For over
twenty years Touby Lyfoung and his family had been locked in a bitter, tense
struggle for political control of the Meo of Meng Khouang Province with another
powerful Meo family, the Lo clan. It was a contest of chesslike subtlety in
which key political moves were planned years in advance, and carefully
calculated to slowly reinforce one side's position without pushing the other
side too far. Suddenly the French intervened on the side of Touby Lyfoung's
family, overturning the chessboard, and changing the game into a life-and-death
struggle.
Even today, when tribesmen are asked to explain why so many Meo have died fighting for both the royal government and the Communist Pathet Lao over the last ten years, they will relate the fifty-year history of this clan struggle. And if the listener is particularly patient, they will begin at the beginning and tell the whole story.
While they have no historical archives and few written records, the Meo attach enormous importance to their collective past, and have an uncanny ability to recall precise dates and details of events that took place fifty to a hundred years ago. They view history as a causally related chain of events, thus perceiving their current problems not only in terms of the immediate past, but in terms of decisions made two or three generations ago. However, their profound sense of history is crippled by parochial vision; foreign actors have only a dimly perceived role in their pageant, even though all of the monumental decisions that have affected the Meo-from their systematic slaughter in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries at the hands of the Chinese to the massive bombing by the U.S. air force today-have been made unilaterally in the foreign capitals of great empires and superpowers. And even on this artificially restricted historical stage there are only a few leading actors; in the minds of the Meo, events are determined, not by social conditions or mass aspirations, but, as in a 'Greek tragedy, by the personal strength and weakness of great leaders.
The Meo in Laos today can still recall that there were "great Meo kingdoms" in the highland plateaus of southern China several hundred years ago. In fact, Chinese imperial archives show that large numbers of Meo lived in southwestern China (Szechwan, Yunnan, Hunan, and Kweichow provinces) for over two thousand years. Even today there are more than 2.5 million Meo living in the mountains of these four provinces. Until the seventeenth century, these rugged provinces were of little importance to the imperial court in Peking, and the emperors were generally content as long as the Meo nobles sent regular tribute. In exchange, the emperor decorated the Meo leaders with noble titles and recognized the legitimacy of their autonomous kingdoms. (70) When the emperors of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), for example, were confronted with Meo dissidence, they rarely sent in exterminating armies. Instead they weakened the powerful Meo kingdoms by appointing more kings and nobles, thereby creating a host of squabbling tribal principalities. (71)
This policy of indirect rule produced a rather curious political hybrid. In the midst of an imperial China divided into systematic provinces and governed by a meritocracy respected for their erudition, there sprang up a random mosaic of Meo fiefs. These kingdoms were ruled by hereditary "little kings," known as kaitong, who commanded a quasireligious reverence from their subjects. Each kingdom was dominated by a different clan, the kaitong and the ruling aristocracy usually sharing the same family name. (72) But trouble descended on the Meo tribes after the Manchu dynasty was established in 1644. Among their many bureaucratic innovations, the Manchus decided to abolish the autonomy of the Meo kingdoms and integrate them into the regular bureaucracy. When this policy met with resistance, the Manchus began to exterminate these troublesome tribes and to repopulate their lands with the more pliable ethnic Chinese. (73) After a two hundred-year extermination campaign culminated in a series of bloody massacres in the mid nineteenth century, thousands of Meo tribesmen fled southward toward Indochina. (74)
Most of the retreating Meo moved in a southeasterly direction and burst upon northern Vietnam's Tonkin Delta like an invading army. But the Vietnamese army drove the Meo back into the mountains without too much difficulty since the invaders were weakened by the humid delta climate and frightened by the Vietnamese elephant battalions. (75) The defeated Meo scattered into the Vietnamese highlands, finally settling in semipermanent mountain villages.
Three Meo kaitong, however, avoided the headlong rush for the Tonkin Delta and turned to the west, leading their clans past Dien Bien Phu and into northeastern Laos. One of these clans was the Ly, from southern Szechwan Province. Their kaitong had been the leader of the Meo resistance in Szechwan, and when the Chinese massacres began in 1856 he ordered his four sons to lead the survivors south while he remained to hold back the Chinese armies. His third son, Ly Nhiavu, was invested with the title of kaitong, and he led the survivors on a year-long march that ended in Nong Het District in Laos, near the Lao-Vietnamese border (76) (see Map 6 on page 251). The hills surrounding Nong Het were uninhabited and the rich soil was ideal for their slash-and-burn agriculture. The location had already attracted two other refugee clansthe Mua and Lo. Since the Lo kaitong was the first to arrive, he became the nominal leader of the region. As the word spread back to China and Vietnam that the Laotian hills were fertile and unoccupied, thousands of Meo began to migrate southward. Since no other kaitong arrived to rival the original triumvirate, Nong Het remained the most important Meo political center in Laos.
Soon after the French arrived in 1893, their colonial officers began purchasing opium for the Laotian Opium Monopoly, and ordered the Meo to increase their production. Outraged that the French had failed to consult with him before making the demand, the Lo kaitong ordered an attack on the provincial headquarters in Xieng Khouang City. But Meo flintlocks were no match for modern French rifles, and their uprising was quickly squelched. Humiliated by his defeat, the Lo kaitong conceded his position in the triumvirate to the Mua kaitong. The French, however, were considerably chastened by their first attempt at dealing directly with the Meo, and thereafter dealt with them only through their own leaders or through Lao administrators.
