpointed responsibility and strong discipline.46 Professionalism sought to achieve a higher level of operating efficiency by emphasizing standard operating procedures, fast responses and efficient use of time.47

As stated previously, this often isolated the officers from all accountability to the public. It also initiated research to inquire into the area of the role of the officer and into new directions of policing. Resulting from this research came a "common wisdom" on the police. This wisdom contains the following points:

1) The police do much more than deal with crime; they deal with many forms of behavior that are not defined as criminal.

2) The wide range of functions that police are expected to perform, including dealing with fear and enforcing public order, are appropriate functions for the police; from the perspective of the community, they may be as important as the tasks the police perform in dealing with behavior labeled criminal.

3) Too much dependence in the past has been placed on the criminal law in order to get the police job done; arrest and prosecution are simply not an effective way to handle much of what constitutes police business. And even if potentially effective, it may not be possible to use the criminal justice system in some jurisdictions because it is over-loaded.

4) Police use a wide range of methods-formal and informal- in getting their job done. "Law Enforcement" is only one method among many.

5) Police, of necessity, must exercise broad discretion, including discretion in deciding whether to arrest and prosecute in situations in which there is ample evidence that a criminal law has been violated.

6) The police are not autonomous; the sensitive function they perform in our society requires that they be accountable, through the political process, to the community.48

The professional model focused on a preoccupation with the running of an organization or department rather than with the impact of the organization on community problems. Non-substantive matters are more self-contained within the agency and police are therefore less dependent on outside forces for their success in dealing with them. This model perpetuates the imbalance between concern for operating efficiency and the concern for substance.49
Thus, to gain substance there was the need to engage the community. Areas of cities requiring the greatest amount of police attention are usually those in which there are no shared norms and little sense of community. Thus, under the philosophy of problem-oriented policing, police tend to engage the citizenry in a very pragmatic and relaxed manner.50 They use "community" deftly to describe those affected in any way by the specific problem. The police hold no expectation that they have identified a community with shared values.51 It is taken for granted at the onset that the people to whom one seeks to relate will vary a great deal, consequently, police urge inhabitants to look out for one another as the ultimate goal is to have a community which polices itself.

Yet when setting out to engage a community, a department must be careful that its focus is not too broad. Setting out in a general manner to engage total community only perpetuates the imbalance of means over ends. Involving the community as needed in dealing with specific problems is preferred.52 Officers can most productively achieve the cooperation of the community by (1) assigning officers to areas for long enough periods of time to enable them to identify the problems of concern to the community; (2) develop the capacity of both officers and the department to analyze community problems; (3) learn when greater community involvement has the potential for significantly reducing a problem; and (4) in such situations, work with those specific segments of the community that are in a position to assist in reducing or eliminating the problem.53

Basic Elements of Problem-Oriented Policing

As with today's style of policing, officers deal more with the most obvious, superficial manifestations of deeper problems and not with the problem itself. It follows that incidents are usually handled as isolated, self-contained events. Thus the first step in problem-oriented policing is moving beyond just handling incidents.54 This calls for recognizing that incidents are often merely overt symptoms of problems. This requires that officers recognize the relationships between incidents (similarities of behavior, location, persons involved, etc.) and it requires that they take a more in-depth interest in incidents by acquainting themselves with some of the conditions and factors that give rise to them.55 This relationship between incidents or recurring incidents are labeled as the substantive problems which constitute police work.

Once the problem is recognized an in-depth probe of all the characteristics of that problem and the factors that contribute to it must be conducted acquiring detailed information.56 This approach makes much more effective use of the data typically collected as part of crime analysis. It also requires focusing more broadly on all of the problems police handle rather than on just traditional categories of crime and requires trying to understand the nature of these problems as a basis for critical review of the agency's response, rather than limiting inquiries to narrower operational goals.57

In targeting problems police must be careful in choosing their priorities as choosing incorrectly could cause a backlash against neighborhood policing among the public and within the police department.58 They must identify competing social interests and rank them according to their relative importance resulting from value judgements made by the officers themselves. Ideally this decision will be made with the help of the community although this step is admittedly difficult.59 Often communities will pressure police to define as problems behavior or conditions that are not illegal. Although this behavior may constitute a problem for the community, the obligation of the police to protect Constitutional rights requires them to make an independent judgment regarding the problem and what can be done about it.60 In pursuing the aim and duty of maintaining of peaceful community, the New Haven Police Department describes one of its main value statements as adopting the role of stimulating cooperation in the creation and maintenance of a way of life which strikes the optimum balance between the collective interests of all citizens and the personal rights of all individuals.61

