1. Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #1448/71), April 8, 1971.
2. Ibid. (#1459/71), April 24, 1971.
3. Ibid. (#1460/71), April 26, 1971.
4. The New York Times, August 11, 1971, p. 1.
5. Interview with diplomatic officials, Vientiane, Laos, August and September 1971.
6. Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, New Haven, Connecticut, November 18, 1971.
7. Report of the United Nations Survey Team on the Economic and Social Needs of the Opium-Producing Areas in Thailand (Bangkok: Government House Printing Office, 1967), pp. 59, 64, 68; The New York Times, September 17, 1963, p. 45; June 6, 1971, p. 2.
8. Interview with John Warner, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1971. (John Warner is chief of the Strategic Intelligence Office of the S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.)
9. John Hughes, The Junk Merchants (Boston: The Christian Science Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 13-14.
10. The New York Times, April 3, 1970, p. 3; the director of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, John E. Ingersoll, has testified that the 80 percent figure "has been handed down from very obscure beginnings" and admitted that he has not been able to verify the figure. (U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and RelaQ Proqrams Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, 92nd Cong., Ist sess., 1971, p. 610.)
11. The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2.
12. Alain Y. Dessaint, "The Poppies Are Beautiful This Year," Natural History, February 1972, p. 31.
13. Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele, The World Heroin Problem, 92nd Cong., Ist sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1971), p. 20.
14. The Milford Citizen (Milford; Connecticut), September 28, 1971.
15. Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Washington, D.C., October 21, 1971.
16. The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2.
17. Interview with Police Col. Smith Boonlikit, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971. In mid 1971 the going price for a gram of no. 4 heroin in Bangkok was about $2 (40 baht), compared to about 120 (2.5 baht) for no. 3 heroin.
18. About sixty-five tons of opium are smuggled into the major cities in upper and central Burma for local consumption, but almost none gets beyond these cities into the international markets (interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971. William Young worked for the CIA from 1958 until 1967).
19. Ibid.
20. U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, "The World Opium Situation," mimeographed (Washington, D.C., October 1970), p. 10.
21. The New York Times, June 6, 1971, p. 2.
22. The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), June 19, 1972.
23. Interview with Elliot K. Chan, Vientiane, Laos, August 15, 1971. (Elliot K. Chan is a USAID police adviser to the Royal Laotian government.) Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, New Haven, Connecticut, November 18, 1971.
24. Interview with Edward Fillingham, Vientiane, Laos, September 5, 1971. (Edward Fillingham is the director of the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund.)
25. Louis Kraar, "Report from Laos," Fortune, September 1, 1968, p. 52.
26. Ibid., p. 54.
27. Far Eastern Economic Review, 1971 Yearbook (Hong Kong), p. 216; Straits Times (Singapore), August 22, 1969; Eastern Sun (Singapore), February 24, 1971.
28. British Broadcasting Corporation interview with Sisouk na Champassak, Vientiane, Laos, 1970. (The quotation is filed at BBC Lime Grove Studios, London, England.)
29. For example, Sisouk himself made this statement before the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1957:
"The Royal Government is determined, as it always has been:
1. to prohibit the production or consumption of opium derivatives throughout the
national territory under its control;
2. to take vigorous measures to combat illicit traffic;
3. to ensure effective and complete enforcement of the prohibition of the consumption
of opium"
(United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Illicit
Traffic, 12th sess., agenda item no. 4 [E/CN.7/1_1691, May 28, 1957; [no.
295/MPL/ONU] May 29, 1957).
30. The Washington Post, July 8, 1971.
31. Interview with Police Col. Smith Boonlikit, Bangkok, Thailand, September 21, 1971. (Colonel Boonlikit allowed the authors to read and copy reports from U.S. customs, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, and Interpol relating to Corsican syndicates in Southeast Asia. Practically all of the following information is based on these reports unless otherwise noted.)
