I would only say, Sir Edward, that certainly I wish you and your Committee well in your studies, and I am here to assist you in any way that I can, because it is a cardinal belief of the Government at the moment, about this problem, that whereas it was the view of governments years ago that the best way to keep the drugs problem under control was to seek to say in every public utterance that there was not a drugs problem, that is no longer an acceptable basis on which to proceed and has not been for some time. (David Mellor, Junior Home Office Minister, giving evidence to House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 1986)

For many years discussions about British drugs policies could be summed up by the catchwords 'treatment' and 'rehabilitation'. Policy-makers, doctors, agency workers, researchers and journalists have looked to the drug user as a focus for policy, object of treatment and help, and for explanations about the nature of drug problems. The 'drugs' problem was seen as a matter of people and their problems: what could be done, for example, to treat users, reduce harm, or encourage people to stop using drugs. These are, of course, admirable aims, for they deal with the real problems that individuals experience.

The limit to this perspective is that it excludes an examination of the related issues of drug production and distribution. To understand drugs in Britain today, we have to look beyond individual use to those features of international and national economics, trade and policy which make possible the widespread production and use of illicit imported drugs such as heroin and cocaine. A first step in understanding the British heroin problem is to examine the links between drugs on sale in British towns today, and the raw product grown by peasant farmers some several thousand miles away.

This chapter will raise questions about supply, about policies aimed at controlling it, and examine some of the limitations to the current British policy response. The chapter will focus mainly on heroin, as it is around the issue of heroin that much of British policy has been shaped.

The medico-centrism of British policy

An understanding of the heroin market has not been aided by the types of debate that have dominated British policy. Until recently British policy took what I term a 'medico-centric' approach to the addict and the treatment of addiction. The medico-centric approach was otherwise known as the 'British system' for dealing with drug problems. The idea that the British did things in a special way inspired many early discussions and it was often American observers who were prominent in this debate. In the 1940s and 1950s Lindesmith (1965) developed the idea in his arguments against the American penal approach, and in favour of a more medical one. It is interesting on re-reading these early comments to see social scientists' contributions to the médicalisation. of addiction. The issues were later developed by Schur in Narcotic Addiction in Britain and America (1963). Later contributors such as Judson (1973) and Trebach (1982) similarly claimed that the US could learn a lot from the way we did things here: Judson's book for example was subtitled 'what Americans can learn from the English experience'.

There have been many interpretations of this policy, but what is clear is that, in comparison with other countries, the balance swung much more to the medical side than to the legal. From the 1920s until very recently, drug problems were discussed at the policy level, and treated, mainly within the sphere of medicine. We claimed that we treated our addicts rather than sent them to prison. Edwards summed it up by saying that 'A system which sees the addict as someone in need of help is totally to be preferred to one which treats him only as a criminal' (Edwards, 1969, p. 770).

A second feature of the 'British system' was that as well as treating the individual addict, it was seen as beneficial to the broader society. The approach was thought to limit the social problems of addiction by reducing the financial and criminal problems often associated with it. Furthermore, containing the individual addict in a treatment system would help to prevent the spread of addiction. In other words, it was clearly realised that medical treatment had benefits for society as well as, and sometimes instead of, the individual addict.1

This medico-centric view of the addict as a patient had economic implications for the heroin market. This was the special emphasis of Schur's analysis, for he clearly thought that if doctors supplied opiates to addicts, then there would be no subculture of addiction and no illegal market. It is worth reading a quotation which summarises his analysis:

There is practically no illicit traffic in opiates [in Britain], because the legal provision of low-cost drugs . . . has largely eliminated the profit incentives supporting such a traffic. Similarly, as already noted, serious addict-crime is almost non-existent. The addict in Britain need not become a thief or a prostitute in order to support his habit . . . British policy has also inhibited the development of an addict subculture. The addict is not subjected to a continuous struggle for economic survival and for drug supplies, nor need he constantly attempt to maximise his anonymity and mobility. There is relatively little need for group support, and actual contact with other addicts may be slight (Schur, 1965, pp. 154-5).

Schur wrote before the changes in drug use that occurred in the mid-1960s, and his analysis seemed reasonable at the time. But it was not just social commentators who felt that the medical approach curtailed the development of an organised subculture. Such ideas were later elaborated in the post-1968 Drug Dependency Clinic situation, where many doctors and politicians saw that the clinics would be competing with the illegal market and 'prescribing to keep the Mafia out'. Medicine from the late 1960s was seen to be in a functional relation with the illegal market, in which its major task was the social control of drug distribution. What informed the early days of the drug clinics was the idea that addicts would be attracted to treatment by the lure of a prescription, and that doctors would prescribe the right amount — neither too much, for the surplus could be sold, nor too little, because the patient would turn to the illegal market. Consequently the devetopment of illicidevelopmentould be curtailed.

There was always an alternative model of the drug user, even if it received less attention. This saw the user (or technically, illegal possessor) as a criminal. Whilst professional debate has been about treatment and rehabilitation (the addict as patient), this country has in fact continued a vigorous legal and penal approach to drugs (the addict as criminal). Indeed, the medico-centric approach was always set within a criminal system that penalised non-medically authorised possession, though this rarely received much attention.

The medico-centric position tended to ignore the fact that the non-medical possession of opiates is subject to strict legal penalty, and that numerous other drugs are not part of the medico-centric domain. It also ignored the fact that a continuing — and probably increasing — part of the British response has been through policing, the courts and the prison system. For example, whilst in 1985 about 4300 new patients were seen in drug addiction out-patient clinics, in the same year over 26 000 were convicted or cautioned for drug offences, and nearly 4000 of these wee for offences concerned with heroin and cocaine. In that year nearly 6000 people received a custodial sentence for a drug offence. This side of the British response has tended to be neglected by those centrally involved in policy discussions and debate. For example, the main government advisory body, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) has devoted much more attention to treatment, rehabilitation and prevention, than it has to penal, legal and control issues.