After identifying the problem, the objective is to develop tailor-made responses: to fashion a response that holds the greatest potential for eliminating or reducing the specific problem. It is anticipated that an effort to mobilize the community will be among the most common measures included in the development of a tailor-made response. Engaging the community holds the potential for invoking informal controls that are more permanent and more effective than any measures the police themselves are in a position to implement.62

Thus we can see from these basic elements of problem-oriented policing that police are urged to think through how they respond to problems and it encourages and facilitates greater accountability on the part of the police. The problem-oriented approach calls for police agencies to develop the skills, procedures, and research techniques to analyze problems and evaluate police effectiveness as an integral continuing part of management.63

It is here that we see an integration of academia into the field of policing. Police will now be forced to think and take an integral part in solving the problems of a community rather than simply acting in a chain of command, responding to orders whereby they only temporarily eliminate these problems. The idea of management will replace command staffs. Data analyzation, group thought and aid from outside agencies will now take the place of mass arrests and criminal prosecution as a way to eliminate and deter crime. This will in turn greatly change police training and require more from the individual officer. Police must now think "academically" and hopefully more compassionately rather than authoritatively. Thus the way in which we now measure the success of police in combatting crime will also change. Arrests must no longer be a way to judge the quality of the job done by officers. Rather, an officer's ability to engage the community, be motivated, creative and their ability to arrive at strategic solutions to community problems will now be a more effective way to judge success. This will require high-level management to assess patrol officers' ability to think and respond in a logical, rational and effective manner. It will also require overseers to view themselves as motivators. They must now allow their subordinates to be more proactive in their approach thus embodying the idea of accountability rather than command.'64

The words "integration of academia" are used here only because this new way of thinking is something that is associated with academia and intensive education and not something that has been a traditional mainstay of police work. This is not to say that officers currently in the field are not educated. It is simply that they have never been trained to approach police work in this manner. It has taken a new breed of police management to make this change. Traditionally there was a tendency for chiefs to be local and inbred where as chiefs of today tend to be urbane and cosmopolitan.65 Such innovators include: Chief Nicholas Pastore of New Haven, Conn., Commissioner Lee Brown of New York (Ph.D. in criminology from the University of California-Berkeley), former Chief Joseph McNamara of San Jose, Calif. (Ph.D. from Harvard University) and Chief David Couper of the Madison Police Department in Wisconsin.

Specifically, Chief Pastore states the assets of this integration in his city-wide implementation of problem-oriented policing:

We often call upon our neighbor, Yale University, to help us with the "big picture." Universities have a particular responsibility, we believe, to synthesize their academic interest with practical reality. They must provide us with the theoretical underpinnings essential to our job. And we can offer them an understanding of the practical world, the world on the street, where academic concepts are played out in the form of community behavior.66

As we can see these leaders have extensive academic backgrounds from which it can be logically assumed they have been influence in their way of approaching policing. Although it is not necessary to have this kind of background to be an effective problem-oriented officer, unless training in this area is firmly integrated into the initial and basic training of officers at the academy, there will continue to be the need to bring this training and education in from outside the police arena.

Problems with Implementation

First, before discussing the problems with implementing problem-oriented policing into a department, it should be noted that this concept of policing or at least the idea of community policing is nothing new. The idea goes back to the mid-1800s when Sir Robert Peel wrote the fundamentals of policing in a free society.67 Yet in the 1930s there was a switch from foot patrol to the centralized technology-intensive style implemented in reaction to corruption among beat officers.

Today, fear of squandering resources is among the biggest arguments against using the approach of problem-oriented policing. Yet this argument is based on the myth of efficacy of rapid response.68 Robert Wasserman, a noted tactician and Research Fellow in the Program in Criminal Justice at Harvard has stated:

It is simply wrong to propose abandoning foot patrol in the name of short response time an visibility vis-a-vis patrolling in cars. Every shred of evidence is that rapid response and patrolling in cars doesn't reduce crime, increase citizen satisfaction, or reduce fear.69

The second problem is fitting problem-oriented policing into the current organizational structure. The problem-oriented approach is not incident nor technology driven. Officers operate on a decentralized basis. It emphasizes officers being in regular contact with citizens and allocates police on the basis of neighborhoods.70 Middle-level department brass are suspicious of such plans that make patrol officers more independent.71 Many officers complain that community-type policing will reduce them from crime fighters to what they scornfully call "social workers with guns."'72 Carolyn Robinson of the Tulsa Police explained, "There's an unfounded fear that it detracts from the macho image and takes the fun out of putting the bad guys in jail."'73

