By the Andean Commission of Jurists

This article is based on articles that appeared in The Andean Newsletter published May 7 by the distinguished Andean Commission of Jurists. To sub-scribe to the monthly publication send $12 the Comision Andina de Juristas, Los Sauces 285, Lima 27. Peru. Specify whether you want the publication in English or Spanish.

The drug problem in the Andean region is affected by three forces:

economic factors that generate drug trafficking, especially coca leaf production and the "narcotization" of the region's economies;

law enforcement, particularly the controls over precursor chemicals and money laundering at the international level; and

domestic and international policies that address, or have an effect on, human rights and the strengthening of democracy.

Information available on this topic is manifold and often contradictory. New developments occur rapidly. Drug-related violence increases quickly. Sophisticated detection mechanisms are introduced. International coopera-tfon is encouraged. International ten-sions vary according to diplomatic and military pressures.

Drug trafficking today is a problem that has captured worldwide attention. Nations and international organiza-tions have deemed it necessary to state their positions and to prevent the eco-nomic distortions brought by drug traf-ficking. Some are especially interested in the human rights violations brought about by eradication policies imple-mented in recent years.

Civilians, including peasants, con-sumers and the unemployed, are most affected by drug trafficking. Many find themselves involved in criminal activi-ties related to drugs. Many often also become victims of human rights abuses that are the direct consequence of certain drug trafficking policies.

The Andean Commission ofJurists is concerned about the multiplying ef-fects of drug-related violence, respect for human rights, and the viability of democratic systems, which depend on the governments' attitude. The envi-ronmental damage in the Amazon re-gion created by drug production and herbicide eradication of crops is also a serious source of concern.

In this context, 1990 is a turning point in the international struggle against drug trafficking. In February, the Andean Commission of Jurists organized an international conference, that was followed by the Cartagena Summit and then a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Na-tions. It is against this background that we examine two of the Andean nations most impacted by drug traf-ficking: Peru and Bolivia.

Drugs in the Upper Huallaga: cooperation or repression?

On April 22, The New York Times reported that the Bush administration, in spite of the Cartagena agreements of last February, was planning to sign a bilateral military agreement with Peru. Its objective is to reinforce the Peruvian military and expand the struggle against drug traffickers and the guerrilla movement of Sendero Luminoso.

The terms of the agreement have not officially been made public, but media accounts claim that $35 million was budgeted for military training by U.S. Special Forces ("Green Berets"), for the construction of five training camps, for boats and twenty war planes.

This information came as a surprise to Peruvian politicians. The Ministry of Foreign Relations released a press communique that denied "the alleged participation of American troops," but did not specify whether or not the agreement was contemplated.

The Senate demanded more informa-tion from the Ministry of Defense.

The U.S. Embassy clarified that the United States would "not build new bases against drug trafficking in Peru, but will cooperate with the installation of a temporary site, where anti-drug personnel will be trained."

In the midst of this uncertainty, the Andean Commission of Jurists is-sued a statement warning of "the dan-gerous consequences of setting mili-tary objectives as a priority in a largely rural area where coca is grown. As the Declaration of Cartagena recognizes, drug production, trafficking and use are complex phenomena that resist simplistic solutions. Coca production must be countered with alternative programs of rural development; drug trafficking with selective police repres-sion; and drug abuse with prevention and rehabilitation programs."

United States anti-drug efforts in the region has traditionally focused on supporting the police in law enforce-ment, especially in eradicating coca crops and destroying the traffickers' infrastructure. However, from the National Drug Control Strategy re-leased in September 1989, and from a comparison of the resources devoted to police assistance and those for develop-ment, it is evident that the U.S. ad-ministration intends to increase mili-tary and police activities in the Andes.

It is a matter of deep concern that this tendency will be confirmed by the military assistance agreement between the United States and Peru. As our press statement indicates, "this mili-tary assistance follows from the Na-tional Drug Control Strategy knovvn as the 'Bennett Plan.' Apparently, it has been decided that the anti-drug policy will also include anti-subversive activi-ties in the Upper Huallaga. We are convinced that it is a profound mistake not to differentiate between anti-sub-versive and anti-drug efforts..."

The Peruvian police have been in charge of eradication and interdiction programs in the coca-growing regions. An example of U.S. emphasis on police activity is the police base in Santa Lucia, in the middle of the Upper Huallaga, which was built with funds from the Drug Enforcement Administration.

When Sendero Luminoso began its activities in that region, the Armed Forces began anti-subversive programs, introducing new variables in the area. It is troublesome that foreign military assistance might evolve into greater U.S. involvement in a serious internal conflict between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian state and society. It is not far-fetched that the presence of the Green Berets will play into Sendero's purposes, fostering their "anti-imperi-alist" discourse.

On April 26, President Garcia de-clared to a foreign press agency that "the war against drugs cannot be sus-tained only by military assistance." He also stated, "I will not sign any agree-ment that does not include economic assistance for crop substitution and for balance of payments."

Bolivia: alternative development, but with the military

The U.S. ambassador to Boliva has maintained conversations with the Bolivian government since March to bring about a $43 million military as-sistance plan. This assistance is condi-tioned on the involvement of the Boliv-ian Armed Forces against drug traf-ficking. Different political sectors op-posed the possibility of military inter-vention, as it risks the "Colombianiza-tion" of Bolivia.

On April 24, a Bolivian newspaper published a report that President Paz-Zamora would involve the Armed Forces in the effort against drug trafficking, due to the inefficiency of the police in such matters, and in compliance with military cooperation agreements.

This presidential decision presents several serious risks for Bolivia, where there are no armed groups, as in other countries. The United States' insistence on military involvement lacks a coher-ent justification. The Bolivian Armed Forces risk becoming corrupted in this struggle. Notwithstanding the government's program of alternative development, military intervention may antagonize the powerful peasant organization, especially if the repres-sion becomes tainted with human rights abuses.

As a response to this prospect on April 20 labor organizations and non-governmental organizations sponsored in Cochabamba the "National Sover-eignty Campaign: No to Militarization, Yes to Development." The purpose of this campaign is to prevent military involvement in anti-drug trafficking efforts.

Threat to sovereignty

The Declaration of Cartagena stated that drug trafficking was essen-tially a matter of law enforcement. However, given its magnitude and dif-ferent facets, and in conformity with the sovereign interests of each state and its legal order, the armed forces of each country, within their own terri-tory and national jurisdiction, may also become involved.

Since Cartagena, U.S. economic pressure has pushed Bolivia and Peru to an unwarranted, and counterpro-ductive, use of the military in combat-ting the drug traffic. As we stated in the Final Statement of the Andean Com-mission of Jurists International Con-ference, this is a threat to national sovereignty:

At a time when a sovereign Latin American nation has been invaded in the name of the struggle against drug trafficking and the security of American citizens, Latin American nations are rightfully alarmed at the prospect that, within the paradigm of a struggle against drug trafficking, a new "big brother" policy is re-emerging, one that disregards basic international norms of co-existence.

While the traffic in illegal drugs presents serious economic and social problems for the Andean region, great care must be taken to not improperly react and bring foreign and domestic military forces into the anti-drug traficking effort. Improper use of the military will weaken national sovereig-nity, corrupt our military and strengthen insurgent movements, thereby creating greater problems for the Andean region and the United States.