In the 1980s the character of British policy is changing. I have argued elsewhere that British drug policies are in a state of transformation in which medicine is being displaced from its former central role and being replaced by a more extensive and diffuse response involving a broader range of agencies and ideas about drug problems (Stimson, 1987). A stronger role for the state has emerged: a more active role is being played by central government, the debate on drugs is becoming politicised, and there is a new emphasis on law enforcement, with legal and penal measures to control the supply of drugs. This 'war on drugs' is examined in this chapter. But first it is necessary to understand some of the changes that have occurred in patterns of use of heroin since the end of the 1960s.

The heroin market

Over the past twenty years there have been major changes in the extent and characteristics of heroin consumption. In the 1960s heroin use was mainly concentrated in London and the south-east of England with a handful of users in other major cities. Twenty years later (1987) it can be found in most parts of the country, and is no longer confined to urban environments. Whereas it was once a relatively isolated activity engaged in predominantly by rather eccentric/Bohemian/counter-cultural users, it is now fairly common in many parts of Britain and not accompanied by any special view on life.

Let us look first at the number of consumers and how consumption has changed over the past twenty years. It is hard now to believe that in the mid-1960s there were really only a few addicts, many of whom were known by name by Home Office Drugs Branch staff. In 1968, after what had been seen as a major increase in the extent of heroin addiction, the total number of addicts known to the Home Office was only 2782. In 1984 the number was 12 489 (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 1985).2

Estimating the 'real' number of regular users is a matter of speculation, but methods developed by drug-indicators projects (Hartnoll et al., 1985) suggest that official addict notifications in London, at the time of that research, may be multiplied by 5 to give an approximation of the number of regular users (ISDD, 1984, p. 8). Some drug workers estimate that more than that number again may use opiates on an occasional basis.

On the supply side there are three indicators of the size of the market: seizures by police and Customs, purity, and price.

In the mid-1960s there was virtually no smuggled heroin in this country. At that time, supply was mainly of pharmaceutical heroin diverted from legitimate prescriptions and there were virtually no seizures of illegally imported heroin. The first major seizures came in 1971, when 1.14kg were seized. By 1984, the Customs seized 312kg and the police a further 49kg; the total exceeds that seized in the US (Penrose, 1985). In 1985 seizures in the UK were 334kg and 32kg respectively (Home Office, 1985; 1986).

That supply is buoyant is suggested by purity levels. The average purity of samples analysed by the Forensic Science Laboratories in the winter of 1984 was 46 per cent. Customs data also suggests a rise in purity in the past four years (Society of Civil and Public Servants, 1985). There are wide variations, particularly with small quantities which have passed through several levels of distribution and been mixed Ccuf ) with other substances. Street level seizures varied from 20 per cent to 70 per cent purity in 1984 according to the Office of the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit (1984). The purity level here is much higher than in the USA where it is estimated at between 3 and 6 per cent.

The final indicator of supply is price. In 1984 the Office of the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit reported that it was retailing at around £80 per gram, but with considerable variation by region and size of purchase. It is one of the few products to have fallen steadily in price in recent years. Between 1980 and 1983 the real price of heroin in London, controlled for inflation, is estimated to have fallen by 20 per cent (Lewis, 1985). This reflects world-wide price changes: the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (1985) estimates that allowing for inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, illicit heroin prices fell by about 25 per cent between 1980 and 1983. In these inflationary times, there can be few other commodities that have had such dramatic price falls.'

The main change in the pattern of supply in the past twenty years is from a distribution that was locally supplied, casual and fairly loosely structured, to the establishment of a more systematically organised market with fairly regularised supply and distribution. In other words, in these twenty years we have seen the development of a heroin market. No one can know the size of this market nor how much heroin is consumed each year in Britain. Some idea of the scale of the market is essential, as we shall see later, in judging the impact of the 'war on heroin'. A simple market-research approach to estimating market volume would take estimated numbers of regular and casual users and estimates of typical consumption as part of the calculation. With current estimates of upwards of 60 000 regular users, and many more casual users, it is likely to be in the region of 3000kg, or 3 tons. That amounts to about 8kg every day.4

Law and order and the 'war on drugs'

This is the context for recent policy changes. Clearly, the pattern of drug use in this country has changed dramatically from the days of Schur's commentary. We can no longer accept the argument that the médicalisation of addiction prevents the development of drug cultures and markets. The late 1960s medical view of the social control of addiction, suggesting a functional and competing relation between medicine and the illegal market is also no longer tenable. Medicine gave up this fight in the 1970s. The displacement of medicine from its former central position is occurring as a new debate on drugs is emerging.

Since 1984 there has been an unprecedented level of central government interest and activity in the drugs field. This is the first government to have viewed drug taking as a serious issue, as indicated in David Mellor's quote at the start of this chapter. It has set up collaborative machinery at ministerial level (a recognition that the issues cut across government departments). Drugs policy is no longer of concern to just the DHSS and the Home Office, but also to Customs and Excise, Department of Education and Science, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Overseas Development Administration, Ministry of Defence, Department of the Environment, Scottish Office, Welsh Office and the DHSS Northern Ireland (Home Office, 1986). This Ministerial Group on the Misuse of Drugs has developed a strategy on drug problems, and the government has put large amounts of money into law enforcement, and into educational, preventive and treatment projects (see Chapter 5 by MacGregor and Ettorre).

