Drug Abuse

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DRUG POLICY, VOL 7, NO 2,1996

DUTCH WEED AND LOGIC. PART 1:
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM ON DRUGS POLICY

C.W. Maris, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Professor CW Maris is Professor of Legal Philosophy, University of Amsterdam; translation by Donald Gardner

The liberality of The Netherlands' liberal drugs policy is the subject of much debate. While the French government is severely critical, some German federal states are nowadays tending to take it as an example. In this ambiguous international situation, the Dutch government has recently published a Memorandum on its drugs policy, which frankly acknowledges its own inconsistency: 'One must bear in mind that formulating a drugs policy is not an exercise in logic.' Its concrete resolutions in other words are not directly derived from its underlying principle, the prevention and diminution of harm, but are pragmatically adapted to 1hat is politically feasible in the light of the international war on drugs.

This raises two questions, which are dealt with in this article. First, what would a fully consistent Dutch drugs policy look like? Second, are its illogical deviations awise response to foreign political pressure? The article starts with a analysis of the inconsistencies of the Drugs Memorandum. Next, the article presents the harm principle as it has been elaborated by philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Joel Feinberg. Part II, to be published in the next issue of this journal, points out the policy that would ideally follow from this principle, in the light of scientific findings on the effects of drugs. It concludes by discussing the extent to which this liberal approach could be put into practice.

STONED THINKING

The Dutch government's recent Memorandum on hashish: drugs policy concludes with a brief self-criticism:

'In part the policy proposed maybe still contains inconsistencies. It has to be realised that drugs policy is not an exercize in logic (P.58)

A Memorandum on drugs that proclaims its own lack of logic reminds one inadvertently of Baudelaire's description in Artificial Paradises of the consciousness-expanding affects of drugs such as opium and hashish:

'Every form of contradiction vanishes, all philosophical questions become transparent, or at least so it seems.' (Baudelaire, 1971, p-49)

Some authors argue that an indifference to logic may be a sign of a higher or deeper understanding. In A Trip to Stonesville, Andrew Weil states that drug-induced 'stoned thinking'is more open to intuition than is the arid'straight thinking'of the rational intellect that confines itself to inductive reason. Under the influence of psychedelic drugs consciousness takes far better account of the reality, which has many facets:

'Straight thinking with its either/or logic cannot understand this phenomenon, much less accept it and derive benefit from it. But as soon as we turn out of our intellects and into our intuitive sources of knowledge, we discover that ambivalence is part of the way things are.' (Weil, 1975, p.69)

The Dutch Memorandum on drugs chimes in well with this eulogy to irrational thinking. Instead of treating its lack of logical rigour as a shortcoming, it presents it as a flexible response to 'an obdurate Hydra-headed problem that is subject to rapidly changing social and cultural developments at home and abroad' (p. 58). Should we conclude that the Dutch policy of permissiveness has degenerated to the extent that people abroadhave long suspected? Is it really true that civil servants in the 'higher' echelons of the justice and Health ministries and in the Home Office now feel free to write consciousnessexpanding memoranda?

The suspicion is reinforced by the Memorandum's somewhat fishy preference for the green green grass of home cultivated by Dutch licerved growers and distributed via bona fide 'coffee shops'. The government actually dreams of'a model by which the crop will be transported under governmental supervision' (p. 14). There is even a nostalgic allusion to the glorious Dutch colonial tradition in dealing:

'One is forcibly reminded of the analogy with the government's opium monopoly in the Dutch East Indies.' (p. 14)

The ideal thing would be for the Dutch government to make soft drugs completely legal. Unfortunately international relations do not permit this; ideological prejudice means that most other countries condemn the Dutch policy on drugs in no uncertain terms (p. 11). This is why the Memorandum, of necessity, chooses for a continuation of the present pragmatic policy of permissiveness with a privileged place being allocated for the foreseeable future to Dutch homegrown. In the meantime, attempts to educate foreign neighbours are being intensified:

'Sorgdrager praises Dutch marijuana as being less expensive and less dangerous than products from Morocco and Pakistan; she recommends that Paris adopt the Dutch approach.' (Interview with the Dutch Minister of justice in Le Figaro, quoted in the Volkskrant, 23/10/95)

SOFT DRUGS: BUY DUTCH!