This touches upon the idea of what the police role actually is and how officers today view that role. It appears, as is stated in the above quotes, that officers are appalled by the possibility that their work could entail social work. Yet it is precisely this idea that lays at the base of problem-oriented policing. In an article published in The New York Times entitled "Study Criticizes Community Policing" (Aug. 8, 1991), Doug Elder, president of the Houston Police Officers Association, commenting on the community policing program begun by former Police Chief Lee Brown stated, "I think a lot of officers probably feel they're expected to be more like social workers than police officers." This quote is very dismaying in that it draws a definite line between the duties of the two occupations. Just by the nature of police work it would only be logical to assume that social work is inherent in policing. It is unrealistic to separate the two. As agents of the law, officers have the duty of protecting the citizens of their community from crime yet they also owe it to their citizens to treat them as human beings. They are not only there to put hard-core criminals behind bars but they are also there to aid and comfort each and every citizen of their community from the less threatening problems of society.

Pastore has stated that a 21st century police officer will be as much a social engineer as a law enforcement professional. By "social engineering" he means bringing a wide variety of socio-psychological tools to bear on everyday problems.74 It requires the broadening of understanding of crime. By relying only on legal authority and the militaristic tactics which accompany it, police officers not only fail to root out the causes of what will inevitably become a nagging neighborhood problem, but will also demean themselves.75 This is already ocurring today with the great loss of respect for the police by the community emanating from the harsh tactics and penalties dictated by the war on drugs.

The third problem concerns the fear of corruption. This stems from the decentralized police authority found in problem-oriented policing where officers must create for themselves the best responses to problems and become intimately involved with citizens. Traditionally it was thought that the only effective way to quell the fear of decentralized police authority and thus the fear of corruption was to centralize authority, limit discretion and reduce the level of intimacy between police and citizens. This goes back to the history of policing when financial corrupti6n was widespread and there existed a major failure in citizen protection and zealotry.76

These dangers mean that police executives will have to manage through values, rather than merely through policies and procedures. They must establish regular neighborhood and community institution reporting mechanisms rather than through centralized command and control systems.77

Community Policing/Problem-Oriented Policing as a Guise for Good Public Relations

In the 1960s and '70s most community programs were initiated with mayoral fanfare and soon died because of a lack of internal support or long-term commitment by department leaders.78

Today, many agencies have erected a facade with no real substance behind it. Many chiefs give lip service to the concept of community policing, particularly in talks with communities but then sabotage it through poor management.79 Some administrators jump on the crime prevention bandwagon simply because to do so is progressive and makes for good public relations. They also recognize that it provides a rationale for urging the public to support the police.80 These ideas of crime prevention take the form of specialized media relations units, community education programs and neighborhood watch programs which are all too often just add-ons to existing operations. 81As in the 1960s and '70s, we continue to see the disintegration of such programs due to a lack of political commitment to follow through and a lack of continued communication with the public.

Lack of Departmental Integration
In practice, crime prevention units operate as separate entities within departments, never fully integrated into daily patrol duties. It is usually placed in the service track and not under operations as jobs are manned by staff and not line officers.82 The result is crime prevention being viewed as "arts and crafts" by patrol officers and detectives consequently not viewing crime prevention officers as "real cops." 83 Illustrating this point Bayley and Skolnick note:

Departmental segregation has by now become an almost predictable problem of community policing. Community policing activities are assigned to newly created, specialized units—crime prevention branches, mini-stations commands and community relations squads. Community police personnel "do their own thing" and are not integrated into traditional patrol or criminal investigation activities. Police departments are composed of jealous fiefdoms that don't want to. ..share their responsibilities with community policing units... Community policing becomes another specialized function, distinct from other ongoing department activities.84

Obvious remedies include integrating crime prevention into the every day job of the line officers starting with training as mentioned above and ridding departments of overspecialization. Crime prevention squads should be eliminated as crime prevention should be a tactic incorporated into the every day duties of the officers.

Examples of Successful Implementation

Apprehending and incarceratingretail drug dealers and their superiors is not the only way to intercept illicit drugs activity. By maintaining a high profile in a community and by mobilizing the community to cooperate in repelling drug dealing, police can often deter street dealers from entering a neighborhood initially and can reclaim neighborhoods that the dealers have occupied. This tactic is part of a broader approach to "community policing."85

One example of the successful implementation of problem-oriented policing to combat illicit drug activity was the creation of Operation Clean in Dallas, Texas. Operation Clean was based on the premise that drug trafficking and crime problems need to be addressed by the whole community, not just the police.86 The operation was divided into three phases:

1) Provide immediate relief from high profile drug trafficking in the target area.

