Drug Abuse

Article 9

COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD

General comments

1. Articles 9-15 contain provisions on the constitution of the Inter-national Narcotics Control Board, on its composition, the election of its members, its procedure (articles 9-11) and its functions (articles 12-15). Provisions located in other parts of the Convention also confer functions on the Board:

i. Article 21, paragraph 3, requiring that quantities of drugs found by the Board to have been manufactured and imported by a country or territory in excess of its supply limits 1 shall be deducted from these limits and from "the total of the estimates" 2 of that country or territory in the following year;

ii.Article 21, paragraph 4, subparagraph (a), authorizing the Board to order the discontinuation of the export of drugs to a country or territory which has exceeded its import limits as defined in this provision;

iii. Article 24, paragraph 2, subparagraph (a), authorizing the Board to review the notification of a Party, which under paragraph 3 of that article is not automatically entitled to export opium of its own production nor has under paragraph 2, subparagraph (b) obtained the approval of the Council to do so, that it desires to engage in the export of opium of its own harvest, in an amount not exceeding five tons annually. The Board may either approve the notification or recommend to that Party that it not engage in the production of opium for export;

iv. Article 45, paragraph 2, authorizing the International Narcotics Control Board to perform the functions which the Permanent Central Board and Drug Supervisory Body had under earlier narcotics treaties;3

v. Article 49, paragraph 3, subparagraph (b) requiring Parties which have made a reservation under that article to furnish to the Board "estimates" 4 and statistical returns 5 in respect of the reserved activities in the manner and form prescribed by the Board;

vi. Article 49, paragraph 4, subparagraph (a) requiring the Board to send to a Party which has made a reservation under article 49 and has failed to furnish the prescribed estimates and statistics (6) within three months after the date on which they were due, a notification of the delay, with the request to provide the missing information within three months after the receipt of that notification.

2. The International Narcotics Control Board has replaced two organs which were established under earlier narcotics treaties: the Permanent Central Board and the Drug Supervisory Body. 3

 

1 To be established in accordance with article 21, paras. 1 and 2.

2. Defined in article 19, para. 2 and serving as basis for the computation of import limits of a country or territory which an exporting Party must respect; see article 21, para. 4, subparas. (a) and (b) and article 31, para. 1, subpara. (b).

3. See above, comments on article 1, para. 1, subpara. (a) and article 5, and below, comments on article 45.

4. See article 19.

5. See article 20.

6. article 49, para. 3, subpara. (b)

7. Failure of the Party to comply with such a request renders ineffective the reservation which it made under article 49. For other references to functions of the Board, see article 19, paragraph 1, introductory paragraph and para. 4, article 20, para. 1, introductory paragraph, para. 2 and para. 3, article 24, para. 4, subpara. (a), clause (ii) and article 49, para. 4, subpara. (b).

 

Paragraph 1

1. The Board shall consist of eleven members to be elected by the Council as follows:

1. Three members with medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical experience from a list of at least five persons nominated by the World Health Organization; and

2. Eight members from a list of persons nominated by the Members of the United Nations and by Parties which are not Members of

the United Nations.

Commentary

1. The Economic and Social Council, which was the body which appointed the Permanent Central Board 1, one of the two predecessor organs of the International Narcotics Control Board, 2 is also the electoral organ of the latter Board. The requirement that three of the eleven members of the International Narcotics Control Board be elected from a list of persons nominated by the World Health Organization is explained by the facts that the new Board not only took over in substance the functions assigned by the earlier treaties to the Permanent Central Board, but also those entrusted by these treaties to the Drug Supervisory Body, two of whose four members were appointed by the World Health Organization. Since that Organization need not nominate more than five persons, it has considerable influence on the composition of the Board, reflecting the importance of medical, pharmacological and pharmaceutical knowledge in the work of that organ. The World Health Organization's nominations are made by its Director General.3

2. The right of non-Parties to the Single Convention which are Members of the United Nations to nominate candidates for membership on the Board appears to be justified on the ground that they contribute to the budget of the United Nations, and thus to the costs of maintaining the Board.4

3. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, at its twentieth session, drew up a procedure 5 which the Economic and Social Council approved 6 and which the latter follows in electing the members of the Board. Under this procedure the Secretary-General of the United Nations invites the Members of the United Nations, the Parties to the Single Convention which are non-member States, and the World Health Organization to nominate candidates within an indicated period. The invitation, which is to be issued one year before the session of the Council at which the election takes place, contains information on the relevant treaty provisions, the election procedure, in particular on the dates on which the Council will act, the requirements of membership of the Board, and the rights and duties of members. 7 The treaty provisions regarding the required qualifications of members are explained, and the views of the Council on their interpretation are given. 9 The Governments are also informed of the qualifications which the Council finds desirable, but on which the Convention is silent. The attention of the World Health Organization is in particular drawn to the desirability that its nominees should not only enjoy a reputation in the medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical world as required by article 9, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a), but should also have a sound know-ledge of international and national narcotics administration. 9 Governments are informed that it is not essential that their candidates be technically qualified as doctors, chemists or pharmacists, as the Board will have at its command the benefit of such qualifications from the inclusion of those of its members who are nominated by the World Health Organization, and who under the terms of the Convention must have the necessary scientific knowledge.'" It is, on the other hand, pointed out that it is highly desirable that Government nominees should have a good knowledge of national and international narcotics administration. Governments are also reminded that they may nominate candidates who are not their nationals. 11 The Secretary-General transmits to the members of the Council two lists, one composed of persons nominated by Governments, and a second of candidates nominated by the World Health Organization, annexing copies of the curricula vitae which he has received. He is required to do this before the session of the Council at which the election procedure is commenced. He supplements the lists by forwarding to the members of the Council late nominations, i.e. nominations which he receives after the expiration of the period which he had indicated for this purpose in his invitations to name candidates.

4. The election process takes place in two stages. The Council sets up a Committee on Candidatures charged with the task of selecting from the nominees those persons whom it considers particularly qualified. This Committee establishes two panels of recommended persons, one containing Govern-mental nominees and the second containing candidates named by the World Health Organization, and reports to the Council. It is suggested that the panel of Government nominees should contain 16 persons, i.e. twice the number of members to be chosen among them. It is also proposed that the panel of World Health Organization nominees which the Committee establishes should contain at least five names. 12 The Committee may meet outside the time in which the Council is in session.

5. At the next session, whether or not it is formally a new session or a continuation of the earlier session ("resumed" session), the Council proceeds to the actual election. It is suggested that the election should take place in two different parts, and that the election of the members of the World Health Organization nominees be carried out first. It is also proposed in the procedure drafted by the Commission and approved by the Council at its fortieth session 6 that an interval sufficient to facilitate consultation should take place between the election of the World Health Organization nominees and that of the Government candidates. It is also suggested that not more than one national of any particular country should be chosen. 13 The Council is not bound to choose from the panels established by the Committee on Candidatures. 14 It can, however, elect only persons nominated by the World Health Organization, by Members of the United Nations or by non-Member States which are Parties to the Single Convention. It may elect a person who is neither a national of a Member of the United Nations nor of a Party not a Member, and even a stateless person, provided only he has been so nominated. The elections are decided by secret ballot under the Council's Rules of Procedure. 15

6. If a vacancy occurs, the outlined procedure is applied mutatis mutandis. If a place held by a Government nominee becomes vacant, only Governments are invited to make nominations. If on the other hand the vacant place had been occupied by a World Health Organization nominee, only this Organization is asked to propose candidates.

7. The Convention does not state how many candidates the World Health Organization should propose in the event of such a vacancy. It appears however that it would hardly be compatible with the spirit of article 9, paragraph 1, if the World Health Organization nominated less than two per-sons, because doing so would deprive the Council of its right of choice of the member of the Board, as therein provided.