32. Interview with Touby Lyfoung, Vientiane, Laos, September 4, 1971; Time, February 29, 1960, p. 35.
33. Paule Bernard, Lotus, Opium et Kimonos (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1959), p. 90; telephone interview with an agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Washington, Dr.., December 20, 1971.
34.
Paul
Louis Levet's syndicate consisted of six men, including himself:
1. Jacques
Texier.
2. Jean
"Jeannot" Giansily, who reportedly arrived in Indochina from France in 1954-1955
and first worked for Bonaventure Francisci. Later hired by Levet.
3.
Barth6lemy "M6m6" Rutilly, Levet's contact man in Saigon.
4. Charles
Orsini, an elderly Corsican resident of Phnom Penh who served as the contact man
in Cambodia.
5. Tran
Hung Dao, an alias for a Vietnamese member of the syndicate.
35. In late 1959 or early 1960, for example, a small Beaver aircraft chartered from Roger Zoile picked up three hundred kilos of opium at Muong Sing, in northwestern Laos, for Levet's "account." The aircraft landed at a small strip on the western edge of Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia, where the opium was repacked in orange crates and trucked to the Cambodian seaport of Kompot. From there half was shipped to Hong Kong and the other half to Singapore.
36. Interview with Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, McLean, Virginia, June 18, 1971.
37. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
38. Joel "alvern, "The Role of Chinese in Lao Society," Journal of the Siam Society 49, pt. I (July 1961), 31-34.
39. Joel M. Halpern, Economy and Society of Laos (New Haven: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, 1964), pp. 117-118.
40. Stanley Karnow, "The Opium Must Go Through," Life, August 30, 1963, pp. 11-12; Hong Kong Dispatch 4222, from Jerry Rose to Time, Inc. (November 9, 1962).
41. Ibid.
42. L'Express, no. 1052 (September 6-12, 1971), p. 18. (This article identified JeanBaptiste Andr6ani, a Guerini partisan during the vendetta discussed in Chapter 2, as an associate of Antoine Guerini and Bonaventure Francisci.)
43.
U.S.
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has the following information on this
incident:
1. Owners
of the aircraft: René Enjabal and Lucien Don Carlini.
2.
Vientiane opium dealers: Roger Lasen, Maurice Lecore, Ao Thien Hing (Chinese
resident of Laos), and Thao Shu Luang Prasot (Chinese resident of Laos).
3. Waiting
for the opium on the ground in Ban Me Thuot were: Charles Merelle (French),
Padovani (French Corsican) and Phan Dao Thuan (Vietnamese).
4. Opium
was destined for two Chinese distributors in Cholon: Ky Van Chan and Ky Mu.
5. Also
believed to be involved as financiers: Roger Zoile and Francois Mittard
(telephone
interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
Washington, D.C., December 20, 1971).
44. Karnow, "The Opium Must Go Through," p. 12.
45. Telephone interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Washington, D.C., December 20, 1971.
46. Also arrested were Mme. Isabela Mittard, Roger Boisviller, Roger Paul Jean, Etienne Kassubeck, and Jean Roger Barbarel. Barbaret escaped from prison in 1960 and has never been apprehended.
47. According to Vietnamese Passport Control, Frangois Mittard visited Laos briefly from December 28 to 30, 1964, and left Saigon for Laos on January 31, 1965. He has never returned to Vietnam (interview with Ton That Binh, Vietnamese Passport Control, Saigon, Vietnam, September 10, 1971).
48. Hong Kong Dispatch #222, from Jerry Rose (November 9, 1962).
49. The New York Times, May 8, 1953, p. 4; U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, "The World Opium Situation," p. 10.
50. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1971.
51. Len E. Ackland, "No Place for Neutralism: The Eisenhower Administration and Laos," in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 149.
52. Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1971), p. 116; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 114-115.
53. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 153.
54. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
55. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.
56. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
57. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 219.
58. Le Monde (Paris), May 24-25, 1964.
59. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 28, 1964, p. 421.
60. Le Monde, May 24-25, 1964.
61.
General Ouane gave the authors the following statistics:
Contróle du Opium au Laos
Month
Report No.