The Prime Minister's interest, numerous ministerial statements, reports from the House of Commons Home Affairs and Social Services Committees, and ministerial visits to producer-countries indicate that the area for debate has shifted away from 'drug experts' and that centre stage is for the moment held by government and Parliament. With statements from politicians in other parties, such as David Owen's speech on unemployment and drugs (Owen, 1985), and the inclusion of drugs in Labour's new statement on health (Labour Party, 1986), it would appear that drugs, for long neglected as issues for political debate, have now been politicised (cf. Dorn and South, Chapter 6). We are likely to see drugs in all party manifestos at the next election.

The present Conservative government has put drug control on the agenda as a public and political issue, and made it an important part of government policy. There has been a major injection of funds into treatment, rehabilitation, education and prevention: many 'drug workers' would not be in post today but for this money. The comparatively large funding has even led to complaints from experts in the underfunded areas of alcohol and tobacco problems (British Medical Journal, 1986).

The argument in this chapter is about the relative emphasis in policy and funding given to different sectors of the response. Evidence that there has been a shift in the debate and response can be found first in the overall description of governifient strategy. The key document is Tackling Drug Misuse: A Summary of the Government's Strategy (Home Office, 1985 and 1986). There are five aspects to this. Listed in the order they are presented, they are:

(a) reducing supplies from abroad
(b) tightening controls on drugs produced and prescribed here
(c) making policing more effective
(d) strengthening deterrence
(e) improving prevention, treatment and rehabilitation.

The major part of Tackling Drug Misuse is devoted to measures to control the supply of drugs. These include supporting international efforts to curb the production and trafficking of drugs by financing enforcement and crop limitation projects, and by promoting international cooperation on enforcement; strengthening Customs and police enforcement through additional staff and reorganisation; tightening the controls on drugs produced here so that there is no 'leakage' to the illicit market; deterring drug traffickers and dealers by high maximum penalties, and by depriving them of the proceeds of their crimes. Second, there is the expenditure on different areas. It is difficult to calculate expenditure on enforcement, because apart from particular international projects, cash sums are rarely specified (unlike the case of new educational, treatment and rehabilitation projects). However, it seems likely that the expenditure on international efforts, Customs and police work, the legal system, and imprisonment, must far exceed expenditure on other areas of the response to drug problems.

Third, evidence is found in the changed nature of the debate. It is typified by the report of the Home Affairs Committee (1985) which argued that the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force should help the Customs and the police. The committee, chaired by Sir Edward Gardner, called for intensified law enforcement efforts, sequestration of the assets of drug traffickers, extradition of suppliers from other countries, a reform of the banking laws to trace drug money, more efforts for crop substitution and eradication, and an increase in the penalty for systematic dealing in drugs to 'no less than the penalty for premeditated murder'. This was echoed when the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, visited the Customs at Heathrow and the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit at Scotland Yard. She made it clear that there was now a war on traffickers and smugglers, and warned We are after you. The pursuit will be relentless. We shall make your life not worth living.'

The medico-centric view included a weak economic version of drug markets (focused on the local drug 'scene', the Mafia potential, and the effect of competitive prescribing). This new strategy also has economic implications, drawing on what we might call a criminal—economic model. The guiding assumption is that old familiar 'guilty pushers' and 'victims' model. The pusher in mind is not so much the local user-dealer (though in the end this is where most enforcement effort is probably expended): rather it is some major criminal entrepreneur. The trade in heroin is seen to be conducted by evil, criminal men, who exploit human weakness. Hence this market has to be regulated by criminal and penal means.

The 'war on drugs' metaphor neatly sums this up. During the 1986 debate on the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, referred to the Bill as a sharp new weapon in the fight against drug smuggling. He talked of the world as being 'awash with drugs'. The Home Affairs Committee referred to the 'flood of hard drugs', and described it as the 'most serious peace-time threat to our national well-being'. Similar descriptions abound in this short report:

Western society is faced by a warlike threat from the hard drugs industry. The traffickers in hard drugs amass princely incomes from the exploitation of human weakness, boredom and misery. The war has never been openly declared and the drug traffic infiltrates insidiously into Western countries . . . the ruthlessness of the big drug dealers must be met by equally ruthless penalties once they are caught, tried and convicted . . . The American practice, which we unhesitatingly support, is to give the courts Draconian powers in both civil and criminal law to strip drug dealers of all the assets acquired from their dealings in drugs. Drug dealers must be made to lose everything, their homes, their money and all that they possess which can be attributed to their profits from selling drugs (Home Affairs Committee, 1985, pp. iv—v).

The effectiveness of the law enforcement response

The rhetoric of the 'war on drugs' has dramatic appeal and captures the public imagination. But what is the nature of the task? Is it possible to stop or slow the supply of heroin to this country? Just what are the problems facing any country trying to control drug importation? What is the impact of measures to control the supply of drugs?

The questions require examination of drug production, importation and distribution within this country; of resources put into intervention measures at each of these levels; and some measure of the 'return' on these resources. We shall start in producer-countries, and follow through to distribution within this country.

Intervening to control production

Supply starts in some poor country. Heroin is derived from opium and all the countries producing opium illicitly on a large scale are underdeveloped (Third World) countries (Lewis, 1985, p. 18). The evidence from seizures indicates that 85 per cent of the heroin currently coming to Britain originates in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the rest coming from South-east Asian countries such as Burma, Thailand and Laos, and from the Middle East (Penrose, 1985). The main supplier areas have changed over time — for example, in earlier years it was South-east Asia, then Iran. The prominence of supply countries relates less to geographical proximity (although Mexico is a main supplier of heroin to the US) than to crop success, political conditions, enforcement activity, and cultural and economic links between supplier and supplied countries (Lewis, 1985; Penrose, 1985; UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 1985). World opium production from these areas was estimated at between 1423 and 1913 tons by the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1983.