8. The vacancy should be filled if possible at the Council session immediately following its occurrence. 16

 

1. See above, comments on article 1, para. 1, subpara. (a) and below comments on article 45. Prior to the 1946 Protocol the members of the Permanent Central Board were appointed by an electoral college consisting of the members of the Council of the League of Nations, a representative of the United States of America and, when Germany was not a member of the League, also a representative of that country. When Germany became a Member of the League, it became also a permanent member of its Council.

2. The other predecessor organ was the Drug Supervisory Body, whose four members were, under article 5, para. 6 of the 1931 Convention as amended by the 1946 Protocol, appointed as follows; two members by the World Health Organization, one member by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and one member by the Permanent Central Board. Prior to the 1946 Protocol, one member was appointed by the Health Committee of the League of Nations, a second member by the Office International d' Hygiene Publique, an intergovernmental organization located in Paris and established in 1907 (see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 100, p. 466), a third member by the League's Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs (the predecessor body of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs), and a fourth member by the Permanent Central Board. In the last five years of their existence (1963-1968), there was a complete union of membership between the Permanent Central Board and Drug Supervisory Body, the appointive bodies of the Supervisory Body having elected to membership to that body four of the eight members of the Permanent Central Board; see Economic and Social Council resolution 914 F (XXXIV) (1962) para. 2; see also Economic and Social Council resolution 667 (XXIV) (1957) and foot-note 13 referring to the comments on article 7; as regards the dissolution of the "Office Inter-national d'Hygiène Publique" and the transfer of its functions to the World Health Organization, see Protocol concerning the International Office of Public Health, dated 22 July, 1946, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 9, p. 3.

3. Resolution WHA 1846 (May 1965) of the World Health Assembly.

4 Article 6 of the Single Convention, which also provides for contribution of Parties which are not Members of the United Nations.

5. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, report on the twentieth session, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 2 (E/4140). See also documents E/4158/Rev. 1 (1966) and E/476I (1969).

6. Council resolution 1106 (XL), para. 5.

7. Document B/4158/Revd, para. 17. As regards a similar procedure for the election of the members of the past Permanent Central Board, see Council resolutions 49 (IV) and 123 D (VI).

8. See also below, comments on article 9, para. 2.

9. Document E/4158/Rev.1, para. 14, see also document E/4761, annex II, para. 14; see also Records, vol. II, p. 6, foot-note 16.

10. Document E/4158/Rev.1, para. 8; see also document E/4761, annex II, para. 8, see also Records, vol. II, p. 6, foot-note 16.

11 Document E/4158/Rev.l, para. 13; see also document E/4761, annex II, para. 13.

12 Documents E/4158/Rcv.l, para. 21 and E/4761, para. 3; see also document E/4772.

13 There is no express treaty provision prohibiting the election of two persons of the same nationality. See below, comments on article 9, para. 3.

14 Document E/4158/Rev.], paras. 22-24.

15 Rules 67-69 of the Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council, United Nations, New York, 1967, document E/3063/Rev.l ; United Nations publication, Sales No. 67.I.32.

16 Document E/4158/Rev.l, para. 25; article 10, para. 5 of the Single Convention.

 

Paragraph 2

2. Members of the Board shall be persons who, by their competence, impartiality and disinterestedness, will command general confidence. During their term of office they shall not hold any position or engage in any activity which would be liable to impair theft impartiality in the exercise of their functions. The Council shall, in consultation with the Board, make all arrangements necessary to ensure the full technical independence of the Board in carrying out its functions.

Commentary

1. The International Narcotic Control Board is held to have some judicial functions, as was its predecessor, the Permanent Central Board. 1 The function of establishing whether a country or territory has failed to carry out provisions of the Single Convention and has thereby seriously endangered its aims, and that of recommending that Parties discontinue the import or export of drugs or both, from or to the offending country or territory, 2 undoubtedly has judicial characteristics. 3 Article 9, paragraph 2 therefore contains rules to ensure the independent functioning of the International Narcotics Control Board. Its independence is called "technical" to indicate that it refers only to the performance of its functions, which are mainly of a technical nature. It depends for its election and budget on organs of the United Nations. 4 The Board must also submit to the Council, through the Commission, an annual report on its work. 4a

2. This report, as well as such additional reports as the Board may choose to make, serve the purpose of calling the attention of Governments to points of strength or weakness of the international control system, and to particular conditions which may require remedial action by political intergovernmental organs such as the General Assembly, the Council or Commission and by the national Governments. Both the Council and the Commission may make such comments on the Board's reports and work as they see fit; but neither of them nor any other United Nations organ may, directly or indirectly, give the Board instructions as regards the actions which it should take.