Amount exported
Profits
Equivalent (Dollar)
November 1963
Report I/A
1,146 kgs.
1,948,200 baht
$97,410
December 1963
Report 2/V
1,128 kgs.
1,917,000 baht
$95,880
January 1964
Report 2/V
1,125 kgs.
1,912,500 baht
$95,625
(Interview with
Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1,
1971.)
62. Ibid.
63. General Kouprasith told one reporter that, "some of the things he [Phoumi] has done with the economy of the nation are wrong, including the introduction of gambling and the monopolies. Some of the things he has done have helped to support and strengthen the Communists in their attack on us" (Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 265); Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #3764), April 20, 1964.
64. D. Gareth Porter, "After Geneva: Subverting Laotian Neutrality," in Adams and McCoy, eds., Laos: War an,~Revolution, p. 204.
65. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 28, 1964, p. 421.
66. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 286-287.
67. Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #3998), February 8, 1965.
68. Cabled dispatch from Shaw, Vientiane (Hong Kong Bureau), to Time, Inc., received September 16-17, 1965.
69. The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 313-314.
70. Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971; interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971; Don A. Schancbe, Mister Pop (New York: David McKay Company, 1970), pp. 240-245.
71. The authors visited Long Pot village in the region west of the Plain of Jars in August 1971 and interviewed local officials, opium farmers, and soldiers who confirmed Air America's role in the local opium trade.
72. James Hamilton-Paterson, The Greedy War (New York: David Mckay, 1971), pp. 275-276.
73. Interview with Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Alexandria, Virginia, June 17, 1971.
74. Interview with Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, McLean, Virginia, June 18, 197 1.
75. Interview with Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Alexandria, Virginia, June 17, 1971.
76. Peter Kunstadter, "Vietnam: Introduction," in Peter Kunstadter d., Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 681-682; Howard Shochurek, "Americans in Action in Vietnam," National Geographic 127, no. I (January 1965), 38-64.
77. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
78. Interview with Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Alexandria, Virginia, June 17, 1971.
79. Genevieve Sowards and Erville Sowards, Burma Baptist Chronicle (Rangoon: Board of Publications, Burma Baptist Convention, 1963), pp. 411-414.
80. Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
81. The Boston Globe, September 3, 1970.
82.
The
CIA's Tibetan operations began in August 1959, when twenty Khamba tribesmen from
southern Tibet arrived in Camp Hale, Colorado, for special training. These men,
and others like them, served as cadres in the CIA's guerrilla army, which
devoted most of its resources to mining the two major roads between Tibet and
China. Through these operations the CIA hoped to slow the flow of Chinese men
and materiel moving into Tibet, and thereby strengthen the political position of
the exiled Dalai Lama. When the operations were curtailed in May 1960, there
were an estimated forty-two thousand Khamba guerrillas fighting for the CIA
inside Tibet (L. Fletcher Prouty, article in The Empire Gazette [Denver,
Colorado], February 6, 1972).
83.
Interview with Don A. Schanche, Larchmont, New York, February 12, 1971. Don
Schanche is the author of Mister Pop.
84.
Interview with Maj. Chao La, Ban Nam Keung, Laos, September 12, 1971. (Maj. Chao
La is commander of Yao mercenary troops in Nam Tha Province for the CIA.)
85.
Schanche, Mister Pop, p. 5.
86.
John
Lewallen, "The Reluctant Counterinsurgents: International Voluntary Services in
Laos," in Adams and McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolution, pp. 361362;
for an official USAID admission of the military character of these
"humanitarian" refugee operations, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee of the
Judiciary, Refugee and Civilian War Casualty Problems in Indochina, 91st
Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, pp. 22-24.
87.
Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 241-242.
88.
Interview with Touby Lyfoung, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
89.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 294-295.
90.
Interview with a Royal Laotian Army officer, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971. (This
interview is the basis for the foregoing description of Vang Pao's early
career.)
91.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 133-134.
92.
Lao
Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #2,700), September 12, 1960.