2) Begin short term remedies to maintain a relatively drug-free environment. This included a six-week period where other city agencies moved in to rehabilitate the target area. These included:

a) Streets and Sanitation

b) Fire Department — check for code violations and board up unoccupied buildings

c) Housing and Neighborhood Services — conduct code enforcement and identify unsalvageable properties.

d) Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board — demolish unsalvageable properties

e) Water Utilities — check for water leaks and sewer problems

3) Develop long-term solutions involving the police, social services, ministerial counseling, and environmental services.87

During the first two phases, the police department maintained a high profile making numerous arrests, wrote tickets and generally made sure drug activity did not return to the area.88

The program in Dallas seems to be highly effective and the police department staff and the city manager's office continue to hold weekly meetings to ensure that services continue to work in concert.89 This program demonstrates how one community can capitalize on its existing resources and how the lack of federal intervention is not necessary in implementing effective drug strategies. This is a prime example of community policing at its best.

Chief Nicholas Pastore of New Haven has also successfully implemented a problem-oriented policing program as well as a needle exchange program to aid its drug-addicted citizens into treatment rather than jail. Pastore has commented, "There are many factors to the drug problem, and therefore, it must be dealt with comprehensively. The approach to prevention should include education, enforcement, interruption and treatment efforts." As Pastore considers his officers "social engineers" they approach citizens and refer potential drug abusers into treatment. This increase in police visibility has helped to erode the "us-versusthem" relationship between police and drug abusers which our current policy has created. His program has been proven not only highly effective in improving the department's image and relations with the community but it has also been proven cost-effective. Pastore believes the police cannot stop the drug trade by trying to crush it. "Violence begets violence, "he says, "we get tough and the criminals get tougher."'90

Some chiefs go even farther advocating a dialogue on the legalization of drugs. Chief Randall Wellington of the Youngstown, Ohio, Police Department has called for a national debate on legalization:

I'm not advocating making drugs legal, what I'm saying is that I would like to see a national dialogue on the subject. Maybe legalization is the answer. We're obviously not getting anywhere doing what we are doing. Legalization may be the only answer.91

These are just two of the many chiefs who have made the realization that our current drug policy is not working. There are many more in agreement yet unfortunately due to the nature of the job many active chiefs and officers are afraid to voice their sympathetic views for job security reasons. This is quite a sad commentary in itself that in today's day and age our right to free speech is stifled.

Although we may never reach the level of a legalization policy it would seem that the approaches of demand reduction and harm reduction towards drug abuse dictated by the philosophy of problem-oriented policing is a more effective and compassionate way to handle the drug problem here in the United States.

Conclusion

As we can see problem-oriented policing relies heavily on the idea of crime prevention and that integration of the community is an integral part of that deterrence. Officers act under a more academic atmosphere rather than one of authority and militarism. To achieve an effective level of law enforcement of which includes drug enforcement, law enforcement personnel must change their attitude towards their roles. This should not be all that foreign as the idea of community policing is not new. Yet none the less it would appear that today's officers have lost touch with what it really means to be a police officer and have become confused about what that role entails. That role must be redefined in today's age of the omnipresent drug war so that officers are seen as compassionate human beings who can rely on their own knowledge and thought capabilities rather than simple commands amd militaristic tactics. As New York Police Commissioner Lee Brown has stated, "I can assure you that in the end the community police officer permanently assigned to the neighborhood is a better deterrent to unrest than a SWAT team waiting in the wings."92 We must reach the point again where, as one citizen has put it, "I knew the beat cop. I knew his name. He was a friend. You always felt secure when he was around, and he always seemed to be around."93

Although it may seem more comfortable and safer to stick with old tactics, police must recognize that the current strategies employed to fight the illict narcotics trade here in the United States have proven ineffective and have conseqeuntly created a situation where their efforts are actually counterproductive. It is now time to change the course of law enforcement to create effective strategies. Police must continue to experiment with methods to improve police effectiveness and efficiency. As we have seen problem-oriented policing is one experiment which has proved successful in many areas of our nation.

Stacie Norton helped organize the Drug Policy Foundation Law Enforcement Committee. She is a graduate of the American University with a Bachelor of Arts degree injustice.

Endnotes

Bibliography furnished by author upon request.