3. Paragraph 2 contains three different rules to ensure the full technical independence of the Board. One refers to the personal qualifications of its members, another excludes from membership persons engaged in activities which might affect their impartiality, and the third provides for the Board administrative working conditions appropriate to enable it to function independently. The first two rules impose obligations in regard to nominations by the World Health Organization and by Governments, as well as upon the Council acting as an electoral body, to see to it that the nominees and persons who are elected fulfil the requisite conditions.

4. The first sentence of paragraph 2, requiring that the members of the International Control Board should by their "competence", "impartiality" and "disinterestedness" command general confidence, is in substance the same as, and textually very similar to, the second paragraph of article 19 of the 1925 Convention which applied to the members of the former Permanant Central Board. High standards of a technical, intellectual and moral nature are required.

5. As regards the technical qualifications which form a part of the "competence" required, see above, comments on article 9, paragraph 1.

6. The condition of "impartiality" presupposes that on the basis of his background the candidate can be expected to adopt a judicial attitude in performing his functions if elected to membership on the Board.

7. Both "impartiality" and "disinterestedness" must be ensured not only by the absence of any material interest in favouring particular elements of the controlled drug trade, but also by the assurance that the candidate will be free from any bias which might prevent him from acting impartially.

8. The general rule of the first sentence of paragraph 2, stipulating the conditions of "impartiality" and "disinterestedness" of the members of the Board, is strengthened by the specific rule of the second sentence, prescribing that they should "during their term of office" "not hold any position or engage in any activity which would be liable to impair their impartiality in the exercise of their functions". The second sentence corresponds to the sixth paragraph s of article 19 of the 1925 Convention, which applied to members of the old Permanent Central Board, and which read as follows: "The members of the Central Board shall not hold any office which puts them in a position of direct dependence on their Government." This paragraph was, prior to World War II, understood to exclude Government employees from membership on the Board. It was also held that such employees were excluded from election if at the date of their appointment they had not retired from Government service. This narrow interpretation became difficult to maintain after World War II, when the economic and social conditions had become very different from those prevailing at the time of the conclusion of the 1925 Convention, and in particular when a number of socialist countries had emerged. It was found that in many countries it would be difficult to find persons who would not be government employees and would at the same time be qualified for membership on the Permanent Central Board. It was, moreover, considered that the narrow interpretation of paragraph 6 of article 19 of the 1925 Convention did not do justice to its text, which did not exclude all Government employees but only those who held an office "which puts them in a position of direct dependence on their Government", and that the wording of that paragraph did not eliminate from election even those Government officials who were in such direct dependence, provided only that they ceased to maintain such a relationship with their Governments while serving on the Board. The Economic and Social Council accepted this new view, and adopted a resolution which endorsed the opinion that candidates who were Government employees in such capacities as judges, university professors, and medical practitioners, but who were not in a position of direct dependence on their Governments, were eligible for membership on the Permanent Central Board, and were not required to give up their position while serving on the Board. Even some lawyers or specialists in other professions who were in Government employment could, in the Council's view, fall in the same category. The Council also held that officials in active civil service who were in a position of direct dependence on their Government could be appointed, provided that following their election they ceased temporarily, i.e. for the duration of their membership on the Board, to exercise their functions as officials (e.g. by taking a leave of absence), and while serving on the Board did not act under instructions of their Governments. 7 The second sentence of paragraph 2 of article 9 was drawn up with this resolution of the Council in mind. 8

9. It may therefore be assumed that government positions which did did not prevent the eligibility of candidates for the old Permanent Central Board under Economic and Social Council resolution 123 D (VI) may also be held not to be liable to impair the "impartiality" required under the first two sentences of paragraph 2 of article 9. Moreover, persons who are in government positions which may be considered to be liable to affect their "impartiality" may nevertheless be appointed to the International Narcotics Control Board if they cease to hold their positions for the duration of their term of membership, whether temporarily by taking a leave of absence or permanently by resigning from their Government position, and if they do not accept instructions from their national Governments while serving on the Board.