Until the opium crisis of 1940 forced them to intervene in Meo politics once more, the French exercised a more subtle influence over tribal affairs. But they still had ultimate political authority, and those Meo leaders ambitious and clever enough to ingratiate themselves with the French could not fail to gain a powerful advantage. Ly Foung and his son Touby Lyfoung were such men.
Although Ly Foung was a member of the Ly clan, he was no relation to kaitong Ly Nhiavu or his aristocratic family. Ly Foung's father had arrived in Nong Het as a porter for a Chinese merchant in 1865, eight years after kaitong Ly Nhiavu. Although Ly Foung's father asked Ly Nhiavu and his three brothers to accept him as a fellow clansman, they refused. He was from Yunnan, not Szechwan, and his willingness to work as a porter-a virtual slave-for a hated Chinese made him unacceptable in the eyes of the Ly aristocrats. (77)
Rejected by the aristocracy, Ly Foung's father founded his own small village in the Nong Het area and married a local tribeswoman, who bore him a large family. Unfortunately, some of his children were born with serious congenital defects, and he had to center all of his ambitions on his third son, Ly Foung, who grew up to become a remarkable linguist, speaking Chinese and Lao fluently and having an adequate command of Vietnamese and French. Ly Foung, realizing that kinship and marriage ties were the basis of power among the Meo, set out to marry into kaitong Lo Bliayao's family. Reportedly a rather strong, hard man, Bliayao's undeniable talents as a leader had enabled him to establish himself as the premier kaitong of Nong Het.
The traditional Meo wedding is unusual. When a young man has decided he wants to marry a particuluar woman, he forcibly abducts her with the help of his friends and bundles her off to a makeshift forest cabin until the marriage is consummated. The custom is declining in popularity today, and even in its heyday the kidnapping was usually not performed unless the parents gave their tacit consent. In 1918 Ly Foung decided to marry Lo Bliayao's favorite daughter, May, but instead of consulting with the father himself, Ly Foung reportedly paid the bride's uncle to arrange the abduction. Whatever Bliayao may have thought before the marriage (there are reports that he disliked Ly Foung), he made no protest, and hired Ly Foung as his personal assistant and secretary (78) ' Although May gave birth to Touby (the current Meo political leader) in August 1919 and to a healthy daughter as well, the marriage was not a happy one. During a particularly bitter quarrel in their fourth year of marriage, Ly Foung beat May severely. She became despondent and committed suicide by eating a fatal dosage of opium. In his rage and grief, Lo Bliayao fired Ly Foung as his secretary and severed all ties with the Ly clan. (79)
To avoid what looked like an inevitable confrontation between the Lo and Ly clans, the French accepted the Meo suggestion of separating the feuding clans by dividing Nong Het District into two administrative districts. Lo Bliayao's eldest son was appointed chief of Keng Khoai District, and several years later Ly Foung's elder son was appointed chief of Phac Boun District. (80)
The division of Nong Het District was accepted without protest, and the quarreling ceased. In December 1935, however, kaitong Lo Bliayao died, severing the last link with the "Great Meo Kingdoms" of southern China and creating serious political problems for the Lo clan. Lo Bliayao's eldest son and successor, Song Tou, was in no way his equal. Devoting his time to gambling and hunting, Song Tou avoided his political responsibilities, and soon dealt a serious blow to his family's prestige by mismanaging local tax collection and losing his position as chief of Keng Khoai District. (81) When Ly Foung agreed almost immediately to make up the taxes Song Tou lost, the French colonial government appointed him district chief.
It was a great victory for the Ly Foung family. A mere seventy years after his father had been rejected by the Ly aristocrats, Ly Foung had made himself leader of the Ly clan and the most powerful Meo in Nong Het. With Nong Het's two districts governed by himself and his son, Ly Foung had excluded the Lo from all the high political offices open to the Meo and secured a monopoly on political power.
The Lo clan's decline deeply disturbed Song Tou's younger brother, Faydang. who had inherited his father's strong character. Shortly after Ly Foung assumed office, Lo Faydang set off on a 120-mile journey to the Lao royal capital, Luang Prabang, where he petitioned the popular Prince Phetsarath, widely renowned as one of the few Lao aristocrats with any sympathy for the hill tribes. The prince interceded on his behalf, and got everyone involved-the French, Ly Foung, and Laotian aristocrats-to agree that Faydang would become district chief of Keng Khoai when ,death or illness removed Ly Foung from office. (82) (The prince's support was not forgotten. In 1946, when the prince fled into exile as a leader of the insurgent Lao Nationalist movement, he left Faydang behind as his representative among the Meo and one of his most active guerrilla commanders. Today Faydang is vice-chairman of the Pathet Lao revolutionary movement, while his nephew, Touby, has become a political leader of the pro-government Meo.)