Opium growing provides a major source of income to many poor farmers. A peasant farmer in Pakistan might devote an acre to opium, producing about 7 kilos which, depending on the success of the crop that year, sell at between £22 and £100 a kilo. The considerable variation in yield is related to soil, density of planting, irrigation and weather (Davies, 1984). South-west Asia has Higher yields than South-east Asia. Opium growing is labour-intensive, and the size of the crop is limited by the supply of labour and the need to put some land over to foodstuffs. Depending on quality, 10 kilos of opium make approximately 1 kilo of heroin. Opium is converted to heroin in simple refineries. Patterns of refining have changed since the days of the French Connection when much of this occurred in Mediterranean laboratories. Refining has shifted to producer-countries, with resultant cost and transportation advantages. The local wholesaler in Pakistan sells it for export at about £3000—£4000 a kilo.

Estimates of total illicit production are difficult: satellite surveillance can identify the crop, but yields, as already noted, are variable. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1983 estimated opium production for Afghanistan at 400-575 metric tons; Iran, 400-600; Pakistan, 63; Burma, 500-600; Laos, 30-40; and Thailand, 30-35 (Lewis, 1985).

Since the 1970s, there have been many attempts by Western countries to persuade producer-countries to cease growing opium. This has had some success with recipients of US funds in the 1970s, but less in South-west and South-east Asia. Three approaches have been tried; crop eradication, law enforcement and crop substitution.

Crop eradication Crop eradication involves burning or spraying the growing plants. The difficulty with this approach is that these areas are often beyond the reach of government. In the so-called 'Golden Triangle' of South-east Asia the growing areas are controlled by tribal warlords or anti-government rebels; in the so-called 'Golden Crescent' region of Afghanistan and Pakistan many of the growing areas are controlled by fiercely independent tribal groups. These areas are poorly policed, inaccessible and hostile to government officials and to officials from other countries. The US Drug Enforcement Agency has twenty officials in Pakistan, but mostly in the cities rather than the growing areas. Visits to some of the growing areas can only be undertaken with heavily armed guards.

Law enforcement The second approach is law enforcement to prevent people from growing, distributing and refining. For example, the UK has contributed £180 000 to support law enforcement in Pakistan, and has provided additional vehicles for the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. Law enforcement faces the same problems as crop eradication.

Crop substitution The third approach is to encourage crop substitution, persuading farmers to grow other crops such as sugar beet, fruit or grain crops. This is sometimes accompanied by rural development schemes to develop a new local infrastructure. For example, again in Pakistan, the UK is contributing to a planned five-year crop-substitution and rural-development scheme in the Dir District of the North-west Frontier province of Pakistan. The problem here is that growing-areas are often a long way from markets for these crops, transport is difficult, and the cash returns are much lower. No other crop returns as great a yield as the opium poppy in these conditions.

Whilst law enforcement, crop eradication and substitution are extremely difficult, programme-implementing agencies claim that they are not unsuccessful. In Pakistan it was estimated that opium production was 800 tons in 1979, and this was down to an estimated 63 tons in 1983. Pakistan now claims that much of the heroin emanating from there has been refined from opium grown in neighbouring countries.

It is also no coincidence that the main opium-growing areas have been and remain, politically unstable areas, dependent on trafficking bands, tribal groups and private armies for border security. Western governments have often supported these people as a buffer against communism. This was certainly the case with CIA support for tribal and military groups in South-east Asia, for the groups that controlled opium production were also in military control. It probably also partly accounts for the reluctance of Pakistan and Western governments to disrupt opium-growing and distribution in the border region with Afghanistan. Further, opium growing in Afghanistan is controlled by anti-government and anti-Soviet tribespeople who use opium revenue to finance their armed struggle. Political interests often run contrary to the aims of drug control, as also noted in the final chapter in this volume.

It has been the case that many people in drug-producing countries do not share Western governments' views on the need to control a traditional crop which brings in money. However, there is some evidence that this view is changing since the recent growth of internal heroin markets, in contrast to traditional and less extensive patterns of use of cannabis and (raw) opium. Drug production in the Third World relies on poverty, suitable climates, and an abundance of labour. Drug production provides some additional income to poor peasants. However, the romantic view of the 'happy peasant' working to produce a traditional crop is also misleading. Peasant farmers are exploited just like most growers of raw materials for export. The main profits are made at the refining and export levels. These profits are often taken out of the country, and rarely benefit its economic development. Drug production reproduces the traditional exploitation of poor countries producing raw materials for world markets.

Analysts of cocaine and marijuana production in Central and South America have argued that some national economies are distorted by drug production. Bolivia, a main producer of cocaine is a prime example. It is estimated by Bolivia's Interior Minister that 50 per cent of the country's export earnings come from cocaine (Guardian, 1986a). Bolivia is not alone in relying heavily on earnings from drug exports. As for cannabis, it is estimated that it contributes more to Jamaica's foreign-exchange earnings than all other exports combined (Malyon, 1985, p. 64). Some writers have used the concept of `narcocracy' to describe a political system whose principal economic activity is the production of illicit drugs. Henman argues that the informal narcocracy is becoming a predominant form of social and political organisation in Latin America (Henman, 1985, pp. 140-57). It is not clear how appropriate this concept is for South-west and South-east Asia. It probably applies to conditions in some sub- or cross-state regions, but not to these countries as a whole. It indicates however that drug production cannot be seen as being divorced from the economic and political circumstances of producer countries; indeed drug production may play a part in shaping those circumstances.

Intervening to control importation

The next stage of the journey taken by heroin is when it is smuggled into the consumer countries. Little is known about the structure of importation. From reports of major seizures it appears that importers include 'professional' criminals who are involved in several importations, and also business people who may indulge in one-off importations.