10. The 1925 Convention expressly excluded from membership on the Permanent Central Board only Government employees, but not persons en-gaged in non-governmental activities affecting their impartiality. While this latter class of persons was not made ineligible for membership on the old Board by a specific rule, it appears that they were nevertheless excluded by the general provision of the second paragraph of article 19 of that Convention requiring "impartiality" and "disinterestedness". The Single Convention contains the same general rule, 9 which likewise must be considered to have the effect of excluding from membership on the International Narcotics Control Board persons engaged in such non-governmental activities; but the Single Convention goes beyond that. Its definition of activities which might be incompatible with the "impartiality" required for membership on the International Narcotics Control Board covers not only government employment, but "any position" and "any activity", no matter whether governmental or private, which would be liable to impair that impartiality. Positions in the private drug industry or trade may therefore present grounds for exclusion.

11. The third sentence of paragraph 2 of article 9 contains a provision which is very similar to that of the first paragraph of article 20 of the 1925 Convention. Article 20 stipulated that the Council of the League of Nations should, in consultation 10 with the Permanent Central Board, make the necessary arrangements for the organization and working of that Board with the object of assuring its full technical independence.

12. The independence of the work of an organ can undoubtedly be impaired if it is impeded in carrying out its functions by unfavourable administrative conditions under which it must perform its tasks, and especially by unsatisfactory secretariat services. 11 The International Narcotics Control Board must in particular be able to meet as often as in its opinion may be necessary for the proper discharge of its functions, as it is indeed authorized to do by article I1, paragraph 2 of the Single Convention. It must not be prevented, for example, from holding urgent meetings by lack of administrative facilities. Whether such a session is urgent must be left to the free judgement of the Board. Dependence in this matter on the decision of another organ undoubtedly would affect the "technical independence of the Board in carrying out its functions". The Board must also be able, through a secretariat, to carry out certain technical functions on definite dates. Its inability to do this might have serious consequences for the operation of the Convention; for example, some countries might not obtain urgently needed medical supplies without delays very damaging to their health services. 12

13. There can, on the other hand, be no question that the General Assembly of the United Nations must have full budgetary control over the administration of the International Narcotics Control Board, whose expenses are borne by the United Nations. The Single Convention moreover provides expressly that the expenses shall be borne in such manner as shall be decided by the General Assembly; 13 but in order to be able to carry out its functions in full technical independence, the Board must have some degree of budgetary and administrative discretion, within limits set each year by the General Assembly taking into account the nature of the Board's work, which, as has been pointed out, includes some judicial functions.

14. The Council, in carrying out its tasks of guardian of the Board's independence under the third sentence of paragraph 2 of article 9, by its resolution 1196 (XLII) of 16 May 1967 adopted administrative arrangements to ensure the full technical independence of the Board. 14 These arrangements had been drafted by the Secretary-General in consultation with the old Permanent Central Board 15 for the Council's approval. They are similar to those which the Council had adopted for the Permanent Central Board under article 20 of the 1925 Convention. 16 Under the Council resolution of 1967, the International Narcotics Control Board has some degree of budgetary discretion within the limits set each year by the General Assembly, and has a separate secretariat " which is an integral part of the Secretariat of the United Nations and under the full administrative control of the Secretary-General. This secretariat is bound to carry out the Board's decisions. Its head is appointed or assigned by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Board. Pro-vision is made for administrative measures to protect the confidential character of the Board's correspondence and other papers. The Board has also the right to be represented at meetings of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, as well as at meetings of the Economic and Social Council, of other organs of the United Nations, of conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations, of specialized agencies and of other organizations at which problems relating to narcotic drugs are considered.