But when Ly Foung died in September 1939, the French broke their promise to Faydang and gave the post to Ly Foung's son, Touby. They had regarded Faydang's petition to the royal court two years before as an act of insubordination and were unwilling to entrust Faydang with any authority in the region. Chastened by their earlier experiences with the tribes, the French were only interested in dealing with tribal leaders of proven loyalty who would act as brokers to purchase the opium harvest and reduce the amount diverted to smugglers.
While Faydang was a possible troublemaker, Touby's loyalty and competence were proven. His father had understood how much the French valued a good colonial education, and Touby was the first Meo ever to attend high school, graduating from the Vinh Lycee in the spring of 1939 with a good academic record. When Ly Foung died that September, both Touby and Faydang clearly intended to present themselves before the assembly of Keng Khoai village headmen for election to the now vacant office of district chief. Without any explanation, the French commissioner announced that Faydang was disbarred from the election. Touby ran virtually unopposed and won an overwhelming victory. (83)
With the outbreak of World War II, the French launched a massive effort to boost tribal opium production and Touby's political future was guaranteed. Several months after his election Touby began an eight-year tenure as the only Meo member of the Opium Purchasing Board, providing valuable technical information on how best to expand Meo production. (84) In Nong Het region itself, former residents recall that Touby raised the annual head tax from three silver piasters to an exorbitant eight piasters, but gave the tribesmen the alternative of paying three kilograms of raw opium instead. (85) Most Meo were too poor to save eight silver piasters a year, and took the alternative of paying in opium. Since an average Meo farmer probably harvested less than one kilogram of raw opium a year before Touby's election, the tax increases precipitated an opium boom in Nong Het. With its fertile hills, excellent communications (Laos's major road to the sea passed through the district), and concentrated Meo population, Nong Het became one of Indochina's most productive opium-growing areas.
Moreover, these measures were applied to Meo districts all across northern Laos, changing the hill tribe economy from subsistence agriculture, to cashcrop opium farming. Touby himself feels that Laos's opium harvest more than doubled during this period, rising to as much as thirty or forty tons a year. As one French colonial official put it, "Opium used to be one of the nobles of the land; today it is king. (86)
Although Faydang pleaded continually throughout the Second World War with French authorities to install him as district officer as they had promised, the opium imperative tied the French firmly to Touby. Faced with a situation where two clans in a village or district were incompatible, the Meo usually separated them by splitting the village or district, as they had done earlier in Nong Het. But the French were firmly behind Touby, who could guarantee them an increasing supply of opium, and rejected Faydang's requests. As a result of their opium policy, Touby became a loyal autocrat, while Faydang became increasingly embittered toward colonial rule. The French betrayal of Faydang was probably a significant factor in his evolution as 'one of Laos's more important revolutionary leaders. Moreover, the French policy created intolerable tensions between the Lo and Ly clans-tensions that exploded at the first opportunity.
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945 the Laotian and Vietnamese (Viet Minh) nationalist movements took advantage of the weakened French posture to occupy the major cities and towns. Throughout Indochina the French began to gather intelligence, seize strategic points, and generally maximize their minimal resources to prepare for reoccupation. Realizing the strategic importance of the Plain of Jars, the Free French had parachuted commandos and arms into secret bases set up for them by Touby Lyfoung and his followers in 1944 and 1945. (87) Then, on September 3, French officers and Touby's Meo commandos reoccupied Xieng Khouang City, near the Plain of Jars, without firing a shot. Touby was sent back to Nong Het to secure the region and guard the mountain pass leading into Vietnam against a possible Viet Minh assault. Doubting Faydang's loyalty to the French, Touby sent a messenger to his village demanding that he declare his loyalty. (88) Although Faydang had not yet made contact with the Viet Minh or the Lao nationalist movement, he refused. Now that Touby had some modern arms and surplus ammunition, he decided to settle the matter once and for all. He sent sixty men to encircle the village and massacre the Lo clansmen. But Faydang had been expecting the move and had ordered the villagers to sleep in the fields. When the attack began, Faydang and some two hundred of his followers fled across the border to Muong Sen and made contact, for the first time, with the Viet Minh. (89) Guiding a Viet Minh column into Laos several months later, Faydang urged his fellow Lo clansmen to rise in revolt, and several hundred of them followed him back into North Vietnam.
When Faydang began to organize the guerrilla movement later known as the Meo Resistance League, the oppressive French opium tax administered by Touby was evidently a major factor in his ability to recruit followers. During World War 11, many Meo had been driven into debt by the onerous tax, and some of the poorer farmers had been forced to sell their children in order- to deliver a sufficient amount of opium. (90) According to Faydang's own account, the Meo began joining his movement "with great enthusiasm" after he abolished the opium tax and introduced some other major reforms in 1946. (91)
Today, more than thirty years after the French began boosting Meo opium production, almost thirty thousand of Touby's followers are fighting as mercenaries for the CIA. And on the other side of the battle lines, thousands of Faydang's Meo errillas have joined the Pathet Lao revolutionary movement. This simple clan conflict, which was pushed to the breaking point by the French opium imperative, has become a permanent fissure and has helped to fuel twenty-five years of Laotian civil war.