The authors of the Memorandum blame the contradictions in the policy they recommend mainly on excessive pressure from more powerful foreign neighbours; they do not claim to have been inspired by Dutch homegrown. If it contains inconsistencies, they argue that this is because their policy is not in every respect based on the principles behind it; rather it is sensibly and pragmatically tuned to a changing situation. Politics after all is the art of the possible, not an abstract philosophy of norms. What are the implications of this pragmatic approach for the inner logic of its basic principles and for the practicat implementation of the policy?

The introductory first chapter states that the central aim of Dutch policy is the preventionand reduction of harm caused by drugs by reducing the dangers of their use both to the community and to the individual (p.4). The first question then is how far are soft drugs really harmful. According to the government they are not harmful in themselves, but only in specific circumstances and in cases of excessive use. Here they make a fundamental distinction between hard and soft drugs. Hard drugs in their view are so harmful for the public health that they must be forbidden without any question. Soft drugs are much less harmful than both hard drugs and legally permitted substances such as alcohol and nicotine. They therefore also call for a more flexible policy. In keeping with this logic the Memorandum devotes separate chapters to the separate categories.

Chapters 4 and 5.6 deal with soft drugs. These mild intoxicants are mainly used for purposes of relaxation. They induce a mood of euphoria in which one's powers of concentration are reduced. They do not lead to death through an overdose, nor to physical addiction; the degree to which they lead to psychological dependency is also much less than with hard drugs. According to the Dutch experience, they also do not encourage one to experiment with harder substances as the 'stepping-stone' theory would have it. Alcohol is much more likely to lead to aggression. Soft drugs only represent a danger for specific groups such as school-going children and the socially vulnerable.

In view of the fact that the harm done is so minimal the Dutch government would prefer to attack the crime involved in the traffic of soft drugs by making them totally legal. Prices would then fall and criminals would no longerbe able tomakemoneyout of them. Ideally speaking, legal penalties would not be replaced by complete freedom but rather by the kind of controls that are now applicable to alcohol. 'One should think rather in terms of introducing a government monopoly or a system of licences' (p.52). An ideal like this, however, cannot be realised in practice without the consent and cooperation of our neighbours. International treaties prohibit legalisation. Drugs tourism moreover would increase with all the resulting nuisance. Organised crime would continue to make handsorle profits by exporting high quality Dutch drugs.

As the international situation makes legalisation impossible, the government has opted instead for a continuation of the present pragmatic course. However, it does argue that account should be taken of a number of new developments, such as the emergence of a national crop of a superior form of marijuana, known in The Netherlands as Nederwiet, or Dutch weed.

The possessionofup to 30gramsof the products of the cannabis plant - marijuana or hashish-for one's own consumption was decriminalised in 1976 by an amendment to the Opium Law. Since then it has no longer been treated as a crime but as a misdemeanour; the much smaller punishment for an infringement like this is in practice never resorted to, seeing that the Public Prosecutor regards prosecu, tion as inappropriate. He is allowed to do so on the basis of discretionary powers, which he has in Dutch law-unlike other legal systems. Since thenthe number of users has hardly increased at all, even though it means that soft drugs are freely available. Internationally, however, the trend has been a rise in the number of users between 1984 and 1994. In 1994, the sale in coffee shops of a maximum of 30 grams of soft drugs to people over 18 is, under certain conditions, officially permitted. This at least is the tenor of the directive on Criminal investigation policy with respect to coffee shops (see Staatscourant, 1994, No. 203 - the official government gazette).

One important condition is that coffee shops do not also deal in hard drugs. In making a distinction between the markets for hard and soft drugs, the government aims to prevent consumers of cannabis products from coming in contact with derivatives of opium and the coca leaf, such as heroin and cocaine that are regarded as being much more harmful. That this policy of separation has been successful is evidenced by the very small number of users of mildly narcotic drugs who go over to using harder drugs. An estimated 675 000 people in The Netherlands smoke soft drugs on a regular basis, compared with a figure of 25 000 who smoke, snort or inject heroin or cocaine. With its 1.6 addicts per thousand inhabi, tants, The Netherlands compares favourably with countries such as France, England and the USA, which have a much stricter drugs policy; the European average is 2.7 per thousand. Moreover, the number of young consumers of hard drugs is very small. Due to effective information and the sight of older addicts people are fairly well aware of the risks involved. Most smokers of cannabis remain content with what their coffee shop has to offer:

'Any coffee shop with a proper assortment can offer the customer a choice of various sorts of
marijuana, hashish and home-grown.' (p.39)

In short, 'the coffee shops have a useful social function for young people as a buffer against the criminal milieu that surrounds hard drugs'(p.5 2).