15. The arrangements adopted by the Council resolution of 1967 expire on 1 March 1974. The council may, in consultation with the Board, prolong, revise or replace them by different measures. 18

 

1 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, report on the twenty-first session, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 2 (E/4294), para. 108; Records, vol. II, pp. 218 and 222.

2 Article 14 of the Single Convention; see also articles 24 and 26 of the 1925 Convention, article 14, para. 3 of the 1931 Convention and article 11-13 of the 1953 Protocol.

3. The corresponding functions of the Permanent Central Board, one of the two predecessor bodies of the present International Narcotics Control Board, were termed "judicial" as early as 1927 in a report dated 1 October 1927 of a sub-committee of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs on the Relations of the Advisory Committee and the Central Board; League of Nations, document O.C. 669, p. 3. That Board was sometimes called a "judicial" organ, or, because it has also administrative functions, referred to as "semi-judicial" or "quasi-judicial".

4. Articles 7 and 9, para. 1.

4a Article 15.

5. Fifth para. of article 19 as amended by the 1946 Protocol.

6. Resolution 123 D (VI), of 2 March, 1948.

7. Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fourth Session, Supplement No. 1, report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (E/251), p. 7; Ibid., Sixth Session, Supplement No. 2, report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (E/575), pp. 21-23 and annex IV, pp. 74-87; see also resolution of the Economic and Social Council 49 (IV) of 28 March 1949 (part dealing with "Appointments to the Permanent Central Opium Board").

8. Records, vol, II, p. 218. Article 13, para. 3 of the Third Draft serving as working document for the Plenipotentiary Conference contains in substance the same pro-vision as the two first sentences of article 9, para. 2 of the Single Convention.

9 Article 9, para. 2, first sentence.

10 The French text provided that the arrangements should be made "d'accord avec le Comité".

11 For a discussion of these problems as they may affect the International Narcotics Control Board, see the report of the Permanent Central Narcotics Board to the Economic and Social Council on the work of the Board in 1965, paras. 61-76 (document E/OB/21); see also Commission on Narcotics Drugs, report on the twenty-first session (1966), Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 2 (E/4294), paras. 98-113.

12 E.g., article 12 (particularly para. 5 thereof), article 21, paras. 1 and 4 and article 31, para. 1, subpara. (b).

13 Article 6.

14 Annex to resolution 1196 (XLII).

15 Article 45, para. 1 of the Single Convention. Until I March 1968 the Permanent Central Board performed the functions of the International Narcotics Control Board under the Single Convention; see Economic and Social Council resolution 1106 (XL).

16 Economic and Social Council resolution 201 (VIII) of 2 March 1948.

17. As regards the possibility of establishing a "single secretariat" serving the Board as well as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, see below, comments on article 16.

18. Para. 20 of the Arrangements of 1967 provides that the Secretary-General has at any time the right, to propose, in agreement with the Board, to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and to the Economic and Social Council, revisions to enter into force before I March 1974. For proposal of changes to come into force after that date, only consultation with the Board, and not its agreement, is required.

Paragraph 3

3. The Council, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographic representation, shall give consideration to the importance of including on the Board, in equitable proportion, persons possessing a knowledge of the drug situation in the producing, manufacturing, and consuming countries, and connected with such countries.

Commentary

1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 9 contain provisions to ensure the technical competence and impartiality of the individual members of the International Narcotics Control Board. Paragraph 3 supplements these provisions by setting up two principles for the guidance of the Council in electing the members of the Board. The application of these principles has the effect of promoting the impartiality and technical competence of the Board as a whole.

