Drug Czar William Bennett and other top federal officials are giving consideration to ideas for kidnapping or assassinating major foreign drug traffickers. Conceivably, such actions might also be directed against kingpins on American soil.

Even beheading has been discussed. On "Larry King Live," June 15, 1989, a caller to the national cable television show suggested to Mr. Bennett, "Behead the damned drug dealers." He replied, "I mean, what the caller suggests is morally plausible. Legally, it's difficult.... But...somebody selling drugs to a kid? Morally, I don't have any problem with that at all." Mr. Bennett reiterated his position the next day in a written statement that told drug dealers, "You deserve to die."

Many Washington experts look upon all of these assassination and beheading stories as non-stories; humorous, weird, but not worthy of serious comment. Yet, these are not jokes. Given our history and current drug war hysteria, some of these ideas could soon be implemented. Even official consideration of these ideas documents how continued pursuit of the current drug war and harsh enforcement of prohibition will destroy much that is precious about the great American experiment in democracy and decency. The essence of the democratic approach is to deal with wrenching social problems in a balanced, non-violent fashion that preserves the constitutional freedoms of all Americans, even the most despised ones.

On too many occasions throughout our history, however, the American government and people have lost their collective heads, egged on by demagogues in power, and violated that decent democratic credo. In every case, extreme actions were taken supposedly to preserve the nation from destruction. In many of the past cases — for example, the internment of loyal Japanese-Americans during World War II and the destroying of lives and reputations by McCarthyism during the 50s — it later became clear that the actions were morally wrong, illegal, and unnecessary. Fortunately, none of those past excesses ever involved a systematic campaign of assassinations and kidnapping during peacetime.

Meddlesome Legal Issue: Murder Is Murder

Under virtually all applicable law — that of the United States, most foreign nations, and international legal codes — the harsh actions being considered are illegal. Killings and kidnappings carried out by government officials, or at their direction, remain just that, killings and kidnappings. The fact that otherwise illegal acts are carried out in the name of a government or of a noble cause, as Oliver North has discovered, does not make them legal. Indeed, we are quick to label violent acts of the nature we are now contemplating as state-sponsored terrorism when carried out by countries we do not like.

The law of civilized nations for centuries has provided for two broad situations in which killings were legal. First, when a war had been formally declared or when a condition of open hostilities had existed between two nations. Second, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter confirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations...." It is this ancient right of nations that is now being invoked by hard-line legal experts, such as Maj. Gen. Hugh Overholt, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General, to justify the killing of terrorist leaders wherever they may be found. The same logic is being applied by federal drug war zealots to major drug traffickers.

The self-defense argument posits that since President Reagan declared drug trafficking to be a threat to the national security of the country, killing or kidnapping major drug dealers, or "narcoterrorists," is justified under Article 51. The argument is, in a word, preposterous. In its essential core, the activity of drug sellers is to provide wanted products to willing buyers. It is doubtful that an impartial court would find that Article 51 applies. If, however, American officials or their agents ignore these cautions and operate in foreign countries under this new, tortured doctrine of international law, other nations could use it to legitimately send their hit squads to American soil for the purpose of "taking out" those American officials involved in the initial assaults. The narcoterrorists would also retaliate using the law of the jungle as justification.
 

Capital Punishment for Drug Dealers

Assume, however, that we are somehow, magically able to surmount all of the legal questions, that we grant the most committed drug warriors their fondest hopes and that we cow the American people and the world into accepting a tough new legal order providing the most severe punishment for drug dealers and users. What then?

There is little in the criminological history of the world to suggest that any form of capital punishment would have any significant effect on the use and abuse of drugs in the general society over the long haul. Even for murder cases, many advanced nations have concluded that capital punishment has no documented impact on the crime rate and demeans the society that uses it. Thus, capital punishment has been written out of their laws.

The United States retains capital punishment for murder and treason. The United States also has had legal provisions on occasion during this century providing for execution in cases of drug trafficking, but no such execution has ever taken place within our borders. No federal or state law now provides for any form of execution in cases of simple drug trafficking, as distinguished from homicides committed in the course of drug trafficking. A review of the laws and the legal literature suggests that no advanced, democratic country has the death penalty in drug trafficking cases today. Only 12 countries clearly do so: Algeria, Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guinea, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Saudi Arabia. Because the laws are not always clear, even this list is based upon some conjecture and other countries could probably be included.