93.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 154.
94.
Lao
Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #2,692), September 1, 1960.
95.
Ibid.
(#2,716), September 29, 1960.
96.
Interview with a Royal Laotian Army officer, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971.
97.
Interview with Touby Lyfoung, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
98.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 161, 296; interview with Touby Lyfoung,
Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
99.
Hugh
Toye, Laos: Bufler State or Battleground (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968), p. 161.
100.
Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 75-76.
101.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 179, 207.
102.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
103.
Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.
104.
Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.
105.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 207.
106.
Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 97-100.
107.
Brig.
Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, "Resources for Unconventional Warfare, S.E. Asia," in The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, pp. 138-140.
108.
Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 103, 115-116.
109.
Ibid., pp. 162-163.
110.
U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, United States Security Agreements
and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, 91 st Cong., I st sess., 1970, pt.
2, p. 473.
111.
Interview with William Young, Chianginai, Thailand, September 8, 1971; interview
with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.
112.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 197 1; Schanche,
Mister Pop, pp. 171-173.
113.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 183.
114.
The New York Times, April 25, 1963, p. 7.
115.
Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.
116.
An
Australian anthropologist working in northern Thailand has shown that the high
price of opium enabled the Meo in one village to support themselves on only
onethird of the land it would have required to produce an adequate amount of
rice for the village's subsistence (Douglas Miles, "Shifting Cultivation-Threats
and Prospects," in Tribesmen and Peasants in North Thailand, Proceedings
of the First Symposium of the Tribal Research Center [Chiangmai, Thailand:
Tribal Research Center, 1967], p. 96.)
117.
Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 240-245.
118.
Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971;
interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.
119.
Inter-view with Lo Kham Thy, Vientiane, Laos, September 2, 1971.
120.
Interview with a former USAID official, Washington, D.C., June 1971.
121.
Interview with high-ranking Meo officials, Vientiane, Laos, September 1971.
122.
U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, pt. 2, p.
465.
123.
Ibid., pp. 470, 490.
124.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 297, 299.
125.
A Meo
social scientist of Paris now working for his doctorate at the University of
Paris estimates that there were eighty thousand Meo in Meng Khouang Province and
fifty-five thousand in Sam Neua Province before the mass migrations began
(interview with Yang Than Dao, Paris, France, March 17, 1971). One USAID refugee
official at Ban Son estimates that there are a total of about 250,000 hill
tribesmen living in the mountains of these two provinces (interview with George
Cosgrove, Ban Son, Laos, August 30, 1971 ).
126.
Schanche, Mister Pop, pp. 294-295; Senate Committee of the Judiciary,
Refugee and Civilian War Casualty Problems in Indochina, pp. 24-28.
127.
Interview with George Cosgrove, Ban Son, Laos, August 30, 1971.
128.
Ibid.; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, War-Related Civilian
Problems in Indochina, Part II: Laos and Cambodia, 92nd Cong., Ist sess.,
1971, p. 48.
129.
Interview with Lyteck Lynhiavu, Vientiane, Laos, August 28, 1971. (Lyteck
Lynhiavu is a member of one of the most prestigious Meo clans in Laos and
director of administration in the Ministry of the Interior.)
130.
Ibid.; interviews with Meo villagers, Long Pot village, Laos, August 1971. The
Royal Laotian government conducted an investigation of Vang Pao's regular
infantry - battalions in September 1970 and found that all of them were far
belO*w their reported payroll strength of 550 men: the Twenty-first Battalion
had 293 men, the Twentyfourth Battalion had 73, the Twenty-sixth Battalion had
224, and the Twentyseventh Battalion had 113. According to Laotian army sources,
Vang Pao was pocketing the difference.
131.
Interview with George Cosgrove, Ban Son, Laos, August 30, 19 1. (George Cosgrove
is a USAID refugee officer for Military Region II.)
132.
James
G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Laos: April 1971, 91st Cong., Ist sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, August 1971), p. 16.
133.
Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p.
352.
134.