Attempts to control importation are a Customs responsibility. Indeed, the Director of Customs has stated that 'Drug smuggling is the top priority of the Department' (Home Affairs Committee, 1986, p. 67). There has been little research on the policy, strategy and effectiveness of Customs work, but it is possible to delineate some of the parameters of their task. In 1985, 42 million passengers arrived in the UK from foreign destinations. The peak volume at Terminal 3 at Heathrow Airport is 4000 passengers per hour (Rigby, 1985) and it is estimated that as few as 1 in 100 are searched. The person who brings in heroin could be acting independently but is more likely a courier, receiving £1000-£3000 for the trip. The importer is paying about £6000 per kilo of heroin including import costs, so if several couriers are sent through, and one is caught, the loss of heroin is a relatively minor cost against the profits that are made. That kilo of heroin will sell for about £20 000 at the next level of distribution.

The problem of intervening at the level of importation stems not only from the number of passengers, but also from the number of motor vehicles, ships, aircraft and postal traffic — for example, there were 1800 postal seizures of drugs in 1985. There is an increasing use of commercial freight to bring in large consignments. Customs policy is that only 2 per cent of European Community goods are subject to random searches, and in 1983 only 6 per cent of total freight brought into the UK was examined. On the south coast there are thousands of boats, many capable of sailing to other countries. The Society of Civil and Public Servants, pressing a claim for more Customs staff, reports that on a Sunday night up to sixty yachts on the Hamble may report their arrival from abroad and a similar number not bother. There are not enough Customs officers to deal with those asking for Customs attention. The numbers of Customs staff involved in first-line duties — inspection of passengers, vehicles and goods — has been reduced as part of this government's overall reduction in civil •service staffing (Home Affairs Committee, 1986, pp. 72-3; Society of Civil and Public Servants, 1986).

Most seizures — probably around 80 per cent — come from random searches, but quantities are small, and are likely to hit the one-off independent rather than the large-scale importer. Many sandom seizures of small quantities of cannabis are now dealt with by the Customs 'compounding' powers, the payment of an immediate monetary penalty in lieu of prosecution (Godfrey, 1984). Such cases are considered to be too time-consuming for officers to pursue through the courts.

Contrary to popular views, random searches are not the main thrust of the Customs effort. Much of the work is in the area of intelligence. The Customs have over 200 investigators who are now specially assigned to drugs, with government plans for an increase to about 300 by 1987 (Hansard, 1985). About eighty work on heroin (Rigby, 1985). Drug investigations now form the major element of the work of the Customs Special Investigation Division. They work in this country and in producer-countries. The UK has now stationed a Customs official in Pakistan, and two are due to be based in India (Observer, 1986). International collaboration comes through Britain's membership of the International Customs Cooperation Council which allows for international cooperation against drug-smuggling and connected financial operations (Rigby, 1985). Some of the most spectacular seizures occur from this work — a recent seizure of 40kg of heroin at Felixstowe docks was found in a shipment of brassware from Pakistan.

Despite such successes, the Customs admit that they have a difficult job. In 1985 the Customs seized 334kg of heroin (up from 312kg the year before) (Home Office, 1986). The average size of seizures has risen from 0.523kg in 1979 to 1.487kg in 1984 (Society of Civil and Public Servants, 1985) but as the Home Affairs Committee admitted `no amount of law enforcement can stop the great bulk of supplies getting through'. Seizures have certainly increased, but probably remain proportionally minimal compared with that which does get through. The Chief Investigation Officer for Customs and Excise, Richard Lawrence, is reluctant to estimate success rates, but no law-enforcement agency anywhere in the world credibly claims more than a 10 per cent interception rate.'

Finally, there is the problem of the balance between Customs' inspections and the demands of international travel and trade. There have been considerable pressures in recent years for Customs authorities throughout the world to speed tip the movement of goods. As Norman Godfrey, Director of the Customs Directorate puts it, 'there are limits to what it is reasonable to expect the travelling public and the trading community to accept' (Godfrey, 1984). In his evidence to the Home Affairs Committee he described the Customs as being pulled in different directions between the demands to facilitate tourism by reducing controls, and the demands for stricter controls against drug- and other smuggling. Later he stated in reply to a question about lorry searches:

It is certainly true that the level of complete turn-out of lorries at Dover and, indeed, at any port is somewhat restricted. The reason is quite simple: that if we tried to turn-out a very high proportion of the vehicles going through Dover, the port of Dover would very quickly come to a standstill (Home Affairs Committee, 1986, p. 68).

Intervening at the level of distribution within Britain

The next step in the supply of heroin is distribution within this country. Just as little is known about smuggling and the nature of the Customs effort, little is known about the structure of drug distribution within this country or the nature of police strategy and effectiveness.

As to the nature of the distribution system, the best description we have at the moment comes from Lewis (1985, pp. 47-8):

It is hybrid in the sense that it is neither truly competitive nor completely monopolistic. Relatively concentrated at the import level, it becomes increasingly dispersed as the product flows downwards through a series of sub-levels. At each level there is a mark-up between buying and selling price, representing expenses, time expended, labour costs, overheads, relative risk in relation to arrest, theft or fraud, as well as a return on capital. Security considerations ensure that distribution units at each level are small, comparatively isolated and restricted in access . . . The dispersed and fragmentary nature of the retail heioin market is such that it is unlikely that any single group or cartel could ever dominate the domestic delivery system from top to bottom.