2. Two different rules are established: the principle of geographic distribution, and that of "including on the Board, in equitable proportion, persons possessing a knowledge of the drug situation in the producing, manufacturing and consuming countries, and connected with such countries". The second of these principles, but not the first, was also provided for in the 1925 Convention in regard to the election of the members of the former Permanent Central Board.' The fact that the members of the International Narcotics Control Board are collectively familiar with the drug situation in different geographic regions, as well as in countries with basically different interests in the drug trade, is likely to reduce the possibility of any bias, however unconscious, of that organ in favour of a particular country or of particular economic interests. 2

3. The Council is required to give consideration to the principles laid down in paragraph 3 not only in the election of government nominees, but also in that of WHO candidates. Paragraph 3 applies to the election of the Board as a whole. The Council's tasks under this paragraph are facilitated by the practice of the World Health Organization, which is guided by the principle of equitable geographic representation when nominating its candidates pursuant to paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) of article 9.

4. The wording of paragraph 3 allows a flexible application of its rules. While the Council must, of course, give due consideration to all of the aspects of paragraph 3 at each election, the emphasis which it may place on each of them may differ from election to election, depending on the availability of highly qualified candidates.

5. The election of more than one national of the same country is not expressly prohibited by the Single Convention, but it would be very difficult to reconcile with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 9, particularly with the principle of equitable geographic representation.

6. The terms "producing" and "manufacturing" are to be understood in the sense of the definition of "production" and "manufacture" in article 1. A "producing" country is thus a country which is engaged in the separation of opium, coca leaves, cannabis or cannabis resin from the plants from which these drugs are obtained, and a "manufacturing" country is a country which is engaged in the making of other drugs. The word "consuming" is, on the other hand, to be understood in its ordinary meaning, and not in the sense of the definition of article 1, paragraph 2, which states that "a drug shall be regarded as 'consumed' when it has been supplied to any person or enterprise for retail distribution, medical use or scientific research". 2

7. All countries are of course "consuming" countries, some of them are in addition also "manufacturing" countries or "producing" countries, and a few belong to all thee groups of countries mentioned in paragraph 3. For the purposes of this provision, a country should be assigned to that category which appears to be dominant 4 in the light of a worldwide view of the drug trade. A "consuming" country will thus be a country which relies for its drug supplies mainly on imports, although it may also be engaged in the "manufacture" or "production" of drugs, or both. In view of the purpose of paragraph 3, it may also be assumed that only those countries should be considered as "manufacturing" or "producing" which—as the case may be—"manufacture" or "produce" relatively important quantities of drugs. 5

8. A country "producing" only cannabis or cannabis resin could hardly, under the conditions prevailing at the time of this writing, be selected as a "producing" country for the purposes of paragraph 3 since the medical use of cannabis drugs is at present considered to be obsolete, has in many countries been abolished, and in any case can be only very limited. Since drugs obtained from opium are incomparably more used in medical practice than cocaine, which has only very limited medical uses and has largely been replaced by synthetic substances, countries producing opium in important amounts may for the purposes of paragraph 3 have generally to be preferred to countries producing coca leaves.

9. The application of the rule concerning manufacturing, producing and consuming countries should have the effect of ensuring that the Board has collectively a knowledge of the economic and administrative drug problems peculiar to each of the three categories of countries mentioned in paragraph 3.

10. The requirement that a Board member should be "connected" with a country belonging to one of the three groups does not necessarily mean that he must have the nationality of the country concerned, although this will generally be the case. His connexion, by residence and experience in drug control or economy, should, however, be so close as to justify the expectation that he would be thoroughly familiar with the drug situation in the country concerned.

 

1 Article 19, para. 5 of the unamended text, or para. 4 of the text as amended by the 1946 Protocol.

2. 4 As regards similar rules guiding the composition of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which is however a body consisting of Government representatives, see Economic and Social Council resolutions 9 (I) and 1147 (XLI), para. 4 together with resolution 845 (XXXII) II, paras. 2 and 3, and III, para. 1; see also above, comments on article 7. In the composition of the Commission the consideration of "consuming countries" is however replaced by that of those countries in which drug addiction or the illicit traffic constitutes a serious social problem.

3. In practice there would be no difference whichever of these two meanings is given to the word "consuming" in para. 3.

4. Records, vol. II, pp. 214-215.

5. Records, vol. II, p. 214

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