Interview with Chinese merchants, Vientiane, Laos, August 1971. It is very
difficult to measure the exact impact of the U.S. bombing campaign and refugee
movements on Laotian opium production. However, the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics has
made an attempt. In 1968 the Bureau estimated Laos's production at 100-150 tons.
In mid-1971 it estimated Laos's total production at 35 tons. (U.S. Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, "The World Opium Situation," p. 10; U.S.
Congress, Senate Committeee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related
Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, 92nd Cong., Ist sess., 1971,
p. 583.)
135.
The
authors visited Long Pot District from August 18 to August 23, 1971. Most of the
following information is based on these six days in Long Pot unless otherwise
noted.
136.
Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.
137.
For a
detailed examination of the problem of "choice" in a Meo village in Thailand,
see W. R. Geddes, "Opium and the Miao: A Study in Ecological Adjustment," in
Oceania 41, no. I (September 1970).
138.
One
Thai government study reported that "tasting" is an important part of opium
cultivation: 139.
F. B.
G. Keen, The Meo of North-West Thailand (Wellington, New Zealand:
Government Printer, 1966), p. 32.
140.
For a
description of the burn-off in other hill tribe villages, see Paul J. Zinke,
Sanga Savuhasri, and Peter Kunstadter, "Soil Fertility Aspects of the Lua Forest
Fallow System of Shifting Cultivation," Seminar on Shifting Cultivation and
Economic Development in Northern Thailand (Chiangmai, Thailand, Janu~iry 18-24,
1970), pp. 910.
141.
Geddes, "Opium and the Miao: A Study in Ecological Adjustment," pp. 8-9.
142.
Keen,
The Meo of North-West Thailand, p. 35.
143.
Ibid., p. 36; Dessaint, "The Poppies Are~Beautiful This Year," p. 36.
144.
In
comparison, Professor Geddes found that the Meo village of seventyone houses he
surveyed in northern Thailand produced a minimum of 1,775 kilos, or over
11/4 tons of raw opium. This is an average of 25 kilos per
household compared to an estimated 15 kilos for Long Pot villaee (Geddes, "Opium
and the Miao: A Study in Ecological Adjustment," P. 7).
145.
Interview with an agent, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Southeast
Asia, August 1971.
146.
Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.
147.
A
Report on Tribal Peoples of ChianRrai Province North of the Mae Kok River,
Bennington-Comell Anthropological Survey of the Hill Tribes in Thailand
(Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1964), pp. 28-29; Delmos Jones, "Cultural Variation
Among Six Lahu Villages, Northern Thailand," (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University,
1967), pp. 40-41, 136.
148.
Interview with the headman of Nam Suk village, refugee village, Long Pot
Divrict, Laos, August 21, 1971.
149.
Interview with the headman of Nam Ou village, refugee village, Long Pot
District, Laos, August 21, 1971.
150.
Many
Meo clan leaders regard Vang Pao as something of an uncultured usurper.
According to a number of influential Meo, Vang Pao is acutely aware of his low
social stature and has tried to compensate for it by marrying his relatives into
Touby's family. In 1967 Vang Pao's daughter, May Ken, married
Touby's son, Touxa Lyfoung. In 1969 Vang Pao's son, Franqois Vangchao, married
Touby's daughter, May Kao Lyfoung. Finally, in 1970 Vang Pao's nephew, Vang Gen,
married Touby's niece, May Choua Lyfoung. Vang Pao was threatened by military
setbacks and mounting opposition from the Lynhiavu clan, and so felt
compelled to arrange this last marriage to shore up his declining poli ical
fortunes.
151.
Interview with Edgar Buell, Ban Son, Laos, August 31, 1971.
152.
Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 22, 1971.
153.
Ibid.
154.
When
the authors left Long Pot District on August 23, a number of village headmen
explained that their people would begin dying from starvation in several months
and urged us to somehow force the Americans into making a rice drop. Upon return
to Vientiane, we explained the situation to the local press corps and an article
appeared several days later in The Washington Post and on the Associated
Press wires. As might be expected, many American officials denied that the rice
had been cut off. 155.