The response to this is a police responsibility, with some Customs involvement at higher levels. The police response is at three levels. All uniformed and plain-clothes officers deal with drug offences which arise in the normal course of duties; every police force in the country (bar one in Scotland) now has a drugs squad which, with the CID, deal with more serious cases; and Regional Crime Squads cover drugs cases crossing more than one police area. In 1983 RCSs had their terms of reference changed to allow them to undertake major drug inquiries and it was soon found that the investigation of drug offences or drug-related crime had become a major part of their work, to the detriment of other police work (Pead, 1984). In July 1983, Leon Brittan, at that time Home Secretary, followed up a recommendation of the Association of Chief Police Officers and announced that RCSs would be strengthened by the addition of dedicated drugs 'wings' and by an increase of more than 200 officers (Penrose, 1985). In 1986 there were over 1200 police officers in force drugs squads and in the Regional Crime Squads with a major commitment to drugs work (Home Affairs Committee, 1986, p. 56).

Intelligence for these activities is provided at New Scotland Yard by the recently created National Drugs Intelligence Unit, which replaces the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit, and is staffed by both police and Customs. An indication of the seriousness with which the Home Office now views drug distribution is the fact that the coordinator, Colin Hewett, has previously headed the Metropolitan Police Special Branch and Anti-Terrorist Squad. As Leon Brittan put it when he announced the new appointment 'In drugs, as with terrorism, the need for good intelligence is paramount'. The presence of both police and Customs is necessitated by the need for cooperation in investigations and apprehensions — for example, with the technique of the 'controlled delivery' where a consignment of illicit drugs is detected in freight or unaccompanied baggage, in circumstances where it is pôssible for those gopossibleo forward under the surveillance of police and/or Customs with a view to identifying those responsible for the smuggling (Cutting, 1984).

At an international level, the main vehicle for collaboration is Interpol. The Drugs Sub-Division, which is the largest unit in Interpol, monitors and responds to information about drug enforcement, analyses intelligence, and does drug liaison work and training (Leamy, 1983).

What is the comparative return on this effort? The police make many more seizures than the Customs (3000 seizures of heroin in 1985) but the seizures are much smaller. In weight, the total police seizures amount to only 10-15 per cent of those of the Customs. Despite attempts to move up the chain of supply, the majority of convictions are at the user and user—dealer end: in 1983 for example, two-thirds of police seizures were for less than 1 gram.

New initiatives include a telephone hotline — Scotland Yard's Drug Information line — started just before Christmas 1984, whereby members of the public may inform on suspected drug dealers. Other police forces have followed this initiative, and Customs has launched a similar scheme. Many police areas now use cautioning for offenders caught with small amounts of drugs.

Recent government proposals provide for new control measures and penalties. Parole has been removed for major drug traffickers, and the maximum penalty for trafficking in Class A drugs such as heroin has been increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. It is unlikely that this will deter major importers while profits remain high. The structure of drug distribution makes it difficult for police to gain information on such people. Deterrence seems to be influenced more by probability of arrest than by the penalty. Nor will it be much use in persuading people to inform on those higher up the levels of distribution: for them it may be a choice between a life sentence in prison and a death sentence from a major importer.

Sequestration of assets is another change. New legislation means that drug traffickers can be deprived of their assets. It is hoped that this will take some of the profit out of trafficking. The Drug Trafficking Offences Act deals with seizures, upon conviction, of drug traffickers' assets. It provides new powers for tracing and freezing assets, and for a confiscation order to be imposed on a person convicted of a drug-trafficking offence. Some banks have begun scrutinising customer accounts (Guardian, 1986d).

This issue is not being pursued by Britain alone, the idea having been around for some time and already being practised in some countries. In 1983 the Council of Europe Cooperation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in Drugs (the Pompidou Group) recommended that each EC country should promote the tracing, freezing and confiscation of assets from drug trafficting, and suggested ways of increasing cooperation between countries in such matters. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs recommended early in 1984 that such measures be pursued in member states (Bulletin on Narcotics, 1984).

Sequestration may be one way of increasing the costs of heroin distribution, and make heroin a less attractive proposition to criminals. The problem is that it requires international cooperation in monitoring the flow of capital, and tighter national controls. The government's current policies on free exchange control militate against this. Indeed international 'money laundering' is not unknown amongst legitimate financial concerns.

The police will also need considerable additional new expertise, including officers with experience of company law, international financing, asset tracing, offshore banking, and other activities such as commodity broking. The task of tracing drug money is so complex that some police commentators believe that it is almost impossible to bring a successful prosecution against major international drug dealers. By establishing a number of companies and bank accounts in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, it is possible to finance drug operations in Third World countries, and to hide the proceeds offshore. During the whole operation a British financier will not personally own identifiable assets within the jurisdiction of the British courts (Bosworth-Davies, 1985).

What is likely is that sequestration will be successful against low- and intermediate-level dealers, and not at the higher level, the latter having greater resources for covering and defending themselves.

The effectiveness of control measures

What can be made of all this effort? Earlier it was estimated that the total market for heroin was 3000kg in the UK. Against this in 1984 361kg was seized by Customs and police, and 368kg in,1985. At best, resources put into Customs and police work resulted in the interception of perhaps 10 per cent of imports. This is a 90 per cent failure rate. Seizures, and interventions in producer-countries seem to have had little or no impact on supply. The Society of Civil and Public Servants concludes that at current levels of staffing:

The large quantities of heroin and cocaine seized by HM Customs and Excise have had no effect on price and purity. 'This indicates a plentiful supply. Further, the continuing low price and continuing high purity level has happened at a time when the demand has increased rapidly. This increase in demand is indicated by the increased number of addicts notified. It can only be concluded that the supply of hard drugs is more than matching the market (Society of Civil and Public Servants, 1985).

An equally pessimistic assessment was made by the head of the Metropolitan Police Drugs Squad:

In recent times, by reference to the performance indicators of seizures of drugs and arrests of traffickers and users . . . we have done well and are improving, but by reference to the more appropriate indicators of street price and purity levels, and the Addicts index — we are not doing at all well — in fact we are doing badly — street prices of heroin and cocaine have come down and at best remain steady and purity levels have gone up (Penrose, 1985).