Out of an annual total of 500 million guilders' consumption of soft drugs in The Netherlands,Dutch homegrown now claims 50% of the market; imported hashish comes mainly from Morocco and the traffic is run by Moroccan gangs. With ill, concealed pride, the Memorandum announces a national success story:

'The traditional Dutch expertise in horticulture and methods for improving these crops has played a vital role in conquering this section of the market. Dutch homegrown is a reliable quality product and is therefore popular, particularly among young people.' (p.36)

Sadly the Memorandum also contains three items of bad news. In recent years organised crime has increased enormously, concerning itself not only with hard drugs but also with large-scale cultivation, trade and export of Dutch homegrown. Second, due to their varied assortment ofquality products the coffee shops are also a magnet for foreign'drugs tourists'. Finally the criticism from abroad of the Dutch export and supply of drugs to foreigners has become increasingly sharp. For this reason the regime has decided to act against the wholesale trade in soft drugs by criminal organisations and to discourage drugs tourism. Since the average customer does not buy more than 3 grams for 25 guilders, the maximum amount permitted for individual purchase has been reduced to 5 grams.

As far as the supply side is concerned, the Public Prosecutor's new directive states that bona fide coffee shops with a stock of a few hundred grams will not be investigated. The income that coffee shops earn in this way does not come under the heading of'improper transaction'. The government itself also has a stake in the drugs traffic in the form of income tax.

The remaining conditions for permitted coffee shops will be tightened up in order to reduce the risk to vulnerable groups of users and the nuisance caused to neighbours. With the aim of protecting school children, sales to people under 18 will be forbidden as will shops in the neighbourhoods of schools. Furthermore, coffee shops will not be permitted to sell hard drugs or alcohol, nor may they have any one-arm bandits on their premises nor should they cause any nuisance in the neighbourhood. According to the Memorandum these regulations will lead the 1200 existing premises being reduced by half.

The bona fide coffee shops should preferably obtain their permitted stock from the tens of thousands of bona fide Dutch home growers. The advantages are obvious:

'On the one hand a development can be traced of bona fide coffee shops obtaining their wares from networks of non-criminal home growers. This means that the shops can avoid having anything to do with criminal organisations. Given the aim of permitting organised crime as little leverage as possible, this is a positive trend. In theory it is possible that the +35,000 home growers - this figure is some, what on the generous side - with their very modest crops of a few plants each, should be able to cater for the entire domestic market. There will not be any place for a criminal traffic any longer.' (p.49)

Nonetheless, the threat exists that the cultivation of homegrown will be taken over by criminal organizations. The government aims to prevent this by giving a priority to the prosecution of large-scale cultivation and trade, especially that for export. The maximum penalty for large-scale cultivation is to be increased from 2 to 4 years prison. Small-scale domestic cultivation by contrast will not be deliberately prosecuted. The Memorandum does not discuss the positive aspect of the latter policy that it reduces unemployment.

What is the logic of this policy for soft drugs? The Memorandum itself offers no comment on its own inconsistencies. I will confine myself to three instances. First of all the distinction between hard and soft drugs can be defended as consistent with the prime aim of the policy: to limit the harm done by drugs. This argument, however, is only valid if you assume that hard drugs are categorically more harmful than soft ones, something that is by no means certain, as I will show later. Furthermore, it is inconsistent that the comparatively harmless cannabis remains illegal unlike substances such as alcohol and nicotine that the government views as much more harmful.