Interview with the assistant headman of Ban Nam Muong Nakam, Long Pot village,
Laos, August 21, 1971.
156.
Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.
In late 1971 one American reporter flew over the Plain of Jars and described what he saw:
157.
Interview with Ger Su Yang, Long Pot village, Laos, August 19, 1971.
158.
Interview with George Cosgrove, Ban Sop, Laos, August 30, 1971.
159.
The
bombing has seriously disrupted opium production even in villages that manage to
survive the attacks and remain in their original location. In August 1971 the
authors visited the Yao village of Pha Louang. in the mountains eighty miles
north of Vientiane. Residents reported that their village had been bombed in
August 1964 by a squadron of T-28s bearing Royal Laotian Air Force markings.
When the planes first appeared over the village, people hid in their houses. But
as the bombs began hitting the houses they tried to flee into the forest. The
aircraft strafed the village, shooting the people as they tried to climb up the
steep ridges that surround the village. All the houses were destroyed, most of
the livestock was killed and twelve people (about 20 percent of the inhabitants)
were killed. There were five Pathet Lao soldiers hiding in a cave about a mile
away and villagers feel they might have been the cause of the attack. Once the
planes left, the Pathet Lao emerged from the cave unharmed and marched off.
Villagers report that the mid 1971 opium harvest will equal the harvests before
the bombing attack. However, intervening harvests have been much smaller because
of the material and human losses they suffered. 160.
Interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, September 1, 1971.
161.
Interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.
162.
The
New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, pp. 313-314, 362.
163.
Interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.
164.
The New York Times, October 22, 1966, p. 2.
165.
Gen.
Thao Ma had good reason to fear Kouprasith. Following the February 1965 coup,
General Phourni's right-hand man, General Siho, fled to Thailand. After
consulting with a monk in Ubol, Thailand, who told him that it would be good
luck to go home, General Siho returned to Laos. General Kouprasith had him
arrested and imprisoned at Phou Khao Kquai, where he was shot while "attempting
to escape" (Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 287). According to a former
USAID official, Loring Waggoner, Kouprasith's right-hand man, Gen. Thonglith
Chokbengboung, told him at a funeral for one of Thonglith's relatives several
years after the incident, "Siho was dirty and corrupt," and that he was "glad"
that he had a hand in eliminating him (interview with Loring Waggone~, Las
Cruces, New Mexico, June 23, 1971).
166.
Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.
167.
Ibid.; interview with Gen. Ouane Rattikone, Vientiane, Laos, August 21, 1971;
interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971.
168.
Lao Presse (Vientiane: Ministry of Information, #232/66), October 22,
1966.
169.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 290.
170.
Interview with Gen. Thao Ma, Bangkok, Thailand, September 17, 1971; The New
York Times, October 22, 1966, p. 1; ibid., October 24, 1966, p. 4.
171.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, p. 29 1.
172.
Interview with Capt. Kong Le, Paris, France, March 22, 1971.
173.
Interview with Jimmy Yang, Chiangmai, Thailand, August 12, 1971.
174.
Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 217-218.
175.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 1971.
176.
Interview with Maj. Chao La, Nam Keung, Laos, September 12, 1971; Peter Kandre,
"Autonomy and Integration of Social Systems: The In Mien ('Yao' or 'Man')
Mountain Population and Their Neighbors," in Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian
Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, 1. 11, p. 585.
177.
Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.
178.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
179.
Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.
180.
J. Thomas
Ward, "U.S. Aid to Hill Tribe Refugees in Laos," in Kunstadter, ed.,
Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, vol. 1, p. 297.
181.
Inter-view with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
182.
Fred
Branfman, "Presidential War in Laos, 1964-1970," in Adams and McCoy, eds.,
Laos: War and Revolution, p. 270.
183.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
184.
Interview with Maj. Chao La, Nam Keung, Laos, September 12, 1971.
185.
Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, June 1971.
186.
Ibid.
187.
Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, New York, June
1971; interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 8, 1971.
188.
In
the early 1950s for example, anthropologists estimated that there were 139,000
Lahu in China's Yunnan Province, 66,000 in northeastern Burma, and 2,000 in Nam
Tha. Currently, there are 16,000 Yao in Nam Tha and probably over 100,000 in
Yunnan, most of whom dwell in the border regions. (Frank M. Lebar, Gerald C.
Hickey, and John K. Musgrave, Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia
[New Haven, Human Relations Area Files Press, 19641, pp. 31, 82; interview
with Maj. Chao Lao, Nam Keung, Laos, September 12, 1971; Peter Kunstadter,
"China: Introduction," in Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian Tribes,
Minorities, and Nations, vol. 1, p. 1~4.)
189.
Kandre, "Autonomy and Integration of Social Systems," p. 607.
190.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.
191.
Sowards and Sowards, Burma Baptist Chronicle, p. 409. (Emphasis added.)
192.
Ibid., p. 411.
193.
Ibid., pp. 412-413; for one of Reverend Young's early reports from China, see
Lizbeth B. Hughes, The Evangel in Burma (Rangoon: American Baptist
Mission Press, 1926), pp. 124-129.
194.
Sowards and Sowards, Burma Baptist Chronicle, pp. 413-414.
195.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.
196.
Lebar
et al., Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia, p. 32.
197.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971.
198.
Hugh
Tinker, The Union of Burma (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp.
159-160.
199.
Josef
Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the
Union of Burma," Journal of Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (November 1958), 54.
200.
F. K.
Lehman, "Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems," in
Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, vol. 1, pp.
94-95. The vehemence of the Shan reaction to these arrests by Ne Win can
be seen in these paragraphs from a communiqué by the Shan State Army: 201.
Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.
202.
Interview with Rev. Paul Lewis, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 7, 1971.
(Reverend Lewis was working in Kengtung at the time of the U Ba Thein's
departure.)
203.
Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.
departure.)
204.
The Washington Post, August 6, 1971.
departure.)
205.
One
of the first camps used for training was located in a river valley about twelve
miles due north of Nam Keung, but this was closed in 1965 when Chao La arxd a
group of Chinese opium smugglers opened an opium refinery nearby. Young was
afraid that the constant movement of mule caravans and boats in and out of the
area would compromise the base's security; eventually it was moved across the
Mekong River into Thailand and rebuilt in an uninhabited mountain valley, known
only by its code name, "Tango Pad" (interview with William Young, Chiangmai,
Thailand, September 8, 1971). departure.)
206.
Interview with a former USAID official in Nam Tba Province, New York, June 1971.
departure.)
207.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971; interview
with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.
departure.)
208.
The Boston Globe, September 3, 1970; interview with a former USAID
official in Nam Tha Province, Laos, New York, June 1971. In general, the
security on these cross-border operations was terrible, and almost every hill
tribesman in the Golden Triangle region knew about them. In mid 1971 the authors
met several Yao tribesmen in northern Thailand who knew the names of five or six
Yao who had been on the forays and could recite their itinerary with remarkable
accuracy. Both the Chinese and Burmese governments knew about the operations,
since they have captured a number of teams. In fact, it seems that the American
public were the only interested party ignorant of their existence.
departure.)
209.
Interview with William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, September 14, 1971; interview
with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971. (Since
Young's resignation from the CIA in 1967, these bases
have declined in importance and may no longer be in operation.)
departure.)
210.
Interview with U Ba Thein, Chiang Khong District, Thailand, September 11, 1971.
There have been a number of reports that Air America helicopters have been forced to land in Burma because of mechanical failure. According to one report by Dispatch News Service International correspondent Michael Morrow, an Air America helicopter was forced to make an
emergency landing in May 1971 in the eastern Shan States. The helicopter had
been chartered from Air America and was reportedly carrying a CIA operative
(Dispatch News Service International, November 8, 1971 ).
departure.)