This very much reflects the world picture. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (1985) reported that world-wide seizures of heroin doubled to 12 metric tons from 1982 to 1983 with no impact on price at wholesale or retail level.

Could things be done differently? What if the state allocated more resources to policing and Customs work? Mrs Thatcher has said that the work of Customs must not be hampered by lack of resources and that 'The taxpayer will find the money'. However, despite these strong words of support, it is inconceivable that any government, especially one committed to limitations on public expenditure, could put enough money into this area to reduce the amount of heroin imported to an appreciable extent. Even a doubling of seizures, if nothing else changed, would mean that 80 per cent were getting through. And increased seizures are really only a small additional cost to the importer that can be countered by increasing supply, reducing quality or raising price.

Government ministers are pessimistic. The Social Services Secretary, Norman Fowler, told an international conference of health ministers in London in 1986 that the supply of illegal drugs had not diminished, despite many successes against traffickers. The failure, he said was 'a fact we must face' and called for further international action. Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, in the debate on the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill said, would be quite wrong if I did not warn that the drugs problem in the UK could well continue to get worse before it gets better . . . [And] we can reasonably expect price and purity levels to remain fairly static' (Guardian, 1986b; 1986c).

Policy options — the issues and the questions

It is clear that we cannot understand drug use just at the level of consumption, and that there can be no adequate response limited solely to the consumption-related categories of prevention, education, treatment or rehabilitation. The alternative conceptualisation, promoted in the government strategy, of seeing the problem as predominantly a matter of crime, and the response in mainly legal and penal measures, incorporates an understanding of many of the issues concerning both supply and demand but in turn fails because it deals inadequately with the complexity of the international and national economics and politics of drugs.

One response to the complexity of the task is the libertarian stand that there should be no controls — that there should be free availability. This view is based either on the premise of a 'right to use' or on the argument that most of the problems stem not from drug use but from the control measures themselves. One of the difficulties with this is that all societies control the use of psychoactive drugs in one way or another. If the libertarian appeal is to the abolition of formal controls, in the hope that adequate informal controls will emerge, the evidence is that many societies have been unable to develop an equable relationship with psychoactive drugs. This is not to deny that informal social controls are important, for informal regulation occurs with all drugs. In the case of heroin, such informal controls probably prevent most people from developing a dependency or other problems with their drug use. This area, however, is tittle researched.

At the other extreme is the view that drug use should be totally prohibited, as at present. The problem here is that no state has been successful in this task , however punitive the measures used. In this country we have seen that despite large resources allocated to Customs and policing, and introduction of very high penalties, the heroin market has expanded. With a combination of poor producer-countries, and a high demand for heroin at home, Customs and police efforts cannot stop the import of heroin; at best they slow it down. Against this must be set the undoubted (but difficult to assess) deterrence effect — without controls, it is likely that imports would have been much higher. Here, comparative studies of states and regions which have attempted to deregulate heroin would be of interest.

Somewhere between these positions is the medico-centric approach that was once central to the British response. Controlling the drug problem by treating the addict medically was an option when numbers were small, but, despite calls for a return to the clinic maintenance system, is probably both unworkable and undesirable in the present circumstances.

There is no alternative but to take the control issue seriously. Academic debate on policy options has been scarce, and many practitioners have been prepared to ignore these problems. There is an urgent need to raise the level of policy debate, to review policy options, and to ensure that at a local level, enforcement issues are on the agenda. A number of points might be part of this debate.

First, the need to clarify the overall aims of policy. When we move from the relatively safe areas of treatment, rehabilitation, prevention and education, few (apart from government and control and law enforcement agencies) have clear ideas of what they would want from a control policy. What would be the overall aim? Are we correct in assuming that it would be less heroin, less harm, and fewer users?

Second, if the free availability of dangerous drugs is unacceptable, then controls over supply and use are inevitable. But If total prohibition is unattainable, the question is what sort of limitations there should be. The debate then concerns the acceptable, effective and efficient means of limiting supply. We have various models to work from : alcohol, tobacco, therapeutic drugs, and illegal drugs are subject to different regulatory mechanisms. There is agreement in all cases that regulation cannot be left to market forces. There is divergence and disagreement about strategies.

Third, what are the consequences of the aims and strategies? All policies have costs and benefits to different sectors. At an international level, policy and strategy must respect and benefit needs of both producer- and recipient-countries. At a local level, strategies will have various implications: for example, aggressive enforcement aimed at reducing local supplies, if successful, will force up price. This in turn may reduce availability and hence in turn reduce the numbers of new users: but on the other hand it increases financial costs to regular users and may thereby exacerbate other problems.

Fourth, how will a control strategy relate to other elements of a drug strategy, for example, in the fields of prevention, education, treatment and rehabilitation? From the point of view of social and medical workers the user is a client or patient, but to the police the user is a criminal. What problems arise from these conflicting positions?

Fifth, there is a need to take a long-term view. Some of the conditions for drug production are engendered by the poor positions of producer-countries in the world economic order. In the long run, drug production is related to development issues, which are in turn related to a restructuring of that economic order so that some countries are not kept rich at the expense of the poor. The history of former drug-producing countries, such as China and Yugoslavia, suggests that drug production diminishes when there are major economic, political and social changes.