The first inconsistency invites a second - one that has the aim of partially modifying the undesirable criminalisation contained in the Opium Law. The inconsistency lies in the contradiction between the prohibition on the one hand and the opportunistic acceptance in the Public Prosecutor's guidelines on the other. This contradiction is disguised by an appeal to the principle of discretion; the Memorandum recommends that the police and the courts get their priorities right. This would seem to bean oppot tunistic argument however, because the real aim is by indirect means to decriminalise the traffic.

Finally the expectation that the coffee shops will obtain their entire stock from acceptable noncriminal small-scale producers of homegrown is exaggerated. The demand for foreign marijuana and hashish is still 50%. As for foreign cannabis, the contradiction between the 'front door' and the 'back door remains unaltered : coffeeshops disposing of a stock- in-trade is officially tolerated, but the essential replenishment of the stock is not.

HARD DRUGS

Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of the Memorandum concentrate on hard drugs, particularly heroin and cocaine. In these chapters too the gist of the argument follows logicallyfrom the mainaimof the policy- tocombat the harm caused by drugs. Once more the reasoning is based on a distinction between different sorts of harm; it is a distinction, however, that the Memorandum never states in so many words.

First, there is the medical and social harm suffered by the users themselves. Addicted users are viewed as patients requiring treatment rather than criminals to be punished. The policy aims at the social integration of addicts, seeing that kicking the habit completely is not normally a realistic medical goal. Through good medical facilities, needle exchange, the provision of methadone etc., the aim is to improve their health and social functioning. The criminal law is not aimed at the use of the drugs as such, but against the crime and nuisance that tend to go with it.

This leads us to the second categorywhere the taw does play a role - that of the harm that drugs cause indirectly to others. This category is again subdivided into two categories. First, there is the harm done by hard drugs users, particularly the crime that gives users the means to buy these drugs, and the nuisance caused by their antisocial behaviour. Second, there is the harm inflicted by criminal dealers, frequently professional gangs of non,addicts. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the social and medical welfare of addicts and the approach that should be adopted in the courts to criminal addicts; Chapter 5 discusses how the law should deal with criminal sellers.

The proposals for prevention and care are extremely abstract. In the case of addicts, there is talk of programmes of'personally customised care'geared both to the individual and to the group, 'with attentionbeing paid to every areawhere help maybe needed - for instance housing and social skills'(p. 26). A cautious start will be made withan experiment inthe medically supervised provision of heroin to longdoor' remains unaltered: coffee shops disposing ofa termaddicts.

Far more specific is the paragraph on the 'coercion and welfare of addicts', combining elements of both the socio-medical approach and the legal one. Addicts who are convicted of crimes can choose between a prison term and voluntary treatment in an open or closed institution. If they choose treatment, steps are taken to encourage their reintegration in society, amongst other things through schooling and projects that may lead to work. The Memorandum adds somewhat optimisticatty:'Ideally there will the prospect of a job at the end of the course'(p.30). (The Memorandum might be more consistent here if it recommended that the candidate receive a training in the cultivation of Dutch homegrown.) It will also be possible to impose a legal restraint on addicts, forcing them to undergo a maximum of 2 years treatment on being found guilty of a series of minor crimes amounting to great harm being done to others. Because such offences are mainly committed by a comparatively small and easily identified group of 5000 extremely antisocial criminal addicts, the government hopes to book a quick success with this policy. All these measures will be supervised by an Interdepartmental Task Force for the Care and Treatment of Addicts.

The legal measures will also concentrate on the criminal traffic in drugs (Chapter 5). Heroin is mainly imported by Turkish gangs from Southwest Asia, white cocaine comes from South America with the trade being run by Columbian gangs. Although ever targeramountsof drugs have been confiscated and 27 of the 80 major organised gangs have been dismantied since 1993, the amount of drugs available and the number of gangs have not decreased. The government aims to intensify the struggle with its plans to set up a nationwide criminal investigation team and to improve international cooperation in this field. They also intend to introduce measures against the nuisance caused by home dealers and drugs tourism, on the model of 'Operation Victor' carried out recently in Rotterdam.

In addition to traditional hard drugs, the Memorandum pays special attention to the current fashion of synthetic 'designer drugs' such as ecstasy that is commonly used by young people in situations such as house parties. In 1993, 3.3% of school children had used'ecstacy'at least once; generally speaking it is used occasionally and for purposes of relaxation. Since 1988, ecstasy has been placed on the Opium Law's list, because the government is concerned that there is a serious risk to public health from dehydration and liver and kidney damage associated with this drug.