"In each
village, one or a few men are able to determine the suitability of the terrain
for poppy by tasting the soil; apparently a highly respected qualification. When
the ph [soil acidity index], after several years of continual use, begins to
decrease, these men can 'taste' when the soil becomes unsuitable for further
poppy cultivation" (F. R. Moormann, K. R. M. Anthony, and Samarn Panichapong,
"No. 20: Note on the Soils and Land Use in the Hills of Tak Province," in Soil
Survey Reports of the Land Development Department [Bangkok: Kingdom of
Thailand, Ministrv of National Development, March 19641, p. 5).
Edgar Buell was incensed and told the authors, "When you're saying that no f-- rice
gets into that village you're not saying that Charlie Mann [USAID director]
won't send it in. And sending or not sending soldiers don't make any difference.
Hell, hippies, yippies and every other thing won't go. Now if they won't send
soldiers we don't take 'em out of college or pL4 'ern in jail; we give 'em rice.
. . .
"You shouldn't have snuck into that village and then talked to Charlie Mann. You
should have come here right off and talked to Pop Buell and got the real story.
You've caused a lot of trouble for people here. Hell, I'd kill anybody who'd say
old Pop Buell would let somebody starve" (interview with Edgar Buell, Ban Son,
Laos, August 30, 1971).
On September 2 Norman Barnes, director of United States Information Service, and
Charles Mann, director of USAID/Laos, flew to Long Pot village to make a report
on the situation for USAID/Washington. Norman Barnes later contradicted Edgar
Buell's assertion that the rice drops had not been cut off and admitted that
there had been no deliveries since early March. Mr. Barnes denied that there
were any ulterior motives and explained that the presence of Pathet Lao troops
in the immediate area from early March until August 20 made it impossible for
aircraft to operate in Long Pot District. But, Mr. Barnes was now happy to
report that deliveries had been restored and a rice drop had been made on August
30 (interview with Norman Barnes, Vientiane, Laos, September 3, 1971).
However, the authors saw an Air America UH-lH helicopter land at Long Pot on the
afternoon of August 19 and were told by villagers at the time that Air America's
helicopters had been flying in and out of the village since the rice drops
stopped. Moreover, villagers reported that Pathet Lao forces had left the area
several months earlier.
"A recent flight around the Plain of Jars revealed what less than three years of intensive
American bombing can do to 6 rural area, even after its civilian population has
been evacuated. In large areas, the primary tropical color-bright green-has been
replaced by an abstract pattern of black, and bright metallic colors. Much of
the remaining foliage is stunted, dulled by defoliants.
"Today, black is the dominant color of the northern and eastern reaches of the Plain.
Napalm is dropped regularly to burn off the grass and undergrowth that covers
the Plain and fills its many narrow ravines. The fires seem to burn constantly,
creating rectangles of black. During the flight plumes of smoke could be seen
rising from bombed areas. . . .
"From an enlarged negative of a photograph covering one small, formerly grass-covered
hill about 100 feet high, I spotted several hundred distinct craters before
losing count. In many places it is difficult to distinguish individual craters;
the area has been bombed so repeatedly that the land resembles the pocked,
churned desert in stormhit areas of the North African desert" (T. D. Allman,
"Plain Facts," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 8, 1972, p. 16); for a description of life under the bombs in northern Laos, see Fred Branfman, ed., Voices from the Plain of Jars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
"Our leaders secretly and fervently hoped against hope that they would come out
successful and save Union of Burma from plunging into Racial Wars and eventually
forced into a potentially hot-spot for the stability of Southeast Asian
Countries. Their dreams turned into a nightmare, and their hopes shattered but
shaping up of events and situation developments shows that what they had forseen
[sic] are materializing and we are witnessing it. Everything proved to the Shan
people's suspicions on the Burmese or rather Newin and the only choice we had in
wanting to own our own rights proved to be correct. This armed struggle that
they did not want was the only choice after all" (Communiqué from the Central
Executive Committee, Shan State Progress Party, typescript [Chiangmai, Thailand,
September 1971, pp. 1-2).