The desire for long-term changes should not allow us to evade the question of the direction for policy in the short term. In the meantime, what about the existing effort? What of the first link, the producer-country? It is often said that crop-control schemes have failed, but there is room for a more vigorous and imaginative approach. World-wide, the total budget for the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), the body through which schemes are pursued, was only $6.8 million in 1983 (Malyon, 1985). The UK contributes £100 000 to the UNFDAC general budget and in 1986 pledged £3.4m for assistance to Pakistan, spread over five years (Home Office, 1986) but, of course, the bulk of UNFDAC contributions does not go directly to the farmers. (it is spent on road-building, irrieation works, other infrastructural work, administration, etc.). Western governments must pay farmers a decent price for crop substitution. One policy option might be to accept that opium growing will continue while these countries remain poor and underdeveloped, and for Western governments to purchase opium at source for later destruction. The 3000kg of heroin that comes to Britain would cost between £600 000 and £3m to buy as opium from farmers (or between £9m and £12m from the wholesaler). A planned crop-intervention scheme would guarantee producers an income and interrupt supply at source. This is cheap compared with the estimated £200m a year that drug users in London alone spend on heroin — but costs would rise as more farmers began to cultivate opium for the market.

An alternative is to encourage development of a Third World pharmaceutical industry based on locally grown drugs, legitimising controlled production, and furthering economic development.

What about importation and distribution? First, I suggest we should insist upon public accountability of resources and effectiveness. The 'value for money' calls now made on other state services are equally applicable to law enforcement. If there is a pay-off from the new resources which the present government is putting into law enforcement, we should expect over the next year to see some significant outcome in terms of several publicly available statistics — on number, quantity and size of drug seizures.

Second, what is the most effective and efficient means of law enforcement? At what levels should effort be expended? Is there a better return from more money for the police, or for the Customs? Certainly, the figures on drug seizures suggest a greater return from Customs' work: over 90 per cent of the total weight of heroin (and other drugs) is seized by Customs. Intercepting 1 kilo at import is clearly much cheaper than after it has been divided into 1000 separate 1-gram packets. There is need for mort research on the effectiveness of the various Customs and police activities.

Third, there is the question of the relative allocation of resources to suppression of each of the drugs of misuse. Despite the emphasis in government policy on the problem of heroin and cocaine, cannabis continues to be a major target and accounts for the majority of drug seizures and convictions. If detection of all drugs requires similar efforts, then at present the majority of Customs and police resources are devoted to cannabis. What would be the impact of a redirection of resources from cannabis to heroin and cocaine?

Fourth, this debate must be informed by evidence of the impact of Customs and policing activity. Law enforcement has an impact not only on availability, but in shaping the distribution system, for example, the structure of drug markets, their location, and membership Law enforcement is reasonably successful in keeping dealing off the streets (although the 'street' metaphor often used by agency workers and researchers can be misleading) and in keeping it confined to certain locations. We know little about the impact of policing. The rhetoric of police work (and a view shared by agency workers) is that control agencies should prioritise the pursuit of higher level dealers. We know this is a difficult task, even though it seems not to have been formally evaluated. Equally plausible might be a strategy that contains and limits dealing networks at a local level — also a hitherto unevaluated strategy. Here is an opportunity for law enforcement, agency workers and researchers to collaborate in local experiments in different enforcement strategies.

Finally, allocation of resources to law enforcement must be seen in the broader context of the total resources available to the drugs problem. Thatcher's optimism about the unlimited resources for the Custom's battle against smuggling — 'anything more we can do will be done and must be done' she is reported to have said — may make good press, but belies the complexity of the task. As I have argued, law enforcement alone is unlikely to have a major impact on the availability of drugs. Many will be asking for a broader consideration of the right balance between public expenditure on education, prevention and treatment, as well as enforcement. The money spent on the education and inforgiation campaigninformationcal treatment and rehabilitation projects while welcome, begins to look small in comparison with expenditure on enforcement.

Notes

1. For fuller discussions, and different analyses see Stimson and Oppenheimer, 1982; Benidge, 1984; Smart, 1984; Judson, 1973; Trebach, 1982.

2. Since 1968 Home Office statistics on addict notifications have been presented on a 'profit' and `loss' table which start with those known at the beginning of the year (5079 in 1984), to which are added new notifications (7410), and from which are deducted those who for various reasons are removed from the tabulation during the year (for example, by reason of imprisonment or death or no longer 'seeking treatment') (6620). This gives a net figure of 5869. I think that a more realistic working figure is the gross number known at the year beginning, plus those notified during the year, a total of 12489. For discussion of problems in interpreting Home Office Statistics see Stimson, 1984.

3. Estimates from the Society of Civil and Public Servants (1985) show even more dramatic falls. 'They estimate the street price per gram of heroin as £250-350 in 1980, falling to £100-150 by 1983. These street prices are considerably higher than other estimates and have probably been calculated on a basis different from that of other sources quoted. All sources agree there was an overall fall in price.

4. Any calculation of the total amount of heroin consumed in the United Kingdom is highly speculative. The estimated consumption of 3000kg in 1985 is based on the following assumptions. Regular users: 60 000 using a quarter gram per day of 45 per cent purity for four out of five days, gives a total of 1971kg per year pure heroin. Casual users: 120 000 using a quarter gram per week of 45 per cent purity, gives a total of 702kg per year pure heroin. Total amount of pure heroin is 2673kg, but assuming that on import this is in fact 90 per cent pure, the total amount at import is 2970kg. Another estimate, by J. A. Dellow, Assistant Commissioner at New Scotland Yard, suggests a national annual expenditure of £400m (Guardian, letter, 10 October 1986). This estimate takes the number of known addicts multiplied by 5, use for 74 months a year, subtraction of 10 per cent for 'those acquiring but not purchasing', an average consumption figure, and known street prices. The actual figures in this equation are not given. If Dellow assumed average street price at £100 per gram, then £400m would buy 4000kg.

5. There are major problems for customs in controlling import of any goods. For example, there is a regular pattern of tobacco smuggling from Belgium to England. Journalists' interviews with importers indicate ton shipments three times a week, hidden inside containers of vegetables so that the overall lorry weight is consistent. It was estimated by one smuggler that only one load in fifty is seized (Sunday Times, 26 January 1986).