While the broad lines of the chapters on hard drugs policy represent a logical development of the central purpose of the drugs policy, they also contain considerable inconsistencies. The government, for instance, points out that the harm to users of alcohol and nicotine (5 million deaths worldwide per year) is much greater than that caused by illegal hard drugs (200 000 deaths). Having said that, it does not offer any explanation why a ruling for hard drugs is not possible like that for alcohol.

The gist of the argument for prosecuting the traffic in hard drugs is that this forces up the price, thus keeping them off the open market (p.45). This argument conflicts sharply with other passages in the Memorandum that discuss the excessive illegal supply of these drugs and the crime associated with obtaining them. These passages make it clear that the illegal character of hard drugs and their relatively highprice donotcomprisean insurmountable obstacle; instead users are forced into crime, with all the harm that causes to themselves and to others. This conflicts with the main aim of the drugs policy, that of countering and preventing the harm to users and third parties.

The government rejects the notion of decrim, inalising hard drugs because it would result in an increase in the number of users (p.52). Elsewhere, however, it points out with satisfaction that decrim, inalising soft drugs has not led to any significant rise in the number of users. Furthermore, government policy only has a limited influence on drugs use: What form would the Memorandum on drugs take if 'Their use would seem mainly to be determined by all the policy proposals did in fact fit in with its main fashions in international youth culture and by other separate developments such as the extent of longterm unemployment among young people'(p.35).

The government defends its policy of tolerating bona fide coffee shops with the argument that soft drugs users would otherwise be forced to depend on a criminal circuit (p.39). The same argument is also applicable to hard drugs users, but there is no ment ion of this in the Memorandum.

The government acknowledges that combatting the drugs traffic has not had any effect on the supply or price of hard drugs - in other words, the policy has not been very effective. It admits that it is this very prohibition that forces up underworld profits, thus threatening to infiltrate legal economic and administrative institutions (p. 45). The Memorandum even hints that the democratic rule of law may be threatened by these enormously wealthy criminal organisations (the worldwide annual turnover is estimated at 500 billion guilders). It offers no indication of how it hopes to prevent this by continuing with the present prosecutions policy. At the same time it stresses that decriminalisation would lead to a significant lowering of prices so that criminal organisations would lose their main source of revenue (p. 52). Despite this admission it declares its resolve to intensify its legal fight against organised crime. In doing so, it brings about the very harm to society that it aims to combat, effectively undermining its own central aim.

The government acknowledges that the dangers of ecstasy to the public health are largely incidental ones and that users in general act as critical consumers who want as much as is possible to avoid any risk. Despite this, it has taken the step of a strict prohibition as though what was involved was a hard drug, thus forcing it into criminal circuits without there being any decrease in its use. This prohibition is harmful because it actually encourages crime and increases the health hazards associated with the drug. Again a central aim of the drugs policy is contradicted.

DRUGS AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE

What form would the Memorandum on drugs take if all the policy proposals did in fact fit in with its main aim of combatting harm? In citing this basic principle it would seem to be alluding to the famous'harm. principle', formulated in exemplary fashion by John Stuart Mill in'On Liberty'(1859) as a general criterion for the use of justifiable force on the part of the government:

'That principle is, that ( ... ) the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.' (Mill, 197 7, p. 135)

Mill's harm principle is frankly opposed to governmental moralism: the government may not force citizens to behave in a certain way, just because it sees 't as morally correct. It pertains to the realm of the autonomous responsibility of each individual to be allowed to determine his or her own ideals of how to live. The principle also prohibits paternalism on the part of the government: it is also not permitted to forbid someone from harming himself, even for his own good. This too belongs to the autonomous rea tm of the individual: anyone who wants to lWe dangerousty, for instance to have a career as a racing driver or mountain climber is free to choose that option.