Also unclear from the evidence is the impact of capital punishment in drug trafficking cases on the use of drugs in these nations. Indeed, there is much evidence that while highly publicized executions sometimes seemed to slow down drug activity temporarily, the usual pattern was that executions took place side-by-side with much trafficking and use. For example, admirers of China have claimed that in the late 40s a combination of the revolutionary spirit and mass executions of narcotic addicts stamped out the drug problem. While there may well have been a downturn in use, there have been persistent reports in recent years from Chinese goiiernment sources of trafficking through China and of executions for both drug sales and possession.

Many committed drug warriors have argued nevertheless that the brutal methods, for the most part, worked in China and that it is time for America to get just as brutal with drug dealers and users. However, in light of recent events, with mass upheavals against the dictators who rule the country and public executions, does any drug war zealot now want to argue that their system "worked" even in regard to controlling drugs?

The Lesson of Ayatollah Khalkhal

It is, of course, difficult to obtain a clear picture of what is actually going on in any area of Chinese life. Somewhat more obvious is The Lesson of Ayatollah Khalkhali. With the advent of the Iranian revolution in the late 70s, it was ironic that heroin use boomed in the midst of Moslem fundamentalism. So did the use of other drugs, including marijuana and hashish. Millions of users were reported in the press. By the summer of 1980, officials of the revolutionary government responded to the growing crisis with some of the harshest actions in the history of drug control. They took action which their counterparts in western nations sometimes dream about on bad days.

The roving executioner of the revolution, Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, sent out his hit squads, picked alleged drug traffickers and users off the streets, presided at brief trials, shouted "I shall exterminate you vermin!" and ordered summary executions that often were carried out within minutes. During a seven-week period, 176 people were executed for drug offenses, many shot standing near neighborhood walls where they had been caught.

Yet, drug trafficking and use flourished. The Ayatollah was criticized by his peers for not being effective enough in controlling the drug problem. On July 8, 1980, at a press conference, he defensively explained that there were practical limits even to his direct methods of dealing with drugs: "If we wanted to kill everybody who had five grams of heroin, we'd have to kill 5,000 people, and this would be difficult."

That is The Lesson of Ayatollah Khalkhali. Vast multitudes of Iranian citizens continued to violate the drug laws even in the face of immediate death sentences. Few national leaders or drug experts seemed to have learned this lesson.

Malaysian Model: Death and Detention

Certainly, Malaysian leaders have not learned the lesson. It is important to look at that nation because the Malaysian model for controlling drugs is cited time after time by drug war supporters in America. Malaysia plays an active role in promoting tough international campaigns against drugs. There is active cooperation between Malaysian police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. In 1985, Dr. Siti Hasmah, the prime minister's wife, participated in Mrs. Reagan's First Ladies Anti-Drug Conference in the United States.

Malaysia's drug laws are among the harshest in the world. Their Dangerous Drugs Act of 1975 demands a mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking. Mere possession of small amounts of drugs — 15 grams of heroin or morphine, 200 grams of marijuana — can and has put a noose around a human neck on the presumption that the drugs were being held for sale. From the beginning of 1975 through September 1988, 73 people were hanged for violation of the drug laws. (On a proportional basis, this would have been equivalent to at least 1,100 executions in the United States.) One hundred thirty-six drug offenders were awaiting execution on death row at the end of September, 1988.

A 1985 legal amendment allows the government to order two-year detentions without trial of per sons suspected of being drug traffickers. At the end of 1988, the government had 894 people under such detention. A new law in 1988 provides for civil procedures to seize assets of suspected drug traffickers, apparently in imitation of American law.

Despite all of these draconian measures, official reports state that the use and abuse of drugs keeps rising. There was comparatively little documented drug abuse during the early 70s. By the early 80s, however, it was reported that at least 300,000 youth in this small country of approximately 16.5 million people were using drugs during school days. (They were not necessarily addicts.) The number of hard drug addicts was placed at 61,334, 80 percent of whom were men below 30 years of age. By 1988, Malaysian government experts estimated 90,000-100,000 active registered drug addicts; U.S. State Department experts estimated the total number of addicts in the society at 250,000, most on heroin and engaged in crime to support their habits.

This is not meant to pick on Malaysia or any country with drug troubles. Indeed, Malaysia is probably typical of many other nations which are less open and honest about providing information to the outside world. Yet, Malaysia must look anew at its drug policies which seem so well intentioned and yet so counterproductive.

And the United States must also look closely at the Malaysian model. If the hardliners in the Bush administration continue to receive encouragement from the president, the Congress and the American people, by the end of the century we will look like an expanded version of Malaysia. Perhaps the major difference will be that instead of the hangman's noose, the symbol of our modern drug control effort will be the headsman's axe.

Arnold S. Trebach, "When Will We Learn The Lesson of Ayatollah Khalkhali?" Tha Drug Policy Letter, July/August 1989, p.1.