To sum up, the gist of the harm principle is that freedom is permitted as long as one does not harm another. The next question of course iswhatqualifies as harm. According to Mill, there is a question of harm when a transaction affects another person in his legitimate concerns. The fact that certain behaviour may arouse offence, anger or moral indignation is not a sufficient objection. What exactly one should understand by wrongful encroachment on the interests of another is elaborated in detail by Feinberg (1984). Feinberg describes interest as being any matter that has to do with a person's well,being. Matters such as health and income are basic interests or rather essential preconditions for someone's wellbeing. In principle the government has the task of protecting non-trivial interests against wrongful interference by others.* In the case of a conflict of interests, both of which in principle merit protection, the government must protect that which is the most important. Here the conflicting interests need to be weighed against each other; amongst other things account must be taken of their relevance for the well-being of the person concerned and of society as a whole. When the government is considering a legal prohibition it must bear in mind that in doing so it is encroaching on the freedom of its citizens. According to Feinberg it can only forbid harmful behaviour if the harm resulting from the loss of freedom is necessary in order to prevent greater harm.

With respect to drugs, the harm principle implies that the government should not prohibit them just because it regards them as morally evil. Criminalisation needs to be tested against the following considerations:

1. Individuals should be free to use drugs as long as they do not cause harm to any third party.

2. Where drugs do cause harm to anyone other than the user, this harm should be weighed against the harm done by a prohibition.
a. The harm resulting from a prohibition also includes the infringement of the freedom of the individual to decide his own life, the drugs user's interest in his freedom to use drugs should also be taken into consideration.
b. Because of the interest the user has in his freedom, one should also enquire in weighing up the different interests whether other less drastic means may not be sufficient to combat the harm.

On the basis of his own harm principle, Mill himself argued for a free use of hard drugs and alcohol. This can be seen from his principled criticism of the Chi, nese government's prohibition of the import of opium. Mill regardedas wrongful everystep that aims to prevent the obtaining of a particular article -'not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer' (p. 135). For thesame reasons he also condemned the prohibition of the sale of alcohol implemented by some states in the USA since 185 1. (Alcohol can be viewed as a hard drug, in terms of the definition of drugs in Dutch criminal law as 'substances affecting one's state of mind that when used may result in harm to the individual's health and to society' (Opium Law, article 2). Mill, it seemed, did not think that alcohol and other drugs caused any harm to third parties, so that it was not necessary to weigh the right to freedom against the seriousness of any potential harm.

On the other hand, Mill was quite clear that in fact there is hardly such a thing as an act that is purely private in the sense that it doesn't affect other people. Even when someone does harm in the first instance to himself this can have repercussions for the people around him:

'If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If he deteriorates hisbodily or mental faculties, he not only brings ~vil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself from rendering the services which he owes to his fellow creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection or benevolence; . . . ' (p.21 1)

Contrary to what Mill himself suggested, the liberal harm principle therefore does not automatically imply the free use of drugs. Apart from the ethical argument, prohibition can also be based on the argument that drugs do in fact harm third parties, including in the ways that Mill himself listed. Advocates of a prohibition also argue that the use of drugs leads to harm in the form of other misdemeanours, especially crimes against property to pay for the substances.

Mill was therefore somewhat too quick in pleading for freedom in the use of drugs and alcohol. The harm principle requires at least a further weighing up of the individual's freedom against any potential harm. 1 will do this in the second part of this article.

Professor CW Maris, University of Amsterdam, Postbus 1030, 1000 BA Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

*To impose limits on interests that are malicious and moralistic is legitimate, since they do not deserve to be respected. It is legitimate for example to limit the freedom of a sadist to inflict pain on other people against their wishes. Someone, moreover, who in fair competition for goods that are in short supply frustrates the interests of another is also not acting wrongfully. This kind of legitimate encroachment on the interests of others does not qualify as causing 'harm' and it is not the task of the authorities to prevent it.

REFERENCES

BaudelaireC (1971). Les ParadisArtificiels. Paris: Gallimard.
Feinbergj (1984). The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 1: Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mill JS 0 97 7) (185 1). Utilitarianism. Glasgow: Col lins.
Nota inzake het Drugbeleid (Memorandum on Drugs Policy) (1995). Den Haag: Staatsdrukkerij.
Weil A 0 975). The natural mind, in Peter Haining (Ed.), The Hashish Club Vol 2, pp. 67-73. London: Peter Owen.